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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis offers new insights into the challenges and opportunities brought by 
European Union (EU) integration policies by taking as a case study the process of 
accessing EU funding in Romania and its impact on the performance and 
reproduction of contemporary entrepreneurial identities. It is based on 16 months of 
ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Romania between June 2007 and September 
2008. 
 
The thesis argues that EU funding - as an economic process shaped by EU anti-
corruption practices, policies and assumptions – configures new political and 
economic subjects through intertwined vocabularies of corruption and crime, a mix 
of formal and informal entrepreneurial practices and the commodification of 
finance. This dynamic process concomitantly enables Romania’s top-down 
integration into the EU through the adoption of transnational regulations, 
institutions and anxieties and Romania’s bottom-up integration into the EU through 
the assimilation of the EU funding regulations into the vernacular practices of doing 
business. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: Band-aiding corruption 
 
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis that put the euro under strain and called 
into question the viability of the Union itself, the gaps between transnational-led 
policies and national interests, political priorities and cultural identities have 
become wider due to the declining trends of economic growth and unsustainable 
social promises. This thesis offers new insights into the challenges and 
opportunities brought by EU integration policies by taking as a case study the 
process of accessing European Union funding in Romania and its impact on the 
performance and reproduction of contemporary entrepreneurial identities. 
 
After joining the EU in 2007, Romania could access up to €20 billion by 2013 (The 
Economist 2012), through EU funding structural and cohesion programmes. In 
December 2013, Romania, the poorest country in Europe, had managed to absorb 
roughly 33% of this amount and is now in danger of losing more amidst concerns of 
irregularities and corruption (Dimulescu et al. 2013). Official reports and 
journalists’ reports uncovered dubious arrangements that involved high-level 
officials, stories of fraud or misuse of funds and entire projects fully funded by the 
EU that existed only on paper. Probably the most famous case involved the former 
Minister of European Integration – Mrs. Hildegard Puwak – who distributed EU 
funds to firms controlled by her husband and her son.1 The on-going investigation 
had started in 2003 and she had to answer not only to accusations of fraud, but also 
to accusations of corruption. 
 
However, beyond these scandalous accounts and quantitative assessments, there is 
little research about the people and practices of accessing EU funding. This thesis 
aims to fill this gap by providing an ethnographic account of EU funding in 
Romania. In doing so, it pushes forward the understanding of EU funding as a space 
                                               
1
 http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/Politica/17577/Procurorii-PNA-au-redeschis-dosarul-
fostului-ministru-al-integrarii-Hildegard-Puwak.html last accessed on the 12th of April 2012. 
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of interaction between global, European and local forces, while unpacking the 
assumptions, policies and practices behind the regulations that govern it. 
 
The thesis argues that EU funding - as an economic process shaped by EU anti-
corruption practices, policies and assumptions – configures new political and 
economic subjects through intertwined vocabularies of corruption and crime, a mix 
of formal and informal entrepreneurial practices and commodification of finance. 
This dynamic process concomitantly enables Romania’s top-down integration into 
the EU through the adoption of transnational regulations, institutions and anxieties 
and Romania’s bottom-up integration into the EU through the assimilation of the 
EU funding regulations into the vernacular practices of doing business. 
 
Even since the inception of the EU one of the most important issues faced by the 
European leaders envisaged sustaining the EU’s expanding agenda and 
development policies encompassed in EU funding while protecting its financial 
interests. Historically, at the transnational level, anxieties associated with EU 
funding misuse have materialised in heightened regulations that employ the 
vocabularies of crime and corruption. In 2007 after the second Eastern 
Enlargement, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, these anxieties reached 
paroxysm because in these countries corruption was perceived as a societal 
condition. Such a medicalised view called for vigorous treatment and the European 
Commission imposed a set of ‘conditionalities’ that entailed enhanced surveillance 
in order to curb corruption while designing even stricter regulations for EU funding 
eligibility and control. This thesis assesses for the first time the effects of such 
heightened regulations on the process of accessing EU funding and on corruption, 
showing that their main effect is to increase the costs associated with accessing EU 
funding and thus exclude a wide range of applicants. By discussing the association 
between corruption and EU funding regulations in Romania, this thesis shows that 
EU funding as a development theme was metamorphosed into corruption, a crime 
theme. The thesis investigates the rebranding mechanisms – that created new labels 
for vernacular ways of doing things, changing the meanings associated with 
contemporary entrepreneurial practices or reporting the present in a language 
compatible with global anxieties related to corruption. 
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Even though transnational entities and the state proved their potency by imposing 
regulatory control over the EU funding economy, they failed to make it accessible. 
Hence, a new market force took over this task: consultancy appeared at the 
intersection of bureaucracy and local entrepreneurship in order to mediate between 
the two spaces and decode the highly technical eligibility idioms of EU funding. As 
market-makers, consultants commodify EU funding, treating eligibility criteria as 
production factors. In this sense, the growing transnational articulation of European 
integration is not a form of cultural domination by the EU over the local, but finds 
its embodiment in the appropriation by the local elements of EU funding in order to 
formulate new and innovative economic and social forms. Consultants are unique 
elements in this equation, as they are deeply embedded in the local histories, thus 
familiar with the inclusive morality of informality, but also highly literate in the 
exclusive idioms of EU funding. By discussing this unanticipated process of 
market-making through EU funding, this thesis contributes to economic sociology 
debates about economic coordination mechanisms, money, markets and modes of 
exchange. 
 
EU funding is an essentially interactive phenomenon governed transnationally, but I 
have been concerned to situate it within the drastic economic and social changes 
that have been inflicted on Romania. Despite the new legislation (starting 2000) that 
effectively rebranded as corruption typical economic practices in Romanian society, 
entrepreneurs use them in daily work routines. The entrepreneurial culture 
described in the thesis is an unremarkable characteristic of the local work routines. 
Fundamentally, this economic activity is a chaotic space in which the use of old 
solidarity networks, favour and gift exchange or informal arrangements co-exist 
with complex risk assessments, business plans and feasibility studies. By looking at 
mundane practices of accessing EU funding in Romania, this thesis gives an 
intimate view into an economy and its shifting values contributing to the academic 
debates about post-socialist and transition economies. 
 
Situated within the general territory of economic sociology, this thesis employs a 
mid-level instrument of analysis that explores three modes of coordination of social 
and economic life: markets, hierarchies and networks (Thompson et al. 1991). It 
argues that EU funding is a hybrid space, based on a plurality of coordinating 
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mechanisms that aims to accommodate transnational regulations with vernacular 
practices. Broadly, the network provides the overarching model of analysis due to 
its flexible nature, thus embedding hierarchies and markets in the social. Particular 
attention is paid to transnational and national regulations and their role in framing 
the economic process bearing in mind Weber’s remark that “legal order of legal 
theory has nothing directly to do with the world of real economic conduct, since 
both exist on different levels. One exists in the realm of the ought, while the other 
deals with the world of the is.” (Weber [1922] 1968:312). The thesis explores this 
gap between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ through the concept of entrepreneurship, that is well 
grounded both in economic sociology and the sociology of deviance literatures. 
Building on these links, the thesis contributes to the sociological debates by 
analysing the blurred boundaries between legal, informal and illegal economic 
activities in the area of EU funding. 
 
The thesis is based on ethnographic material collected during 16 months of 
fieldwork conducted in Romania between June 2007 and September 2008. The bulk 
of the data was acquired through participant observation in my own consultancy 
firm set up in January 2008 in partnership with two other friends. Participant 
observation was complemented by the use of other methods: statistical analysis, 
secondary data analysis, institutional analysis, media review and over thirty 
ethnographic interviews. Using mixed methods was the best option for this research 
as it allowed triangulation of data while increasing the reliability and validity of the 
findings. A detailed discussion of the consultancy company and the numerous 
ethical dilemmas entailed by this type of fieldwork can be found in the second 
chapter of the thesis. 
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1. 1. Research questions and aims of the study 
 
This research aims to uncover the ways in which EU anti-corruption policies, 
practices and assumptions frame the process of accessing EU funding in Romania 
by looking at the vernacular entrepreneurial practices, the nature and impact of the 
institutional establishment and the links between (in)formal and (il)legal economic 
arrangements. 
 
In order to do so, the thesis asks one main research question: 
 
How do EU anti-corruption policies, practices and assumptions frame/shape 
the process of accessing EU funding in Romania? 
By addressing this question my research focuses on the process of accessing EU 
funding and the logics of action and representation at each of the three levels of 
analysis: individual, network and institutional, with an emphasis on the first. The 
following three sub-questions focus on each element of the main question: 
 
• How does the institutional setting frame the process of accessing EU 
funding? 
This question starts from the observation that EU funding is a highly regulated 
arena of transnational and national intervention. The anxieties about possible 
embezzlement of EU citizens’ money were incorporated in a strict framework that 
made strong reference to corruption. In this sense, it would be justified to study the 
ways in which anti-corruption policies shape the process of accessing EU funding. 
 
• What actors and networks are involved in the process of accessing EU 
funding? 
The previous question focused on the institutional framework, but the ambition of 
my research is to provide insights into the ‘deep mechanisms’ of accessing EU 
funding by looking at the intermingling networks in Romania that govern or provide 
access to EU funding. Hence, this second interrogation takes the endeavour a step 
further and focuses on two main entities - actors and networks – and the interplay 
between the individual and intermediate level of analysis. For the purposes of this 
research, the network is seen as a flexible entity which influences the logics of 
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action. Networks are acknowledged to provide means of both vertical and 
horizontal integration and facilitate the acquisition of social and financial capital 
due to the multiple links among local business people, judges, high-ranking law 
enforcers and politicians that mix socially and professionally. 
 
• What practices are employed to secure EU funding? 
This last question is the logical extension of the previous queries. The control 
apparatus that protects the EU’s financial interests enforces changes that aim to 
destroy the routines of economic activities that are presumed to be marked by 
corrupt practices. I question this assumption and focus on the interplay between the 
individual and the institutional level and on the internalisation of the market 
mechanisms. A dialectical relation between practices and the discourse about them 
is assumed. The actors are presumed to act reasonably, according to the institutional 
shortcomings and local constraints. 
 
Broadly, the thesis has four main aims: 
 
The first aim is to analyse an organisational transposition from EU to Romania, by 
looking at the ways in which EU policies, practices and assumptions have shaped 
the Romanian organisational establishment. The thesis will pay particular attention 
to the relationship between controlling the use and distribution of EU funding and 
anti-corruption apparatus. 
 
The second aim is to construct an ‘archaeology’ of practices employed to secure 
EU funding – whether they are legal or illegal. Complementary to the discourses 
about them, practices are interpreted as adaptive strategies of response to 
institutional demands. They provide key insights into vernacular entrepreneurial 
work routines that are part of the cultural understanding of business. 
 
The third aim is to analyse the impact of EU funding on the ‘old’ solidarity 
networks in the Romanian context. Having delved into the practices employed to 
secure funding and having analysed the institutional framework of EU, this research 
will further shed light on the efficacy and efficiency of structural funds in Romania. 
This project will reveal whether or not these funds have improved the economic 
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conditions and facilitated upward mobility for new people or have allowed the 
strengthening of the ties between the former nomenclaturiști. 
 
The fourth aim is to explore the rebranding mechanisms that attach new labels to 
entrepreneurial routines within the framework of EU funding in Romania. In this 
sense, my research will trace the contours of ‘corruption’, question its meaning and 
analyse its continuity and changes. It will also aim to compare and contrast the EU 
funding anti-corruption regulations with vernacular entrepreneurial practices. 
 
1. 2. Outline of the thesis 
 
BOTTOM-UP METHODOLOGICAL INSIGHTS INTO THE PROCESS OF 
ACCESSING EU FUNDING 
Chapter 2 discusses the ethical dilemma raised by conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork within the framework of my own consultancy firm set up specifically for 
this research. Despite the very entrepreneurial nature of this research endeavour, 
this thesis was never designed nor conducted as covert research. However, the 
participant observation conducted in my home environment did involve limited 
disclosure, as I had very little control on who was entering the field. By opening my 
personal archives for readers’ consumption, I discuss emotions as data while 
uncovering the moral dilemmas of participating in vernacular economic practices. 
 
THEORETICAL AVENUES FOR EXPLORING THE PROCESS OF 
ACCESSING EU FUNDING 
Chapter 3 situates the thesis within a broad economic sociology framework by 
discussing three ways in which economic and social life are coordinated: markets, 
hierarchies and networks. It emphasises that markets and hierarchies are embedded 
in networks that sustain a vibrant entrepreneurial culture. Insights from the 
sociology of entrepreneurship are combined with those from the sociology of work 
in an attempt to trace the key theoretical elements that might shed light on the 
practices of accessing EU funding. The second part of the chapter analyses the 
impact of law on the economic process, touching upon issues of transnational 
governance and development aid. The last part links economic sociology with 
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sociology of deviance by analysing the blurred boundaries between legal, informal 
and illegal arenas through the concept of entrepreneurship. 
 
EUROPEAN UNION FUNDING AS TOP-DOWN INTEGRATION TOOL: 
TRANSNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL 
Chapter 4 analyses the institutional establishment of EU funding by looking at the 
transposition of EU directives into the Romanian organisational framework. The 
first part of the chapter constructs an archaeology of the present by tracing 
systematically the historical preoccupations with the protection of the financial 
interests of the EU. The link between EU funding and corruption is established, as 
the chapter argues that at the EU level, historically, concern with corruption was 
rooted in the need to protect the financial interests of the EU. The second part of the 
chapter situates EU funding in the drastic economic and social changes that have 
been inflicted on Romania during transition from socialism to capitalism. Within 
this context, EU funding as an ideal type of entrepreneurship shaped by Brussels 
bureaucrats’ assumptions, anxieties and policies entailed the creation of a new 
institutional setting designed to administer economic opportunities differently; this 
was based on transfer of ‘good practices’ from the EU to Romania that involved a 
‘one size fits all’ approach, which put in place impersonal institutions that failed to 
take into account the elements of time, space, biography and context. The chapter 
argues that as opposed to the European historical trend, in Romania, anxieties 
regarding corruption have preceded preoccupations regarding safeguarding the 
financial interests of the EU. 
 
THE PROCESS OF ACCESSING EU FUNDING: EU IDEAL TYPES, 
ROMANIAN INVENTORS AND INNOVATORS 
Chapter 5 shows that the process of accessing EU funding as imagined by the EU or 
Romanian bureaucracy has very little in common with the practice of accessing EU 
funding as employed by Romanian entrepreneurs. Following the logic of the 
process, the actors involved, the dynamics of the local markets and the interaction 
between various economic, social and political forces, I argue that actors who apply 
for EU funding are influenced by multiple frames of meaning (regulatory, political, 
economic), act at the intersection of different markets (market for consultancy, 
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market for tourism, market for construction), move between registers of eligibility, 
compliance and profitability and, in doing so, use a wide range of practices. The 
process of accessing EU funding is a complex economic endeavour, complicated on 
the one hand by eligibility rules’ ambiguity and rigidity and on the other hand by 
fluctuating business conditions and political instability. In order to reduce the risks 
and enhance profitability, actors rely on formal and informal arrangements, old 
solidarity networks, transfer of capital, favour and gifts exchange which are 
adjusted and included in the new repertoire employed for EU funding thus making 
the distinction between legal, illegal, informal spheres superfluous. Contrary to the 
effects anticipated by the EU bureaucrats, this type of funding does not 
fundamentally change the practices of doing business in Romania, but leads instead 
to emerging syncretic cultures of entrepreneurship. 
 
COMMODIFICATION OF EU FUNDING: CONSULTANTS 
Chapter 6 argues that EU funding is commodified by consultants through the 
exploitation of its symbolic, technical and economic space as a terrain on which to 
(re)construct market relations. Entrepreneurs who want to access these funds are 
taken aback by highly elaborate technical idioms employed in the rules that grant 
access to EU funding. Historical low levels of trust in local bureaucracies and the 
need to make profit cause them to turn to consultants who teach them to become 
beneficiaries by decoding and performing eligibility requirements. In this way, 
consultants act as agents of change, being both by-products of this tectonic shift of 
EU integration and its exponents. As by-products of European integration, but also 
entangled in local historicities, consultants decode and transmit information 
regarding EU funding to the applicants. As exponents, consultants act as market-
makers by treating criteria of eligibility as production factors. 
 
This chapter shows that consultants are chameleonic actors who capitalise on their 
previous social capital to construct themselves as professionals. In the absence of 
formal training and faced with the impossibility of getting on-job-training, 
consultants make use of transfer of capital from their previous professional 
positions to claim expertise in this new line of work. Typically, established 
consultancy firms have on their boards retired high-level bureaucrats who act as 
brand names. The vernacular cultural interpretation of this fact can be anything 
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from assuming knowledge, putting in a ‘good word’, opening doors and getting 
insider information. Even though not illegal, rarely investigated and never 
convicted, such interpretations increase the perceived levels of corruption. 
 
GOVERNING EU FUNDING THROUGH CORRUPTION CONTROL: 
BUREAUCRATS 
Chapter 7 argues that transnational anxieties regarding possible abuses of EU 
financial interests have put in place numerous new routines of control conducted by 
‘elite squads’. The institutional design of EU funding control was sustained by the 
specialisation of the justice circuits based on the systematic association between 
corruption and protection of the financial interests of the EU. However, the 
transnational-led control framework clashes with vernacular work routines creating 
its own informality. The unanticipated consequences of the establishment of EU 
funding control are analysed through three paradoxes: the discursive power of EU 
funding, informality and the costs of compliance 
 
THE INFORMAL ECONOMY OF EU FUNDING: ENTREPRENEURS 
Chapter 8 shows that the high levels of regulation that accompany financial 
participation cause EU funds to have perverse effects in Romania, allowing access 
mainly to actors who are already endowed with high levels of financial, political 
and social capital, thus reinforcing economic gaps in the society by making the rich 
richer and excluding the poor from this process. This chapter profiles the winners of 
this funding as serial entrepreneurs, involved in multiple businesses 
simultaneously, for whom EU funding is a side-line activity. It shows that EU 
funding is enacted through vernacular practices of entrepreneurship, decoded 
through work routines which are a direct result of the social and economic context, 
carrying both the characteristics of the communist regime and the traits of the newly 
born capitalism. Whereas the EU regulations will provide only one way of 
conducting transactions (which is usually as impersonal as possible), entrepreneurs 
will try to make them as personal as they can, for example, by entering informal 
arrangements, bribing, getting discounts and using their social capital to get favours. 
Such practices might lie outside the orthodoxy of the market exchange as 
understood by the EU Agencies, but they do not challenge the conventions of the 
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local markets. In itself the context favours the existence of nuanced ethical systems 
due to the blurring boundaries between legal and illegal. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion brings together the most important theoretical lines of argument, 
suggests several areas of policy intervention and gives some directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Bottom-up methodological insights into the process of 
accessing EU funding 
 
 
This chapter details the fieldwork experiences and justifies the methodological 
choices made during my ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Romania between 
July 2007 and September 2008. The bulk of the data was collected through 
participatory means within the framework of my own consultancy firm set up in 
January 2007 for the purposes of this research, complemented by secondary data 
analysis, media review, interviewing and institutional analysis. This ethnography 
was an iterative process mixing inductive with deductive strategies in an attempt to 
go beyond the official data and innovate the theoretical framework surrounding the 
world of EU funding. In discussing the choices made and dilemmas raised by 
fieldwork activities, I show that this endeavour was an interactive and 
transformative framework in which ethics, danger and risk were processes and not 
codes of action. The chapter is organised in four parts: the first part details how I 
entered the field, the second part is dedicated to participant observation, the third 
part reflects on ethics and the last part takes reflexivity one step further to discuss 
issues of measurement, validity and reliability. 
 
 
2.1. Researching EU funding in Romania 
 
A striking feature of the booming literature on EU funding and deviance is how the 
comparatively small number of ethnographic studies is easily overshadowed by 
quantitative assessments, policy papers and secondary sources. For example, a 
recent World Bank review noticed that only 2% of the relevant scientific literature 
on corruption is covered by anthropological studies (in Torsello 2012). This thesis 
contributes to this line of ethnographic fieldwork based studies, following the 
contemporary, but not-yet-established, practice of hyper-comparative trans-local 
ethnographies that analyse a concept while retaining the sensitivity to the context 
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and that deconstruct the moral indignation associated with big concepts like 
organised crime (Hobbs 2013), (il)legal trades (Nordstrom 2007) or corruption 
(Ledeneva 2013). Such studies are based on flexible, distinctively qualitative 
methodologies, while retaining an “ethnographic attitude” (Haraway 1997) not 
confined to a set of methods. To a certain degree, they are similar to studies from 
the sociological tradition of the Chicago School (Cressey 1932, Polsky 1971/1967) 
and its followers (e.g. Cohen 1971, Downes 1966, Hobbs et al. 2003) that are based 
on sustained critical effort to understand the context-specific social interactions and 
interpretative schemas of people’s ‘worlds’ (van Maanen 1995). In the same 
fashion, this research was conducted from an appreciative position hoping to 
present EU funding as a complex, exciting, dull and messy space of interaction. 
 
According to Hammersley and Atkinson, ethnography 
 
[i]n its most characteristic form … involves the ethnographer 
participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an 
extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to 
what is said, asking questions – in fact, collecting whatever data 
is available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of the 
research. (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:1) 
 
Following this non-restrictive approach, this ethnography explores the area of EU 
funding using a mixture of methods featuring participant observation, statistical 
analysis, interviews and media review. Guided by the Chicago School “inquiring 
attitude” that refused to separate empirical from theoretical concerns (Fielding 
2005), this research used an eclectic methodological repertoire in order to respond 
to epistemological concerns aroused by empirical investigations. Consequently, the 
ethnography became an iterative process that required moving back and forth 
between quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. Such an endeavour, 
highly sensitive to the empirical commands of the fieldwork for theoretical 
purposes, could easily be misinterpreted as methodological incoherence because of 
what appears to be ‘the changing nature of fieldwork and data collection’. 
 
However, this strait-laced interpretation would be inappropriate for two reasons. 
Firstly, EU funding is an emerging and elusive object of study whose contours, sites 
and shapes are subject to continuous negotiation and interpretation that take place at 
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local, national and transnational levels (see Chapter 5). These aspects cannot be 
known beforehand and even once known, they change rapidly thus determining the 
researcher to engage with multiple, complexly connected sites of investigation 
(Marcus 1998). Secondly, contemporary Romania, with its socialist past, present 
embeddedness in the global economy and the political integration in the European 
community, is not a clearly defined context of research due to the urgency and 
anxiety that dominate its transition from socialism to capitalism (as shown in 
Chapter 4). It became thus imperative to move beyond a multi-sited investigation as 
advocated by Marcus (1998) and engage with multiple “dimensions and scales” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2003). The intention was to create an ethnography 
attentive to the workings of the state, negotiations with European bureaucracy, 
national and international courts, the politics of networking and lobbying for the 
state’s wealth, ‘real-life’ practices of appropriating EU funding, narratives of 
justification and control, traditional social practices of support and rebranding 
mechanisms using crime and corruption narratives. 
 
Thus, this research became a multi-sited ethnography, not only in a geographical 
sense, but in a deeply sociological one, in which a site is a space of interaction and 
meaning creation, constantly evolving and reshaping itself, but where rules of 
conduct can still be deduced. An essential aspect of the methodology is the position 
of “marginal native” (Freilich 1970) adopted while in the field, which involved both 
closeness to and distance from the object of study that facilitated data collection and 
the emergence of a critical voice. My nativity opened physical and interpretative 
doors, raised issues of commitment and compliance with the norms and rules 
accepted ‘back home’ (see also Barsegian 2000) and provoked intellectual and 
ethical dilemmas that a foreign researcher would have avoided.2 The following 
sections describe how each method of data collection uncovered the rules and 
meanings attributed to EU funding by a particular site, their complementarity, 
cacophonies and dissonances, but first a note on time and place. 
 
                                               
2
 Foreign researchers who conducted fieldwork communist countries were sometimes regarded as 
spies (Hörschelmann 2002) and in some places, such perceptions have not completely vanished, as I 
discovered during my fieldwork.  
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2.1.1. Time and place 
Conducting ethnographic fieldwork in post-socialist societies raises particular 
empirical and methodological challenges dictated primarily by the necessity of 
keeping up with the speedy societal transformation (West 2002). This research 
commenced one year before Romania formally joined the EU– an event that took 
place on the 1st of January 2007. Between 2006 and 2008, the EU funding lines 
were closed because Romania had to adjust the regulations to reflect its new EU 
Member State status. Within this interval, new routines, institutions and structures 
were established under the close supervision of Brussels-based officials. After 2008 
the funding rules have been frequently redesigned, thus hampering any attempts to 
ensure the validity of findings over time; very often a six month span between data 
collection and analysis made research results obsolete, transforming them into 
archival records. 
 
As institutions were created and abolished at a fast pace, competences transferred 
between various ministries, it was difficult to find the key actors and understand 
their roles in the process. Fractured social and professional networks restricted 
access to the field in the absence of reliable gatekeepers. Confusion governing the 
area of EU funding was a reflection of a generalised feeling which made narratives 
incoherent over time, thus obstructing analytical understanding. ‘Established 
cultural assumptions’ in relation to EU funding could not be traced, simply because 
they did not exist. In her research on the Hungarian transformation, Barbara West 
describes a similar situation: “the transition from socialism created an atmosphere 
in which no category, concept, symbol, or reference point could be taken for 
granted” (2002:3). Classical methodological tools were not adapted to capture 
situations where taken for granted concepts and ways of doing things were 
questioned radically. In an attempt to use my frustration creatively I started to map 
out the institutional apparatus related to the EU funding and its changes. Over time, 
this exercise proved useful as it became a dynamic ‘top-down reality’ that could be 
juxtaposed over my ‘bottom-up’ account built up during participant observation. 
 
Fieldwork was conducted in the southern part of the country. Traditionally, this 
region was called Regat (The Kingdom), but in the contemporary EU based jargon 
it became Region 3. Following the EU requests and specifically for the purposes of 
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EU funding, Romania has undergone a process of regionalisation that entailed a 
new administrative division of the territory. The newly set up Region 3 was chosen 
because: it was my home area; Bucharest is part of this region, thus allowing access 
to the central decision apparatus that designed the EU funding rules and assessed 
EU projects; it displayed all the typical challenges associated with the process of 
regionalisation minus the geographical distances – for example, the decision- 
making process was conducted in Bucharest, but the files had to be handed in at 
Targoviste which was the newly established regional centre. These towns were 
separated by 80km of bad and busy roads, constantly under reconstruction. The 
region had high touristic influx due to the proximity with the Southern Carpathians 
(e.g. Valea Prahovei area), was better populated with high influx of work migrants 
and economically booming as compared to other regions. 
 
Even though this research focused on three types of EU funding specifically 
designed for rural areas, the fieldwork moved beyond rural locality in an attempt to 
capture the process of EU funding. My research endeavours followed the 
participants’ struggles to obtain funding and their frequent trips between home, 
county, regional and national capitals. The decision to cross the rural/urban 
imaginary border (Mihailescu 2013) led to some professional regrets of never being 
able to conduct a Malinowksi (1922) type of ethnography (spending an excessive 
time one location), but protected me from the classical mistake of too quickly 
assuming that boundaries of rural communities were clearly defined. Unexpectedly, 
the methodological imperative of conducting a multi-dimensional and multi-sited 
ethnography led to paradoxical epistemological insights: even though EU funding 
rules were designed based on the classical urban-rural divide, the process of 
accessing EU funding worked towards ignoring or eliminating that divide as 
detailed in Chapter 5. 
 
2.1.2. Secondary data and statistical analysis 
The paucity of academic accounts of EU funding and their overwhelming 
quantitative nature (e.g. Morovan 2010; Dimulescu et al. 2013) channelled me 
towards official statistics, using open access and internet based research. This type 
of data gave a general picture of EU funding in Romania, its dynamics, risks and 
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crime levels (mainly presented in Chapter 7). The official websites of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of European Integration, Ministry of 
Justice, National Anti-Corruption Directorate, the Romanian branch of OLAF 
(Office Européen de Lutte Antifraude) and the specially designated EU funded 
institutions (e.g. APDRP- Agenţia de Plăţi pentru Dezvoltare Rurală şi Pescuit ) 
offered scattered information about this topic –e.g. the number of applications, 
approvals, grant size and beneficiaries (APDRP), the level of criminalisation 
(National Anti-Corruption Directorate) and misdemeanours (the Romanian branch 
of OLAF). 
 
Working with these figures gave me a sense of comfort – the quantitative sociology 
tradition was solid ground (from Durkheim (1892) onwards). However, EU funding 
statistics were not, as one might suppose, sure indicators of the impact of EU 
funding, or even meaningful ones. For example, similarly with other research 
(Morovan 2010; Dimulescu et al. 2013) my analysis showed that Romania accessed 
only a small portion of this funding because of structural and institutional 
challenges and because crime levels associated with EU funding tended to increase 
over time (Chapter 7). However, there was no information about the number of jobs 
created through the EU funding, their impact on the regional development or how 
sustainable these projects were. Expanding my search to other EU member states 
(e.g. Poland, Czech Republic), I discovered that such statistics were scarce. These 
methodological issues had theoretical implications. To my surprise, there was little 
evidence to support the generally held idea that EU funding enhanced development. 
 
It is particularly challenging to explain the rising levels of crime associated with EU 
funding because 
statistics – whether crime or opinion polls – have an ideological 
function: they appear to ground free floating and controversial 
impressions in the hard, incontrovertible soil of numbers. Both 
the media and the public have enormous respect for the ‘facts’ – 
hard facts. And there is no fact so ‘hard’ as a number – unless it 
is the percentage difference between two numbers. (Hall et al. 
[1978] 2013: 13). 
 
EU funding crime statistics are not solid indicators of the volume of crime (Hall et 
al. [1978] 2013, Hobbs 2013) because: 1. The data show only the number of 
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reported crimes, and do not capture the ‘dark figure’; 2. Various criminal justice 
institutions have different recording routines; 3. EU funding crimes are investigated 
by the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (NDA), a special branch of the 
criminal justice apparatus which is directly monitored by the EU through the 
Mechanism of Cooperation and Verification. Thus NDA is under national and EU 
pressure to ‘over-perform’, so is highly sensitive to EU funding and corruption, 
which are ‘targeted crimes’; 4. Political pressures and public anxiety about EU 
funding lead to over-reporting; 5. Changes in the law make strict comparisons over 
time difficult; 6. The creation of new criminal labels for EU funding through special 
laws that double or counteract the effects of the Criminal Code thus leading to lack 
of consistent practice among magistrates, which in turn inflates certain crime 
categories; 7. In the official imagination, EU funding crimes and corruption are 
inextricably linked (see Chapter 7). Disentangling the two from official statistics 
was impossible for this researcher, and this determined the use of other 
methodological devices to complement the information. 
 
2.1.3. Online research and media review 
A media review was carried out covering five years, in order to give a more detailed 
picture of the phenomenon. Two Romanian news portals (hotnews.ro and ziare.ro) 
were closely monitored. Hotnews.ro has a section dedicated to EU funding based on 
interviews with high profile politicians, analysis and civil society reports. In 
addition, one website entirely dedicated to EU funding www.fonduri-structurale.ro 
and a discussion forum facilitated insight into the most problematic areas of EU 
funding from different perspectives (e.g., government, media oligarchs, and civil 
society). The media review portrayed ‘exemplary cases’, often involving high status 
politicians and large sums accessed through trade in influence. The discussion 
forum gave a more mundane perspective grounded in the view of different actors 
(e.g., small business people). In using these data, I was aware of the shortcoming – 
i.e. the media might communicate stereotypical or sensationalist images (Rawlinson 
2008) and that the forums would not be an instrument for subtle analysis. 
 
This second entry point proved exceptionally insightful because it alerted me to the 
rising political influence of EU funding and its potential as a political bargaining 
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chip. This point was followed up thoroughly during participant observation 
(Chapters 5, 6, 7). Even though I never intended to carry out a systematic media 
analysis, I used this device at various points and for various reasons. In the 
beginning, I used it to see the most challenging/controversial aspects of EU funding, 
later to explore some stories and triangulate the data (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). 
 
2.1.4. Interviews 
In order to complement the scattered information obtained from statistical analysis 
and media review, 25 ethnographic interviews (Heyl 2007) were conducted with 
applicants, beneficiaries, consultants, experts, police officers, lawyers, architects 
and bureaucrats. This methodological tool proved useful for gaining insight into 
actors’ histories, their motivations for accessing in EU funding, the very process of 
accessing funds and its impact on their business practices. Numerous informal 
conversations supplemented formal interviewing (as recommended by Back 2007 
and Hobbs 2013) acting as evidence of the localised practicalities of accessing EU 
funding. 
 
Accessing respondents was not difficult. The EU Agency database listed detailed 
information about former beneficiaries (e.g. name, address, amount accessed, and 
name of the consultant). After conducting a few interviews, snowballing became the 
most efficient method of recruiting new respondents. The response rate was always 
very high despite some delays and rescheduled appointments, which were typical 
challenges associated with interviewing respondents of higher status (Dodge and 
Geis 2006). By contrast, interaction with consultants was governed by the law of 
quid pro quo, which constructed the relationships on a more egalitarian basis. As 
detailed in Chapter 6, consultants were generally young professionals, very mobile, 
dynamic, who had studied abroad. 
 
Similar professional preoccupations and backgrounds facilitated communication 
despite random meetings in conferences, at school (I was also teaching at the 
University of Bucharest), and through common friends. After I had set up my own 
consultancy firm, the relationships with other consultants strengthened through 
repeated information exchange about new laws and regulations, participation in 
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public bids and providing each other with names of experts. Bureaucrats always 
remained at a healthy distance because penetrating this culture was beyond the 
intent of this research, despite regular encounters with front desk clerks, informal 
conversations with policemen and officials from the EU Agency. There was an 
offer to conduct a two-week internship in the EU Agency, but I declined it on 
ethical grounds because my own consultancy firm was already set up. 
 
An important aspect of conducting ethnographic interviews was my ‘presentation of 
self’ (Goffman 1969). For example, my style of dress was always smart casual, 
modest, unisex, neat and clean. Any fashion extravagance would have exposed me 
to refusal and misinterpretation. Very early in the field, it became apparent that 
different actors required different interviewing techniques. Interviewing 
beneficiaries and bureaucrats was challenging because my interviewees were older, 
higher status and more knowledgeable than me. Following the textbooks, my initial 
presentation of self (Goffman 1969) gravitated around and “an informed innocent 
‘babe in the woods’” (Dodge and Geis 2006:80). However, this strategy was 
unsuccessful with beneficiaries, who did not want to ‘teach’ me anything because of 
lack of time and vocation. Their attitude was polite and condescending, ironic even. 
 
Finding ways to communicate with the research participants has always been a key 
aspect in conducting qualitative research (Pearson 2009). Feminist researchers 
argued that strong reflexivity is needed that “requires the researcher to subject 
herself to the same level of scrutiny as she directs to her respondents” (McCorkell 
and Myers, 2003: 205). In my case, such openness proved successful only with 
women, who seemed to be more competent narrators of their biography. In one 
case, when interviewing a woman entrepreneur who had built a hostel, I asked 
about her background. Her husband showed up in the kitchen door and interrupted 
with: “Make her a soap opera!” In the end, he was very helpful and referred me to 
several of his friends from the same business. With a warning though: “These are 
very busy people. They don’t have time for these things. Maybe their mothers or 
wives, as they are at home all the time!” (M - entrepreneur). The status gap between 
me and the respondent could also hinder communication. Once, the manager of a 
company sent his secretary to replace him for the interview because he was too 
busy. My only polite recourse was to carry out a one hour interview with someone 
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who was selling a success story. In this case, the interview was fraught with power 
issues that could not be resolved without disturbing professional relationships; 
hence I left never to come back, learning that the secretary is not only a gatekeeper 
(Dodge and Geis 2006), but also a front for the manager. 
 
One of the most challenging aspects of interviewing was how to use the data in a 
meaningful way. Some interviews, conducted before I became a consultant, were 
carefully constructed narratives of self in which respondents were presenting 
themselves through local stereotypes of success. Truth in fieldwork might ‘lie in the 
eyes of the beholder’ as Van Maanen (1995) noted, but circumstantial evidence 
collected through alternative methodological devices indicated otherwise. Without 
policing my interviewees, it became apparent that I was occasionally presented with 
completely manufactured selves which impacted on the credibility of my 
respondents. As a researcher, my responsibility was not only to the respondents, but 
also to the readers who took my claims seriously. Hence, romanticising sporadic 
accounts was not a viable option, but neither was disregarding such stories. The 
solution revolved around enhanced reflexivity because, as Kuenhast explains, 
 
Conducting fieldwork in the post-socialist era is an ethnographic 
opportunity for negotiating identities between anthropologist 
and informant. Whether these identities are remnants of the Cold 
War or fragments of the global marketisation of popular culture, 
a reflexive approach is necessary to re-examine our assumptions 
about the other. (Kuenhast 2000:114). 
 
Aware that the post-socialist context is a complex interpretative terrain (Humphrey 
2000), where western concepts such as ‘market’, ‘civil society’, ‘Europeanisation’ 
take on distinctly different meanings from those applied by policy makers, my 
approach was to deconstruct and re-contextualise accounts that seemed at first 
glance exaggerated. My aim was not to impose a moral or theoretical template, but 
“to comprehend and to illuminate the subject’s view and to interpret the world as it 
appears to him” (Matza, 1969: 25). 
 
So far, this chapter has focused on several methods of data collection (statistical 
analysis, media review, interviewing) showing that fieldwork was “like life itself an 
improvised gig” (Denzin 1989 in Hobbs 2013). As an iterative process this 
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ethnography might not present the most coherent account, but then again, coherence 
is not the best test of validity, as there is nothing more coherent than a paranoid 
story (Geertz 1973). The next section describes my endeavours as a consultant and 
completes the story of this fieldwork discussing participant observation. 
 
2.2. The biography of a business project 
 
The previous methods of data collection were valid entry routes which gave a voice 
to activists, politicians and the social control apparatus. EU funding, as a 
superimposed new reality needed, however, to be interpreted and understood in 
concrete local contexts that were probably removed from such political views, 
which created confusion. 
 
More than a world moving forwards, or even a world turned 
upside down, we seem to have before us a world moving 
sideways and backwards, simultaneously and often skewed. The 
ways that people talk about the past and the present, and their 
ambivalence about “modernity” and “tradition”, reflect this 
confusion. (Pine 2002:98) 
 
 The climax of this methodological journey was the realisation that instead of 
looking at EU funding to find out about illegal, informal or illicit acts, it might be 
more useful to gain insight into the mundane, routine activities of the actors 
involved in the process. This empirical turn led me to set up a consultancy firm, 
reasoning that with doing comes learning and it was always easier to criticise a 
process that I had never been through (for similar insights see Whyte 1943/1955, 
Hobbs 1988, 2013). Even though not part of my initial research design, this 
unforeseen avenue was a conscious response to the emerging empirical ‘reality’ on 
the ground. Without dismissing the typical methodological endeavours employed 
for studying EU funding (e.g. quantitative analysis (Dimulescu et al. 2013)), my 
decision to conduct participant observation was a clear option for ethnographic 
investigation (e.g. Ditton (1977), Hobbs (1988, 2013)). 
 
I set up my consultancy company in January 2008. The business aim was to support 
people who wanted to access EU funds for rural development. The research aim 
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was to immerse myself into a project in order to understand it better. Both goals 
were very much present in my mind at all times, even though I could not share my 
time equally between the two roles. Going into consultancy gave me the freedom to 
move vertically, between clients and bureaucrats and horizontally, between 
different kinds of experts and other consultancy firms. Entering the economic arena 
was not easy, as I lacked the most basic entrepreneurial skills, but found some 
comfort in Schutz’s (1974) observation that researchers who study their own society 
can also be cultural outsiders as nobody is ever accustomed to all the social arenas. 
Thus I proceeded to engage in what has been dubiously dubbed as “anthropological 
estrangement” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). 
 
2.2.1. A stranger in the business: gaining access to the field 
In setting up the business, I had two business partners: Ion and Andrei - both of 
them were men, old friends and migrants. Partnership required less input resources 
(money, time) while providing enhanced access to the social and economic 
networks involved in accessing EU funding. Ion was a former migrant who wanted 
to reintegrate as soon as possible into the Romanian environment. He received his 
university degree in computer science and worked in the UK for five years in a 
wide range of jobs, before deciding to come back to Romania for good. Andrei was 
trained as an engineer, worked as a hydrologist in a state company before making a 
life as an immigrant in the United States. 
 
The negotiations were conducted over Christmas and New Year’s and covered 
financial participation, human resources, business plan, distribution of work tasks 
and types of capital that each of us brought in. Ion suggested that each partner 
should make an upfront financial contribution of £300. He put himself forward as 
the potential administrator of the firm; this position gave him the decision power 
over the other associates. We decided to split the work and profit equally, but the 
division of labour (Durkheim 1892) followed specialised lines. Ion was in charge of 
financial negotiations, business calendar, online presence; I dealt with bureaucracy, 
information management, funding applications. Finding clients, getting approvals, 
creating friendly and easy access to any strategic field (e.g. police, bureaucracy) 
were essential everyday activities for both of us. Andrei functioned more in the 
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background, providing financial capital if needed as well as access to highly 
specialised hydroelectric expertise. 
 
Even though our initial agreements were clear, subsequent work arrangements were 
in flux most of the time. Such clash between work routines and business design was 
routed in cooperative action based on a system of mutual obligations that 
determined the fluid nature of fieldwork and its quality of non-prescriptive technical 
exercise (Whyte 1943/1955). In many ways our consultancy company reflected the 
contemporary working system (Sennett 1998) (i.e. flexible, mobile, highly skilled, 
technology based) and so, it was not different from any other small company set in 
Silicon Valley. For example, we conducted business through regular Skype video 
calls in order to include Andrei in the decision-making process. Our practices and 
ways of doing business were very much grounded in the socialist traditions of 
reliance on old solidarity networks and exchange of favours, without solely relying 
on them (Ledeneva 2006). All these gave a rather ‘glocal’ (Hobbs 1998) flavour to 
the enterprise. 
 
By December, various reliable sources informed us that the first open call for EU 
funding application would include public actors. A quick pilot survey conducted by 
the three of us on a cold winter day in the nearby villages revealed that roughly 80% 
of them had two major problems relevant for us: no current water and no access to 
gas (this meant that all cooking and heating used wood, which had to be acquired 
individually by each household from the nearby forests). Other potential sources of 
enrichment for our small consultancy company were: poor quality of roads (some of 
which were not paved), no internet connection, non-functional/existent village 
libraries or camine culturale [cultural houses].3 Everywhere we looked, we saw 
opportunities. As other ethnographers of post-socialism explained (Burawoy and 
Verdery 1999), as local actors, we were reconfiguring our lives in the context of 
broader economic and political developments brought on by ‘transition’ and EU 
funding. 
 
                                               
3
 Specially designated spaces for cultural functions – e.g. dancing, poetry, weddings. During 
communism, Caminul Cultural was attached to the village hall and was a common element in the 
village life. After the Revolution, these spaces were left to decay or transformed in night clubs or 
magazine (shops that sold a wide variety of merchandise). 
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Thriving in harmony with the local order, our work practices were part of the 
negotiation of contemporary realities that “domesticate capitalism” with the use of 
socialism (Creed 1998, Pine and Bridger 1998, West 2002). By January 2008 our 
small consultancy company had become a judicial reality, as it was registered at the 
local court and listed on the Register of Commerce. Officially, the firm was located 
in Ion’s flat, but it would have been impossible to use it as an office because he was 
sharing a small two bedroom flat with his mother.4 We considered renting office 
space, but in the light of the new expenses and lack of clients decided to leave such 
grandeur for later. The firm had consultancy as its only activity, and was the 
smallest economic unit that according to the Romanian legislation only required one 
employee, one administrator and an accountant. We hired Ion’s retired mother as a 
secretary, paying her the minimum wage (in order to avoid a high level of taxation). 
She never cashed any money from us, as she was family and we were not earning 
anything yet. The next step was to find a competent and reliable accountant – a 
friend stepped in to recommend someone she trusted. This mix of legal, illegal, 
formal and informal practices shows that deviance was pivotal to fieldwork, but 
deviant action, while functional, was largely unstructured (as Whyte 1943/1955 
showed in relationship to youth). 
 
Waiting for success, we created a logo, business cards and advertised ourselves 
through word of mouth which ensured that people would find out about our joint 
venture, but no unwanted disturbances would interfere with our activities. 
Effectively, our firm existed only on paper as there were no visible signs of any 
entrepreneurial activity. For anyone outside our close circle of friends and families 
it would have been virtually impossible to find us because we never used TV/radio 
commercials or flyers. Unsurprisingly, for a year, nobody did. 
 
This turn of events threw my close friends and family members into an ocean of 
worries. Their best case scenario was that I would be taken advantage of, their worst 
that I would end up paying debts incurred by the other partners. In a nutshell, they 
thought this was risky, expensive and completely unnecessary. Furthermore none of 
my academic peers have ever heard about setting up a business to do research. I 
                                               
4
 It is very common in Romania to set up a small firm and put as the official location one’s residence 
which is usually a small flat. This does not mean that people actually do business at that address. We 
followed the rule of thumb here without thinking too much, as we were quite mobile ourselves.  
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agreed with all their arguments, but pointed out that academic excellence was in 
fact about “striking out and taking risks to expand the parameters of social 
knowledge” (Whyte 1943/1955). Despite inherent risks, this was a strategic choice 
research-wise. To show that I was not alone in this line of work, I told everyone 
about how sociological researchers had immersed themselves in roles defined by 
the field (Bourgois 2003, Calvey 2008, Ditton, 1977, Hobbs 1988, Whyte 1943). 
Hearing about Rosenhan’s study of psychiatric hospitals (1973) in which research 
assistants passed for clients put a new complexion on the matter and even my 
father, the most reluctant among all, turned supportive. 
 
Such heightened levels of sociological and anthropological literacy did not leave 
dormant the pragmatic spirit of my inner circle. Their support materialised in two 
ways. The first strategy was to update themselves on the biographies of my future 
business partners and their families, using second order ‘reliable’ accounts. This 
social curriculum vitae was not only about knowledge, but also about protection. It 
prevented my mistreatment as it effectively embedded me in a network specifically 
for this purpose, and it offered potential reconciliation channels outside of the 
justice system. The second strategy was to give me a crash course in the basics of 
doing business in the vernacular fashion. For example, I was taught to reduce my 
financial contribution to the minimum and under no circumstances make an upfront 
payment. 
 
Setting up this firm essentially enhanced my participation in the process of 
accessing EU funding, thus allowing me to become a participant-observer (Gold 
1958). Methodologically, I make a distinction between gaining access to the 
research fields and gaining access to the market of EU funding, between my 
research and business identities. For a business, most of the strategies discussed 
below would appear under the ‘gaining access’ heading. For research purposes, I 
group them under ‘maintaining rapport’, as they describe how I learned by doing, 
and this was only possible once I was part of a rapport previously established. The 
next section describes the typical business strategies employed while acting as a 
consultant. 
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2.2.2. Within relational ontologies: Maintaining rapport 
This ‘Me Inc’ section continues the previous account about setting up the business 
to show that even though the economic process started as a rational calculation 
involving division of labour and profit, it ended up as a reasonable adjustment 
according to contextual constraints (Lampland 2002, West 2002). The typical 
vernacular entrepreneurial strategies described here show the fluidity of an 
environment that is under constant change and thus inevitably in permanent crisis. It 
also shows that this economic process is entangled in a messy world, highly in tune 
with the global vibe, but also detached from it, in which European directives and 
work routines are decoded and enacted through ad hoc interactions that lead to 
unpredictable results. 
 
Writing about these practices of doing business and my personal involvement is a 
choice that resonates with the work of Weber (1949), Mills (1959) and Becker 
(1967). They emphasised that social scientists should be clear about their own 
values, ideas and reflect on how these affect their work. “The social scientist is not 
some autonomous being standing outside society. No one is outside society” (Mills 
1959:204) and “…the question is not whether we should take sides, since we 
inevitably will, but rather whose side are we on” (Becker 1967:239). In recounting 
my involvement and appropriation of the vernacular fashion of doing business I not 
only position myself within the social world I studied, but I also move away from 
simplified ideas of taking a side to issues of mixed loyalties and shifting identities 
in fieldwork (Mauthner et al. 2002). Thus I open the discussion for the next section 
regarding ethical frameworks which portrays ethics as a dynamic, empirically 
informed process and professional codes of ethics as practical guidelines for the 
researcher in the field. 
 
• PR 
Word of mouth, as a PR strategy, works on the hidden power of networks that 
socially transmit and create reputation (Hobbs 2013 has a similar insight regarding 
gossip). In my case, it involved telling our friends and families that we were in the 
consultancy business and asking them to sponsor us. Their response was 
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encouraging. For example, a close family friend took it upon himself to introduce us 
to three mayors in the same day. His motivation was always the same: “Let’s help 
the young generation make a living”. The introduction was typically made using the 
language of help (Ledeneva 1998), which rephrased any cooperative social 
interaction as ‘help’, regardless of its deviant nature. Such “hierarchy of personal 
relations based on a system of reciprocal obligations” was also documented by 
Whyte (1955: 272). However, the subsequent relationship was a function of our 
own abilities to perform as capable consultants. 
 
If PR typically means creating a story about the organisation, then our PR strategy 
was to tell a story about ourselves which involved constructing an entrepreneurial 
professional self. Friends and family members decided to sponsor us inferring from 
our social selves, previous work experience, school grades, drinking patterns, love 
affairs or family history. The analytical implication is that this context based on 
social sponsoring as the dominant frame of action for social and economic affairs is 
a complex political arena that does not sit comfortably with the neoliberal paradigm 
envisaged by the EU funding design. Methodologically, the empirical route used 
here leads to a particular type of knowledge construction, one based on complicated 
research relationships and intimate knowledge of the setting and people, in which 
emotions play a crucial role (Ryan-Flood and Gill 2010). 
 
Working with my inner circle involved responsibility for relationships developed 
and maintained with a clear awareness of blurred boundaries between professional 
and personal arenas (Hobbs 1988). Within this space of interaction - where 
credibility came from was unpredictable. I was accepted as part of my first joint 
venture partially because Ion’s mother was a fellow secondary school teacher of my 
mother. Objective criteria for credibility were hard to establish, at least in the 
beginning of my entrepreneurial adventure. For example, as rumours about our new 
firm expanded, we were asked: “Whom do you work with?” In the beginning, 
naïvely, I indicated the name of my business partners. I realised later that this 
question inquired not about the names from the official transcripts, but about the 
unrecorded associated biography which pointed to the kind of embeddedness we 
could rely on. Inquirers wanted to know if they should count on us or count us out 
(as failed attempts to enter an emerging market). This question brought to the 
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forefront inevitable theoretical interrogations about power relations, patronage, 
‘corruption’ and what it meant doing business in this context. The opposition state-
society became meaningless, as the state was dissolved at the local level and 
replaced by networks and socio-cultural practices (Gupta 1995 made the same point 
about India). As I did not want to give any false hope to occasional business or 
research participants, once I understood the meaning of the question I refuted any 
brand association and simply replied: “Nobody”. It would be hard to assess the 
impact of this answer on the business, but it certainly did not immediately end any 
relationships. 
 
• Networking – The power of stories 
Throughout my entrepreneurial time, networking was the most used strategy for 
doing research and business. Only during the first month, I met over sixty people 
(and henceforth stopped counting) through family, friends, friends of friends, 
conferences, school, former university colleagues, local church, and town halls. The 
heterogeneity of gatekeepers was perfectly mirrored by the participants: consultants, 
former and present beneficiaries, unsuccessful applicants, potential clients, hotel 
managers, tourist agents, bureaucrats, mayors, constructors and supervisors of 
construction sites. Once I had an established consultant aura, data and people came 
to me without much effort, but also without any apparent logic or order. Messiness 
and uncertainty were part of fieldwork; in this carousel I had little control over who 
was entering the field (Hobbs 1988) and serious difficulties in distinguishing 
between research participants and non-participants. 
 
Learning to network was an act of immersion in the field which brought to the 
forefront the interplay between distance and closeness in my research role (Ryan-
Flood and Gill 2010). It entailed learning the etiquette of business relationships, 
acquiring historical and situated knowledge about people, strategic selection of 
gatekeepers, cautious boundary maintenance between individuals who did not 
belong to the same circle, protecting sensibilities, alertness to the potential of 
introducing social disturbance and instrumental use of relationships. In one case, 
Nutzi – my mother’s friend – introduced me to Tantza – the sister-in-law of a man 
who had obtained EU funding to build a small Bed and Breakfast (B&B). Nutzi 
explained that I was doing research on the process of accessing EU funding and 
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wanted to interview her brother-in-law. She asked Tantza to “call him and put in a 
good word or, even better, ask her husband to talk to his brother” for me. The 
response was surprising: 
“Tantza: But I can’t do that! My husband would be very angry at me. You know, 
they don’t really get along. It would put my marriage in danger. They barely speak 
to each other. 
Nutzi: [taken aback] Oh God, I did not realise. So, how should we do it? Roxana 
needs to speak to him? What is the best way to approach him? 
Tantza: Just go to his office and tell him what you need. He reacts badly to 
interventii [interventions]. Too many people have asked him for favours when he 
was the director of X [one of the former state- owned utilities companies]. If you go 
through someone, you are bound to fail. If you go by yourself, you have a chance to 
talk to him.” 
After we left, Nutzi commented: 
“I had not expected that! She did not even invite us in! After all the help that I have 
provided her with! How could she do this? But, did you see how scared she was 
when we started talking about her brother-in-law? She was afraid of her husband! 
She did not have an easy life with him. People say he still beats her up. And she is 
unhappy, as her in-laws are so rich, living in a newly built beautiful house and she 
is still living in her old flat like in the communist times...” 
(Field notes August 2008) 
 
This story uncovers three important points about the rules, cacophonies and 
implications of networking in this context. Firstly, networking is a typical strategy 
of doing business, but in this context it acquires vague nuances that point to 
communist times. In the heat of the moment, I did not question the language used 
by Nutzi and Tantza (e.g. abordare [approach], interventie [intervention], stii pe 
cineva la…[ the overly vague but incredibly precise ‘knowing someone who knows 
someone in a specific place’], am intrat prin cineva [going through someone]), but 
when instructed to ‘approach’ the man directly I realised the gap between the 
language and the indicated mode of action. Essentially, an embedded relational 
language of action framed a disembedded interaction routine. I followed the advice; 
contacted Mr Georgescu (Tantza’s brother on law) and we had an insightful 
discussion because he greatly appreciated my ‘direct’ approach. The irony of this 
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interaction was encapsulated in an ethical dilemma: how could have I told Mr 
Georgescu that it was one of his close relatives that taught me to approach him 
impersonally? Paradoxically, I had been taught how to do things, but as the 
depositary of social knowledge, I was then in the position to become a disruptive 
force. My sense of ethics instructed to limit my disclosure in front of Mr Georgescu 
and protect his sister-in-law. 
 
Secondly, during my fieldwork, networking had to be conducted according to the 
etiquette, as any breaches led to emotional clashes. For me, Tantza’s rejection was 
liberating, as it allowed the researcher to surface. For Nutzi, it was different. She 
was not upset at Tantza’s denial to do her a favour, but was revolted at the way in 
which the favour had been denied. Not being invited in and treated with a coffee 
was a serious breach of etiquette. Nutzi chose to disregard this faux-pas because of 
a shared history of domestic abuse and the necessity to maintain higher values like 
family peace. 
 
Thirdly, networking in this context meant that gatekeepers were not only generously 
sharing their social capital with me, but were claiming and appropriating me as 
much as I was using their names. Living on borrowed loyalties came with a 
responsibility code that required treading carefully as my research and economic 
endeavours were not only embedded in the social, but in the personal. For example, 
becoming friends with an enemy of my sponsor was considered highly unethical, 
experienced emotionally as betrayal and reproached in the pathetic tones of 
‘treason’. The wonderful side about being ‘within’ was that my embeddedness 
offered access to virtually anyone. The danger was becoming locked in a position. 
 
• Promising and delivering 
“Ethnographic appreciation and exposition of local interests in their historical 
contexts” (Creed 1998: 278) proved that networking was a good strategy to enter 
the field and create a pool of contacts ready to be activated when and if a project 
would materialise. However, what we needed was not only contacts, but clients. As 
the funding lines were not yet open in February 2008, we entered pre-working 
arrangements. I use the concept of ‘pre-work arrangements’ to denote a non-
formalised understanding between future business partners. A handshake did not 
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have the value of a written contract, but it was on the one hand better than nothing 
and on the other hand a necessary part of the social seduction game in which we had 
become involved. The latter was due to the non-existing regulatory situation and to 
the specific nature of our clients. Mayors of rural areas were slow, reluctant clients, 
and shrewd business people. They showed their openness to cooperate with several 
consultants, thus increasing competition. 
 
Entering agreements was exciting, delivering was impossible because the funding 
lines were closed. While I was part of the firm, there was no project concluded, no 
contract signed and no money cashed from consultancy as far as I know. This 
period was emotionally draining, as I felt that I was not getting anywhere and did 
not know what to do. In the face of the unknown, I turned to other consultants. 
Surprisingly, all the consultants interviewed at that time were not particularly 
inconvenienced by the lack of access to EU funding, because they were all doing 
this activity on the side (Chapter 6 provides more details on consultants and Chapter 
8 shows that applicants and beneficiaries also regard EU funding as a collateral 
activity). The ethnographic material collected for this research shows that back in 
2008, consultancy for EU funding, as the main occupation, was non-existent – 
everybody lived on promises of future rewards, which shows that such ‘pre-work 
arrangements’ were typical strategies in that context, comparable with 
developmental practices in postcolonial Africa (De Sardan 1999, Blundo et al. 
2006) based on on-going relationships of dependence. 
 
• Splitting future profit 
An important element of entering pre-working arrangements was splitting future 
profit at the time of the handshake.5 This was a challenging task because: the new 
regulations of EU funding were still a matter of negotiation between Bucharest and 
Brussels; nobody knew the costs of doing an EU project in the near future; such 
costs could not even be approximated, because they might have involved different 
kinds of approvals; it was not only the official costs that needed to be calculated, 
but also the unofficial. Hence, the market could not function properly and as 
consultants we could not set a price, but merely, with great reluctance, suggest a 
                                               
5
 This has nothing to do with economics; it is the pure art of bullshitting (as conceptualised by 
Frankfurt (1986)).   
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percentage. Discussing such matters was a way to build emotional ties, share 
common identity and exchange information. Ethnographic accounts of corruption 
show that discursive practices about this phenomenon have the same role (Zerilli 
2005, Anders and Nujiten 2009). 
 
The following scene from my field diary describes how pre-working arrangements 
were set, paying attention to the force of conviviality involved in splitting future 
profits. 
“Last night I met a priest. Young, with a decent belly,6 two toddlers, house under 
construction. I was introduced by a close friend who had known him for twenty 
years. He wanted EU funds to continue the renovation his church which had started 
three months before. Visiting the construction site, I saw two teams of workers 
digging for a new fence and repairing the roof. Once back to his residence, my 
sponsor ironically noticed that the priest’s house was also under reconstruction and 
that there was a certain flow of materials and workforce between the church and his 
house. I resumed praising his initiative while sampling his latest wine production. 
 
After some small chat, my friend suggested leaving the ‘small stuff’ and ‘talk 
business’. He wanted us to have a clear conversation about how the future profit 
would be split. I was taken aback as I did not even know if this project would 
materialise. On the spur of the moment, I suggested equal shares – 50%. The priest 
was happy with this principle of sharing which corresponded to his standards, but 
wanted clarification as to what that would mean in ‘real money’. I made it clear 
that it was hard to guess, as it would be misleading to expect too much and 
dangerous to hope (as I wanted to finish my PhD in London). Once we agreed on 
the basics, the sum of roughly 1000 Euros was mentioned. The priest was happy, I 
was happy, my sponsor was furious. If I was getting half and the priest was getting 
half, how much was his share? Once my sponsor articulated the question, I could 
clearly see his reasoning. The conflict was resolved later over drinks mixed with 
emphatic declarations of mutual respect and affection in the name of a shared 
upbringing.                                                                        (Field notes April 2008) 
                                               
6
 In rural areas from Romania, a big belly is a sign of status, of a good life, as someone has food and 
is not stressed.   
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The episode was revealing as it showed the entanglements of economic, social and 
personal spheres (Zelizer 2004). I thought within my job description to provide 
good services, at competitive prices. However, I had never anticipated that the 
tricks of the trade resided in making the perfect personal business arrangements 
which involved dealing with the unofficial, un-recordable, never spoken out loud 
“what’s in it for me?” In time, I became better at creating win-win situations and 
realised that ‘was furniture’, when my reactions started to be natural. As Schutz 
(1974:101) pointed out, one goes native when “shows all the marks of habituality, 
automatism and half consciousness” typical for the established members of the 
group. 
 
• Bureaucratic arrangements and conflicts of interest 
Developing pre-working relationships led to prolonged social interaction that 
encouraged us to expand our reach. Even though the funding lines were not yet 
open, we had become close to some mayors who were doing their best to ‘help’. 
Some decided to stick to their promise of not hiring another consultancy firm for 
their projects. Others were more eager - they gave us readymade feasibility studies 
asking us to start writing the project. As the Romanian administration was moving 
slowly and there were little chances of making mayors our clients, we were offered 
possible employment. A mayor offered to hire one of us in his town hall, as an EU 
project manager (see Chapter 8). By the summer of 2008, the government had ruled 
that each town hall should have an employee dealing with EU funding. One of us 
took the job (even though the mayor’s argument that “We all have to retire some 
day and it’s good to have a safe pension!” seemed a bit remote). This position 
opened up new doors, as it facilitated the interaction with officials from the county 
administration. By participating in the meetings every fortnight, our EU project 
manager would get first-hand information that would enhance our private quest for 
EU projects and increase our circle of potential clients. 
 
The above example is a clear instance of when I decided to follow the local 
standards of morality and practices of doing business. Classical corruption literature 
(Mungiu-Pippidi 2013) would label the above example as ‘conflict of interest’. If 
 44
legally, such concepts had a meaning,7 socially they were empty, because deviance 
and ‘corruption’ were part of regular working routines (Ditton 1977, Hobbs 1988, 
2003, Ledeneva 2013, Whyte 1943/1955). As detailed in Chapter 4, it was common 
in Romania to complement the income from a public sector position with private 
economic activity. By getting the job, our team member was not socially excluded; 
he was either ignored (which meant this was a common way of doing things) or 
congratulated by other common friends who have not thought about such a shrewd 
way of doing business. 
 
While my business partner was busy “domesticating capitalism” (Creed 1998), I 
was caught within the uncomfortable duality of being a researcher and an 
entrepreneur and refused to get the position for myself. My readings (Rose-
Ackerman 1999) and previous methods of data collection had taught me that 
bureaucracy and business were separated by clear boundaries; any mix of the two 
was considered ‘corruption’. Conversely, participant observation was showing that 
low-level bureaucrats functioned on an inclusive logic. They simultaneously acted 
to produce the boundary between spaces, cross it and regulate it. Unlike the Indian 
(Gupta 1995) or Mexican (Lomnitz 1995) cases, the excessive 
“compartmentalisation of power” (Torsello 2012) at the local level, driven by EU 
accession reforms which have implemented wide decentralisation reforms created 
the paradoxical situation in which ‘corruption’ was more used by those who 
denounced it or were in charge of anti-corruption reforms – e.g., mayors. I could see 
that, to some degree, ‘corruption’ was an outcome of the EU funding process fusing 
together different traditions of civil service through the practical use of discursive 
Europeanisation practices. I was caught between the two paradigms, unprepared to 
admit the discrepancy between the previous data and reluctant to explore further as 
a participant. Ethnographic honesty prevailed, so I took part and become partial 
(Haraway 1991) by displaying solidarity with the local practices, resisting labelling 
and imposing correcting narratives. 
 
This section has shown that in this particular context, entrepreneurial practices 
included a wide range of behaviours: networking, lying, cheating, showing off and 
                                               
7
 Conflict of interest is criminalized by Romanian legislation through the Criminal Code. 
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honest work. The choices entrepreneurs made encompassed unclear social values 
(to me! and at the moment!) and savvy economic ethics. If this was risky, then it 
was part and parcel of their everyday routines (Hobbs 2013), a defining feature of 
their work (Ditton 1977, Mars 1994). This was people doing business, and I was 
happy to move away from the anti-corruption jargon to learn from the participants, 
without imposing preconceived theoretical frameworks (Matza 1969) as long as my 
sense of self allowed. 
 
2.2.3. Return to academia: Negotiating exit 
The short story of my exit from the field is that I gradually started to be less 
involved in the activities of the firm. No on-going project made my transition 
easier. The negotiations for my exit were as time consuming and as expensive as 
my entry. I started to prepare myself around June 2008, discussed the bureaucratic 
arrangements with Ion and Andrei in August, left Ion with my shares, covered my 
bills and left for London at the end of September 2008. In a move that has since 
become one of the leitmotifs of this research I paid the price but did not sign the 
papers. It took several more months to formalise my exit and during the Easter 
holiday in 2009 I gladly exited my first attempt to become an entrepreneur. After 
my departure, the other business partners also changed their entrepreneurial 
objectives. 
 
A more complicated chronology of the exit included staying away from the field 
during the post fieldwork stage. Without realising, by the time I decided to sell my 
share of the company, I had become deeply immersed in the process of accessing 
EU funding. The nature of work, the general social and political context and 
familiarity with the location and the research participants had effectively 
transformed me into a consultant, overshadowing my research identity. After my 
exit from the consultancy, I was still considered part of the business, receiving calls 
and emails regarding various projects or informal invitations to participate in bids. 
Everybody knew that I moved to London to write my thesis, but the aura of 
expertise remained to a degree. In order to avoid feelings of loss and 
disappointment in relationship to my business partners and clients I continued to do 
pro bono work for some time. Continuing to maintain rapport in order to minimise 
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any research related distress proved to be effective for a short while, after which it 
became counter-productive. 
 
This complex and dynamic exit was sustained by my regular visits to Romania 
during holidays which brought me into proximity with the business environment 
thus tempting me to conduct more fieldwork during each trip. As the data was 
mounting up, I took drastic measures and decided to refrain from visiting home for 
a year (2009-2010). This decision was also provoked by a dilemma typically 
encountered in qualitative research – whether to maintain research relationships 
while analysing the data (Ryan-Flood and Gill 2010). The previous over-
involvement from my fieldwork was followed by over-dissociation with the 
research site in order to allow the researcher to surface and the entrepreneur to fade 
off socially. As much as possible, I consciously tried to minimise contact with 
previous research participants in the register of the business. It would have been 
impossible to cut these relationships as they were part of my history and the social 
context to which I was still connected to, but did my best not to minimise their 
voices in writing. 
 
2.3. Ethics as a process 
 
I discuss ethics as a part of the interaction established during fieldwork that 
involves at least three elements: the process of data collection, particularly 
participant observation; the British academic ethical guidelines; and my sense of 
self. Thus, this account strips ethics of its honorific status and decodes it as part of 
the ethnographic condition (Calvey 2008, Hobbs 2013, Winlow et al. 2001). In 
drawing attention to the multiple contexts which influenced this research and in 
which this research took place, I inevitably position myself at centre stage. This 
study began with a deontological approach to ethics that conditions the researcher to 
follow the academic ethical guidelines under all circumstances. While in the field, I 
learned that everything was negotiable, as far as my sense of self would allow it. I 
argue that these two positions cannot be unravelled in a simplistic way rendering 
one position ‘ethical’ to the detriment of the other (Calvey 2008). Thus, this 
research is informed by a wider concept of ethics, associated with ‘acting 
responsibly’ (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000) as a researcher who is committed 
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firstly to research participants “but also to those who read, re-interpret and take 
seriously the claims” made (Doucet and Mauthner 2002:125). 
 
The distance between my research design and fieldwork experiences shaped an 
unusual relationship with ethics which developed outside formal academic 
channels. After 2008, the LSE refined its ethical procedures for students in the field. 
At the time of my fieldwork, there was no formal request to fill in ethical forms or 
information sheets regarding the methodological changes operated while in the 
field, as there was no indication from any of the subsequent review panels that this 
would be necessary.8 After setting up the consultancy company I perused more 
carefully (but not obsessively) the ethical landscape, trying to position my 
experiences within the British academic expectation system. It became apparent that 
the BSA (British Sociological Association) guidelines reflected “awkward tensions” 
(Edwards and Mauthner 2002:21). For example, they pointed “to a set of 
obligations to which members should normally adhere as principles for guiding 
their conduct” while recognising that “often it will be necessary to make…choices 
on the basis of principles and values, and the often conflicting interests of those 
involved”. Confused, I decided to self-regulate my standards of ethical behaviour 
taking the BSA guidelines as behavioural ground rules. 
 
Participant observation conducted through the consultancy firm and familiarity with 
the context provided much broader access to situated knowledge than that typically 
encountered in research (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000). My insider knowledge 
encompassed a wide range of information: where/ how people lived, personal and 
family histories, meeting their families, participating in weddings, funerals, birthday 
parties, countless discussions about almost anything, endless coffee drinking 
sessions, money making/spending, going to concerts, playing music etc. Being in 
the ‘field’ thus meant recalibrating ethical judgements to accommodate the sensitive 
areas of social life (Hobbs 2013). The embedded ethics of action sometimes pushed 
me towards ethical involvement and other times towards ethical indifference. For 
example, I was never tempted reporting to the police that a bid was fixed or a fellow 
entrepreneur committed irregularities in claiming VAT. Other researchers reported 
                                               
8
 Despite the fact that this fieldwork was considered out of the ordinary by successive PhD review 
panels, I was never recommended to sit through an Ethics Review Panel. 
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similar routes of action (Ditton, 1977, Hobbs 1988, Whyte 1943, Bourgois 2003). 
However, when I tried to incorporate vernacular practices into my personal 
repertoire, I became uncomfortable, my emotional reactions signalling ethical 
dilemmas long before I could rationally reflect on them (Doucet and Mauthner 
2002). This shows that certain people, practices and things belong to certain 
landscapes and not to others, and are in turn associated with particular ethical 
orders. 
 
In my case, the ethical process did not begin or finish with fieldwork. As this 
research also used information obtained before the project began, a particular 
challenge was how to use accounts obtained without adequate disclosure (Gold 
1958). For example, I had detailed knowledge about recent and distant histories of 
contemporary local and national elites (who had been friends of my parents or 
parents of my friends) that comprised ad hoc love affairs, social drinking sessions, 
gambling, bribing, stealing and cheating. Sensitivity to the position of people who 
could be affected dictated to use them only when and if they had become part of the 
local folklore and could be sustained by public, external, freely observable signs of 
economic mobility. This led me to post-hoc ethical decisions that sometimes 
entailed heavy editing to anonymise the participants or even complete exclusion of 
data. 
 
2.3.1. How appropriate was the use of the consultancy company? 
The consultancy company was suitable for providing unprecedented access to the 
field, deep insights into the process of accessing EU funding while facilitating 
methodological training for the novice researcher. It was instrumental in 
constructing rapport in a reciprocal, non-hierarchical and non-instrumental manner. 
This firm was never a laboratory to reproduce other people’s experiences; on the 
contrary, it was an honest search for meaning in a market environment. The 
minimal social distance facilitated deeper understanding of the intimate relations 
between emotions, economic and social lives, thus enriching this ethnographic 
account. Being part of the consultancy business, even for a short while, gave me a 
mandate to talk more confidently about this social arena. By assuming a ‘useful 
role’ (Adler and Adler 1983), I became more of an insider in the process of 
accessing EU funding, while retaining my quality as an outsider throughout my 
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learning process, which was very much a rite of passage. This last aspect had 
important educational outcomes for my training as an ethnographer. 
 
Setting up the firm was a turning point for my research prompted by the emerging 
nature of the fieldwork and my dissatisfaction with the previous data. After 
reaching the saturation point (Bauer and Gaskell 2000) through interviews, I felt 
there was still insufficient information to answer my research questions. My desire 
was to move beyond interviewees’ projections and learn what they did not want to 
talk about. Topics like informal means, connections, money given as bribes or 
incentives, even personal background were taboo for various reasons. First, I was 
too shy to ask, because I might have offended my interlocutor; second, the 
interviews had been transformed into a sensationalistic reportage, which had more 
to do with blaming the ‘other’ and entering strong and aggressive narratives of 
justification. Third, it was dangerous to open up too much in front of a stranger who 
could turn to the police. Fourth, interviewees thought these aspects were obvious 
and failed to understand why would I want to know “what was not important”. This 
last point made me question my eagerness to find out about ‘the real way to do 
business’; it made me interrogate my reasons and wonder if I was not trying to find 
out what I had pictured to be there, ultimately if I was not just looking for data to 
support my theories. As one interviewee put it: 
“Oh, so this is what you really want to talk about [informal means, bribes etc]! Yes, 
there is that too – of course! But there is so much more than that! If you really want 
to know what it is like…why don’t you do a project yourself? You will find all these 
things that you want to know about and so much more!” 
(R - Bureaucrat). 
 
Changing my field role had implications for my field notes and my persona. 
Becoming a consultant was an act of immersion into the natural habitat of the EU 
funding. As a cultural alien to this environment (Schutz 1974), I was keen to 
understand and record its shapes and patterns as accurately as possible in order to 
provide a “thick description” (Geertz 1973). My initial field notes, taken as soon as 
possible after the observed action (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995), were long lists 
of taboos made audible through unanswered questions or embarrassing silences. At 
later stages, the field notes captured my change of persona, from the naïve ‘babe in 
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the woods’, unacceptable for the consultant presentation of self (Goffman 1959) to 
a red-haired, highly skilled, well-connected, polyglot Snow White. 
 
This change of persona coincided with my decision to de-emphasise my research 
identity because: 
1. I had ethical concerns regarding the use of LSE brand to advance my business 
endeavours. Even though this business was part of my research strategy, which 
was part of my doctoral studies, I did not claim to be an LSE expert, nor used at 
any time the School funding in order to make profit. 
2. Research participants found confusing the use of this additional ‘hat’. During 
the formal introduction, in front of my sponsor, I would always mention my 
academic interests in the matter of EU funding and my intention to write a book 
about that, along with my business intentions. From these two, the research 
participants seemed to discard the first with a polite: “How nice!” and retain the 
second. My identity space was already saturated by being ‘consultant’, ‘related 
to’, ‘former employee of’, ‘friend of’ and so on. Among all the mirrors and 
masks the ‘researcher’ was the least important for the business transaction. One 
example is relevant in this sense. After being introduced to a welcoming mayor, 
I realised I had no business cards on me with my company logo and gave out an 
LSE card instead. My sponsor immediately noticed: “Why don’t you use your 
own cards? How is he going to find you?” It did not take me long to 
understand that even though I had my personal details on the LSE card (email 
and phone number), when the mayor would check his agenda for possible 
consultants, my status as a PhD student would not encourage him to call me. 
3. Some research participants were intimidated or considered that I was showing 
off when putting forward my research identity. 
 
De-emphasising my research identity came with additional ethical and 
methodological dilemmas. There was no doubt in my mind that everybody knew I 
was a researcher who was doing business to collect data. However, if it was difficult 
for me to keep up with the insider/outsider dynamic, for the other participants it 
must have been even more challenging. Frequent reminders of my research status 
put me in danger of being misinterpreted thus leading to ethnographic suicide 
(Westmarland 2002). Once I assumed the role of consultant, other research 
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participants started to treat me as an insider, assuming practical literacy. In a short 
time, I found myself adopting a whole new language (Mauthner et al. 2002)– I was 
nodding in complicity, exchanging knowing smiles, replacing the non-committal 
‘umm’ from my interviews with approvals expressed as anything from shrugs to 
technical economic language. One consultant explained how to fill in the technical 
part of the funding application: “You need to be on zero at the end, but the software 
is not great. So, basically, do the usual trick…You know…”. I did not know and 
while revealing my lack of knowledge I learned an important methodological lesson 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967 had similar insights): claiming knowledge meant missing 
data. In conducting ethnography my purpose was not only to see how I understood 
and experienced the process of accessing EU funding, but to find out how other 
people decoded the same phenomenon, what meaning and interpretation did they 
attribute to the same social fact (Matza 1969). 
 
2.3.2. Explaining the research to the participants 
While in the field, three aspects had a great impact on explaining my research to the 
participants. The following paragraphs discuss the methodological complexities 
behind ‘participants’ (Gold 1958), ‘participation’ (Junker 1960) and ‘local 
understandings of research’ (Wolf 1992, Motzafi-Haller 1997). 
 
The new LSE (2012) Ethics Review Questionnaire for Researchers that is now 
incorporated into the standard application toolkit for all research staff at the LSE 
(this was not the case in 2006) poses the following questions: “Who do you identify 
as the participants in the project? Are other people who are not participants likely to 
be directly impacted by the project?” This question presents no easy answers in my 
case. Before conducting participant observation within the firm setting, I had a 
strong influence on the selection of research participants. Once I set up my own 
business, the process of data collection took a life of its own as I had little control 
over what was happening and who was entering the field. A comprehensive view of 
the ‘research participants’ would dictate attributing this label to all the people that I 
have interacted with while consulting. However, I contend that this would be 
inappropriate; such view would expand the methodological parameters of 
sociological research beyond the researcher’s control thus making ethnographic 
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methodologies less than adequate for ethical purposes. Thus, I consider 
‘participants’ to this research all the people with whom I repeatedly interacted and 
had explicitly acknowledged my research status during their participation in the 
research and/or business. Even though other people were part of the field, the notion 
of ‘participant’ should be used to denote a shared understanding of the research, 
meaning and consequences of participation. 
 
Throughout this research, the participants typically decoded their participation in 
this research as ‘helping’ me, as detailed in the section regarding informed consent. 
The familiar environment and the business facilitated a specific type of research 
relationship characterised by sharing personal, entrepreneurial and intimate 
experiences over a long time. The BSA ethical guidelines acknowledge the 
complexity of relationships established while conducting research in paragraph 10: 
“Sociologists, when they carry out research, enter into personal and moral 
relationships with those they study, be they individuals, households, social groups 
or corporate entities”. Doing the business involved acts of self-disclosure completed 
in an atmosphere of trust and closeness in which confidentiality was a must, since 
disclosure had more than reputational costs. Establishing and maintaining ‘good 
research relationships’ for me meant honest and reciprocal rapport between me and 
the other participants. I was probably not on ‘moral high ground’ (Birch and Miller 
2002:92), as the ideal type promoted by the textbooks, but I tried and firmly believe 
that I maintained a reasonable balance between academic recommendations and 
field imperatives. 
 
An essential element of conducting fieldwork in this context was the local 
understanding of social research as a practice and/or profession because individual’s 
expectations along with more complex evaluations of the researcher, her interests 
and intentions would inform the decision to participate (Edwards and Alldred 
1999). For example, old respondents from rural areas thought I was attached to the 
police: “Cercetezi? [You do research?] What are you cercetezi? [researching] 
Whom? What have they done? Why are you asking us?” The Romanian verb ‘a 
cerceta’ is the literal translation of the English ‘to research’. It is also the equivalent 
of the English ‘to investigate’, used in relationship to criminal justice apparatus. 
Language in this case covers the meaning and the implications of the concept, 
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which was only uncovered emotionally though fear. Initially respondents were 
afraid that I might be attached to the police and they would be under investigation 
for some crime. The consent forms and the recording equipment only reinforced 
their initial assessment. The research position reflected power issues, as in the local 
imagination I was attached to the State. In an attempt to escape, people presented 
themselves as unworthy of such high honour encompassed in participating in 
research and directed me towards another one who ‘knew better’. Once reassured 
that I was not in any way related to the control apparatus, the immediate question 
was: “What do you want to find out?” This question gave me chills because I did 
not know what I wanted to find out and I was afraid to say it. Articulating lack of 
knowledge inappropriately would have meant killing an interview/an encounter 
before it started. In time, I found that framing the answer along policy lines (Wolf 
1992) worked well, because research tended to be perceived as pointless if it did not 
impact on the local standards of living: “I want to know how EU funding works in 
order to suggest ways of making it better”. 
 
2.3.3. Covert vs. Overt research 
The fluid nature of my ethnographic fieldwork challenges the contemporary clear-
cut dichotomies of covert – overt research (as presented by the BSA9 ethical 
guidelines). If covert research means research not disclosed to the participants and 
overt research full disclosure, then this research does not stand in either of the two 
categories. The term that best describes my approach is “limited disclosure” 
favoured by the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (Spicker 
2011). Without ever concealing my research aims and interests, I have not always 
taken active steps to make myself visible as a researcher. As an active member 
(Adler and Adler 1983) with a functional role in the EU funding community, I was 
sometimes less visible as a researcher. A ‘participant as observer’ position (Gold 
1958) allowed for observation without impacting on the behaviour of the other 
participants. For ethnographers who work in flexible and inductive modes it is not 
always possible (or desirable) to be completely open about the research (Hobbs 
2013). Even when I thought I was transparent about my research purposes, there 
were incidental social interactions and third parties unwittingly involved in this 
                                               
9
 Unfortunately, I was not able to find the definition of ‘covert research’ in the BSA ethical 
guidelines. 
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research. Disclosure to a party is not disclosure to everyone or not to the same 
degree, so it would be misleading to argue that this was overt research. However, in 
my case, it would have not been possible to conduct covert research – I acted as a 
consultant at home, with my friends and family. Anyone outside of my inner circle 
would have been unable to contact our firm; I have met all my business 
partners/clients through close ties that have sponsored both my business and my 
research. 
 
2.3.4. Informed consent 
Limiting disclosure raises issues regarding informed consent which is considered 
the benchmark of ethical practice (Spicker 2011). The sensitivity of this topic and 
the nature of my fieldwork made obtaining signed consent forms impossible. These 
would have been impractical in the daily business routines, acting as punctuated 
research pauses from the entrepreneurial affairs. Furthermore, within the culture of 
informal arrangements sealed with a handshake, the formality of this ‘research 
contract’ was perceived as an anomalous intrusion. At the beginning of my 
fieldwork, I asked my business partners to sign consent forms. They thought I was 
out of place, inquired intrigued about the reasons for ‘signing papers’, and 
expressed their misunderstanding: “We just decided to do business together. Isn’t 
this consent enough? Yeah, yeah…you do research… what is the big deal? Why 
don’t we sign the firm’s papers first and then see about this thing…” 
(Fieldwork notes January 2008). They never did. 
 
My friends and family who acted as gatekeepers were most reluctant to sign the 
consent forms, even though they were the most informed about my research 
activities, dismissing my requests with “You’re insane. I’m not signing anything!” 
Their reluctance was due to our joint biography, their interpretation of social 
sponsoring as ‘help’ and a unwillingness to come to the forefront. Probably if I 
would have insisted, they would have ‘helped’ me with the consent forms too, but it 
felt more ethical to be true to the data while respecting the boundaries imposed by 
the research participants. When my access to third parties was mediated by 
gatekeepers endowed with high levels of social, symbolic and financial capital, I 
was granted wholesale access (Miller and Bell 2002:62), thus making the issue of 
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consent fraught with power issues. I was offered immediate support when a high 
profile lawyer introduced me to a few mayors in a day, just one month before 
elections. It was difficult to establish if the mayors were keen participants in this 
research or just wanted the support of my gatekeeper for the upcoming elections. 
My consent forms were waved off immediately with a line: “We do not need 
contracts. We do this to help Mr Ionescu!” Keen to comply with the BSA ethical 
guidelines regarding the protection of research participants, I gave verbal 
assurances of anonymity and confidentiality. The more I conducted fieldwork, the 
less I relied on the formal process of consent (Miller and Bell 2002: 65), as this 
started to get dangerously close to “empty ethics” (Corrigan 2003). 
 
An additional impediment to obtaining signed consent forms was my participation 
in the vernacular economic culture, which crossed the boundaries between legal, 
licit and moral states through partnerships based on trust secured previously with 
full disclosure of my research identity. This aspect raised issues about the nature of 
consent in this case. Blurred boundaries between research and business enhanced 
the ambiguity of this concept. However, if as Beauchamp (1982) argues, the issue 
of informed consent is meant to ensure self-determination of the research 
participants (because it gives them assurances that they can withdraw at any point 
from the research), I would argue that within this context they were in no way less 
autonomous just because they did not sign the forms. 
 
2.3.5. Confidentiality and anonymity 
Even though signed consent forms were not possible to obtain, I have always given 
verbal assurances of confidentiality and anonymity. In most cases, participants 
rejected the use of any data-gathering devices, such as tape recorders or cameras. 
For them, the best insurance policy was participating in the process of doing 
business. Being a consultant, learning and practising the vernacular ways of doing 
business meant that I was going to be careful in revealing anything to third parties. I 
anonymised all the situations, altered details that would facilitate recognition of 
businesses, places or people and gave pseudonyms to all the participants including 
myself. For this reason, I did not make use of any photographs for this thesis. 
Despite all these precautions it is impossible to provide total assurances of 
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confidently (unless one is prepared to go to jail like Scarce in 1991). Following the 
BSA guidelines (paragraph 19), I tried not to give unrealistic guaranties of 
confidentiality aware of the minimal impact I would have once the work is 
published. 
 
2.3.6. A note on deception 
The lack of informed consent is typically associated with covert research, which in 
turn is identified with deception (e.g. Bulmer 1982, Herrera 1999, Homan 1991). If 
deception can be equated with misrepresentation of research activities, I argue that 
this research, despite making use of limited disclosure, has not at any point made 
use of deception. It would have been difficult to misrepresent my activities when 
conducting fieldwork in my native environment with participants who had detailed 
biographical knowledge about me. However, the complexity of the field 
relationships raised several dilemmas which have never been solved. Firstly, doing 
business and research via the consultancy firm led to a confusion of spheres 
facilitating over-involvement. By adding the ‘consultant’ to the ‘researcher’, I 
started to hold unrealistic expectations about my business skills and perceived the 
lack of business success as a research failure. My perception of self and the 
participants’ reflected an inverse causal relationship – they thought I was a good 
businesswoman because of my research skills, I thought I was a bad researcher 
because of lack of business skills. Secondly, research participants tended to 
construe me into an ‘expert’ in the area of EU funding. Apart from the annoying 
feeling of ‘being a social construct’, I was very uncomfortable with such heightened 
levels of symbolic capital because I felt there was no correspondence in my 
knowledge for it. Thirdly, if I had difficulties dealing with myself as a ‘consultant’, 
an ‘expert’ and a ‘researcher’ I could only imagine that the other participants found 
this impossible to deal with. This became clear towards the end of my fieldwork 
when one of the business partners expressed his dissatisfaction by saying: “All you 
want is to do your research, not make money!” This was a reproach for prioritising 
research over business. When I replied that I never kept hidden my research identity 
or goals and that the business was part of a research strategy, Andrei admitted that I 
was right, but he was still disappointed. So, even though I have never 
misrepresented myself and my research, this research involved a more subtle sense 
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of deception which would have been hard to control or eliminate. During my 
fieldwork, openness about my intentions was not enough, because research 
participants wanted to forget as fast as they could that I was a researcher. The 
consultant identity with its potential financial gains overshadowed the modest 
research identity. This was not ideal for a researcher who wanted to conduct 
research in a caring, respectful and responsible fashion. Despite my honest 
intentions to protect the research participants, it was impossible to control the 
environment or people’s perceptions. 
 
2.4. Reflexive ethnography 
 
This last section focuses on risk and danger, validity, reliability and data 
triangulation. Reflecting on the ways in which fears or experiences of danger 
opened up potentially disruptive ethical and emotional situations is a way to 
examine my assumptions and seek new interpretations of events, without 
overshadowing the voices of the other participants (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 
2000). 
 
2.4.1. Danger and risk 
The LSE research ethics policy10 (2012) would qualify this research as involving 
more than minimal risk due to the unconventional methodology and its topic 
sensitivity. While inevitable elements of the ethnographic enterprise (Hobbs 2006), 
risk and danger are not static assessments conducted at the beginning and end of the 
fieldwork. As I became more of an insider into the business, I learned to calibrate 
my definition of risk and danger according to the social arena. Informal, illicit or 
illegal practices were part and parcel of the daily occurrence of entrepreneurial 
affairs, so in this sense danger was an unavoidable element in the research. All 
participants, including myself, negotiated their involvement and exposure to danger 
using various insurance strategies: minimum involvement with official documents, 
keeping a low profile in the press, non-disclosure of private affairs, one-to-one 
persuasion sessions with bureaucrats/other private entrepreneurs, bribing, favour or 
                                               
10
 http://www.lse.ac.uk/intranet/researchAndDevelopment/ethicsGuidanceAndForms/Research_ 
Ethics_Review_Policy_FINAL.pdf last accessed on the 14th of February 2014.  
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gift exchange, forging family links (e.g. asking a high status bureaucrat to become 
the godfather of a child, pretending to be long-distance relatives) or arranging 
surprise parties. Negotiating danger was essentially a function of self-regulation 
taking into account the social interactional setting (Jipson and Litton 2000). 
 
The following excerpt from my field diary uncovers some of the ethnographic 
complexities encountered while doing participant observation. It shows that risk and 
danger do not simply denote immediate physical threats; they are multi-dimensional 
concepts encompassing emotional, social and legal risks entangled in short (twenty 
minutes in this case) interaction spans (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000). Threats to 
the researcher and to the other participants are shown to be connected as they were 
a defining feature of the work conducted (Ditton 1977, Calvey 2008). 
 
“Today was another glorious day. I went out to talk to the insurance guy in order to 
help me recover the money for my car. The process is very slow and T [close friend] 
advised me to be ‘nice to him’, which basically means to give him something. I have 
given him a bottle of whisky last month and he seemed happy. However, things still 
have not moved so, T suggested to give the guy money. Anyway, Easter is coming 
and he needs some pocket money. I put £100 in an envelope after consulting T with 
regards to both the amount and the currency. He said that the amount is ok, but the 
currency might be a problem. Euros would have been better, but I just don’t have 
the time to stop to the bank. I went to the insurance office and found the guy in his 
office [with glass walls]. After a small conversation, I skilfully [at least this is what 
I thought] bring the subject of Easter break and ask him about his plans. He said he 
wanted to take 3 days off and go abroad. With a big smile on my face, I take out the 
envelope and say: 
”Well, this is a small gift from me to help you have a nice holiday.” 
He looks strange and asks: “What’s in there?” 
 Me: “Maybe you should have a look.” 
 He takes the envelope with two fingers and looks inside. His answer is: 
“Take the money back because I can’t accept it!” 
The situation is completely embarrassing, but I insist thinking that this is the way it 
should be: 
“Please, it’s just a small token of appreciation!” 
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 And I stand up and leave his office. He comes out of his office with the envelope in 
his hand, speaking loud: 
“Please take it back, I can’t accept it!” 
 By now, I am beyond the stage of decent blushing; even my ears are completely 
red. I keep not wanting to take the money and say that it is nothing. Eventually, 
seeing he is not being polite, I ask him why he doesn’t want it. His answer left me 
with no replay: 
“Because there are cameras everywhere!!!” 
 I looked around, apologised, took the money, went home and cried. T was first 
annoyed saying that I embarrassed him, but then laughed and said that I was stupid 
to give him the money in the office, that I should have taken the guy outside. ” 
(Field notes, February 2008) 
 
In this case, my poor performance was put down to my lack of training in business 
and a desire for quick success. “When the performer is known to be a beginner and 
more subject than otherwise to embarrassing mistakes, the audience frequently 
shows extra-consideration, refraining from causing the difficulties it might 
otherwise create” (Goffman 1959:225). The need for tutorials (which started post 
factum as one-to-one feedback sessions) shows that risk and danger are highly 
contextual and learned within routine interactions. However, socialisation into the 
practices of doing business started to give me trouble as I had never pictured myself 
in that position – plain bribing had never been part of my life or upbringing. As a 
researcher, I was excited – the snapshot had been very revealing as the “whole 
dramaturgical structure of social interaction was suddenly and poignantly laid bare” 
(Goffman 1959:227). As a person, I could not laugh it off as simply part of the 
fieldwork. Reflecting on this episode brought the dangers of practising ‘vernacular 
entrepreneurial culture’ at the forefront – I had jeopardised my entire study, risked 
getting arrested, embarrassed my friend as he ‘lost face’ in front of his contact and 
felt bad for doing what I considered ‘dirty work’. The gains came as a lesson – as a 
fieldworker I not only had to do research, but also had to live with myself and I was 
not prepared to regard imprisonment as an acceptable occupational hazard. Over the 
next months, I refused to engage in behaviour that I had considered immoral and 
was relieved to see that research participants accepted me even though I did not do 
everything the way they did (Whyte (1955)). Such refusals were accepted by others 
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as risk reduction strategies (for themselves) or interpreted as personal 
idiosyncrasies. 
 
The ways in which the other research participants evaluated my risk potential was 
very important data. Their constant evaluations of me as a changing notion of risk 
and danger (Westmarland 2000) offered not only greater insights into the process, 
but acted also as veritable benchmarks in my “rite of passage” (van Gennep 1960). 
In the above example, I thought my act was unethical, immoral, illegal and 
anticipated immediate punishment from the justice system. For the local 
entrepreneurs these practices were normal courses of action in everyday affairs, “the 
world of daily life known in common with others and with others taken for granted” 
(Garfinkel 1984:35). My performance, however, had alerted them to my social 
incompetence which had potential impact on their reputation; suddenly I was ‘high 
threat’, but the label changed over time. For example, at the beginning of the 
fieldwork, my constant reminders of risk in everyday routines were dismissed with 
a laugh: “You are naïve! Nobody cares! Everybody does it!” At later stages, the 
same questions provoked intense brainstorming sessions with several specialists. 
 
2.4.2. Emotional risks 
The emotional risks were unanticipated, multiple and revealing. This ethnography, 
with its emerging research design, found me completely unprepared for the 
emotional carousel on which I found myself once in the field. In hindsight, it seems 
obvious that my ambiguous position, my nativity, the distance from the nature of 
work and my position as a junior researcher would generate tensions between 
involvement, comfort and identification. 
 
I thought that conducting research at home, supported by friends and family would 
smooth my way into academia. Contrary to my expectations, mixing research, 
business and family introduced a monetary dimension into my personal life, 
contaminating otherwise clear relationships. When a close friend got upset because 
he did not get what he considered his legitimate share of a deal, I started to think 
more carefully about my expectations and taken for granted attitudes. Doing the 
business revealed a whole new dimension of my inner circle – one of savage 
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entrepreneurship that functioned with different emotional rules. If not all research 
relations lead to friendship as Letherby (2000) remarked, then “not all friends 
remain friends when doing business together” (P, entrepreneur). 
 
Such discoveries might have been good data, but I felt uncomfortable because of the 
distance between what I truly felt, what I thought I ought to have felt and what I 
could convey to the others (Ryan-Flood and Gill 2009). Despite moments of 
excitement, I never liked the shady dealings, the practices or how people changed 
when ‘talking biznis’. These constituents of entrepreneurial subjectivity, as well as 
nonverbal codes and their complex relations with the practices involved careful 
boundary maintenance for me as serious ethical doubts were mounting up. 
Ironically, I ended up resembling a ‘stranger within’, as I have never gone native in 
the business area, despite being a firm owner for a year. This difficultly acquired, 
emotionally draining position of ‘stranger within’ was the most valuable for the 
research. It effectively went beyond the classical insider-outsider dichotomist 
position (Atkinson 2007) suggesting a fluid identity, shaped under very particular 
circumstances. Writing from this position meant putting forward a care-full account 
of the EU funding process that did not take the usual corrective stand of the 
legal/moral discourse, but placed EU funding along the local entrepreneurial lines 
of action. 
 
2.4.3. Reliability and validity 
Even reflexive accounts of highly personal ethnographies cannot avoid the 
‘objective’ methodological benchmarks that assess the scientific nature of any 
research. The following paragraphs discuss issues of sampling, representativeness, 
validity, reliability, generalizability and the comparative potential of this study. 
 
Unlike most ethnographies, this research is based on an atypical mix of methods 
that encompassed secondary data analysis, media reviews, interviews and 
participant observation, all of which were subsumed to the ethnographic enterprise. 
By triangulating the data, I increased the validity and reliability (Bauer and Gaskell 
2000) of this research while making this account representative of the Romanian 
context. While using mixed methods I was careful to respect the methodological 
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recommendations related to each and every one of them (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). 
For example, when conducting secondary data analysis, I had a holistic approach 
using all the information provided by public institutions; in conducting media 
reviews, I used simple random sampling to select materials related to EU funding 
within a period of time; while interviewing, my main sampling strategy was 
snowballing. 
 
Beyond quantitative assessments of representativeness I was concerned to uncover 
the typical routines of accessing EU funding in Romania. Unsurprisingly, some of 
the practices described in this thesis are also part of the police nomenclature. Others 
are about to be formalised as criminal offences. In this sense, the research offers a 
contextualised view of the fluidity of legal/illegal frames of action that would be 
difficult to capture with quantitative means. The three categories of actors described 
are recognisable in everyday encounters, but are not mutually exclusive. It would 
not be uncommon to encounter a consultant who is also a bureaucrat and whose 
close relative has just obtained EU funding. 
 
In order to introduce a comparative dimension to this research (which is difficult 
given that there are few other ethnographies of EU funding) I used two approaches: 
1. I have compared EU funding with development aid (de Sardan 1995, Blundo et 
al. 2006), taking into account all the limitations related to the specifics of the 
regulatory framework; 
2. With great reluctance, I have used quantitative studies that assess the impact of 
EU funding in other European countries – e.g. Poland (Nowak forthcoming). My 
reluctance was not only methodologically based, but also epistemologically 
informed. EU funding has different accession rules in various EU member states, is 
highly dependent on the economic growth and social stability. 
 
Simplistic quantitative assessments which define a country as successful on the 
basis of size of funds accessed are examples of ‘irresponsible knowledge’. A point 
related to comparativeness is generalizability. It is hard to say if the results of this 
research can be generalised to other contexts (e.g. post-socialist economies) because 
each country negotiates its own funding rules within the European framework of 
anxieties (see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion). For example, Romania and 
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Bulgaria, who joined EU in 2007, worked on different accession criteria to EU 
funds than earlier EU members. In turn, countries that negotiate their EU accession 
presently (e.g. Serbia, Ukraine) will probably face harsher criteria. 
 
2.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has put forward a transparent documentation of procedures, details of 
sampling (corpus construction) and ethical dilemmas of this research. Carrying out 
this ethnography was not an easy task, as the fieldwork was on the one hand 
“camouflaged by over-familiarity” (Hobbs and Wright 2006: x) and on the other 
hand, fraught with strangeness. However, the language competences and the 
common cultural background helped me integrate in a short time and not exoticise 
the research participants (Burawoy 1998). I have also tried to overcome ‘going 
native’ by triangulation and reflexivity of perspectives (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64
Chapter 3 
 
Theoretical avenues for exploring the process of accessing 
EU funding 
 
 
This chapter situates the process of accessing EU funding within a broad economic 
sociology framework by employing a mid-level instrument of analysis that explores 
three modes of coordination of social and economic life: markets, hierarchies and 
networks. It argues that EU funding is a hybrid space based on a plurality of 
coordinative mechanisms that aims to accommodate transnational regulations with 
vernacular practices. The chapter is divided in four sections. The first section 
discusses markets and hierarchies and emphasises the importance of networks in 
understanding the coordination of any social and economic process. The second part 
looks at the impact of law and regulation on the economic process, touching upon 
issues of transnational governance and development aid. The third part focuses on 
entrepreneurship and vernacular entrepreneurial culture by connecting insights from 
economic sociology and the sociology of work. Building on these links, the forth 
part turns to analyse the blurred boundaries between legal, informal and illegal 
economic activities linking economic sociology with sociology of deviance and 
criminology. 
 
 
3.1. Coordinating economic and social life: markets, hierarchies 
and networks 
 
This section looks at markets, hierarchies and networks – which act as mapping 
devices that explain the organisation of contemporary social, economic and political 
life. This mid-level instrument of analysis explains not only domestic arrangements, 
but also international relationships between states and the impact of transnational 
regulations on domestic affairs and practices of doing business. The ‘coordination 
of social life’ means relating otherwise disparate activities (Thompson et al. 1991), 
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making them compatible and efficient, ordering (Weber [1922] 1968) various 
agents and agencies. The market, some argue (Hayek 1989), is the best way to 
achieve coordination via its ‘invisible hand’ (Smith 1826) of exchange and price 
system supported by self-interested, individually motivated individuals. Against this 
view, others (Weber [1922] 1968) contend that such ‘unconscious mechanisms’ 
should be replaced by administrative means that exercise overt control through 
hierarchies. Promoters of the network approach (Granovetter 1974) criticise the 
previous positions because they neglect the informal mechanisms that govern the 
cross-cutting chains of relatively independent networks of social, political and 
economic relationships. Despite the fact that the economic sociology literature 
presents them as alternative ways to achieve coordination, the section argues that 
markets, hierarchies and networks complement each other in order to transgress 
their individual limits. 
 
3.1.1. Markets 
In the neoclassical version, markets bring together strangers in the act of exchange 
(Marshall 1936 in Thompson et al. 1991). This is a purely economic model of 
exchange where social or political goals are less important than economic goals. 
Polanyi (1954) argued that in the market, goods are commodities exchanged for 
profit according to the law of supply and demand that determine the price tag. In 
order to maximise their profit, decision-makers who are in possession of required 
information adapt their behaviour to the price. The markets are characterised by 
‘perfect competition’ (large number of buyers and sellers with no direct control of 
the prices) and a Pareto type of equilibrium (for every person that is better off, 
another participant to the market must be worse off). By contrast, the neo-Austrian 
school (Krizner 1973) puts forward a dynamic understanding of the market as a 
process characterised by disequilibrium, emphasising its competitive nature. In this 
view, the situation of monopoly is not necessarily wrong as it results from past 
successful entrepreneurial initiatives fostered by dynamic competition. The 
imbalances created by price disequilibrium are considered transitory, soon to be 
regulated through the free market process of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter 
1942). 
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This debate introduces essential concerns that influence a key issue for this thesis: 
profitability. Prices and costs determine the profit of any economic activity, 
ensuring that an enterprise can reproduce itself financially. The supreme advantage 
of the price system allows for ‘consumer sovereignty’which lies at the foundation of 
the market. Prices act as a signalling device that suits a decentralised decision-
making environment, potentially harmonising any conflicts so that all could benefit. 
If the market allows for competition, the price is determined by the interaction of 
buyers and sellers, thus “the price is set by or in the market” (Thompson et 
al.1991:7). In a monopoly, the dominant agent sets the prices because “the 
monopoly is the market” (Thompson et al. 1991:7). Between the two extremes there 
are a number of monopolistic or oligopolistic situations of competition in which 
large enough agents have some influence over market prices. 
 
Profitability, however, is not only defined by an enterprise’s pricing strategy, but 
also by its investment strategies and its relationship with government agencies 
through grants, subsidies or government procurement contracts. An interesting 
combination of markets and hierarchies are the ‘quasi-markets’ in which a market 
model is applied within an organisation. For example, in the UK, the NHS has been 
transformed in the past decades in order to coordinate better its internal activity, 
increase its productivity and service quality, maintaining a low price for a publicly 
provided service (Mullen 1990). The market model has been extremely appealing 
for designing new markets, like the European Union market. Remnants of the 
neoclassical paradigm can be traced in the design of EU funding. 
 
Sociological and anthropological accounts have pleaded for a more nuanced 
approach to markets arguing that economic activity is embedded in social activity 
(Granovetter 1973, Hart 2000, Thrift 2001). Moreover, each market and 
marketplace has it specific cultural logics, processes and representations which are 
sustained and reinforced by social relations (Granovetter 1973). Baker (1981) 
advocated for a middle range theory of markets-as-networks, showing that markets 
were not homogeneous beings, but socially constructed. “Since ‘market’ is typically 
assumed, not studied, economic analysis implicitly characterises the ‘market’ as a 
‘featureless plane’” (1981:211 in Swedberg 2005:247). White’s model (1970) 
contrasts markets with networks testing the concept of ‘vacancy chains’- when a 
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person gets a new job, a vacancy is created which has to be filled, thus creating a 
new vacancy and so on. The most successful application of network analysis so far 
is Granovetter’s (1973) study of the social mechanisms through which people find 
employment. He wanted to know if the economists were right in assuming that the 
labour market allowed for free circulation of information that reached all 
participants. His results showed that 56% of the people got their job through 
contacts, 18.8% through direct application and 18% through formal means. 
Granovetter concluded that “perfect labour markets exist only in textbooks” 
(1974:25) and the economists’ idea of a rational job search is not validated 
empirically. An interesting add to the literature is Brian Uzzi’s contribution (1997) 
which draws on ethnographic material collected from twenty firms in the apparel 
industry in New York. He found that firms tended to distinguish between “market 
relationships” – the embodiment of standard economic analysis- and “close or 
special relationships” – which reflect Granovetter’s embeddedness. He concluded 
that successful businesses strived to achieve a balance in their interactions between 
market and embedded ties reaching for an “integrated network”. This strand of 
literature is a good starting point for discussing the way in which EU funding, as an 
economic activity, is shaped by context. 
 
3.1.2. Hierarchies 
Markets usually stand in stark opposition to hierarchies. According to Weber 
([1922] 1968) bureaucratic rationality is a modern way of introducing order into the 
world through systematic administrative control characterised by specialisation of 
functions, hierarchical authority and progressive breaking down of complex tasks in 
order to ensure coordination according to a fixed set of rules. Administrating an 
internal hierarchy involves particular practices made available through edicts, 
orders, statutes and specialised techniques designed to ‘govern’ which means 
exercise power and authority. 
 
The literature regarding public administration and bureaucratic spirit (Selznick 
1949, Du Gay 2000, Gouldner 1964) shows that bureaucracies are inefficient due to 
inflexible decision-taking mechanisms (Merton 1957), civil servants’ lack of 
initiative and goal displacement (Gouldner 1964) or insensitivity to public opinion 
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(Du Gay 2000). Survival in this environment equates with internalising its norms, 
ethics and aspirations through self-adaptation (Benveniste 1977). The main 
advantage of the hierarchical modes of coordination (Jaques 1990) is consistency of 
decision-taking achieved through the implementation of a clear set of rules which 
reduces discretion, increases accountability and allows for large scale tasks to be 
coordinated. Douglas North (1981) added to this analysis by suggesting that 
institutions can be defined as rules on which organisations play. This strand of 
literature that analyses internal hierarchies is useful for uncovering the internal 
workings of EU funding bureaucratic system in Romania. 
 
External hierarchical coordination refers to the relationships between different 
organisational units (Thompson et al.1991), which may involve nation states, the 
EU or transnational corporations. At a macro level, central planning common to 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from late 1940 until the early 1990s was a 
‘consciously’ managed, rigidly organised coordination mechanism based on a 
predetermined assessment of population needs and demands which shaped 
production and excluded market competition. The post-war Western economic 
development took the form of ‘indicative planning’ (Sartori 1987) which enhanced 
a dialogue between the state and the private sector in order to ensure the growth of 
the economy as whole, without altering the ownership structure. Another form of 
macroeconomic coordination is ‘semi-hierarchical planning’ which essentially 
requires the government to be the major decision factor and influence the private 
sector through fiscal and monetary policies (Sartori 1987). All these forms of 
external hierarchical control are rather attempts to regulate the market systems and 
for this reason important additions to the conceptualisation of EU funding. 
 
Governments also have a series of techniques for ensuring coordination at lower 
levels – e.g., nationalisation, regulation, and subsidisation. When previously 
nationalised industries that have been dismantled and privatised turned into private 
monopolies, governments put forward new sets of regulatory devices to control the 
pricing and protect the consumers from potentially undesirable effects of the market 
changes. Alternatively, previously unregulated arenas of economic activity have 
been regulated in order to protect consumers. Through subsidisation, governments 
direct economic resources into areas that are beneficial to society but lack 
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investments from the private sector, thus creating a form of ‘state capitalism’ 
(Bremmer 2010, Aligica and Tarko 2012). These two mechanisms are essential for 
understanding the process of accessing EU funding. As detailed in Chapter 5, the 
design of EU funding is highly regulated, while being presented as a subsidy – thus 
making this area a new, hybrid form of intervention designed by transnational 
regulatory bodies and implemented by national governments. When EU funded 
projects are used to enhance the political legitimacy of the local or national 
governments and increase their financial capital, one can talk about ‘capitalism pe 
banii UE’ [‘transnational/EU funded capitalism’ – Chapter 8]. 
 
The dichotomous view of markets and hierarchies (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975) 
emphasises the sharp boundaries of firms seen as “islands of planned coordination 
in a sea of market relations” (Richardson 1972 in Powell 1990:266). In response to 
the empirical evidence that documents patterns of change rejecting the vertical 
integration thesis and the arm length’s market contracting, scholars introduced the 
idea of continuum market transactions (Thompson et al.1991). This view situates 
market transactions at one pole and highly centralised organisations at the other, 
with a range of hybrid forms in between, thus implying that the market would be the 
basic form of exchange from which all other methods would evolve. 
Anthropological and historical evidence contradicts this assumption. Finley (1973) 
shows that the market, in a modern sense did not exist in the classical world and 
that economic activities emerged out of a dense web of political, religious and 
social interactions and affiliations. Thompson (1971) described the ‘moral 
economy’ as a system of symbolic expectations surrounding eighteenth century 
British marketplaces, while Agnew (1986) documented the highly hierarchical, 
symbolic and personal nature of the medieval England marketplaces. The modern 
understanding of the market, as a timeless and boundless arena of buying and 
selling, thus separated from the marketplace, only penetrated the British educated 
class around the end of the eighteenth century (Agnew 1986). Similarly, hierarchies 
are not the endpoint of economic evolution, as proven by Braudel (1979) and 
Polanyi (1954). The history of modern commerce is recounted through family 
businesses, cartels, guilds, essentially all enterprises with highly permeable 
boundaries. 
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3.1.3. Networks 
A third mode of coordination of social and economic activity is represented by the 
network, interpreted here as a flexible entity, a source and resource for information 
and capital (Callon 1998). Networks are highly positive social arrangements that 
lubricate the coordination of social life through social relations based on 
cooperation, loyalty and trust (Lorenz 1989). A new trend derived from the 
uncertainty associated with technological developments and economic conditions of 
modern markets has been the dis-integration of big corporations that tend to 
concentrate on core activities and outsource the rest. Divesting peripheral activities 
created new networks of small and medium sized enterprises that act as 
subcontractors for the main business (Lorenz 1989). These new developments 
enhance network-based coordination mechanisms of economic activity because the 
new small enterprises do not return to a market model based on price competition 
while the relationship with the big corporation is also not conducted on the basis of 
hierarchical administrative relations. 
 
Networks are looked upon with suspicion because they are associated with 
informality and illegality, which impact negatively on formal accountability 
mechanisms. Corruption, for example, can be one of the most potent mechanisms of 
coordination in social and economic life (Humphrey 2002, Ledeneva 1998, Wedel 
1986, Yang 1994). As fluid, highly adaptable entities, strengthened by kinship, 
ethnicity, social proximity and economic affairs, networks are most suitable for 
illegal partnerships (Hobbs 2013). Hierarchies are discarded in favour of fluid 
networked models which “make it harder for law enforcement to infiltrate, disrupt 
and dismantle. Many organised crime groups opportunistically form around specific 
short term schemes and may outsource portions of their operations rather than 
keeping it all in house” (Bjelopera and Finklea 2010:1 in Ruggiero 2013). This 
favours the establishment of “dirty economies and fuzzy business careers” 
(Ruggiero 2013) where licit and illicit operations are simultaneously carried out. 
 
Despite its negative connotations, the network model has come to shape the modern 
understanding of coordination mechanisms. Social and political scientists (Alvesson 
and Thompson 2005, Reed 2005) talk about post-bureaucratic organisations which 
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are described as ‘networked’ (Castells 1996), ‘entrepreneurial’ or ‘market-led’, 
manipulated by corporate cultures featuring organic or indirect forms of control. 
The post-modern factory (Drucker 1992) has changed from a traditional battleship 
to a flotilla “a set of modules centred around stages in the production process or 
closely related operations”. The network enterprise (Castells 1996) uses flexible 
rather than mass production through horizontal integration with other corporations. 
Cascio (2000) describes virtual organisations as post-bureaucratic forms of 
coordination in which people are not physically located in the same place but 
cooperate with management and co-workers in a virtual workplace. However, these 
new forms of post-bureaucratic arrangements do not announce the premature death 
of bureaucratic organisation (Alvesson and Thompson 2005) – rather they 
emphasise that contemporary changes are hybrid forms of traditional hierarchical 
organisational principles, which rejuvenate rather than supersede bureaucracy 
(Courpasson and Clegg 2006). This argument applies to public management. For 
example (Farrell and Morris 2003) show that increased ‘marketisation’ of public 
services leads to the emergence of a ‘bureaucratised market form’ or ‘neo-
bureaucracy’ which is a simultaneously centralised and decentralised hierarchical 
forms of coordination. 
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3.1.4. Hybrid orders of coordination 
How can the three models explain complex patterns of coordination and interaction 
of social and economic life? Table 3.1 (Powell 1990) summarises some of the key 
differences between the three models by looking at seven categories. 
 
Key features Forms 
Markets Hierarchies  Networks 
Normative basis Contract-property 
rights 
Employment 
relationship 
Complementary 
strengths  
Means of 
communication 
Prices  Routines  Relational  
Methods of conflict 
resolution 
Haggling – resort to 
courts for 
enforcement  
Administrative fiat – 
supervision 
Norm of reciprocity 
– reputational 
concerns  
Degree of flexibility High  Low  Medium  
Amount of 
commitment among 
parties 
Low  Medium to high  Medium to high 
Tone or climate Precision and/or 
Suspicion 
Formal, bureaucratic  Open-ended, mutual 
benefits 
Actor preferences or 
choices 
Independent  Dependent  Interdependent  
Mixing of forms Repeat transactions 
(Geertz 1978) 
 
Contracts as 
hierarchical 
documents 
(Stinchcombe 1985) 
Informal 
organisation 
(Dalton 1957) 
 
Market-like features: 
profit centres, 
transfer pricing 
(Eccles 1985) 
Status hierarchies 
 
 
Multiple partners 
 
Formal rules  
Table 3.1: Stylised comparison of forms of economic organisation 
Source: Powell (1990) in Thompson et al.(1991) 
 
By comparing and contrasting markets, hierarchies and networks, Powell (1990) 
shows that the process of exchange is shaped differently in each model: in market 
transactions the goods are clearly specified in agreements based not on mutual trust, 
but on legal contracts; in hierarchies, it is shaped by concerns for career mobility, a 
history of previous interactions and detailed information about the other party; 
network-based exchanges entail indefinite transactions within the general pattern of 
interactions, using normative rather than legal mechanisms of enforcement, creating 
indebtedness and reliance rather than immediate one-off interactions. In markets, 
communication is conducted through prices, in hierarchies through regulations and 
in networks through relations. Kaneko and Imai (1987 in Powell 1990) show that 
information obtained from network contacts is ‘thicker’ than obtained on the market 
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and ‘freer’ than obtained from bureaucracy, which makes networks in particular 
adapt for exchanges that are not easily measured and priced (e.g., know-how, 
technological abilities, spirit of experimentation). 
 
Central to the issue of network-exchange is the concept of reciprocity, typically 
discussed by the sociological and anthropological literature in the form of 
indebtedness. Mauss (1925) showed that the obligations to give, return and receive 
did not only involve rational calculations - they carried cultural understandings of 
the implications involved in the act of exchange. Sahlins (1972) regarded 
indebtedness as a measure of imbalance that sustained social partnerships and 
interactions, by compelling further meetings, thus connecting the parties in the 
future. In the game theoretical literature, reciprocity was proven to enhance 
individual interests through cooperation (Axelrod 1984, Keohane 1986). In the 
neoclassical understanding, markets ensure a high degree of flexibility, through the 
anonymity of encounters (Callon 1998), while bureaucratic arrangements and 
network-based interactions are restricted by administrative or social norms. 
Networks essentially create interdependencies through embeddedness with social 
and cultural settings, while markets tend to disembed actors. 
 
Powell’s typology is most useful for understanding the differences between 
markets, hierarchies and networks, as ideal-types (Weber [1992] 1968), but it 
hardly captures the complexity of contemporary social and economic arrangements. 
Admittedly, in the last row of his table, he acknowledges the existence of mixed 
forms of coordination, citing a range of anthropological and sociological studies 
that essentially document the messiness of social arrangements. This thesis starts 
exactly where Powell ends, building on the observation that modern life is not 
easily convertible into categories and typologies due to its chaotic and unpredictable 
nature (Hobbs 2013, Ruggiero 1996). Instead of assuming stability as Powell did, I 
employ change as the dependent variable, thus discussing EU funding as space that 
allows for a plurality of coordinative mechanisms rather than their mutual 
exclusivity. Broadly, the network provides the overarching model of analysis due to 
its flexible nature, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: The coordination of economic and social life. 
 
 
3.2. Governing through economics: The role of transnational 
governance in coordinating social and economic life 
 
The role of the state for the economy has been conceptualised within economic 
sociology by Neil Fligstein (1996, 2001) through “Markets as Politics” and 
“Architecture of Markets”. “I view the formation of markets as part of state-
formation” (1996:657) he argued, showing that the state constructs markets through 
property rights, governance structures and rules of exchange. In relationship to the 
role of conflict in the market, Fligstein argued that modern states would regulate 
competition in order to secure the stability of markets. Once in place, these 
structures would influence the future economic development of the country, 
ensuring that governance rules stabilise the market for the largest firms. The state 
can not only create the market in structural terms as Fligstein (1996, 2001) 
remarked, but also in very direct ways. Hidden exchanges between entrepreneurs 
and politicians presented as lobbying are the rule of thumb in many advanced 
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democracies. Caldwell (2005) showed entrepreneurs ‘invest’ in political campaigns 
and are later rewarded by contracts, purchasing commitments or seats in the House 
of Lords. Syal and Ball (2011) discovered that nearly one in five staff pass-holders 
in the House of Lords is involved in lobbying. These arguments found support in 
the work of Bourdieu (1997) – “Principles of Economic Anthropology” – who 
conceptualised market as part of a field which in turn influenced its dynamics. His 
starting point was that economic life resulted from the encounter between actors 
with special dispositions (habitus) in the economic field. The structure of the field 
consisted of power relations maintained through various forms of capital (e.g., 
financial, technological, social, and symbolic). The economic field was dominated 
by struggles, but also influenced by what happened outside the field, especially at 
the state level. 
 
States influence the workings of human activity in the economic and social arenas 
through laws and regulations. Sociological inquiries in this area have tried to 
establish to what extent legality constitutes “actual determinants of human 
behaviour” (Weber [1922] 1968:312). From this perspective, law is connected to 
the notion of order, which in turn is essential for a society and the well-functioning 
of any economic activity. “An order will be called…law if it is externally 
guaranteed by the probability that physical or psychological coercion will be 
applied by a staff of people in order to bring about compliance or avenge violation” 
(Weber [1922] 1968:34). Weber takes his argument further in the theory of 
legitimation showing that duration in time is crucial for the concept of order and 
that political order is more likely to last if people find it legitimate. However, the 
“legal order of legal theory has nothing directly to do with the world of real 
economic conduct, since both exist on different levels. One exists in the realm of 
the ought, while the other deals with the world of the is.” (Weber [1922] 1968:312). 
 
In this way, the analysis of economic initiative in relationship to law intersects with 
the sociology of deviance (Merton 1938, Hobbs 2013). The strain theory (Merton 
1938) argues that anomie and deviance are the result of a disjuncture between 
cultural goals and institutionalised means to achieve them. In order to adapt, people 
face five options: innovation, conformity, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion. 
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Innovation, in the economic initiative as well as in deviance, starts with accepting 
the cultural goals irrespective of the drastic or illegitimate means that it might 
require. In the face of difficulties and uncertainties prompted by the economic 
environment, actors experiment by developing alternative, sometimes illicit 
strategies that through habituation and custom come to be morally approved by their 
close environment (Roth 1978). Gouldner (1964) talked about a form of 
institutionalised deviance through the concept of ‘mock bureaucracies’ in which the 
governing rules are generally known and ignored. In these settings deviation from 
the rules is status enhancing. The tensions between ‘normative order’ and ‘factual 
order’ (Parsons 1982) can lead to operative crime (Ruggiero 2007), but this is not 
necessarily bad, as it can promote the change of official rules that have been proven 
unsatisfactory. Dalton’s study of organisations (1959) describes a very fluid 
environment based on shifting alliances, pursuit of narrow interests, a climate of 
struggle and antagonism for the regular organisational activities. The cliques and 
conflicts that surround the organisational life are hidden from outsiders, 
“scrupulously and skilfully camouflaged so that the resulting policies appear to be 
in harmony with the official ideology of the organisation” (Mouzelis 1967:59). 
Instrumental use of policies is used to legitimise the organisation in the eyes of the 
surroundings through “legalisation of the workplace” (Edelman 1992) while 
accommodating managerial interests. 
 
As interesting development of this line of argument is the case of whistle-blowing, 
or what happens when an employee decides to expose the employer for 
unlawful/unethical behaviour (Alford 2001, Rothschild and Miethe 1999). Loyalty 
to the organisation and camouflaging conflicts could be turned around against the 
whistle-blower. For example, most former communist countries have 
institutionalised whistle-blowing as part of their international commitments to ‘fight 
corruption’ and incentivised it through financial rewards. In practice, money is 
rarely cashed, because the prize is conditioned by a definite conviction for 
corruption (Bratu 2013). By creating the whistle-blowing institution, states promote 
the anti-corruption legislation and “mediate the impact of law on society by helping 
to construct the meaning of compliance” (Edelman 1992:1557). 
 
 77
3.2.1. Transnational regulations: development aid and crime narratives 
So far, the discussion has focused on the role of law and state and their impact on 
the economic process. However, EU funding as an economic process is not only a 
product of the national and micro-level interactions, but also the result of 
transnational governance. Designed in Brussels through direct negotiations with 
individual states, taking into account international interests and corporate 
assessments, EU funding fuses together different traditions of civil service under the 
notion of ‘supranationalism’ (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). This section looks at new 
technologies of governing promoted in relationship to development, 
Europeanisation and international aid. It shows that in governing aid flows, the 
theme of development through foreign funding has metamorphosed into the theme 
of crime through corruption and violence narratives. 
 
The current debates about foreign aid essentially boil down to one question: has the 
developed world provided enough financial support to help others out of poverty? 
The answer is crucially linked to the role that corruption and violence play in the 
impoverishment of nations. Sachs (2005), as a tireless campaigner for more 
international development assistance, argues that corruption and violence are 
symptoms of poverty that could be cured through financial aid thus ensuring the 
countries in need jump-start economic growth. “The wealth of the rich 
world…makes the end of poverty a realistic probability by the year 2025” (Sachs 
2005 in Fishman and Miguel 2010:11). Easterly (2006) holds the opposing view: he 
contends that advanced states are spending too much on foreign aid already. The 
trillions of US dollars spent so far have not helped the poor, but have been spent on 
grandiose, centrally planned projects (e.g., hydroelectric dams, four-lane highways) 
in countries that lacked the capacity to oversee them. The countries receiving aid 
should be well governed (e.g., strong institutions, powerful civil society, free 
media) and supervised by other agencies in order to ensure that the money reaches 
the poor. Meanwhile, Easterly argued, aid initiatives should focus on small-scale 
entrepreneurs, who are the capable “Searchers”, to find solutions for local problems 
(Easterly 2006). 
 
Recently, international development has widened its scope to incorporate not only 
quantified development (poverty reduction) but also donors’ ideas about social and 
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cultural intervention (Easterly 2006). The modern concept of good governance 
includes political pluralism and prudent fiscal policies as sine qua non pre-
requirements of poverty reduction. Thus, foreign aid is conditioned by institutional 
redesign at central and local levels, driving the implementation of new technologies 
of government as part of a ‘modernisation’ process. In this context, the anti-
corruption agenda plays a major role, aiming at restraining bureaucratic discretion 
and strengthening external oversight, through a credible, apolitical monitoring 
system (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Klitgaard 1988). The new agencies created (e.g., 
auditing agencies and integrity organisations) as part of an anti-corruption 
movement are embedded in a broader system of checks and balances where 
effectiveness depends on the separation of political powers. Thus the dynamics of 
corruption rhetoric and anti-corruption practices are part of a wider political 
economic context whose relevance is critical for the understanding of EU funding. 
 
Anthropology and sociology of social change see development aid as a vehicle of 
change (Hart 2000, Blundo 2006) despite the lack of congruence between 
development policies and their effects (de Sardan 2005). These accounts offer grass 
roots knowledge about the impact and internalisation of development agents and 
institutions and point to their (in)effectiveness. In discussing the (un)anticipated 
consequences of the ‘development and growth’ process, anthropologists analyse 
multicultural encounters between developers and developees, deployed in the 
language of socio-cultural logics, brokerage, ‘popular technical knowledge’ (Hart 
2000, de Sardan 2005, Blundo 2006). Even though the bulk of the research relies on 
African studies, the implications go beyond this continent. 
 
A critical stand suggests that development models are doomed to fail given the gap 
between the nature of the intervention (which is usually disconnected from the 
history and inadequate to local social needs) and everyday realities (Escobar 1991, 
Scott 1997). In this sense, development models are a form of colonialism with 
institutional and ideological effects, that impose social hierarchies (developer over 
the ‘to be developed’) and rankings of knowledge (scientific over indigenous). 
Ethnographic literature (Harrison 2010) shows that corruption is potentially the 
outcome of development in postcolonial Africa leading to the spread of an 
‘assistentialist’ culture (de Sardan 1999, Blundo et al. 2006). High levels of 
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perception are not associated with real practices of corruption (Parry 2000), but 
excessive concern for this topic becomes a pessimistic reflection of development 
policies. Eastern Europe displays similar trends (Torsello 2012), but here anti-
corruption organisations have flourished through foreign aid and funding leading to 
an anti-corruption industry (Bryane 2009). Ethnographic work focusing on India 
shows how excessive anti-corruption rhetoric can mask real needs for local and 
national interventions, including Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) activities 
to counter ‘corruption flagella’ (Tanzi 1998). It is no accident that several political 
careers were made and broken by the use of (anti)corruption narratives (Bratu 2013, 
Torsello 2012). 
 
A development project always claims to be coherent and makes use of specific 
rhetoric devices to portray it. Coherence can be found at four different levels: 
compliance with the technical model, compatibility with the national policy, 
conformity with the donors’ norms and internal coherence of the project (de Sardan 
2005). The ‘language of the project’ is a constant work of translation which is 
within the job description of skilled consultants (who have to transpose policy goals 
into practical interventions and vice versa). 
 
In relation to the practices of mediation and inter-mediation, development literature 
brings forward the concept of corruption. In Africa, corruption was discussed in 
terms of the patron-client model and network analysis (Boissevain 1974, Medard 
1986, Bayart 1993, Medard 1997) and was traditionally entangled in the neo-
patrimonialism and ‘the politics of the belly’ (Medard 1997). Given the blurred 
boundaries between public and private spheres and the positive value attached to 
this practice, scholars emphasised public office as a source of constant legal and 
illegal income (Hart 2000). Postcolonial and post-communist societies present 
‘striking similarities’ (Sajo 1998) in the sense that in both systems corruption is 
portrayed as a structural problem deriving from clientelist practices which are not 
incidental and isolated happenings, but a social phenomenon (Mungiu-Pippidi 
2013). Given the importance attached to corruption by transnational organisations 
and locals, the next section gives a wide theoretical framework for understanding 
corruption. 
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3.2.2. Through the lens of corruption 
The definition of corruption reflects its ambiguity, the lack of consensus among 
academics, policy makers, civil society, control and enforcement actors. 
Heidenheimer (1970) argued that three key concepts organise the debates: public 
opinion, public interest or public office. Public opinion centred definitions focus on 
the public’s understanding of corruption (Scott 1972), thus turning public opinion 
into both the source and the judge of corruption. Public interest definitions suggest 
that through corruption, the public’s interest is violated in favour of a small group 
(Friedrich 1972). Criticised for their vagueness (Rose-Ackerman 1999), the 
concepts of public interest and public opinion were found unsuitable for policy 
purposes, rendering corruption ‘un-measurable’. Definitions centred on public 
office (Myrdal 1968, Nye 1967) focus on the distinction between public and private 
and the misuse of public power. This view was quickly adopted by international 
organisations – i.e. World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Transparency International (TI), who define corruption as the abuse of public power 
for private gain. This view was widely legitimised by Transparency International 
through its Corruption Perception Index (Galtung 1998). The idea that corruption 
could be measured - countries could be ranked according to an index - was so 
appealing to the international community that this index became a powerful 
advocacy tool, despite its methodological shortcomings (TI 2010). In this way, the 
conventional paradigm of corruption started to dominate international debates at the 
end of the 1990s on the basis of three main assumptions: corruption could be 
defined, measured and changed (Ledeneva 2013). Recent scholarship (Brayane 
2009, Krastev 2004, Ledeneva 2013) describes a massive failure of the 
conventional paradigm showing that: 
1. The present definition of corruption assumes a clear distinction between 
public and private spheres which is difficult to document empirically 
(Ledeneva 1998, Torsello 2011); 
2.  Contemporary measurement tools account only for the perception of 
corruption, providing little evidence about experiences; 
3.  Anti-corruption policies implemented on the basis of current research 
methodologies have either failed, or the present research instruments are 
incapable of capturing the nature and scope of reforms. 
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Sociological and anthropological studies (Blundon 2006, Haller 2005, Ledeneva 
1998, de Sardan 1999, 2005, Wedel 1986, 1998, Yang 1994) have traditionally 
focused on the deep structure of corruption, emphasising that it is a mechanism that 
conceptualises the state in everyday encounters by humanising bureaucracy (Gupta 
1995). They show that cultural specificity is essential for understanding the socio-
cultural logics of action, especially gift giving and the workings of solidarity 
networks (Yang 1994, Ledeneva 1998, de Sardan 1999). Research on gift exchange 
(Malinowski 1922, Mauss 1925, Bourdieu 1977, Yang 1994, Ledeneva 1998) has 
shown that the practice of gift giving is a compulsory pattern of response in certain 
contexts, both an art and a necessity of everyday activities, encompassing both gift 
and favour exchanges (Wedel 1986, Yang 1994, Ledeneva 1998). The logic of 
solidarity networks reflects a web of mutual assistance entangled in social relations 
and obligations. The role of the networks is to provide support, act as a safety nets 
or buffers between the individual and the state, offering information and translation 
of bureaucratic practices (Wedel 1986, 1998). An expanded network is also a sign 
of increased social capital (Wedel 1986). The existence of networks and favours 
exchange is acknowledged in language – guanxi – China (Yang 1994), blat – Russia 
(Ledeneva 1998), but any exchange is disguised in the ‘language of help’, thus 
making these transactions morally superior to corruption. However it is a too fine 
line between blat and corruption, impossible to detect empirically and embedded in 
the narratives of justification. In the context of transition to the market economy it 
is argued that these traditional practices have been transformed in corruption and 
this transformation is read as a moral decay of the society (Ledeneva 1998). 
 
Recent contributions from the anthropology of corruption document a departure 
from the Weberian model of bureaucracy (Anders and Nuijten 2009, Pardo 2004, 
Sharma and Gupta 2006). In “The secret of law” Anders and Nuijten (2009) stress 
that in order to understand corruption researchers should move away from the 
Western dichotomist view of public-private/state-society that leaves no room for 
positive ethnographic contributions. Similarly, Pardo (2004) argues that the legal 
conceptualisation of corruption is marked by inherent ambiguities due to cultural 
particularism. He recommends analysing morality as a space in which ideas of 
legality and illegality collide with universal values. Alternatively, he suggests 
focusing on the role of state who “through institutional blindness can allow the 
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interests of the elites” (Pardo 2004:6). In this case, the state is an active agent 
rendering more opaque the borders of legality, exploited by power elites who, 
through law, give significance to and legitimise corruption. A key anthropological 
finding is the discursive power of corruption. Haller and Shore (2006) focused on 
practices that make corruption a semantic of governance, thus suggesting that it is a 
common way to make sense of politics. Torsello (2012) described how 
environmental movements used corruption talk (allegations or facts) to frame their 
protests and communicate with the wider public. This strategy builds on the 
generalised public talk sustained by media reports and locals’ high levels of 
perceived corruption. 
 
Such an approach turns the gaze to a classical sociological concept – the definition 
of the situation, which in this case is conducted through discursive means. W.I. 
Thomas (1923) stated that a social situation is what the participants define it to be. 
In other words, reality is a matter of definition. Social situations are not only 
defined in the present, but also shaped by past experiences (Schutz 1974). The past 
can be made malleable through biographical reinterpretation and dialogue, as in the 
communist countries that continually rewrote their history books to create a heroic 
past (Light 2010, Zajda and Zajda 2003). Through language, new meanings are 
assigned to old facts, which in turn become ‘institutions’ (Berger and Luckman 
1966), thus gaining the social recognition of ‘permanent’ solutions to ‘permanent’ 
problems. 
 
This constructionist view further developed into a full theory by Berger and 
Luckman (1966) has been instrumentally employed to shed light on contemporary 
anxieties typically portrayed using vocabularies of crime (e.g., mugging (Hall et 
al.1978)). In discussing organised crime, Hobbs (2013) argues that this is a socially 
constructed phenomenon, “exported [from North America] like a criminal justice 
version of Starbucks” (2013:12), while its perception is highly influenced by a 
particular understanding of globalisation linked with “the expansion of illegal 
economic activities and its cosmopolitan associations” (2013:12). Hobbs goes 
further to show that contemporary understandings of organised crime are based on 
stereotypes, recollections and reinterpretations of the past. In the same fashion, this 
thesis employs a constructionist view of corruption defining it as a rebranding 
 83
mechanism – it creates new labels for vernacular ways of doing things, changing the 
meanings associated with contemporary entrepreneurial practices or reporting the 
present in a language compatible with global anxieties. 
 
 
3.3. Entrepreneurship as work 
 
Entrepreneurship is a key concept in understanding what drives change in the 
modern economy (Krizner 1997, Schumpeter 1942). Coined by Schumpeter (1912, 
1942), the concept of entrepreneur was subsequently invested with different 
meanings according to disciplinary needs. Political scientists (Schneider and Teske 
1992) use it to denote an individual who changes the direction of politics; 
anthropologists (Wong 1998) working on migration describe entrepreneurship as a 
response to blocked opportunities; criminologists (Ruggiero 1996) employ it to 
explain the particular dispositions that take people into criminality; sociologists 
(Hobbs 2013) uncovers it as a key characteristic of the modern urban environment 
linked to consumerism and hedonism. From a network analysis perspective (Burt 
1992), entrepreneurship involves linking together various points from different 
networks that are in need of each other. The conventional sociological view refers 
to entrepreneurs as individuals who take the risk to found new organisations “which 
occurs as a context-dependent, social and economic process” (Thornton 1999:20). 
 
For Schumpeter (1912, 1942) entrepreneurship was the engine of economic growth 
as it was based on a new combination of existing materials and forces resulting in 
introducing new goods and production methods, opening new markets, finding new 
sources of raw materials. Investing entrepreneurs with almost superpowers of 
charisma and leadership, he argued that entrepreneurship must be placed in its 
social and historical context, showing that “no one is an entrepreneur forever, only 
when he or she is actually doing the innovative activity” (Schumpeter 1942 in 
Swedberg 2000a:18). The innovative capacity is the key element that distinguishes 
between entrepreneurs and other actors more inclined to follow tradition, because it 
“incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly 
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of ‘creative 
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destruction’ is the essential fact about capitalism” (Schumpeter 1942:83). 
Disruptions generated by creative destruction are exploited by individuals well 
equipped to notice the emerging opportunities (Krizner 1997; Shane and 
Venkataraman 2000). 
 
As opposed to Schumpeter, the neo-Austrian School describes entrepreneurs as 
constant searchers for low buys and high sells who establish equilibrium in the 
society through arbitrage (Krizner 1997). Baumol (1993) argued that depending on 
the social structure and context, entrepreneurship can be destructive as well as 
constructive. If Weber’s ([1930] 1976) entrepreneurs were innovative but also self-
restrained, in Schumpeter’s view innovation and deviance go hand in hand in the 
economic process. As Ruggiero (1996) noticed, this view of entrepreneurship need 
not be applied only to law-abiding individuals linking Merton’s theory of deviance 
(1957) to Schumpeterian concepts underpinning innovation. Deviants ab initio 
because of the very innovative practices employed through deviations from the 
norm, entrepreneurs force or bend the societal rules pushing the boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour. In doing so, they take risks – another key concept in the 
entrepreneurship theory – of loss due to the unpredictability of the environment. 
Risk and uncertainty define their social role of promoting work and the circulation 
of goods, which becomes functional for the entire society (Ruggiero 1996). The 
risks of the enterprise justify the unorthodox practices and redeem actors in the eyes 
of the community. If in Schumpeter’s view, risk and uncertainty formed the basic 
conditions of individual entrepreneurial affairs, contemporary scholarship redefines 
risk as a potential social loss (Ruggiero 1996). 
 
Sociological concern with entrepreneurship can be linked with three broad themes 
(Aldrich 2005): first, entrepreneurs both reproduce and challenge the existing social 
order by constructing organisations that are embedded in the social and cultural 
environments reflecting societal conditions under particular historical circumstances 
(Stinchcombe 1965); second, entrepreneurship ensures the reproduction of the 
existing population through incremental additions to the organisational landscape 
(Carroll and Hannan 2000) and generates new populations by carving out niches for 
new organisations (Aldrich and Fiol 1994); third, entrepreneurship impacts on the 
levels of stratifications and inequality by generating high levels of employment 
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volatility through job creation and destruction. For example, between 1992 and 
1996, in the US 11.2 million net new jobs were created of which 70% were by new 
organisations (Birch 1997). 
 
The literature distinguishes between several types of entrepreneurs, but of particular 
sociological interest in the past decade and also for this thesis have been start-ups 
(Alrdirch 1994, 2005). The start-ups capture the chaotic and disordered flavour of 
the business-founding process or what Stinchcombe (1965) referred to as the 
liability of newness. Nascent entrepreneurs are individuals who initiate serious 
activities likely to culminate in a start-up or are giving ‘serious thought to a new 
business’ (Reynolds and White 1997) while engaged in at least one possible 
entrepreneurial activity (e.g., writing a business plan, looking for facilities, and 
acquiring know-how). Research on life course and entrepreneurship (Boeker 1988, 
Freeman 1983, Romanelli 1989) shows that first founding attempts are made in 
their late 30s or early 40s, as by then individuals would have accumulated enough 
work experience, financial resources (even though this variable does not seem to 
deter people) and the capacity to capitalise on knowledge and contacts gained in 
previous jobs (Becker 1993). Existing social networks provide the new entrepreneur 
with ideas about opportunities and sources of funding (Burton et al. 2002). In some 
cases, new owners can establish themselves in the same line of business, serving the 
same customers that they previously had while employed (Cooper 1986, Johanisson 
1988). In other cases, the practices, identities and vocabularies promoted by an 
occupational subculture can be transferred to other settings (Van Maanen and 
Barley 1984) as in the case of former police officers who find employment in 
security agencies. Nascent entrepreneurs can capitalise on their ethnic belongings 
and social position as migrants, thus becoming transnational entrepreneurs (Portes 
et al. 2002). The traditional niche of ethnic migrants has been small shop-keeping, 
but recent research (Saxenian 2001) pointed out that highly skilled Chinese and 
Indian engineers from Silicon Valley have built transnational social and economic 
networks in their original countries. Actors with an interest in “particular 
institutional arrangements and … leverage resources to create new institutions or to 
transform existing ones” (Maguire et al. 2004:657) are denoted by the concept of 
institutional entrepreneurs. DiMaggio (1988:14) argued that “new institutions arise 
when organised actors with sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to 
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realise interests that they value highly”, thus creating a “whole new system of 
meaning that ties the functioning of disparate sets of institutions together” (Garud et 
al. 2002:196). 
 
In order to build up new business ventures, entrepreneurs rely on various forms of 
capital (Bourdieu 1997). Contrary to any expectations, financial capital is not a sine 
qua non requirement for entrepreneurs. According to the US Bureau of the Census 
(1997) the majority of owners required less than $5000 to start their business and 
less than 1% required a million US$. In Germany, higher capitalisation was 
required presumably due to tighter regulations (Albach 1983 in Aldrich 2005). 
Formal sources of financial capital encompass private funding and bank loans. 
Generally, banks are reluctant to lend money to start-ups due to their loss history. 
By categorising new businesses as ‘high risk’ bankers demand higher interests 
while conducting extensive background checks on the founders and thorough 
assessments of financial viability. Most entrepreneurs find such practices oppressive 
(De Meza and Southey 1996) and thus tend to rely on informal sources of capital. 
Unsure of how the market would react, they choose to start small, avoid borrowing 
and rely on their own savings and personal assets (Aldrich 2005). For nascent 
entrepreneurs who are not already in advantageous positions, high status brokers, 
with more social or financial resources, power or prestige can facilitate access to 
opportunities (Aldrich 2005). 
 
Cultural capital (Bourdieu 1997) is directly linked to entrepreneurs’ capacity to 
secure cooperation, which in turn seems to be an essential feature for framing issues 
and communicating goals. Ruef et al. (2003) showed that half of new enterprises 
were set in partnerships, most likely in an attempt to share the risk and pool 
financial and social resources. Drawing outsiders into a project is based on 
entrepreneurial capacity to frame issues in a psychologically powerful manner 
(Gartner et al.1992) which encourages other people to believe in their competence 
and trustworthiness. The rhetoric of ‘charisma’ from the classical literature 
(Schumpeter 1942) returns in the theoretical discussions of leadership – for 
example, Czarniawska-Joerges (1989:7) talks about how leaders have a “capacity to 
confer a convincing interpretation of reality, an attractive vision of possible future, 
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and a prescription of how to reach that vision”. Cultural capital can be connected 
with social capital for skilful individuals, enhancing their reputation, which then 
becomes a form of symbolic capital. 
 
Cultural capital is a key variable in explaining which entrepreneurs mobilise the 
resources needed, directing the argument into issues related to gender. Research has 
shown that women own disproportionately small shares of business and are less 
likely to become nascent entrepreneurs (Reynolds and White 1997). Women’s 
enterprises tend to be small, concentrated in retails and service sectors (Baker et 
al.1997). Historical explanations for this state of affairs invoke women’s 
underrepresentation in ownership, their exclusion from the business discussion 
networks (Carter et al 1996) and restricted access to government contacts and 
information (Lerner 1997). If women are not likely to occupy key positions in the 
financial business sectors, they are unlikely to have equal opportunities with men in 
becoming entrepreneurs (Rytina and Morgan 1982). However, recent research has 
shown that women are on the verge of breaking the ‘glass ceiling’ in employment 
relations, despite their overrepresentation in junior jobs. 
3.3.1. New industries 
While Schumpeter raises the possibility that entrepreneurs could use their resources 
to create entirely new industries, it was Stinchcombe (1965) who offered a detailed 
sociological study of entrepreneurship in this area. He observes that “organisational 
forms and types have a history” (Stinchcombe 1965:153) being influenced by the 
social and historical context. The emergence of new organisational forms depends 
on three factors, he argues: technological innovation and social structural support 
for new developments, entrepreneurs’ access to power and wealth and the changing 
structure of labour markets. Thus, in establishing new industries workforce 
characteristics (e.g., level of skill and literacy), market forces (e.g., barriers to entry, 
density in a particular sector) and legal constraints (whether public or private/ 
corporate) shape entrepreneurial outcomes (Suchman et al. 2001). 
 
Neo-institutionalists (Aldrich and Fiol 1994, Fligstein 2001) develop this argument 
by showing that institutional factors also affect new industries. Organisational 
population growth depends on acquiring cognitive and socio-political legitimacy. In 
 88
the first instance, entrepreneurs need to create effective routines and competencies 
under conditions of ignorance, risk and uncertainty. Knowledge can be acquired 
through experimentation or creative recombination of existing models thus leading 
to cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). The concept refers to the situation 
in which an activity/product becomes so familiar that people take it for granted and 
other participants on the market tend to reproduce it. In the second stage, 
entrepreneurs need to establish links with external environment which might not 
acknowledge their existence or utility. Gaining socio-political legitimacy involves 
moral acceptance by conforming to cultural norms and values and regulatory 
acceptance indicated by new laws passed to oversee an industry. Even though these 
processes start at organisational level, eventually they involve the wider 
community, the state and in some cases international agencies. If heterogeneous 
interests are involved, diverse social groups can be affected and mobilised and 
entrepreneurial efforts to gain legitimacy made more difficult (Lounsbury 2001). 
Institutional theory reintroduces agency, interests and power into the study of 
entrepreneurship showing that the emergence of novelty is not an easy and 
predictable process, but the result of struggles, conflict and political negotiations. 
 
In an analysis of contemporary entrepreneurship in Romania, the importance of 
socialist heritage is undeniable (Humphrey 2002, Kaneff 2002, Verdery 2004). 
However, it is also important to acknowledge the impact of globalisation and 
contemporary capitalist processes as a counterbalance to path dependent theories 
(Burawoy 1999). The absence of business infrastructure, little private enterprise 
tradition and the hostile economic environment imposed the reorganisation of work 
(Johnson and Loveman 1995). 
 
 
3.4. Work as entrepreneurship 
 
 
Sociology of work owes a great deal of its insights to Chicago School contributions. 
According to Everett C. Hughes (1971) modern people’s identity is shaped by work, 
so what happens in the workplace has a strong impact on their lives, and is a 
reflection of wider societal influences. The richness of ethnographic material 
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produced by the American sociologists influenced three main areas: work and 
professions (Whyte 1943), informal relations at the workplace (Roy 1958) and 
work-related conflicts (Dalton 1959, Crozier 1964). Many of the findings and 
insights are still relevant. For example, White et al. (1970) showed that incentives 
played an ambiguous role on the production process: some individual workers were 
not affected, others responded but stopped at the level instituted by the group norm 
(“restricters”) and the third category (“rate busters”) went beyond the group norm. 
Nearly thirty years later Godard (2004) analysed the relationship between 
workplace practices and performance, concluding that there were no general ‘best 
practices’, only elements contingent upon the environment of the workplace (e.g., 
process of production, product, and labour markets). Donald Roy’s ‘Banana Time’ 
(1958) uncovered many of the everyday dramas at work. Thirty years later, 
following on Roy’s steps, Burawoy (1977) conducted his ethnography in the same 
Chicagoan factory showing that workers devised various ways to make the time 
pass. “Making out” had two aspects: being paid and finding something interesting 
to do. 
 
Subsequent research in the Marxist tradition spanned the area of industrial 
sociology focusing on conflict at work (Beynon 1985), the political economy of 
industrial relations and the “labour process” (employees’ behaviour, employment 
relations and issues related to work design and organisation). The pursuit of 
capitalist interests was considered to shape deep conflicts between employees and 
employers, but the relationship has not proven straightforward. For example, 
accumulation of profit requires a certain degree of alignment between employer and 
worker interests in the workplace (Burawoy 1985), without directly determining 
patterns of control and resistance. One of the most famous contributions in this 
tradition is Braverman’s deskilling argument (1974); he stated that capitalism was 
associated with a trend towards deskilling, through routinising and mechanising of 
work tasks. The increasing specialisation of tasks on which the division of labour 
was based (Durkheim 1892) thus became disintegrative under the influence of 
technical and social factors. 
 
Technology is a key dependent variable for explaining the process of accessing EU 
funding. A wide understanding of technology involves the tools, machines, control 
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devices as well as the principles, techniques and reasoning involved in carrying out 
the work tasks. It is no surprise that a range of social theorists have endowed 
technology with causal power (McLoughlin 1999), talking about the “iron hand of 
technology” (Kerr et al.1973) or the “remorseless working of things” (Hill 1988). 
The tragedy of technology completely absorbs individuals into the technical 
properties of the system, leaving no alternative to the apparently intrinsic evolution 
of the industrial society. Conversely, technology was seen just as a necessary, but 
not sufficient condition for social change. Hobsbawm (1985) pointed out that in its 
early days, the Industrial Revolution was rather primitive; hence the motor of 
change was individual motivation rather than new knowledge. Following this line of 
argument, McKenzie and Wajcman (1999) speak about the “social shaping of 
technology” showing that a wide range of social factors and interests influence the 
emergence of any given technology. 
 
Badham (2005) treats workplaces as “socio-technical configurations” defining them 
as “complex webs of human and non-human elements that are locally configured in 
context in the pursuit of formal and informal, explicit and implicit purposes and 
goals” (123). The proponents of actor-network theory (Latour 1987, 2005) abolish 
completely the division between human and non-human actors, arguing that the 
distinction between the natural and social world is a myth of modernisation; hence, 
machines, principles and people can be analysed as equivalent actors in a network 
of activities. Castells (1996) coined the term “information society” to describe the 
globalised dimension of change driven by the “networking logic” of information 
and communication technologies (ICTs), which makes global flows of capital more 
significant than local production of goods. The informational capitalism is a 
networked social order, challenged not by the working classes as traditional 
capitalism, but by a variety of social movements concerned to protect their 
identities instead of their material interests. This position was criticised for the lack 
of empirical evidence and inadequate theoretical grounding to show causal 
mechanisms (Watson 2008). 
 
Technological advancements shaped the work process and organisations through 
flexible specialisation (Piore and Sabel 1984, Sabel and Zeitlin 1997). 
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Microelectronics increased the speed of communication, leading to a breakdown of 
the mass markets associated with Fordism by providing customised products to 
specialised market niches, building trusting and cooperative relations with 
employees. These trends changed workers’ competences as they had to be able to 
use advanced technologies, be proficient across a range of tasks, be ready to switch 
among them as demand required, thus leading to up-skilling. However, when 
looking at marginal workers from the informal, underground economic sectors, it is 
difficult to support this argument. Individuals populating these marginal productive 
areas are low-paid, flexible workers, involved in precarious regular or irregular 
employment (Portes 1994). It is debatable whether the inhabitants of these worlds 
are increasing their skill levels enough to allow for upward mobility or remain 
trapped in poverty. The flexible specialisation theory was criticised because it 
underestimated the costs of computer-led production and oversimplified the mass 
production process (Williams et al.1992). 
 
Contemporary work practices are not only affected by skill level, technology and 
flexible specialisation but also by the blurring of the manufacturing-service 
distinction. Hybrid forms of work practices have been brought together in the fast 
food business. In these restaurants, labour is “highly rationalised and the goal is the 
discovery of the best, most efficient way of grilling a hamburger, frying chicken or 
serving a meal” (Ritzer 1998:178). ‘McDonaldisation’ is based on a mix of 
principles of mechanisation, rationalisation and routinisation (Ritzer 1998) leading 
to a new form of work organisation through standardisation, recognisable in other 
service sectors like banking or retailing. Bryman (2004) argues that the 
contemporary economic world moves towards Disney-isation of culture and society 
with the use of brands and themes of shops, hotels and restaurants. This adds a new 
dimension to work demands, as workers are increasingly expected to give theatre-
like performances. Du Gay (1996) shows that new work settings involve a ‘hybrid’ 
type of activity that combines economic with cultural functions. The service sector, 
he argued, develops its own technologies of work relating to interpersonal and 
emotion management thus enhancing particular skills aimed at ‘wining over the 
hearts and minds of the customers’. 
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3.4.1. The firm 
The arguments discussed so far shape the organisational form in which 
entrepreneurship takes place – the firm. Jensen and Meckling see the firm as a 
collection of contracts among employees, customers, creditors and so on, 
concluding that the firm is a “legal fiction”, consisting of “a nexus of contracting 
relationships” (1976:311). Burns (1963) proposed a two-type schema of firms: 
mechanistic – adapted to relatively stable conditions – and organismic – suitable for 
conditions of change and uncertainty, with a fluid structure and no clear division of 
labour. The latter inherits from Schumpeter’s conception of entrepreneurship in 
which innovation played a crucial role. 
 
In post-socialist countries, entrepreneurship takes place in small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME), as these are more flexible entities that offer learning 
opportunities (Aidis and Sauka 2005). Despite their short life span due to the lack of 
finance (EBRD 2002, Pissarides 2004), SMEs provide alternative employment 
opportunities. Many people who were left unemployed as a result of the mass 
privatisation programme chose to start a small business. For some, this was the 
beginning of a new career, stimulated by the fact that even rudimentary business 
methods obtained profit. This would explain the lack of match between previous 
formal training and the type of business– for example a teacher who sells apples. 
The transfer of previous illegal entrepreneurship experience proved successful for 
the new business sector. However, the SME sector in transition faced enormous 
challenges which ran from low purchasing power (Aidis 2006), lack of qualified 
workers, the complex issue of taxation (e.g., high level of taxes, the frequent 
changes to tax policies, the ambiguity of tax policies) (Aidis 2006, EBRD 2002, 
World Bank 1995), bureaucracy, corruption, and unfair competition from a large 
informal economy. Small businesses were more likely to be vulnerable in highly 
risky environments than their larger counterparts, as they lacked the finance and the 
lobbying power to exercise influence in more complex situations. Furthermore, EU 
market changes favoured large enterprises as opposed to SMEs and put extra 
burdens on SMEs’ budgets, as they had to comply with new technical standards and 
invest in skill development. 
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3.5. From ‘disorganised capitalism’ (Lash and Urry 1987) to 
‘unlicensed capitalism’ (Hobbs 2013) 
 
After discussing the modes of coordination of economic and social life emphasising 
the role of state and transnational regulations, the concept of entrepreneurship and 
work-related elements, the last section turns to analysing the blurred boundaries of 
economic activities. This section frames theoretically the fluidity of the economic 
and social process drawing on sociological, anthropological and criminological 
insights into informality, crime and post-socialism. The purpose is to explore the 
intersections between social structures, policies and enforcement practices in order 
to uncover the opportunities provided or created by entrepreneurs acting in the 
informal, illegal, illicit arenas. 
 
3.5.1. Disorganised capitalism (Lash and Urry 1987) 
The fragmentation of modern life is associated with “heterogeneity, plurality, 
constant innovation and pragmatic construction of local rules and prescriptives 
agreed upon by participants” (Best and Kellner 1991 in Watson 2008) and 
increasing movements of capital across the world that limits the nation state’s 
capacity of reaction. Such trends lead to “disorganised capitalism” (Lash and Urry 
1987) which entails a cultural addition to its economic dimension by fetishising 
cultural images that fragment traditional cultural and class identities. Globalisation 
is “a process of increased density and frequency of international or global social 
interactions relative to local or national ones” (Walby 2003:32) and ‘an empirical 
condition of the modern world’ characterised by complex connectivity. 
 
The effects of this pool of interdependence created by money flows, cultural 
transmissions or socio-technological connectivity are discussed by two opposing 
arguments: convergence and divergence. Convergence proponents argue that 
societies which are industrialised tend to become more alike in their societal 
characteristics and work arrangements (Bryman 2004). Divergence proponents 
oppose, arguing that despite globalisation, societies and work places retain their 
local flavour, even though they respond to certain globalising pressures. A third 
explanation recently emerged argues that increasing connections and similarities 
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around the world tend to co-exist with local and national differences, showing that 
societalisation (Walby 2006) is a matter of degree. The implications of these 
debates for economic sociology and the work process in particular are enormous as 
they uncover important assumptions about work relationships, work patterns, 
linkages between work, economy, and society, identity construction by and through 
work. 
 
3.5.2. Post-socialist capitalism 
The global trends of capitalism are shaped by the context of this research. Post-
socialism literature is convergent in stating that the former communist countries 
from Southern Eastern Europe have undergone profound changes in the last 20 
years (Humphrey 1994, Ledeneva 1998, Wedel 1998). Such changes were driven by 
the more or less sudden switch in the political system (from communism to 
democracy), in the economy (from planned economy to the ‘free market’), and in 
the general social arrangements. Recent trends in post-socialism scholarship have 
moved away from the over-generalised view of a coherent post-communist space, 
thus introducing the concept of ‘varieties of socialism’ (Frieden 2006), which draws 
on Soskice’s ‘varieties of capitalism’ (2001). 
 
Studies of socialist regimes show that these ‘varieties’ have been characterised by 
scarcity of consumer goods, the emphasis put on production rather than 
consumption, the marginal role of the markets, the centrally planned economy and 
the ambiguous character of property rights (Alexander 2004, Eyal 1998, Humphrey 
2002, Kornai 1992, Ledeneva 1998, Szlelenyi 1994, Verdery 2004, Yang 1994). In 
Romania, where the communist regime completely abolished private property, the 
issue regarding property rights was especially difficult. The introduction of private 
property, which followed the process of ‘de-collectivisation’ (1991), modified 
Romanian property rights and created ‘mutant’ forms of property – fuzzy property 
(Verdery 1996) or recombinant property (Stark 1994). According to Verdery this 
process took two main forms: property restitution, which meant giving back the 
houses and land that have been nationalised or collectivised during communism; 
and property creation, which involved “dissolving state ownership over goods and 
objects that have been created during the socialist period, by socialist means” 
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(Verdery 2003:5). The latter had dramatic effects, as privatisation meant the 
dissolution of the state-owned factories by giving shares of the company to the 
employees. With little training in the market transactions, people failed to seize this 
economic opportunity, the context favouring the ones who already occupied 
management positions. This situation was coupled with the breakdown of the 
communist party as the unique ruling body, which, according to Szelany (1988), 
encouraged a change in the elites. In this context, it is interesting to note that the 
path-dependence theory suggest that no change in elites accompanied this new 
political environment (Kornai 1992). According to others, this new political 
situation created ‘greedy elites’ or robber barons (Josephson in Whyte 2009) that 
use different forms of capital to make profit by unorthodox means. 
 
Rather than focusing on elites’ behaviours, this thesis puts the emphasis on the 
experiences and practices of people in everyday encounters. At the ground level, 
research shows that the development of informal networks of support to acquire 
goods in short supply (Wedel 1986, 1998, Yang 1994) led to the privatisation of 
public life through the practice of blat/guanxi which enhanced horizontal solidarity 
(Ledeneva 1998), which ultimately eroded the system from inside (Kotkin 1995). 
Moreover, the informal exchange supported the development of the second informal 
(but not necessarily illegal) economy, where trust played an important role in the 
etiquette of private arrangements (Wedel 1986). The vertical solidarity was 
developed through patronage ( Ledeneva 1998, Wedel 1986, Yang 1994). These 
practices perpetuated a low degree of confidence in bureaucracy and high trust in 
acquaintances. The socialist systems introduced the ‘ideology of equality and 
practice of difference’ (Ledeneva 1998) through the creative practices of 
bureaucratic avoidances. In the socialist regimes the social capital, enhanced by the 
belonging to multiple networks was the most important form of capital, followed by 
the cultural capital. Economic capital played only a marginal role due to the paucity 
of consumer goods (Eyal 1998). 
 
3.5.3. Unlicensed capitalism (Hobbs 2013) 
The modern trends that organise the social and economic life around the work 
environment determined the “formation of a community of practice structured 
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around various levels of entrepreneurial performance that are played out within the 
context of an unlicensed form of capitalism whose fluid parameters are defined by 
the chaos and fragmentation of deindustrialisation” (Hobbs 2013:232). This 
community of practice is based on fluid networks of ad hoc coalitions that perform 
their entrepreneurial work routines competently in illegal as well as legal markets. 
 
Sociological research has long documented that formal organisations not only 
provide opportunities for engaging in illegal/informal activities but sometimes 
incentivise it. In Men who Manage, Dalton (1959) argued that running a business 
involved more than the officially recognised resources. Most employees responded 
affirmatively when asked secretly if willing to help out the organisation if paid thus 
overriding issues of morality or illegality. Ditton’s (1977) ethnography of fiddling 
showed that the organisational setting and culture of the bread factory effectively 
encouraged and socialised employees into fiddling. More recent work on tax 
heavens (Shaxson 2011) emphasised that banks and other financial services are the 
main users of these jurisdictions, despite the common stereotype which placed 
professional criminals at the top. Ruggiero (2013) argued that offshore networks 
enable global financial crime by creating the appropriate secretive and stable 
environment, which has barely been reformed in the recent years. 
 
The ‘disorganised capitalism’ that characterises modern societies provided further 
opportunities for the engagement in ‘unlicensed capitalism’, especially for people or 
corporations in positions of power. For example, in 2012 the “London interbank 
offered rate” (Libor) was at the core of criminal activity conducted by several banks 
which had gained illicit profits by moving the exchange benchmarks. Barclays Bank 
agreed to pay £290 million to redress (Ruggiero 2013) outraged customers. One of 
the paradoxes of modernity is that an economic activity and its opposite are 
typically adopted and ‘marketised’ at the same time. Commenting on several cases 
of illegal waste dumping in Germany, Ruggiero noticed that “the development of 
illegal dumping services runs in parallel with the very increase in environmental 
awareness, the latter forcing governments to raise costs for industrial dumping, 
which indirectly encourages industrialists to opt for cheaper, if illicit solutions” 
(2013:43). The “dirty collar crime” against the environment was the result of 
successful cooperation between industry (to avoid taxation), officials (who provided 
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false certifications) and criminals who innovatively adapted their conduct to change 
the rules and become market leaders. For example, HSBC agreed to pay a record of 
£1.2 billion to settle allegations that it allowed terrorist organisations to move their 
financial resources through the system. Such unruly coalitions (Verdery 1996) 
produce financial gains that may eventually re-enter the mainstream economy, due 
to the instability of illegal markets. 
 
In this way, actors move competently between various registers of legality, 
sometimes within the frame of a working day, paying little attention to theoretical 
and legal boundaries. The same act can make one to be both a crook and a 
benefactor. As Carolyn Nordstrom (2007:99) put it “some profit by acting outside 
the law. And while they clearly profit personally, their actions often bring 
development to their communities”. In a twisted way, they “act as agents for 
development because they rebuild regional industry, donate to health and education, 
and bring in critical resources for the citizenry” (Nordstrom 2007:100). 
 
The work environment can be exploited for criminal purposes just as much as the 
business environment, giving rise to crime at work. White collar crime (Sutherland 
1983) is particularly apt to reflect the fluidity of profit driven activities due to its 
invisibility (both of the perpetrator and of the victim), highly skilled practitioners 
that mimic the legality of legitimate transactions, and the far reaching social 
damage (Ruggiero 2013). White collar crime refers to “a person of respectability 
and high social status” who commits crime “in the course of his occupation” 
(Sutherland 1983:7). Sutherland’s aim was to draw attention to the fact that crime is 
not committed only by the poor, uneducated, working class members of the society. 
Regardless of the definitional ambiguities (what does it mean ‘high social status’? 
and how is one to measure ‘respectability’), this account opened up an entire strand 
of sociological and criminological inquiry. Later on, Cressey (1953:12) showed that 
“some people in the position of financial trust violate that trust”; Clinard and 
Yeager (1980) showed that 582 corporations were responsible for 1,554 crimes; 
however, corporate violations were more difficult to uncover, due to their 
complexity (cf. Punch 1996:52). Maurice Punch used the concept of organisational 
deviance to denote “influential people who utilize their resources for ends which 
some other people define as illicit, and then, not infrequently, employ that power or 
 98
those resources to protect themselves from the consequences of social control” 
(Punch, 1996:57). As my research is not focused on the study of organisations, I 
prefer Ditton’s (1977, Henry 1978) concept of ‘occupational deviance’, which is 
more connected to entrepreneurial innovative capacity, informal rewards, the 
manipulation of work situations and employee deviance for and against 
organisations. 
 
Deviant careers within the business area are possible because “the norms of 
commerce are really qualified guidelines for a zone of acceptable activity, rather 
than categorical imperatives demanding particular courses of action” (Ditton 
1977:174). The structure and values of the society thus make the necessary 
references for analysing this matter. Romania’s recent history and socio-cultural 
logics of action in an unpredictable economy normalises deviant behaviours and 
promotes favourable definitions to bypassing the law. Armed with “large portions 
of justifying rhetoric from cultural interpretation of business” (Ditton 1977: 176), 
the new entrepreneurs do not consider themselves to be criminals, even though they 
admit their conduct “might have been related to an unusual business trend” (Cressey 
1953: 112). Irrespective of the definitional issue, success is a direct consequence of 
entrepreneurs’ social capacity for creating win-win situations. In order to be 
successful, one must be able to exploit the environment by both creating and using 
opportunities. “Knowing one’s business environment is crucial for the development 
of the business. In this sense, it is necessary not only to have a detailed knowledge 
of the market, but also of the criminal law in one’s operating area” (Klockars 
1974:186). Consequently, the criminal law becomes business law, as it can open or 
close business opportunities. 
 
The use of creative skills in handling both the formal and informal norms makes the 
job of control difficult for various reasons. The first difficulty is related to the 
complex nature of the business and the intricate arrangements concealed by the 
work of professionals who know well the weaknesses of business regulations. 
Professional lawyers, accountants, computer specialists have the job to hide any 
dubious transactions. Secondly, as Hobbs (1989) has shown in the case of East 
London, the police and the entrepreneurs are intertwined in the same culture, have 
the same cultural codes about what is admissible and not, thus making it difficult 
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not to sympathise/empathise with the businessmen. Thirdly, the state institutions 
responsible for control face legal deficiencies and administrative complexities, 
which make it hard to detect and punish dubious business arrangements. 
 
Throughout this section, I tried to provide some theoretical avenues suitable for 
analysing the way in which Romanian entrepreneurs access EU funding. My main 
objective was to put forward a dynamic understanding of reality and show that 
concepts like legal and illegal, formal and informal were imagined arenas of 
coherent behaviours. In practice, however, there were no shifting borders between 
formal/informal/illegal, as deviant behaviours relied on the same norms and values 
as the non-deviant. The process of accessing EU funding brings in contact different 
types of entrepreneurs who interact according to the guiding principles of 
profitability. In a highly unpredictable environment, they reduce the risks by relying 
on solidarity networks and old patterns of behaviour. In this environment, the face 
value changes for the value of one’s face, due to the netiquette of social 
arrangements. However, the social protocols of honouring are complemented by 
economic shrewdness, as the entrepreneurs “juggle numerous currencies, multiple 
businesses and complex commodity flows” (Nordstrom 2007:98). 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a theoretical framework for analysing the process of 
accessing EU funding in Romania. It argued that as an economic process, EU 
funding is a hybrid arena, situated at the intersection of three modes of 
coordination: hierarchies, markets and networks. The design of EU funding is 
regulated and monitored by transnational institutions and the national government. 
The second section looked at the impact of state on the economy and the role of 
development aid for economic development, showing that development funding is 
embedded in crime and corruption narratives. In this context, corruption becomes a 
rebranding mechanism that labels vernacular practices using transnational 
vocabularies of crime. The third section turned to analyse entrepreneurship and 
work-related literature, showing that entrepreneurs are the major vehicle of change, 
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leading to the set-up of new industries, which in turn change the work routines. 
Finally, section four connected economic sociology with criminology and sociology 
of deviance by looking at the blurring boundaries between legal and illegal arenas. 
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Chapter 4 
 
European Union funding as a top-down integration tool: 
Transnational and national constructions of development 
and control 
 
 
 
This chapter contextualises the research by looking at the history of EU funding and 
the incorporation of the EU provisions into in Romania’s domestic legal framework. 
It argues that EU funding, as an ideal type of economic activity, was shaped by EU 
anti-corruption policies, practices and assumptions that were incorporated into a 
new institutional establishment which systematically associated EU funding with 
corruption. High levels of control generated by suspicion coupled with a particular 
cultural entrepreneurial ethos that essentially shunned state interventionism led to a 
33.4% absorption rate in December 2013.11 The first part of this chapter provides a 
historical overview of EU funding at the transnational level showing that concern 
with corruption was rooted in the need to protect the financial interests of the EU. 
Conversely, as the second part of the chapter shows, in Romania anxieties about 
corruption have taken precedence over preoccupation with safeguarding the 
financial interests of the EU. 
 
 
4.1. European Union cohesion tools 
 
Designed with the aim of reducing the income disparities between EU member 
states, the common budget has always been an arena dominated by political fights 
and anxieties. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, expressed her 
concerns about the fair distribution of EU budget in rather harsh terms. Her famous 
injunction ‘I want my money back!’ pointed to the fact that the common European 
budget was based on a redistributive mechanism that designated some EU members 
                                               
11
 www.fonduri-ue.ro last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
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as net contributors and others in net receivers. Such concerns have survived and 
grown despite the fact that (or maybe, precisely because) the context has changed. 
Historically, EU regional policy was reflected in the European Regional 
Development Fund established in 1975.12 This was a modestly funded institution, 
heavily controlled by the member states that were in the EC at the time, which 
offered assistance for investments, industrial and service sector schemes. In the 
following three decades, the EU has undergone a process of enlargement (27 
member states presently), fashioned a unique financial unit – the euro - created 
transnational institutions of governance to regulate the social behaviour within 
member states and encouraged the free movement of labour within the Schengen 
area by abolishing internal borders. A few major geopolitical events have altered 
the European social order dramatically: the fall of the Iron Curtain, 9/11 and the 
2008 financial crisis had effective symbolic implications for European social 
identity and regulations. After bailing out Greece for the second time, the EU set up 
a permanent crisis mechanism to shore up the euro. 
 
Regional policy has also undergone major changes after 1979, through the addition 
of new structural funds (for example the Cohesion Fund established in 1993), and 
budgetary expansion (in 2011 the voted budget was €141.9bn). After the landmark 
reform in 1988 which introduced the idea of multi-annual financial framework, 
structural funds have increased their profile in the region. Based on the experience 
of the states that were in the EU 15, it was hoped that the countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe would become efficient multilevel governance structures 
impacting on the regional governance structures and policy practices thus reducing 
regional economic disparities. The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (which came 
into force on 1st December 2009) had a major impact on the EU budget in three 
ways: it gave equal powers to the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union in approving the EU budget, it simplified the budget control 
procedure and it introduced the multi-annual financial framework as part of the EU 
law (Milio 2010). The budgetary expansion and EU enlargement were accompanied 
by increased anxiety about the possibility of fraud in the new EU member states. 
                                               
12
 Unless stated differently, this section is based on the information provided by the EU official 
website: http://europa.eu/policies-activities/funding-grants/index_en.htm last accessed on the 22nd of 
August 2012 
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Such fears were expressed institutionally through the enforcement of strict 
regulations governing European funds. 
 
The preoccupation with safeguarding the financial interests of the EU started in the 
1970s at the European Union level. Up until that moment, regulating fraud against 
the EU was not considered a priority despite the great impact on the credibility of 
the European project that might have been anticipated. Nikodem (2002) argues that 
this was due to the fact that the Community budget was entirely dependent on 
member contributions and thus each state bore the responsibility for controlling 
fraud. However, after 1976, the Community developed its own resources (Szarek-
Mason 2011) and nearly twenty years later the EU managed to develop an anti-
fraud policy. As Simone White remarked (1999), before the 1990s, the EU 
approach to fraud control was rather ‘fragmentary’, as there was no common 
definition of what constituted fraud and it was left to the member states to define 
and sanction crime in relationship to the financial interests of the EU. 
 
Thus, at the European level, safeguarding the financial interests of the EU preceded 
the preoccupation with corruption (Szarek-Mason 2011). Corruption itself became 
an issue precisely because it was prone to facilitate fraud against the EU. The 
conventions and protocols adopted later strengthened this logic reflected 
institutionally in the activity of OLAF (Office Européen de Lutte Antifraud), which 
has gained more powers and has become more active in the area of corruption since 
2007. The Commission started to tackle the matter systematically after 2000, which 
coincided with the first Eastern Enlargement (2004) and reached new peaks around 
2007, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU. For example, immediately after 
the second Eastern Enlargement in 2008, the European Commission decided to 
withhold EU funding payments for Bulgaria. Reuters13 reported that: “The two 
reports on Bulgaria – one on [EU] funds and the other on judicial reform – were the 
harshest criticism ever levelled by Brussels at a member state. A report on fellow 
newcomer Romania, which also joined in January 2007, pointed to political and 
judicial obstruction of corruption trials but avoided sanctions.” 
 
                                               
13
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/23/eu-bulgaria-idUSL23102522720080723 last accessed 
on the 30th of January 2014 
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4.1.1. The EU budget and rules of funding 
The main sources of income for the European Union budget are custom duties, a 
proportion of the VAT (value added tax) and a percentage of each country’s GNI 
(gross national income). As such, I contend that an analysis of the EU’s budget 
mirrors the political influence and monetary participation of member countries. In 
2010, the EU budget showed €141bn in commitments and €122.9bn in revenues,14 
The EU has five main areas of expenditure: sustainable growth, agriculture, 
environment and rural development, EU as a global player and citizenship, freedom 
and justice. However, agriculture absorbs the biggest proportion of funds being 
allotted 43% of the EU budget. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The EU budget distribution for 2007-2013. 
Source: www.2007-2013.eu 
 
The EU budget allocation for a specific member state does not mean that funds are 
transferred directly to the member state in a particular year. The budget for a 
member state is included in multi-annual funds which aim to fulfil EU’s policies or 
objectives, such as the European Fund for Regional Development, Cohesion Fund, 
Social European Fund and the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund. These funds 
contain several operational programmes, measures and projects separately 
contracted. There are three types of payment made by the European Commission to 
the national authorities: pre-funding (advance funds which are paid automatically in 
the first 3 years of the financial timeline 2007-2013), intermediate payments (the 
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 According to the EU official website: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_detail/next_year_en.htm 
last accessed on the 11th of April 2012.  
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Commission refunds payments made by the state to the beneficiaries) and final 
payments. Accordingly, the financial allocation follows the n+3 communitarian 
rule, which means that the funding has to be spent in 3 years from allocation. 
Presently, Romania has already received the advance payments and is now at the 
stage of implementing the programmes in order to receive the intermediate 
payments. 
 
4.1.2. Romania: Two EU funded agricultures 
In 2009, Romania’s contribution to the EU budget was approximately €1bn, which 
represents an average of €45 per person. After redistribution, Romania received 
€2.6bn from the EU, which was mostly spent on agricultural development. At a first 
glance, it would appear that being part of the EU is a profitable state of affairs for 
Romania. However, things are more complicated than this and hide deeper 
inequalities. For example the financial support given to Romanian farmers is 30% 
less than what their Western counterparts receive (but this unequal financial 
contribution should be changed by 2016). The main reason is that Romania has a 
bigger but less developed agricultural sector than the older members of the EU and 
bigger financial commitments would have put too much strain on the EU budget.15 
In Romania roughly 30% of the population has agriculture as its main occupation - 
this is five times more than the EU average (INS 2013)16. Even though the trend is 
declining, this is still the biggest concentration in the EU member states. At the 
same time, the size of Romanian family farms is very small, with an average of 
three hectares per family unit and 2.6 million households with less than 1 hectare. 
Consequently, the biggest rural population in Europe is working in small 
uneconomical farms, producing only for their own consumption, thus maintaining 
subsistence agriculture. 
 
This subsistence agriculture encapsulates the social structure and problems of the 
Romanian rural environment such as hidden unemployment and poverty. In 2007 
the average income from agricultural activities contributed only 20% of the total 
income of the average household whose members had agriculture as their main 
                                               
15
 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_detail/next_year_en.htm last accessed on the 11th of April 2012.  
16
 http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/statistici/comunicate/com_anuale/ocup-somaj/somaj_2012r.pdf last 
accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
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occupation. These statistics point to the fact that one in two people lives below the 
poverty line (Luca and Ghinea 2009). 
 
Agriculture absorbed the economic shocks of the 1990s. An enforced de-
industrialisation was by followed high levels of unemployment for the urban 
population. At the same time, the property restitution which started in 1991 [after 
the communist period] re-established the old property rights. These two factors 
explain patterns of urban-rural migration which translated into an increase of the 
proportion of population working in agriculture from 28.5% in 1989, to 43.5% in 
2001, and 30% in 2005 (cf. Luca and Ghinea 2009). The former urban population 
that migrated to the rural areas had survived by cultivating small lots of land and 
producing for their own consumption. 
 
EU support for agriculture is manifested in subventions proportional to the size of 
the property. The Romanian policy regulating agricultural subsidies is directed only 
to farmers who own over one hectare. This policy left out the 2.6 million 
households with lots smaller than 1 hectare. Furthermore, small farms (between 1 
and 5 hectares) have received approximately 25% of the EU subventions. At the 
same time, less than 1% of farms with over 100 hectares have received over 50% of 
the subventions. The middle sector is under-developed using about 12% of the land. 
Consequently, the Romanian space shows two different agricultures: once 
characterised by subsistence (fragmentation of land and small lots, produce for own 
consumption, receive little or no support from the EU funding) and another one, 
highly competitive, based on big farms – hundreds of hectares and technologically 
developed (Luca and Ghinea 2009). 
 
Despite the need for investment, by December 2013, Romania managed to use only 
a small share – roughly 33%17 of its available funding. Figure 4.2 displays the 
absorption rates (June 2013) comparatively within the 27 EU member states, 
showing that Romania is at the very bottom of the list. Poland, for example, which 
has an agricultural sector comparable to Romania managed to access nearly 60% of 
the funding. Bulgaria, which also joined the EU in 2007, has a 40% rate, which is 
                                               
17
 http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/ last accessed on the 30th of January 2014.  
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quite extraordinary considering that the European Commission had suspended 
payments in 2008 amidst allegations of corruption and fraud.18 The situation was 
worse in 2011, when Romania managed to access only 9% of the EU allocation 
(SAR 2011). Such low absorption rates are perceived as a public loss because the 
EU will automatically withdraw any funds unspent by the end of the financial 
period. The availability of these funds (which are perceived as ‘God’s gift’), the 
time pressure and the Romanians’ incapacity to make use of this opportunity have 
acquired an inevitably pathetic tone, expressed in the rhetoric of ‘now or never’. 
Political analysts talk about “an absurd drama” (SAR 2011), government officials 
complain about the scarcity of good projects, while potential beneficiaries criticise 
the harsh economic conditions and the difficulty of the EU rules for structural 
funding. Instead of being a tool to achieve European cohesion, structural funding 
has become a symptom of disjunction through systematic associations with 
corruption. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Absorption rates of EU funding 
Source: http://insideurope.eu/taxonomy/term/35 
 
 
 
                                               
18
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/23/eu-bulgaria-idUSL23102522720080723 last accessed 
on the 30th of January 2014. 
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This first section has focused on the process of EU funding and showed how is this 
process designed and managed at European level. After establishing the link 
between corruption and EU funding, the following section turns to providing a short 
social history of Romania through the lens of corruption and entrepreneurship. The 
socialist shortage economy and the lack of private property had placed money and 
consumerism very low on the scale of social values. Social status and prestige were 
thus constructed on different criteria, like education, political affiliation or 
professional competency. The 1989 Revolution upset this stability and promoted 
new values. Money became a measure of success and introduced inequality into a 
world that had been traditionally constructed on the principles of egalitarianism. In 
a short time, everybody wanted to be a patron (boss/manager), have their own 
business, make money, and never again work for the State. The new culture 
favoured independence, entrepreneurship, material wealth, innovation and 
consumerism. 
 
 
4.2. ‘The same people’: Socialism and post-socialism 
4.2.1. Socialist entrepreneurs 
Before the end of the 1980s, Romania had established itself as a socialist country 
with a centrally planned economy emphasising production rather than consumption. 
In December 1989, Romania had a Gross Domestic Product of approximately 
US$53,691bn19 (an exchange rate of US$14,440 per leu20). The main sources of 
income for the state budget were industry and agriculture. Politically, the country 
was ruled by a Communist Party which was proportionally the largest in Central 
and Eastern Europe with over 3.7 million members (Stoica 2006). 
 
The socialist economy was inextricably linked with nationalisation, collectivisation 
and industrialisation. The first two phenomena transferred property rights from the 
individual to the state, so by the end of the regime the state was the main resource 
holder. Industrialisation was the chosen long term solution for increasing standards 
of living and reducing disparities between Romania and other European countries. 
                                               
19
 http://countryeconomy.com/gdp/romania last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
20
 http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/exchange_rate_regime/index.php?cid=27 last accessed on the 14th of 
December 2013.  
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Economic development was based on five year plans – an imitation of the Soviet 
gosplans – which encompassed a series of centralised planned actions that were 
designed to bring quick development (Verdery 2004). 
 
After the Second World War, Romania was in a very difficult economic situation: it 
had US$300M in war debt21 and it was almost entirely subordinated economically 
to the Soviet Union. The Romanian Communist Party (established first as a branch 
of the Soviet Communist Party and then an independent entity) started an 
accelerated process of industrialisation, which had ecological implications for the 
population as it changed the composition of the workforce from mainly agricultural 
to industrial workers. As the main industrial plants were situated in cities, the 
process of industrialisation led to rural-urban migration. In turn, this created a 
housing problem, which was solved by a rapid development of the construction 
sector. The industrialisation process was anything but smooth and this fact coupled 
with a severe energy crisis and the communist leaders’ ambition to pay the foreign 
debt in full worsened the standards of living (Verdery 2004) and prepared the 
ground for the ‘economy of shortages’ (Wedel 2003, Ledeneva 1999). 
 
The first decade after the Second World War was dominated by the installation of 
communism. Led directly from Moscow, this process entailed the systematic 
destruction of former political, social and economic elites through imprisonment 
and torture (Steinhardt 2005). By a twist of Fate the later move to convict the 
regime symbolically was led by Vladimir Tismaneanu, presently Professor at the 
University of Maryland as head of the Presidential Commission for the Study of 
Dictatorship in Romania. He is the son of Leonte Tismaneanu, a high profile 
nomenklatura member who was sent from Moscow in 1948 to build up communism 
in Romania. His nomination for the Commission stirred numerous polemics, with 
Paul Goma – a former political prisoner – openly expressing his mistrust of the 
“Bolshevik offspring”22 in his private journal, publicly available on the internet. 
                                               
21
 http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=article&did=FRUS.FRUS1946v04.i0006&id=FRUS.FRUS1946v04&isize=M last 
accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
22
 http://paulgoma.free.fr/includes/Despre_Tismaneanu_11_puncte_HTML.php last accessed on the 
14th of December 2013.  
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The final report does mention Leonte Tismaneanu as a prominent party member 
responsible for indoctrination.23 
 
The area where I conducted my research hosted the Pitești Experiment which is 
considered the most intensive brainwashing torture programme in Eastern Europe 
(Ierunca 1990). Pitești was the prison facility that aimed to ‘re-educate’ political 
prisoners in order to alter their personalities, discard their political or religious 
convictions to become fully obedient to the newly established regime. Nicolae 
Purcarea, who at the age of 17 was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on political 
grounds, recounted some memories from Pitești: 
 
“The main protagonist of re-education was Eugen Turcanu, himself a political 
prisoner. “He was Satan himself. He had a phenomenal, visceral hatred that you 
could read in his eyes […] He was athletic with a big jaw […]. There were two 
awful things: sole beating and testicle beating … and after they beat you up, if you 
faint they pour some water over you to recover and keep beating you up. Eventually 
they sent you by the shit bucket, throw down a wet rag and tell you to run on it. It’s 
like walking bare feet on broken glass…What a horrible invention! […]The main 
problem was they wanted you to turn from victim into executioner. This is what 
drove me crazy. I could not hit anyone, just couldn’t. ” There were two categories 
of prisoners: ‘bandits’ and ‘re-educated’ or ‘human and non-human’… Our 
comforts were pearl barley soup, poetry and praying. ‘Whoever shared the cell with 
a priest was lucky because that one understood God.” 
Nicolae Purcarea, political prisoner24 
 
Political imprisonment was offset by anti-communist resistance groups that hid in 
the nearby mountains. Led by Toma Arnautoiu, the Nucsoara group formed in 1949 
and the last members were arrested roughly 10 years later.25 In this case the entire 
village was a collateral collective victim of the communist regime because it 
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 http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf last accessed on the 14th 
of December 2013.  
24
 http://adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/video-nicolae-purcareasupravietuitor-fenomenului-pitesti-victima-
refuzat-devina-calau-marturii-despre-reeducarea-printortura-
1_5145820900f5182b851a2806/index.html last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
25
 http://www.rfi.ro/articol/stiri/cultura/rezistenta-anticomunista-munti-povestea-familiei-arnautoiu 
last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
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suffered the numerous raids and repeated tortures carried out to discover the 
location of the resisters. During the early 1990s there was not much sympathy for 
the surviving members of the anti-communist group who were blamed for bringing 
the attentions of the Securitatea down on the village (Althabe and Mungiu-Pippidi 
1994). 
 
The socialist state had slowly turned into a totalitarian state by the end of the 1980s, 
and was trying to regulate as many areas of people’s lives as possible: from 
establishing one’s residence (either through job, or forced residence), regulating 
migration (both within the borders of the state and outside) to imposing pro-natalist 
policies (through the 1966 Decree that prohibited abortion). Private property was 
virtually non-existent and the second economy was also strongly discouraged, 
especially after the 1970s. The ‘family background’ expressed by father’s 
occupation had a strong impact on children’s future and so, being part of the second 
economy had far reaching effects. For example, the children of self-employed 
individuals had lower chances of joining the Romanian Communist Party than 
peasants’ offspring who had ‘healthy origins’. They also had lower chances of 
entering universities and/or entering employment in urban areas. Without a 
university degree they had fewer chances for upward mobility in the Party 
hierarchy, as towards the end of the 1980s the leaders had come to favour 
educational credentials (Stoica 2006). 
 
“CB: I worked in this area for 30 years. Before joining the militia forces, I was 
county head of the Party. I grew up here. When I was your age or younger, I 
worked in a factory on a lathe…you know what that is?...it’s metal work. Eight 
hours a day, I mean eight hours per night. I used to do night shifts because I played 
football and did boxing day-time. After sports I would go to evening classes because 
I wanted to finish high school. My parents did not have the money to keep me in 
high school, so they sent me to do vocational training. When I got my job, I decided 
to do it on my own. After nearly fifty years in this area, I know pretty much 
everyone that matters…criminals, politicians, doctors, professors…you name it. 
And they know me. You know, people have not changed. It’s the same people that I 
played football with, or worked night shifts or met while a policeman. It’s the same 
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people, I am telling you! Some are richer, some are in prison, some are dead, but 
their children are here […] 
 
Maybe the sources of income are legitimate and I don’t mean legal, but legitimate. 
For example, it once happened around 1986 or 1987, don’t really remember…there 
was this guy, nice, smiley, good football player, he just liked drinking a bit too 
much. His wife shows up with a fur coat – now that’s expensive stuff. I sniffed 
around…nothing. I went and talked to him. The man was honest, I could see it. His 
in-laws sold three pigs and gave their daughter/his wife the money to buy a fur coat. 
It was not legal to raise pigs and sell them without paying taxes, but people from 
the country…what could I have done? My own parents were doing the same! I let 
him go but told him to keep the wife and the fur at home because people talk!” 
(CB, retired police officer) 
 
As the above quote shows, by 1989, Romania was an egalitarian society which did 
not allow for significant differences of material wealth between its members. 
However, the economy of shortages had polished the entrepreneurial skills of the 
locals. Goods in short supply were acquired through networks of friends and family 
and informal economy thrived – cognac, coffee and Kent cigarettes were typical 
products exchanged on the favour market that was essentially a non-monetised 
economy. A three digit car number was a sign of status reserved for members of the 
middle or high political echelons. The principle of common property ownership 
created a particular work ethic guided by the relationship with the product of work. 
On the one hand employees might have been less interested in producing good 
quality work, on the other hand they were more inclined to fiddle, steal, or 
appropriate components of the “common good”. In this context, the boundaries 
between the legal, licit and moral (and their antonyms) were blurred. People had a 
pragmatic approach to the concept of legality, considering first the morality and the 
necessity of an action and only later its legality. The entrepreneurial skills 
developed in this period related more to survival instinct, dissimulation, negotiating 
acceptable boundaries with authorities and developing strong networks of support. 
 
An essential point is that even though socialism has officially died on Christmas 
Day 1989 when Ceausescu and his wife were executed, people and practices have 
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continued in the same ways, ensuring stability over the transition period. “The same 
people” – the expression used by CB in the above quote - points to the reproduction 
of elites (Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1995) and cultural practices that form the 
contemporary habitus (Bourdieu 1986). The next section turns to the transition 
period showing the ways in which such cultural practices and forms of capital have 
been altered by the social and political context which eventually linked 
entrepreneurship with corruption. 
 
4.2.2. Entrepreneurs of transition 
The Revolution created an ‘open historical situation’ (Wittfogel 1981 in Wedel 
2003) because the breakdown of the former communist structure was replaced by a 
fluid state of affairs that created almost infinite possibilities. In this moment of 
massive transformation, when the political, economic, administrative spheres were 
undergoing irreversible changes, the most reliable entities proved to be the ‘old 
solidarity networks’. The networks of support that had acted as a safety net during 
communism now helped to ensure stability and provided access to various 
opportunities. And the most entrepreneurial individuals took advantage to make 
money, win influence and become successful. The savvy Romanian entrepreneur 
was reinvented in December 1989. 
 
Gigi Becali’s story26 
“…With the jeans it’s true…I brought a truck load of jeans [from Turkey]. Back 
then, for every $1 invested in Turkey, you got $15 return in Romania. I brought 
$40,000-$50,000 merchandise simply because I could not bring $150,000 
merchandise. I brought a load of pens and ten truck-loads of soap. And those 
walkmans… just because they were in a warehouse and nobody was doing anything 
with them. Did I steal? Did I force anyone to buy? Back then there were no taxes. 
The money that I got from trading, I invested in real estate. I bought a CAP [former 
state-owned farm] with $1,500 and sold it in a few months with $25,000 …I took it 
for animals, wanted to do agriculture…I was investing in agriculture, not real 
                                               
26
 This story is partially based on media review, partially on informal interviews.  
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estates. But then when some Greeks told me to sell for $25,000 and they gave me 
the money…I kept this a secret and invested all my money in real estate.”27 
(Gigi Becali) 
 
The story of Gigi Becali - entrepreneur, philanthropist, owner of Steaua Football 
Club, former member of the European Parliament, former deputy in the Romanian 
Parliament, party leader for The New Generation Party, currently imprisoned for 
corruption and fraud serving a three and a half year sentence– is an extraordinary 
recount of upward mobility that resembles Schumpeter’s ideal entrepreneur (1940). 
A Macedo-Romanian, like Gica Hagi, the great football player, and his godfather, 
he was a shepherd before the Revolution, inheriting the family business from his 
father who had established a flourishing trade with cheese, meat and wool under the 
protection of the communist elites. His family had moved from Albania to Pipera, 
near Bucharest in the 1950s. The communist regime required everybody to have a 
job, so Gigi Becali was employed in state factories as stoker and locksmith, despite 
having more than sufficient means to survive. One of his cousins, Victor Becali, 
worked in car repair, while the other one – Giovani Becali – was scalping cinema 
tickets during high school. After several attempts to leave the country, Giovani 
eventually managed to reach Germany in the 1980s. Without a stable income, he 
confessed to having tricked tourists into buying counterfeit Rolex watches.28 
Through his family connection with Gica Hagi, by 1989 Gigi Becali was already 
close to the national football team, providing players with milk, cheese and yogurt 
during their intensive training sessions. After the Revolution, he started importing 
jeans, soap and pens from Turkey, selling them in Romania. During the early 1990s 
he worked on fulfilling his father’s dream of having a big animal farm, with pigs, 
sheep, cows, thus investing extensively in parcels of land. Subsequently, these 
investments have proved a gold mine promoting him to the Forbes Romania Rich 
                                               
27
 http://adevarul.ro/news/societate/becali-recunoscut-facut-avere-vandut-blugi-adusi-turcia-
1_50acb4bd7c42d5a6638898e8/index.html last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
28
 http://m.romanialibera.ro/exclusiv-rl/documentar/doua-decenii-de-rafuieli-cu-justitia-ale-clanului-
becali-bisnita-evaziune-fiscala-spalare-de-bani-violenta-254728.html last accessed on the 14th of 
December 2013.  
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List (in 2012 he held the 22nd position, but after his 2013 conviction he dropped to 
the 85th position).29 
 
Around the late 1990s, Gigi Becali exchanged some of his land parcels with the 
Ministry of Defence, resulting in $892,758 damage to the state for which he was 
convicted in May 2013. In parallel he continued to fund Steaua Football Club and 
took it over in 2003, after an alleged discussion with another high profile Romanian 
Premier League figure – Mitica Dragomir – who told him that “being the president 
of Steaua is cooler than being the president of Romania”.30 Around the same period, 
Gigi Becali obtained control of several key former communist companies – e.g., 
munitions, farming, and metal factories. An outspoken figure with Orthodox beliefs, 
he donated large sums for church renovation, for Romanian monks at Mount Athos 
and also built over 300 houses for flood victims. He ran for president of the 
Romanian Republic in 2004 with his own party – The New Generation – but 
obtained only 1.77% of the votes. In 2006, after reaching the semi-finals in UEFA 
(Union of European Football Associations) with Steaua, he celebrated the success 
along President Traian Basescu, in Golden Blitz – a restaurant where only the 
presidential inner circle was allowed. The location was owned by Dorin Cocos, a 
major donor to presidential campaigns, whose wife Elena Udrea subsequently held 
various ministerial portfolios – ranging from Minister of Tourism to Minister of 
European Integration. 
 
In 2009 Gigi Becali was elected Member of the European Union Parliament but in 
2012 he resigned in order to stand as a candidate for deputy in the Romanian 
Parliament, and was elected with about 70% of the votes. In 2013 Gigi Becali was 
convicted and imprisoned for fraud and corruption. In the “Suitcase affair” he was 
accused of trying to bribe the players from U Cluj football team to ‘correctly defend 
their chances to the title’ against CFR Cluj, offering to reward them with 100,000 
euro per player if they won. This was the last match from Romanian Premier 
League – if CFR Cluj lost, Becali’s team, Steaua București, would have won the 
                                               
29
 http://www.gsp.ro/gsp-special/diverse/averea-i-a-scazut-dramatic-gigi-becali-a-picat-pe-locul-85-
in-topul-forbes-pe-primele-doua-pozitii-doi-patroni-din-fotbal-411773.html last accessed on the 14th 
of December 2013.  
30
 http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/ascensiunea-decaderea-gigi-becali-bisnita-blugi-laparlamentul-
european-apoi-celula-1_519b9d95c7b855ff56131d97/index.html last accessed on the 14th of 
December 2013.  
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title and gone on to play in the European League. The suitcase containing 1.7M 
euro was confiscated by the Anti-Corruption Directorate prosecutors in a restaurant 
in Cluj while the Steaua officials were watching the game and waiting to see if the 
reward was necessary or not. CFR won 1-0 so there was no reason to pay the 
rewards. Nevertheless, the prosecutors opened the file against Gigi Becali in 2008 
and five years later he has convicted to 3 years imprisonment by the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice after having previously acquitted him in 2012. 
 
Gigi Becali’s story shows how he used to his advantage the ‘openness’ of 
Romania’s post-communist situation which was partly an outcome of the 
breakdown of the legal system. Typically for this period, even though involved in 
illegal activities, he did not define himself as a criminal. On the one hand this 
relates to the practice acquired during communism of divorcing morality from 
legality. In those days actions such as coming late to work, performing an abortion, 
acquiring goods in short supply through informal means were not considered 
crimes. On the other hand, immediately after the Revolution, there was a general 
feeling that everything was permitted – expressed by Becali as “back then, there 
were no taxes”. This sense of legal pluralism was preserved long after the formal 
reestablishment of a regular legal system, and represented a fertile terrain to build 
the new entrepreneurial spirit. Another example from my fieldwork exemplifies the 
sense of legal pluralism and typical money making routines. After the Revolution, 
the new leadership in Bucharest decided to reward the people who made “a 
remarkable contribution” to overthrowing Ceaușescu by awarding them 
‘Revolutionary Certificates’. The criteria for awarding such certificates were not 
clear, but there were clear benefits to possessing one. The person who was awarded 
such a certificate was for example exempted from paying taxes. In no time, the 
certificates could be bought or received as a reward, to the point that some who 
fought against the demonstrators to preserve the communist regime and the 
Ceaușescu family obtained one. 
 
The story of Gigi Becali, as extraordinary as it may seem, is the story of 
entrepreneurship shaped by the context of social and economic transition, luck, 
intuition and egomania. Despite his phenomenal upward mobility, Becali’s ways of 
doing business are typical for the context. Entrepreneurship was also striving at the 
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lower levels. Some people chose technical unemployment31 before migrating to 
Western countries for work or setting up small firms. In other cases, people engaged 
in barter using the products of the enterprise they worked in. They stole or bought 
cheap products from their workplace (e.g., porcelain, screws, tyres, textiles), 
transported them abroad in their cars and exchanged them for whatever the local 
market demanded. The preferred destinations were Turkey (for jeans32 and gold), 
Hungary (for coffee and food) and former Yugoslavia (for cognac). Everything was 
for sale and everything could be bought. The demand side of the market was hungry 
for products, no matter what the products were: music cassettes, stereos, colour 
TVs, blankets, jewels, houses, cars, parcels of land to build houses, and so on. For 
example, at the beginning of the 1990s it was common to import merchandise from 
Turkey and sell it in Romania; later, it became unprofitable because, following the 
global trends (Ernst and Centre 2004), cheaper consumer goods had started to be 
imported from the Asian markets. For example, Geta, one of my respondents, 
recounts her experience with Turkish imports: 
 
“I was very brave…you know…I went to Turkey and imported stuff from there. 
Andrei [her husband] was busy at work; he did not want to join. But I went there by 
myself…sometimes with Dana [her sister]. We did not speak Turkish or anything 
but there were so many Romanians that you did not need to. We had this old Dacia 
Break…we would fill it with China porcelain or whatever worked on the 
market…sold it there and bought jeans and gold to re-sell in Romania. It depended 
what we were asked for […] I never left my job, no! I could not know what would 
happen…you know some transports were good, some were bad…I was left with 
merchandise…you could not count on that. Besides, I used to sell most of the stuff at 
work. Why would I have left my job?” 
(Geta, entrepreneur) 
 
                                               
31
 Technical unemployment was an intermediate step between employment and unemployment at the 
beginning of the 1990s when there was no demand for the products of a particular state enterprise. 
Basically, people were sent home and paid 70% of wages in order to be available on call. A 
subsequent move was to encourage people to choose unemployment by offering them to give up 
their jobs in exchange for a sum of money. Thus in the case of big socialist factories, the layoffs 
were done gradually.  
32
 Before the Revolution it was semi-forbidden to wear jeans as this iconic item of American apparel 
was a symbol of capitalism and decadence 
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Geta further explained that, as a low-level entrepreneur she was more vulnerable to 
market forces than Gigi Becali. She did small-scale trades using her private car, as 
opposed to the large enterprise described in the previous example. Furthermore, 
while Becali chose to diversify his business endeavours in order to counteract 
contextual uncertainty (by investing in real estate or football), Geta maintained her 
job in a state enterprise. The logic of practice (Bourdieu 1990) is similar referring to 
diversification of income sources, but the actual practices are very different, one 
emphasising complete change and attention to the market, the other one pointing to 
mixed strategies that combine the stability of a state job with the entrepreneurial 
endeavours required on the market. 
 
International affairs opened up further economic opportunities. During the 
Yugoslav war, illegal trade over the Danube flourished. Oil products such as petrol 
and diesel fuel were in high demand, but other products like detergents could be 
smuggled as well. Between 1992 -1995 and in 1999, while Romania maintained an 
embargo with Yugoslavia, illegal commerce flourished in the areas around the 
border between the two countries. During that period there was a common 
expression: a face embargoul (doing the embargo) which referred to breaking the 
embargo. Fortunes were made quickly (some were also spent quickly) with the help 
of the border guards who were willing to turn a blind eye for a small fee. The 
embargo had negative economic effects of the national economy (Romania lost over 
US$2bn), but it created a market for smuggling and helped the local economy and 
daring entrepreneurs, who were not afraid to risk their freedom for money. 
 
The macroeconomic reading of Gigi Becali story 
The macroeconomic version of Gigi Becali’s story is rather bleak. The recession 
that started in 1991 was undoubtedly prolonged by high rates of inflation. As shown 
in Figure 4.3, in the first few years after the Revolution, the inflation rate increased 
over 30 times from 5.1 in 1990 to 170.2 in 1991. The trend continued until 1994, 
when the economy registered the first significant decrease from 256.1% in 1993 to 
136.7% in 1994. The economy was not stable enough to sustain such a decrease, 
though, and in 1994 the inflation increased five times compared with the previous 
year. After that peak it constantly decreased, which shows that the economy slowly 
became more stable and displayed signs of sustainable growth. The UN Economic 
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Commission for Europe argued that the main source of inflation in the first years 
after the Revolution was the financial loss caused by the state-owned enterprises 
that had not been privatised (Tinerama, no. 146, September, 1993). 
 
 
 Figure 4.3: Inflation rate in Romania 1990-2010. 
Source of data: Institutul Naţional de Statistică (National Institute of Statistics)33 
 
This economic evolution is also reflected in the changes in the National Gross 
Product (Figure 4.4). Similar with inflation rate, the Gross National Product (GNP) 
had negative changes until 1993, switched to positive values until 1996 then only to 
revert to negative until 2000. The 2008 crisis impacted Romania in 2009, when the 
GNP had a negative value of 7.1 as compared to the previous year. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: The evolution of the National Gross Product in Romania 1990-2010. 
Source of data: UNECE34 and businessday.ro35 
 
 
As shown in Figure 4.5 the GNP and the inflation rate displayed similar patterns 
throughout the twenty year period from 1990 to 2010. The high and low values 
                                               
33
 http://www.insse.ro/cms/rw/pages/ipc.ro.do last visited on the 11th of April 2012.  
34 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/publications/Countries_InFigures2011.pdf last visited 
on the 11th of April 2012. 
35
 www.businessday.ro last visited on the 11th of April 2012.  
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occur at about the same times and most likely connected to the process of 
privatisation. 
 
Figure 4.5: The evolution of GDP and inflation rate between 1990 and 2010 
 
Another important indication of the economic state of the country is the exchange 
rate between Romanian Leu and US Dollar. Historical trends show constant 
depreciation of the Romanian currency from 1990 till 2003. Immediately after the 
Revolution, the value of US dollars increased dramatically as compared to the 
Romanian currency – from 21.56 in 1991 it reached a value of 33, 200 in 2003. This 
represents an increase of over 15,000 times in the value of the dollar (Figure 4.6). 
During this period the Romanian currency was depreciating so fast that most people 
preferred to keep their savings in US dollars and conduct market transactions in 
foreign currency. A side effect of the depreciation was the proliferation of exchange 
and mortgage houses (Chelcea 2002) during the early 1990s. Exchange houses 
offered better prices for foreign currency than the banks and had the advantage of 
never being short of cash. The figures below show the evolution of the Romanian 
Leu – US Dollar exchange rate from 1989 till 2010. In 2005, the government 
decided to denominate the Romanian currency, by four digits. The Romanian Leu 
(ROL) became RON. Figure 4.7 shows the evolution of the RON – US Dollar 
exchange rate between 2005 and 2010. 
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Figure 4.6: Yearly average official exchange rates: Romanian Leu per US Dollar 1989 – 2005 
before denomination. 
Source: Banca Naţională a României (National Bank of Romania)36 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Yearly average exchange rates: Romanian Leu per US Dollar 2005 - 2010 after 
denomination. 
Source of data: Banca Naţională a României (National Bank of Romania)37 
 
 
The economic recession had serious social effects, especially because privatisation 
raised the rate of unemployment. As shown in the Figure 4.8 below, tipping points 
occurred in the years 1994 and 1999 (around 11%). In only three years, the 
unemployment rate increased from 1.8 in 1991 to 11 in 1994. These periods 
coincide with the successful privatisation of various state enterprises and with the 
closing down of the former socialist industrial plants. In a more stable economy, 
former workers in these organisations would have been absorbed by other sectors, 
but in the Romanian context this was not the case. The state offered little protection 
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 http://www.bnr.ro/Raport-statistic-606.aspx last visited on the 11th of April 2012  
37
 http://www.bnr.ro/Raport-statistic-606.aspx last visited on the 11th of April 2012  
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for this category of people who were particularly vulnerable as they were not 
psychologically ready to become jobless (since the communist regime required 
everyone to have a job) and had few skills to face the market economy, especially in 
such volatile conditions. Some have argued (Popescu-Birlan 1994) that it was the 
slow pace of privatisation that led to the gradual increase in poverty. However, this 
seems unlikely, as other countries (e.g., Poland) who have adopted a faster pace, 
sometimes known as ‘the shock therapy’ displayed similar patterns (Tisenkopfs 
1999). Even though Romania’s progress has been slow, it has improved somewhat 
in the last years (until 2008 when the financial crisis hit Romania too) as shown in 
the figures above. The unemployment rate started to decrease from 10.2 in 2002 
reaching a minimum of 4.3 in 2007, the GNP had small but positive values for eight 
years between 2000 and 2008, while the inflation rate decreased constantly. 
 
Figure 4.8: The evolution of the unemployment rate in Romania between 1991-2010. 
Source of data: Agenţia pentru Ocuparea Forţei de Muncă (National Agency for Employment).38 
 
 
Trading the state’s wealth: Privatisation 
The unique environment of Romania in transition was marked by the creation of 
property rights. As Katherine Verdery remarks (2004), this occurred through two 
distinct processes: property creation and property restitution. The first involved the 
transfer of goods from state property to private property, the second giving back 
property to its former owners (or their offspring). 
 
The right to private property was established by the 1991 Constitution (Article 44 
from the fundamental law guarantees the right to private property). In an attempt to 
avoid the abuses of the previous regime, the new Constitution introduced a unique 
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 http://www.anofm.ro/evolutia-ratei-somajului-in-perioada-1991-2010 last visited on the 11th April 
2012. 
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feature unique among European states, by stating that in Romania, the licit character 
of wealth was presumed (Art. 44 (8)). This constitutional article creates great 
confusion presently and makes the prosecutors’ job more difficult in the cases of 
inexplicable wealth. It basically makes the confiscation of wealth impossible unless 
there is proof of a crime beyond reasonable doubt. The recent discussions about 
revising Art. 44 (8) were not able to amend or replace it, which shows that the 
memories of the communist regime are still fresh and the anxiety of repeating the 
abuses is too strong. Ironically, my fieldwork shows that a direct consequence for 
EU funding accession is that applicants could launder money under the protection 
of this article. In order to obtain EU funding, an applicant is required only to prove 
the co-funding capacity for a project, but not to prove that the sources of income are 
legitimate. This aspect allowed, for example, several former migrants who have 
worked abroad illegally to successfully access EU funding. 
 
One of the most important laws regarding privatisation, Law 58, was passed in 
August 1991. It stipulated that the newly created Fund of State Property was the 
main body in charge of the complete privatisation of the state-owned commercial 
companies. The Fund of State Property was granted 70% of the companies’ capital 
and was required to privatise them within seven years. The rate of inflation made 
this task impossible and the privatisation process was inevitably prolonged. By the 
end of 1993 an OECD report indicated that only 2% of the industrial sector was 
privatised (Romania Libera 28 August 1993 in Popescu-Birlan 1994). 
 
Privatisation offered opportunities for quick enrichment for those entrepreneurial 
enough, who had some financial means or were in key hierarchical positions, like 
Gigi Becali. A typical mechanism was to set up a private company and then transfer 
funds from the state company to the private firm. Another common route to 
enrichment was to consistently manage a state company so badly that it went 
bankrupt (some examples are further discussed in Chapter 8). Eventually the 
company would be sold (usually to the former manager) at a very low price. Both 
cases rely on bribing the departmental directors and the officials in order to turn a 
blind eye. By the end of 1993, the investigators had uncovered 1, 200 serious illegal 
acts committed by the managers of several state-owned companies (Adevarul, 1st 
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December 1993). Various Romanian officials and managers took advantage of the 
lucrative opportunities offered by privatisation (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). 
 
4.2.3. The agricultural sector: Rural entrepreneurs 
 
“RB: What do you say about getting your land back? 
NB: It’s horrible! I resent it! What am I going to do with it now? I am old, don’t 
have the strength to work hard anymore. My children have left for the city…they 
don’t care about land, they have good jobs there. Here, in the country, the living 
conditions are not good […] It’s very expensive to have my land back. Since I can’t 
work, I need to hire people, but now everybody is busy with their own land, and 
those who don’t have are ripping me off. I pay 50 Romanian Lei per day for hoeing 
plus food and tuica [Romanian brandy]. I need three people for five days. My 
pension is a little over 200 Lei. You do the calculations. Oh, and it’s not only 
hoeing…it’s also planting, picking, putting fertiliser…These people in government 
know nothing about our work, otherwise they would not have given the land back 
[…]. Besides, I don’t need so much corn or flour or plums for tuica… This old one 
[points to her husband] is already drinking too much! 
RB: But then, why do you keep working the land? I mean…if you don’t need all 
these products… 
NB: [rather shocked by the idea] Oh, but that is impossible! What would people 
say? We would be the laugh of the village! No way! 
RB: But aren’t you a bit glad to get your land back…you are proprietar [an owner] 
now! 
SB: Yeah, yeah…proprietar with no means to work what I own…” 
(NB and SB, peasants) 
 
Re-establishing property rights through reinstating former owners was received 
with mixed feelings in rural areas. As the above quote shows, the direct 
beneficiaries of this political move found themselves in the rather awkward position 
of ‘owners with no means of production’. This results in hybrid economic relations 
that are based on both monetary and non-monetary arrangements – in this case 
money and food are part of the payment. The land encompasses various forms of 
 125
capital – much less financial (as it is not a profitable business) and much more 
symbolic (because any work is done with reference to the entire community). If the 
purpose of household economy was producing for its own consumption (Polanyi 
1957), the above quote shows that in an attempt to maintain their symbolic capital 
people produce more than they need. The plus-value (Dobrogeanu-Gherea 1910) is 
not sold on the ‘free’ market because people have no access and no skills to trade on 
such a market. Instead, it is sold to intermediaries who travel the villages in old 4x4 
cars shouting that they buy corn, plums or wheat. Intermediaries prefer to buy the 
raw products because they are cheaper, can be sold fast and the buyer can control 
the quality of the final products. 
 
Law 18/1991 re-established the property rights of the former owners or their 
offspring. Rural areas were greatly impacted as the law dismantled the former state-
owned farms (The Agricultural Cooperative of Production or CAP). The new 
owners wanted to work their parcels but lacked the technological resources that 
were the property of the former CAPs and the workforce (as everyone had their own 
lot, it was very difficult to find people to work the land, especially in the absence of 
technology). A side effect of restitution was the fragmentation of rural space, which 
is even now characterised by a small farm structure where work is performed with 
traditional tools due to the lack of access to machinery, buildings, financial capital 
and low income levels. This phenomenon has had long term impacts, especially for 
accessing EU funding, as described in the previous section. 
 
Recent surveys (INS 2005) show that in rural areas the level of unemployment and 
poverty has been consistently higher than in the cities. The dismantling of the 
industry has left the residents of rural areas with agriculture as their main income. 
However, agriculture is a highly volatile business in Romania, as it is highly 
dependent on weather, is performed with rudimentary tools and thus the 
productivity is very low (Braverman et al. 1993). People produce for their own 
consumption and are involved in ‘subsistence agriculture’ as it is called. According 
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to the UN Economic Commission for Europe in 2009 agriculture contributed 7% to 
the GNP and employed almost one third of the Romanian population (29%)39. 
Creating an agricultural sector based on individual farming was more a political 
move than an economically wise decision. The goal of the new leadership at the 
beginning of the 1990s was not to make the production system more efficient, but to 
change the social paradigm and introduce variations in the ownership structure. In 
this process of paradigmatic change (from socialism to neo-liberalism) little 
attention was paid to the social costs of such policies. 
 
Closely linked to the privatisation process, the agricultural changes were interpreted 
by theorists as an attempt to revitalise entrepreneurship in rural areas (Repassy and 
Symes 1993), a strategy to transform agriculture (Gomez y Paloma and Segre 1993, 
World Bank 1992, 1993, 1995), a post-communist way to divide common property 
(Oberschall 1991), the manifestation of an intention to make this sector more 
efficient (Nelson 1993) or even a new religion (Luckmann 1993). Irrespective of the 
theoretical explanation provided, most scholars agree on the fact that generally the 
privatisation and the transformation of agriculture in Southern Eastern Europe led to 
a gradual economic recession. 
 
4.3. Political changes 
 
“How could a kid born in the Soviet Union know that he would die in the EU? Not 
even the Kremlinologists knew this. Only my grandma knew it. She used to say: my 
family lived in three (meanwhile four) countries without ever having left the 
village”. 
(Vasile Ernu, writer40) 
 
The Romanian transition entailed first and foremost a shift from Eastern – Russian 
political influence to Western – EU political affiliation. The political spectrum did 
not offer a wide array of options, as most parties had similar agendas which were 
developed top-down, from the parliamentary debates, and not from grassroots 
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 http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/stats/publications/Countries_InFigures2011.pdf last visited 
on the 11th of April 2012.  
40
 http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/amintirile-unui-kominternist-intelesul-politrucilor-
1_52ebb486c7b855ff56f66a07/index.html last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
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constituencies. These agendas have been heavily shaped by the international 
constraints regarding the supremacy of the neoliberal market and EU accession. 
Consequently, political parties had few policy options but to keep the substantive 
policy commitments related to the EU entry, without destroying their own 
popularity (Miroiu 2013). 
 
The successful competitive strategies have been those of 
technocracy, populism, and nationalism—the last two tending 
to be combined. These political discourses dominate because 
they offer politicians maximum flexibility to look as though 
they are competing, even if all governments face remarkably 
similar state policy pressures. 
 (Grzymala-Busse and Abby Innes 2002: 68) 
 
In most cases, competing politicians chose populism as the preferred tactic for 
winning elections. This resulted in a highly personalised debate about “corruption, 
personal competence, property restitution, relatively trivial disputes within political 
parties or with neighbouring states, and disputes over who was on which side of the 
barricades in the communist period” (Grzymala-Busse and Abby Innes 2002: 67).  
 
These harsh economic conditions created a sense of dissatisfaction among the 
population who blamed the political class for the lack of improvement in the 
standard of living. This was augmented by the fact that second-echelon communist 
leaders had become the democratically elected representatives of Romanians. Some 
argued that nothing had changed, that it was like a Romanian saying went: “Aceeaşi 
Mărie cu altă pălărie” (“The same Marie [personal name] with a different hat”). A 
well known journalist, Ilie Serbanescu, wrote at the time: "The restoration is total. 
All the [leading] positions are occupied by people of the past who cannot help 
thinking like they used to think in the past...The reform process is completely 
blocked..." (22, no. 35 (137)). Furthermore, certain elites, largely from the former 
nomenklatura had gained access to resources by combining financial capital with 
political influence. These “unruly coalitions” are “loose clustering of elites, neither 
institutionalised nor otherwise formally recognised” (Verdery 1996:193), “less 
institutionalised, less visible, less legitimate” than political parties (1996:194). A 
good example is the energy sector which is dominated by a small group of 
individuals who buy cheap energy from the state and sell it at increased prices to the 
public (Ionita et al. 2003). 
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However, the effect of the collapse of the former communist regime and the 
transition to the market economy was doubled by the pressure to conform to the EU 
accession criteria. Romania initiated the formalities to join EU in the early 1990s 
and put forward its candidacy in 199541 when it was still under the social democrat 
governance (Social Democrat Party - PSD). The European Commission had 
monitored Romania since 1997 and published an annual Regular Report since 1998. 
In 2002, the EU had announced that Romania and Bulgaria had not managed to 
advance rapidly enough in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and would not join EU 
in 2004. However, it was decided to support both countries in joining EU in 2007 if 
they fulfilled all the criteria for accession. 
 
The European Commission set up special mechanisms for Romania and Bulgaria to 
ensure that they both internalised the acquis communautaire. For Romanian 
governments faced with shrinking budgets this was an enormous task and the costs 
for setting up the state administration and its capacity to implement these laws were 
huge. Before even contemplating joining the EU, Romania had to harmonise its 
national legislation with EU standards on every possible front from banking 
regulations to victims’ protection. All these had to be integrated into the legislative 
framework and implemented with the highest possible priority. The European 
Commission has acknowledged since 1999 that Romania had fulfilled all the 
political criteria for accession. However, the Regular Reports pointed to problems 
on Chapter 24 – Justice and Home Affairs, especially in regards to corruption. The 
Commission described corruption as ‘widespread and systemic’, stating in strong 
terms that it impeded on the country’s capacity to develop and fulfil the acquis 
communautaire (EC 2005, 2006). 
 
4.4. Corruption 
 
The past decade was characterised by the globalisation of anti-corruption policies in 
the form of international conventions. These conventions provided the international 
community with a standardised set of anti-corruption instruments. Romania has also 
                                               
41
 Romania submitted its application for EU membership on the 22nd of June 1995 and started 
negotiations for accession on 15th of February 2000, following the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999.  
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become part of the global anti-corruption movement by signing the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the Stability Pact Anti-corruption 
Initiative (2000), the OECD’s cooperation framework on the fight against 
corruption42 and adopting the Council of Europe Civil and Criminal Law 
Conventions on Corruption. The expansion of the anti-corruption domain was 
accompanied by the multiplication of international/regional partnerships that 
monitored and incentivised the implementation of anti-corruption reforms. For 
example, in 1999 Romania became part of GRECO (Group of States against 
Corruption), took an active role in the Council of Europe’s Programme of Action 
against Corruption and is under European Commission’s close supervision through 
the Mechanism of Cooperation and Verification. 
 
The anti-corruption reforms followed a generic pattern based on a set of tools and 
ideas provided by the international community (Rothstein 2010). The ‘one size fits 
all’ approach (Kpundeh 2004: 127) prescribed a “holistic anti-corruption strategy” 
(Galtung 1998, Langseth et al. 1999) which involved among others, institutional 
redesign to increase accountability, legal reforms, an independent media, public 
awareness, an active civil society, economic liberalisation and deregulation (World 
Bank 2000, Transparency International 2000, UN 2004, UNDP 2004). The semantic 
expansion of corruption was doubled by the development of the anti-corruption 
market. By 2003, a rough estimation of the global market size for anti-corruption 
was around $100M, “making anti-corruption an industry in itself – an industry in 
which Central and Eastern Europe was a valuable market niche” (Brayane 2004:17). 
By 2009, the fight against corruption, particularly in Eastern Europe and Former 
Soviet Union, had become a multi-billion dollar industry (Brayane 2009). But while 
governments and donors spent more and more to fight corruption, only a tiny 
fraction of the police cases dealt with this crime. For example, the EU has spent 
millions of euro on cross border anti-corruption programmes, but Europol was 
involved in only a few cases of corruption (Brayane 2009). 
 
However, the Brussels driven Europeanisation did not always have the expected 
results. Despite the complete institutional redesign and the substantive changes of 
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 http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup4/2011-August-
22-  last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
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legislation, analysts duly noticed that the laws were not implemented and the newly 
set up institutions were not used (EC 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, Freedom 
House 2005, SAR 2011, TI 2009). In other words, Europeanisation lacked 
substance. The resistance to change, doubled by the pressure put on the government 
to over perform reform perverted the democratic mechanisms of governance. For 
example, the 2003 EC country report for Romania noticed an abuse of emergency 
ordinances, while the 2006 EC country report mentioned 105 emergency ordinances 
approved between February and July 2006. More recently the government has 
employed the vote of confidence and had assumed responsibility for passing 
particular items of legislation; in 2009 the government wanted to assume 
responsibility for the adoption of the new Criminal and Civil Codes, invoking the 
urgency of the matter (eventually, the codes were adopted through ordinary 
procedure in September 2010) (TI 2011). Even though these are extraordinary 
measures, they have been normalised by overuse. This situation creates not only a 
perpetual sense of urgency, but at a more subtle level, subverts the democratic 
process because these are all mechanisms to bypass parliamentary debates. 
 
Over the past few years (2005-2012), the anti-corruption ethos that aimed to reform 
the entire society was translated in awareness campaigns, emergency lines, opinion 
polls, workshops, meetings and training sessions. Using PHARE (Poland and 
Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) funding, the Ministry of 
Justice conducted an €1.8M anti-corruption campaign between 16th October 2007 
and 27th February 2008. The Ministry of European Integration ran an anti-
corruption campaign with the slogan ‘I do not give bribes – I do not take bribes’ 
(E.U. nu dau spaga – E.U. nu iau spaga) – based on word-play – the message was 
that EU members have nothing in common with corruption. The General Anti-
Corruption Directorate (DGA) and The National Integrity Agency (ANI) 
popularised the telephone “green line” (TelVerde) that citizens can use free of 
charge to report corruption crimes committed by ministry employees, while The 
Fight against Fraud Department (DLAF) focused on preventing fraud to the EU 
budget. Partnerships and strategic alliances between civil society and state 
institutions were established. For example, DGA conducted several such exercises: 
“Let’s get it over with the envelopes!” (“Gata cu plicurile!”) in cooperation with 
Romanian Postal Service (on the basis of a protocol between the two institutions all 
 131
envelopes and receipts issued for the public use will be stamped with anti-
corruption messages and information about the green line), “Travel the anti-
corruption route” (in cooperation with RATB, the Bucharest Public Transport 
Network), “I am financing slavery” (in cooperation with a local branch of Pro 
Democratia Association) (RAI Steering Committee Report 2010). 
 
These campaigns, the international pressures expressing the necessity of adopting 
the acquis communautaire and the demands of the international financial 
institutions and business community had transformed corruption into a catastrophe. 
Thus, the ‘fight against corruption’ had become a complex endeavour, with moral 
entrepreneurs (Becker 1963) making use of various strategic approaches. So far, 
Romania has had four anti-corruption strategies, all of them reflecting a change in 
the ‘fight against corruption’. The first anti-corruption (SNA I: 2001-2004) strategy 
aimed to align the political and penal semiotics by making the legislative 
framework in relationship to corruption as comprehensive as possible. The second 
strategy (SNA II 2005-2007) aimed to establish the institutional architecture 
dedicated to corruption control and prevention. The third anti-corruption strategy 
(SNA III 2008-2011) was mainly focused on the vulnerable sectors and local 
administration. 
   
4.4.1. Did we have corruption before [the Revolution]? 
“What corruption before 1989? Don’t even think about it! There was the 
[Communist] Party! Securitatea was following your every move! Forget it! Maybe 
some low-level train ‘godfathers’, nothing more…” 
(CB, police officer, retired) 
 
“Of course we had corruption! It was the Communist Party that was most corrupt! 
You really don’t know anything about this area? About our history? In these 
mountains, we had the resistance movement. Fifty kilometres down the road was the 
Pitești experiment…” 
(AB, former political prisoner, retired) 
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“Yeah, there was corruption, but it wasn’t a priority for law enforcement. As 
prosecutors, we did not care about it…it was a work-related thing…nothing 
fancy…” 
(IA, prosecutor, judicial inspector, retired) 
 
“What does corruption mean? I do not understand it. We did not use this word 
when I was younger” 
(NB, peasant, agricultural worker) 
 
The above quotes display a wide range of opinions regarding corruption that 
effectively contextualise its meaning through association with the state apparatus 
and its priorities. A more detailed law enforcement perspective is offered by CB 
below. 
 
“Well, it was a bit different…I mean…we did not have as it is today…The thing is 
we had it in the Criminal Code, but it was not our main thing, as it is now. You 
know, we work on performance indicators, always have… always will… So for me, 
as an economic police inspector there are some targets I needed to achieve. For 
example… a certain number of frauds, embezzlements things like that. I did heavy 
stuff, not corruption…back then that was for pussies…you know beginners. They 
would usually realise towards the end of the month that they did not do much work 
and would go on train raids…everyone travelled cu nasul [‘with the godfather’ - 
the common denomination for train ticket inspectors]. Get some of those, make a 
criminal file and move on…easy, no? As for me…no! I had long complicated files, 
with high profile individuals. Trick was that everything was state property back 
then and everyone was in the [Communist] Party, so you had to be careful. Nobody 
got to be an accountant or a director of a major factory if they were not quite high 
up not only in the Party hierarchy, but also in the Securitate.” 
(CB police officer, retired) 
 
Formal attempts to define corruption in Romanian legislation are rather recent. 
Before the Revolution, the 1969 Criminal Code mentioned corruption only in two 
distinct cases: corruption of a minor for sexual purposes and corrupting a witness to 
commit perjury (Banciu et al. 2005). None of these cases had much in common with 
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the present understanding of the concept, which generally referred to ‘the abuse of 
public power for private gain’ (TI 2002). The crimes that incorporated the modern 
meaning of corruption were instead grouped under chapter ‘Crimes in relation to 
work’ and were decoded as bribe giving, bribe taking, trade in influence and 
receiving of undue goods (Articles 254 – 257, Criminal Code 1969). However, the 
concept of corruption was never used in relation to these crimes (Banciu et al. 
2005). 
 
CB explained that, as a work-related offence, corruption was not a priority for law 
enforcement. He elaborated this point by saying that in order to achieve the 
performance indicators law enforcement would ‘raid the trains’. This point relates 
to a typical practice of cultural travelling routines – when I was a student, my 
friends and I rarely bought train tickets as we considered it an unnecessary expense. 
When travelling in large groups, we would all contribute with small amounts 
leaving a male friend to stay on the train corridor smoking and wait for ‘the 
godfather’ [train ticket inspector]. The corridor was full of contributors. When the 
‘godfather’ arrived, the person would give the money and point to the group. With 
an expert eye, the conductor would count the money and quickly assess if the 
amount correlated to the size of the group. This cultural practice was transformed 
by law enforcement into a crime category the effects of which could still be traced 
in the early 2000s. Research conducted by the Romanian Institute of Criminology 
(Banciu et al. 2005) analysed the sentencing patterns for corruption cases and the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the offenders (covering all the definitive 
sentences for this crime between 1998 and 2002). The results profiled train 
conductors as a high risk category for corruption offences, further noticing that 77% 
of convictions were directed at offenders with no previous record, approximately 
one quarter of the offenders convicted for corruption were unemployed (23.8%), 
about 10% were low-level security staff and 5% were retired. 
 
These patterns of crime did not match the perception of levels of corruption (which 
portrayed corruption in Romania as ‘systemic’ according to TI (2002, 2003)) and, in 
2000 the Parliament adopted “Law 78/2000 on preventing, discovering and 
sanctioning of corruption acts”. Apart from establishing in penal language the 
modern understanding of corruption, this law effectively linked it to EU funding. 
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Four major types of crime were included under the umbrella of corruption: offences 
mentioned by the 1969 Criminal Code (bribe giving, bribe taking, trade in influence 
and receiving of undue goods); crimes associated with corruption (a rather 
heterogeneous category including crimes as diverse as fraudulent privatisations, 
bending the rules of crediting, commercial operations incompatible with 
professional status, the abuse of confidential information, blackmail if committed 
by certain categories of civil servants); other categories of crimes regulated by the 
Criminal Code or special laws that were in direct relation or assimilated to 
corruption (such as the abuse of power against the public interest); crimes against 
the financial interests of the EU (this last category was included to respect the 1995 
PIF Convention).43 
 
By 2003, anti-corruption was delivered in packages. For example, Law 161/2003 
(along with Law 52/2003, branded as the Anti-corruption Pack) criminalises 
conflict of interest; institutes prohibitions for high public servants (members of 
government, state secretaries and sub-secretaries, prefects and sub-prefects) to issue 
administrative or judicial acts that would produce a benefit for themselves, their 
partners or any relative to the first degree; defines new categories of 
incompatibilities for public servants; modifies and brings clarifications to other laws 
regarding corruption (e.g., Law 78/2000, Law 188/1999). 
 
Despite the multiplication of legal provisions, the justice system was not achieving 
the desired effects, because it continued to target ‘petty corruption’ as proven by 
conviction patterns (Banciu et al. 2005). Corruption’s insidious nature demanded an 
even more comprehensive approach to eradicate not only low-level offences, but 
also high-level corruption committed by high status officials that heavily affected 
the public budget. This need for expressive justice (Garland 2001) was encapsulated 
in the setting up of the National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (NAPO) in 
2000. Since then, anti-corruption institutions have proliferated – e.g., General Anti-
Corruption Directorate (2005), National Integrity Agency (ANI) and in connection 
to it, the National Council of Integrity (CNI) set up in 2007, individual anti-
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 This law was revised and completed several times (by Law 161/2003, Law 521/2004, emergency 
ordinance 124/2005 issued by the government etc.), only to include more offences under the heading 
of corruption. 
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corruption units within various ministries – showing that this crime had become too 
important and its control demanded a specialisation of the justice circuits. 
 
The National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (NAPO) was set up in 2002 at 
the request of EU and with €2M funding through a PHARE programme. As the aim 
of NAPO was to target high-level corruption, it focused on cases involving sums 
higher than €100, 000 or high-ranking officials. As a distinguishing feature, 
NAPO’s institutional complement included not only prosecutors, but also experts 
and its own judiciary police. To reflect the importance attached to this institution, 
NAPO prosecutors were paid 40% more than their counterparts in the General 
Prosecutor’s Office on the grounds that they were dealing with high-level 
corruption (Freedom House 2005). This, coupled with the lack of transparency in 
the selection procedure, created a lot of resentment in the prosecutorial body 
(Freedom House, 2005:82). Ironically, the main anti-corruption institution was 
suspected of corruption. 
 
The new codification of corruption was accompanied by the reform of the justice 
system in order to ensure a rigorous application of the legislation. The disturbance 
in the traditional economy of illegalities required a system that would administer 
force differently in order to maintain the new adjustments. In the line with the 
orthodoxy of transparency, the justice establishment had to be made independent, 
predictable and impartial, which was a rather surprising turn to Jeremy Bentham’s 
classical criminology (Maguire et al. 2002). In a 2010 report, the Superior Council 
of Magistracy (CSM 2010) admitted that its programmes were designed to take into 
account the funding opportunities and the international reports about the Romanian 
justice system. This short term political calculation was bound to affect the long- 
term development of the Romanian justice system by over-specialising a significant 
body of magistrates in particular areas. 
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4.4.2. ‘Moral entrepreneurs’ (Becker 1964): Anti-corruption as an electoral 
tool 
The 2004 elections were won by a liberal-democratic coalition and the new 
government decided that fighting corruption was its main priority (EC, 2005). 
Monica Macovei, a former prosecutor during communism and a former member of 
civil society during the transition, was appointed the new Minister of Justice. She 
emerged as the leader of anti-corruption movement. Her efforts were highly 
appreciated by the European officials and on the 1st of January 2007, Romania 
joined the EU. Romanian officials were less appreciative of Mrs Macovei’s efforts 
and the Senate voted a motion against her which led to her dismissal. Her successor, 
Mr Tudor Chiuariu, spent less than a year in office and was dismissed by President 
Basescu when charged in a corruption case (Mungiu-Pippidi 2009). 
 
Due to the EC’s close monitoring, the institutional architecture continued to change 
according less to the needs of the system and more to the international 
recommendations. However, as opposed to the previous stage, the new government 
was more focused on developing preventive partnerships between public 
institutions and the civil society. For the first time after the Revolution, NGOs were 
regularly invited to participate in public decisions. Furthermore, there was a marked 
change in the style of management of the public institutions. Ministers started to 
behave like managers of private companies and a new economic ethos was brought 
to the justice system. Public institutions were governed according to strategies and 
action plans, which designed clear lines of action and strict deadlines. Independent 
audits were conducted and matters of cost-effectiveness were considered of utmost 
importance. And all these changes were somehow determined, reported, explained 
or justified through corruption, or to be more precise, through anti-corruption. 
 
A criminological story44 
The Romanian Institute of Criminology was set up in 2002 by Rodica Stanoiu – 
who was the Minister of Justice and was dismantled in 2007 by Monica Macovei – 
Minister of Justice. Rodica Stanoiu was a criminologist who had conducted part of 
her PhD under the supervision of Denis Szabo in Canada. When she took over the 
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 This story is based on informal interviews conducted with various employees of the Ministry of 
Justice. It also builds on my experience as a researcher in the Institute of Criminology (2003– 2007). 
However, at the time, I was already studying abroad.  
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Justice portfolio, she decided to set up this institute within the Ministry of Justice, 
following a Central European institutional tradition. A research institute under the 
umbrella of the Ministry of Justice was considered highly unusual, but it was 
generally accepted that criminology was a branch of Law, hence appropriate 
institutionally. Perceived as ‘Stanoiu’s nest’ the Institute produced a number of 
research projects and organised some conferences. After the 2004 elections, when 
Monica Macovei was installed as Minister of Justice, she changed all the directors 
at the Ministry and brought in former collaborators from civil society. This was a 
typical practice in the Romanian bureaucracy, which essentially signalled lack of 
trust in the previous government. Personal animosities between Macovei and 
Stanoiu determined the former to dismantle the Institute of Criminology. The 
official argument was that due to the lack of financial resources, the Ministry of 
Justice structure had to be reduced and most inefficient units dismantled. In order to 
assess the efficiency of the Institute, the evaluators assigned the symbolic value of 1 
Romanian Leu to each page of published research and further conducted a cost-
benefit analysis by comparing the value of the research with the total of 
maintenance costs (e.g., wages, rent, consumables). This analysis proved beyond 
any doubt that the Institute was not an efficient unit and on these grounds it was 
dismantled in 2007. This example shows how anti-corruption narratives can be 
instrumentally used to frame personal relations. 
 
4.4.3. Monitoring corruption in an EU member state 
When admitted into the EU in 2007, Romania was not considered fully prepared, 
with corruption being flagged as the main problem. Consequently, the European 
Commission set up the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (MCV) to ensure 
further close monitoring in this area. This Mechanism does not have a particular 
deadline and is designed to stay in place until all the benchmarks are considered 
achieved. The third anti-corruption strategy (SNA III 2008 – 2010) focused on the 
fourth benchmark established by MCV (which advised the government to adopt 
further measures to prevent and control corruption in the local administration), but 
it also took into account other national and international evaluations (e.g., GRECO, 
TI). Aiming at building the institutional capacity of the anti-corruption 
establishment, the strategy used the language of risk to define the vulnerabilities of 
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specific sectors, while emphasising the need to conduct further research to identify 
additional dangers and organise anti-corruption awareness campaigns. 
 
Subsequent country reports started to praise the law enforcement agencies. For 
example, the 2010 EC country report noticed the effectiveness of institutional 
cooperation between General Anti-Corruption Directorate (DGA) and prosecutors 
in tackling complex cases of corruption, which was partially attributed to the high 
level of expertise displayed by the DGA police officers and a positive reflection of 
DGA’s specialisation and its exclusive focus on corruption. In 2011, DGA played a 
major role in a spectacular investigation conducted by the DNA which targeted 
border police and customs officers. This success pointed to a “new level of 
institutional capability” (EC country report 2011), which justified the hopes that this 
institution could become involved in more complex cases involving public 
procurement or organised crime. 
 
After Romania had joined the EU without having solved its problems regarding 
corruption, the European community expressed anxiety that the new member state 
would use corrupt means to affect the financial interests of the EU. The sense of 
discomfort was related to the fact that the pre-accession funds were interpreted as 
training for the local elites, who would later use corrupt means to commit fraud on 
the common budget. For this reason Brussels officials expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the volatility of the institutions dealing with the investigation of 
EU funds, even considering the activation of the safeguard clause. The main 
problem derived from the fact that the local counterpart of European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF), the Department for the Fight against Fraud (DLAF), has been 
shaken by a decision of the Romanian Constitutional Court (CC) in November 
2009, which declared the legal basis of DLAF unconstitutional. The legislation was 
later amended, but in 2011, the EC noticed that DLAF’s administrative capacity and 
the quality of administrative action remained weak (EC 2011). 
 
The international anxieties related to the enhanced possibility of fraud to the 
common budget are mirrored by the national anxieties regarding the possibility of 
losing the funds. In order to attract more funding, a new institution was set up in 
September 2011 – the Ministry of European Affairs. Apart from that, there were 
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also shifts in other bodies that dealt with structural funds. The Authority 
coordinating the structural instruments was moved under the direct supervision of 
the Prime Minister in February 2011 (to give an impulse to EU funding), while the 
PHARE Office (OPCP – The Office for PHARE Payments and Contracts) was 
transformed in a directorate within the Ministry of Public Finances, losing some of 
its responsibilities in favour of the Schengen and the Post Accession Programme 
Directorate. 
 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
 
The transition from socialism to capitalism represented a massive change for 
Romanian society with short term high social costs and long term negative 
consequences for the economic development. Romania entered late modernity 
under the close supervision of international organisations (EU, IMF, World Bank) 
which designed and monitored this change in an attempt to align Romanian society 
with the international standards (‘integration from above’). This capitalism-by-
design impacted the society through price liberalisation, opening up of the market, 
and massive privatisation. These aspects shaped people’s economic behaviour and 
determined the adoption of various strategies of coping with uncertainty. As active 
and creative actors of European integration, Romanian entrepreneurs learned to 
adapt their old patterns of behaviour to the new economic opportunities in order to 
improve their life trajectories. This process of behavioural adjustment, or 
‘integration from below’ was shaped by the necessity to adopt the EU acquis 
communautaire. In the case of Romania, the EU conditionality was fashioned using 
narratives of corruption. 
 
The process of accessing EU funding has been shaped by anxieties regarding 
corruption. The official fears regarding the possibility of fraud to the European 
budget translated in high levels of control and numerous bureaucratic delays. In 
short, the negotiations regarding structural funds were encapsulated by over-
regulation which contained a set of rules that were to guide the access of funds 
while shaping a new entrepreneurial spirit. However, few Romanian entrepreneurs 
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had the financial capacity to co-fund the EU projects (Chapter 8) and the patience to 
understand all the rules involved in this process as detailed in the next chapter. 
Predictably, this led to a small absorption rate, which was interpreted as a failure of 
the authorities and debated in inevitably pathetic tones. Unpredictably, it reinforced 
the segregation of agriculture by creating a small, profitable and productive sector 
that attracted high levels of funding and a large subsistence sector that could not 
attract funding. Thus, over-regulating structural funding has made accessing EU 
funding more a political than an economic process. 
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Chapter 5 
 
The process of accessing EU funding: EU ideal types, 
Romanian inventors and innovators 
 
 
Building on the previous chapter that describes the context of this research as 
characterised by striving entrepreneurship and shaped by transnational anxieties 
regarding the possibility of defrauding EU citizens’ money, this chapter aims to 
analyse the process of accessing EU funds in Romania. It follows both the logic of 
the process and the actors involved, showing the dynamics and interactions between 
them. Throughout the chapter I argue that the actors are influenced by multiple 
frames of meaning (regulatory, political, economic), act at the intersection of 
different markets (e.g. market for consultancy, market for tourism, market for 
construction), move between registers of eligibility, compliance and profitability 
and, in doing so, they use a wide range of practices (formal, informal, legal, extra-
legal and sometimes illegal). The chapter has three main parts. I begin with the 
‘official story’ and show how the process of EU funding is presented by the official 
guides. The second section is a case study focusing on a public actor who had 
accessed EU funding. The main reason for putting this case forward is to show the 
entire process through an applicant’s eyes. The last part of the chapter, builds on the 
theoretical framework and puts forward the model that will guide the analysis of EU 
funding throughout the thesis. 
 
5.1. Structural funding for rural development 
 
The National Programme for Rural Development for 2007–2013 designed by the 
Romanian Ministry of Agriculture is the main document detailing the destination of 
the EU funding45. This ‘master document’, designed on the basis of European 
regulations regarding rural environment, has three main aims: increasing the 
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 www.apdrp.ro last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
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competitiveness of the agricultural sector; improving the environment in the rural 
spaces; improving the quality of life in rural areas and supporting the diversification 
of rural economy. For this third aim, Measure 313 aims to support the development 
of agricultural tourism, increase the number of jobs and diversify the sources of 
income. The Agency for Rural Development and Fishing, (APDRP, henceforth ‘the 
Agency’) is the main bureaucratic organisation. 
 
The eligibility criteria and the ground rules for accessing funding are elaborated and 
presented to the public in the form of a Guide published on the main website. 
According to the Guide, Measure 313 is addressed to both public and private actors. 
The main difference lies in the principles of funding: a public actor can receive up 
to 100% financial support and no more than €1.000, 000 and a private actor can 
only receive up to 50% financial support and no more than €200, 000. Until January 
2014, a total of 307 projects were submitted amounting to nearly €600M, roughly 
70% were selected and 44% of the applicants managed to sign a contract with the 
Agency.46 Typically, Measure 313 works on the principle of reimbursement – 
which means that the beneficiary is expected to use private sources and be 
reimbursed at a later date, on the basis of justificatory documents. In 2009, as a 
direct effect of the financial crisis the Government of Romania introduced the 
possibility of receiving funds in advance, thus reducing the applicants’ financial 
burden.47 
 
5.1.1. How to access structural funding for rural development? 
 
“Ah, but it’s very easy! Prepare your funding application, submit it and if it is good 
you get the money. If not…you make it better!” 
(D, bureaucrat) 
 
“I heard that the EU gives money…free money…for young farmers. I submitted two 
funding applications because the first one was not good. The second was awarded 
the maximum grade in June. The Agency sent me a letter sayin’ that I was eligible 
for 40, 000 euros. Now…what to do? I set up a firm to be able to get the money. 
                                               
46
 http://www.apdrp.ro/ last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
47
 http://www.apdrp.ro/ last accessed on the 14th of December 2013.  
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When I got back to the Agency they told me it was a mistake. The file was still 
perfect, they said, but I was not a ‘young’ farmer anymore. That knocked me out! I 
was 35, ready to start my business and …now that. After everything that happened 
to me I think that if you don’t have o pila [connections] you can kiss EU funding 
goodbye. My file stayed in a drawer for months until I was not a young farmer 
anymore. 
R.B: How did the Agency explain this? 
M: They blamed it on the system [software] saying that it makes the selections at the 
national level, not really checking the age thing. That could only be done when I got 
there to sign the contract. As for the delay …lack of workforce.” 
(M, applicant) 
 
There is a wide gap between the two stories and this gap will be explored in the rest 
of the chapter. According to the official guide, there are seven main steps involved 
in receiving this type of funding, as shown in the Figure 5.1 below. The first stage 
involves filling in the funding application and bringing in the required documents to 
prove the necessity and the viability of the project. Once the funding is approved, 
the applicant signs the contract with the Agency and may start the procedures for 
public procurement (if a public actor) or acquisition of materials/provider of 
services (if a private actor). Assuming a private actor does not need funds, he/she 
may proceed with the work and prepare a file to be reimbursed. 
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Figure 5.1: The application process as described by the EU Agency in Romania 
Source: APDRP (Agenţia de Plăţi pentru Dezvoltare Rurală şi Pescuit), Application Guide for 
Measure 313, 2010 
 
 
Official narratives are usually not adequate for portraying the complexity of human 
endeavours. In the case of EU funding though, they are particularly apt to hide 
complexity, justifying the bureaucratic behaviour in a language based on EU 
idioms. The ‘iron hand of technology’ (Kerr et al. 1973) encapsulated in the 
software, the lack of human resources and the irreversibility of the rules effectively 
construct the machinery of bureaucracy along the lines described by Weber ([1922] 
1968). Even the ‘mistake’ is interpreted as being produced by ‘the system’ whose 
rules nobody can really understand (Latour 2005, Ledeneva 2013). M decoded this 
situation through narratives of corruption, pointing to pile [connections]. He further 
explained that he would have needed someone to ‘take care’ of his file, informing 
Step 7
Repeat Step 6 until the end of the works and justifies the use of the advance to the Agency
Step 6
With the first instalment secured, the beneficiary pays for the works, prepares and hands in the documentation to receive 
the next instalment from the Agency
Step 5
Hand in the warranty letter to the Agency
Step 4
Request to the guarantee funds to guarantee all the bank loans
Step 3
Request a warranty letter from a commercial bank in order to receive advance funding
Step 2
Sign the contract with the Agency
Step 1
Hand in the application at the Agency
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him earlier about the situation. In his interpretation corruption meant breaking down 
the bureaucratic machinery into warm social relationships (Gupta 1995, de Sardan 
2006). 
 
The next section takes this points further through a case study of a public actor who 
had sought and secured funds to build a road in a small village. This example 
uncovers the dynamics of the application process and shows that each step entails 
numerous actions which will be further discussed in the third section. 
 
Cornelia’s road: The public actor 
Mrs. Cornelia is the mayor of a Romanian village with approximately 15, 000 
inhabitants. She is a cheerful, large woman in her late 50s. Cornelia’s husband died 
about 10 years ago, leaving her with a big household to run and two children to 
raise. Nowadays, she splits her time between the activities typical of her two roles 
(landowner and mayor). 
 
Cornelia represents the archetypal progressive woman. Her job trajectory is 
characterised by upward mobility, moving from contract teaching to accountant and 
then mayor. Within the universe of the village, Cornelia has reached the highest 
position and has maintained it for 20 years. Her attachment to the place is 
remarkable, as she has not even been subjected to the typical rural-urban migration 
which characterised the 1970s and 1980s. This is materialised occupationally 
through the physical work of the land and socially through everyday practices, 
behaviours and symbols. 
 
Madame Mayor has ‘healthy origins’48 and displays both signs of stability and 
flexibility. Cornelia was offered to run for a position ‘closer to the centre’, which 
she refused: 
“I need to be near my home. If I leave who is going to take care of the potatoes and 
grapes? […] 
R.B: Maybe if you have more money, you could hire someone to do that. 
                                               
48
 The expression “healthy origins” was widely used during the Communist period to denote people 
with non – bourgeois origins (whose parents were peasants). In this case, the Bourgeois were all 
citizens that could be in any way associated with elites (be it financial, social, intellectual or big land 
owners).  
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C: No, I have to be here myself. There are no people to hire. Everybody is abroad, 
working to make money. They went to Spain to pick strawberries, while their crops 
back home are not taken care of. The village is mostly left with old people, because 
all the young ones have left.” 
 
Her enduring logic and principles were contextualised behaviourally. For example, 
in order to maintain her position, she has changed her party affiliation frequently. “I 
did not want to go to Vadim [extreme right] as I don’t like him. Let’s hope it won’t 
be necessary! […] It’s a bit ridiculous as I am the same person, but I had to be 
careful. If the party in power changes, the mayors have to change too, otherwise we 
don’t get any support from the judet [county]. Centrul [the centre] does not like 
people who don’t have the same political colour. And we all know that the light 
comes from the centre, don’t we?” 
 
Cornelia’s frequent allusions to ‘the Centre’ indicate her recognition of a specific 
kind of authority and decision-making mechanism. ‘The Centre’ is a symbolic 
representation of hierarchy and power with monopoly over the decision process. 
 
In 2001 Cornelia decided to apply for EU funding for the first time. This decision 
followed her participation to a judet meeting. On this occasion, Cornelia and other 
mayors asked for public funds to invest in their old roads, flowing water and gas 
supply. The management replied that the State had no money, but there was the 
alternative to SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development) funding, which “was a pain, but it could be done!” 
 
Since Cornelia had little background to understand the rules and expectations of the 
EU funding, she turned to her network for support both in terms of information and 
practices. Other mayors had successfully accessed SAPARD funds to improve the 
quality of the country roads, and they offered advice on the steps involved and the 
criteria of eligibility. 
 
Consequently, it became apparent that the first thing to do was the feasibility study 
[FS], detailing the technical and financial parameters of the investment. In order to 
minimise the risk of being taken advantage of, Cornelia used the same firm that was 
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employed by her predecessors. The contact was mediated by another mayor with a 
“Let’s help the lady to do a good job!” to the expert and finished with “Now that 
you know each other, I will let you talk”, which smoothed the interaction. By 
borrowing from the mediator’s social capital, Cornelia had transformed from mayor 
into client. This introduction was important because even though Cornelia did not 
have the financial capital to pay for the FS, the experts agreed to start working on it 
and receive the payment some time later. The degree of trust implied in this 
(initially) informal arrangement was provided by the recent history of a successful 
business relation and the expert’s ability to distinguish between friends and foes. 
 
However, in order to secure the payment for the FS from the local budget, Cornelia 
needed a bit more than trust. She had to be able to prove the council members that 
the investment of 78 million Romanian Lei49 was safe, which meant that the money 
would not be lost, even if the funding was not obtained. This entailed another 
application to the Ministry of Agriculture to advance the funds for the FS. The 
approval from the Ministry of Agriculture came quite soon, because the designated 
road had been quickly added to the county’s strategic investments list – an element 
which increased the importance of the investment and a fiction invented to please 
authorities. 
 
“Once they approved it, I had a council meeting, here at the county hall to approve 
the investment. As with all the public money, the centre gives you the approval, you 
spend your own money and, once you finish and bring the paper, they refund you. 
The problem is that the refund comes God only knows when. It took me a year to get 
the money back. When I asked for the money, my FS was on the waiting list with 
other 49 from the same county.” 
 
With all the approvals, Cornelia could safely outsource the FS: 
“I started to do the feasibility study in 2002, when the maximum investment for a 
project granted by SAPARD was €1, 000, 000. Of course, we went and bid for the 
maximum, as we thought they [the Agency evaluators] might cut anyway when 
evaluate the project.” 
                                               
49
 Approximately €2, 000.  
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Despite the fact that Cornelia had her paperwork ready in 2002, the project was 
only approved four years later. This unexpected opportunity and was created by a 
disaster: “In 2006 my funding was approved. Why, you ask me? Well...because 2005 
was a very rainy year with lots of floods. We had floodwaters here in S. The 
Government changed its priorities, even declared an ‘emergency state’ and my 
project fulfilled the criteria for the natural calamity”. Consequently, Cornelia 
signed the funding contract on the 10th of August in Bucharest at the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
 
Political and economic environments in Romania have always been in flux after 
1989, but 2006 was a particularly bad year for accessing European funding, since 
Romania was to join the EU in January 2007. On one hand, this translated into new 
laws that changed or adjusted the rules and regulations of EU funding; on the other 
hand it created a lot of confusion, as not even the officials from the ‘centre’ knew 
how to apply them. 
 
“Ordinance 34/2006 created only difficulties and nobody from the centre knew what 
to do or tell us. We were asked to go to the Ministry of Agriculture for a meeting on 
the 15 of May for training. No materials were given at the training session and no 
valuable information was communicated. The room was full not only of mayors like 
me, but also consultancy companies. They did not know anything more than us, the 
mayors. Plus, they were asking for €5, 000 to ‘help’. Honestly, there is no money to 
pay for consultancy.” 
 
Political entropy was doubled by inflation and devaluation: 
“Just to understand what the problem was: when I did the first project in 2002, I 
applied for €1, 000, 000 to build 6 km of road. The euro was 35, 000 lei. In 2006, 
the euro was 42, 000 lei and the roads were in a worse condition. The value of the 
project was the same: €1, 000 000. Furthermore, the prices had doubled and the 
work volume was the same”. 
 
The fluctuating business conditions have led to a re-evaluation of the initial project 
“A decision had to be made. The width of the road could not be changed – it was 
5.5 m – as one cannot put pavement unless one covers the entire road. So, we 
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settled for putting a thinner pavement than the original one (instead of 30 cm, I 
went for a 10 cm) and build two small bridges.” 
 
Formally, the re-evaluation had to be done by an expert, but these actors were hard 
to find. Even though they could be found in the public service (i.e. the Prefect 
House, the specialised directions within the Ministry of Agriculture), they could not 
be employed because of their quality of public servants.50 Once again, Cornelia 
relied on her network to find an expert. “A mayor from a neighbouring village has a 
brother who is a chief in the financial control team from SAPARD. He talked to his 
brother and that’s how I got the name of the expert”. 
 
Regardless of her social and entrepreneurial competence, Cornelia could not work 
alone due to time and physical constraints. Consequently, she had to set up a group 
of people with whom she had more frequent interactions and who “cooperated in 
staging the same routine” (Goffman 1959:85). The team was meant to share the 
workload and ensure the task completion. Its necessity was not only determined 
practically, but it was also required by the EU regulations at a later stage in the 
process. Cornelia’s team was quite small: herself, the deputy mayor, an assistant 
and the secretary. All the members were working in the same place – i.e. at the 
town hall and it was part of their job description to participate in the EU project. 
Within the team, the participants had maintained their social roles and status, so the 
power distribution was unequal as was the degree of responsibility. As opposed to 
the network, the team had different mechanisms to ensure cooperation and resolve 
conflicts. 
 
For example, when filling in the funding application, Cornelia kept both her 
secretary and the assistant at the office until 1 am to finish before the deadline. The 
second day in the morning, she drove about 100km to hand in the application. 
Despite her efforts, the Agency clerks informed her that the EU regulations do not 
allow them to accept handwritten applications. Cornelia got back home and asked 
the other participants to come to the office in order to type the documents. They 
                                               
50
 According to Law 188/1999, the public servants in Romania are not allowed to perform other 
activities that generate profit outside the public office. 
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ended up leaving home at 2 am and the next day, another member of the team took 
over – the deputy mayor took the files to the Agency. 
 
 Cornelia asked the deputy mayor to do the re-evaluation of the indicators, but this 
time he did not perform well. In this case, the actions of one member reflected on 
the entire group and she had to step in to solve the conflict. 
“He [the deputy mayor] talked rubbish. He told the expert what he should not have 
and of course the man got upset. He flared out his feathers a bit, since HE was the 
expert. And that was it! You know… this is the deputy mayor: nice, clean and 
brainless!” 
 
Once again Cornelia relied on her old solidarity networks to solve the conflict. 
“Now, I was left with no other choice than finding a new expert. I asked around 
who could do the job and there were only three people: one was a drunk, another 
was lazy and the third was the devil’s man! My choice was the latter – he was from 
C [a city close to the village]. I called him, talked to him and told him what to do. 
He agreed to do the job: “Sure ma’am! I’ll send it to you in two weeks”, he said. 
When I heard it, I thought I would have a heart attack. “Two weeks? What am I 
going to do with it in two weeks? I need it in a week!” He said he could not do it, 
there was no chance…nothing! When my attempts to persuade him failed, I thought 
about talking to someone who knew him. I started to ask around for people who 
have worked with him, maybe in the same board/commission. Finally, poor Mr. M, 
God bless him, called him and the lunatic [the expert] agreed. However, he settled 
to do everything by Thursday and I needed the project by Wednesday. Besides, he 
wanted to come to the village to see everything himself, not to put his signature 
randomly. I called Mr. M again to complain. Poor man, he was in the hospital but 
said to me: “What are you talking about ma’am? Coming to the village? Is he 
insane? I have been there and that should be enough!” In the end, he [the expert] 
gave me the documents on Wednesday and not Thursday as he wanted.” 
 
The relationship between informal economy, formal economy and the state is not 
antagonistic anymore, since Cornelia is using it competently to achieve eligibility. 
The applicants live concomitantly within multiple spaces, each with its own frame 
of reference. Not only this does not create new incongruence, but it actually solves 
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pressing situations due to the highly personal quality of the relations. In this 
environment, business is personal, through social control manifested as peer 
pressure, favour exchange and transfer of capital. The typical behaviours frequent in 
the first economy (i.e. visiting the place in order to make sure everything is in order 
before signing the document) become unacceptable in the informal sector due to the 
etiquette of the arrangements. Furthermore, the degree of trust is high enough to 
make the expert assess the risk as acceptable51. 
 
With all the documentation in place and the funding approved, the only thing left to 
do was the construction of the road. The EU funding regulations state that any 
public institution using public funds should organise public bids for subcontracting 
parts of production or marketing. Cornelia organised three public bids for her road. 
The first bid was cancelled because of her; the second because of a sudden change 
in legislation. In the first case Cornelia committed two fundamental mistakes: a) she 
made all the calculations up to the last cent not taking into account the inflation 
(which made the business not profitable for the constructor) and b) overpriced the 
technical documentation (for the public bids, the legal representative prepares a 
technical detailed documentation and sells it in order to recover some money for the 
local budget) – she tried to sell it for 40 million lei (approximately €1, 000). In the 
second case, the Government had changed the regulations for organising public 
bids, introducing among other requirements, the obligation for the public institution 
to advertise the bid on the internet. This measure was intended to increase 
transparency and reduce the possibility of fraud. However, Cornelia managed on the 
third try to hire exactly the company she wanted. The procedure was quite 
straightforward – she reached an agreement with a constructor to build her road and 
it was the constructor’s job to bring in two other friends who had construction 
companies and who had bid higher than he. This informal arrangement is a typical 
example of a favour exchange and a win-win result. 
 
 
 
                                               
51
 As a further note, Cornelia had to re-negotiate with another company to stamp her documents, as 
the expert put only the quantities and ‘forgot’ to put the prices.  
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5.2. A dynamic model of EU funding process: Actors and registers of 
behaviour 
 
 
In the process of accessing EU funding, there are several types of actors that come 
into play at different moments, generically denoted as applicants, consultants and 
bureaucrats. The following section focuses on the characteristics of each category. 
Figure 5.2 is a visual representation of the model employed to explain the process 
of accessing EU funding in Romania. It builds up on the theoretical model of 
coordination mechanisms described in the theoretical framework. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Accessing EU funding in Romania: Actors and registers of behaviour. 
 
Applicants are actors who (aim to) access EU funding in rural areas in Romania. 
They move between the register of eligibility (abiding by the formal rules and 
regulations imposed by the EU and Romania when applying for funding), register 
of compliance (abiding by the formal rules and regulations during the 
implementation stage) and the register of profitability (making their investment 
worthwhile), which transforms them from applicants (which is the denomination 
used by the EU agency) into beneficiaries. Despite the mirage of ‘free money’, a 
highly unstable political environment and rigid rules that shape access, EU funds 
seem to grant permission to a specific type of investor that has very little in 
common with the EU’s imagined actor. This high status actor relies on old patterns 
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of behaviour and reciprocity rules in order to reduce uncertainty and move between 
state regulations, formal and informal economy. Within this category, there is a 
distinction between public and private applicants according to their status and role 
(Chapter 8). 
 
Consultant is a generic name denoting the category of actors that mediates and 
intermediates between applicants and bureaucrats. In this category, I have included 
actors who provide information and support to prepare the EU file and experts – 
highly specialised actors that usually provide one-off services. The category of 
experts includes architects, road experts, accountants and supervisors of the 
construction sites. Consultants commodify EU funding by treating the eligibility 
criteria as production factors. In this way, they construct a market that mediates the 
relationship between applicants and bureaucrats. Consultants have different roles, 
more or less formal and formalised. Firstly, they translate the EU requirements in a 
language accessible to the applicants by decoding the eligibility criteria into small 
actions and steps. Secondly, they recode the applicants’ decisions into a language 
that is required and accepted by the EU regulations. This sort of technical 
knowledge is for example visible in filling in the funding application or making the 
budget. The best consultants are “the ones who can make the papers credible” (M, 
consultant). Thirdly, they put applicants in contact with experts who have specific 
skills and whose input is necessary for the feasibility study or any other sort of 
technical evaluation (as shown in Chapter 6). 
 
Bureaucrats are public servants employed by the EU agency and its territorial 
offices, as well as the police and prosecution forces specialising in investigating EU 
funding crime (Chapter 7). They have a double role: to support the potential 
beneficiary by offering information and to check if the funding application and the 
construction fulfil the EU standards and requirements. Bureaucrats act within the 
framework of control and their actions are shaped by anti-corruption policies. 
 
The model described in Figure 5.2 should not be understood as a static description 
of EU funding, but as a stylised representation of a very dynamic process mediated 
by social embeddedness. Markets and hierarchies are decoded and enacted through 
a dense web network of political, religious and social interactions and affiliations. 
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In the case described above, Cornelia accessed the market of experts through her 
social connections managing to submit the file before the deadline due to the power 
of social arrangements and transfer of capital (Bourdieu 1997). The symbolic 
expectations surrounding the personal nature of relationships made possible 
obtaining the expert’s signature without him ever having visited the place. This 
gives rise to a relational economy which entails indefinite exchanges and 
transactions that encompass far more than bureaucratic norms and market prices. 
Gupta (1995) described the same mechanism in the case of bureaucracies in India 
showing that these social arenas are approached and decoded through social 
networks. Some researchers label this mechanism as clientelism (Fox 1994), but this 
research indicates that the inability to access markets or bureaucracies is interpreted 
as social incompetency and attributed to lack of social and cultural capital. Research 
from Africa (De Sardan 2005), China (Yang 1994) and Russia (Ledeneva 1998) 
document the same type of informal mechanisms – e.g. blat, guanxi – that spring 
out of different cultural backgrounds at different strategic moments. 
 
Networks are particularly adapted to counteracting contextual uncertainty by 
ensuring communication about prices, norms or know-how is maintained (Kanoko 
and Imai 1987 in Powell 1990). However, the EU funding process is not a ‘regular’ 
economic activity. Three aspects distinguish it from the pool of typical profit 
enhancing activities: it is a new, excessively bureaucratised arena experiencing 
transnational anxiety of defrauding EU citizens’ money; its regulatory framework is 
subject to constant revisions by Romanian bureaucracy which tries to accommodate 
European directives with the domestic legal framework; it effectively changes the 
work process through three main variables: specialisation, technology and skills 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 1997). These aspects create a wide gap between vernacular 
practices and the EU funding expectations which can barely be fulfilled by the 
diffuse networks. Thus, in order to accommodate the changes of this new economic 
arena, a new force embodied in the consultants assumed the role of communicator 
within a market framework. Essentially, excessive bureaucratisation of EU funding 
led to its marketisation. The next section explains in more detail each stage of the 
process. 
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5.2.1. Act One: Achieving eligibility 
This stage is meant to legitimise the applicant as a competent user of the European 
funds and in doing so the actors are required to present documents as proof of their 
competence. This is an active process of trust construction between the applicant 
and the bureaucrats (Lapavitsas 2007). However, the logic is sometimes reversed, 
the actors changing their status in order to fulfil the criteria. This is a stage 
characterised by intensive networking and creative use of skills in order to deliver 
the best possible documents to please the ‘fanatic’ bureaucracy. The use of old 
solidarity networks (Yang 1994, Ledeneva 1998, de Sardan 1999) and gift giving 
(Malinowski 1922, Mauss 1925, Bourdieu 1977, Yang 1994, Ledeneva 1998) are 
part of the socio-cultural logics of action and the economy of favours (Wedel 1986, 
Yang 1994, Ledeneva 1998). The networks provide support and act as buffers 
between the state and the individuals, offering information and providing help 
(Wedel 1986, Wedel 1998) in translating bureaucratic practices. 
 
The eligibility of the person 
The eligibility requirements for the applicant are straightforward for public actors, 
who are automatically involved in activities for the benefit of the community and 
usually get full funding. The place of residence usually represents the only caveat, 
as to fulfil the requirements, public actors need to be situated in rural areas. 
 
On the contrary, the same requirements prove to be more challenging for private 
actors who find ways to bypass it. The necessity of rural residence applies both to 
the future hotel/building and the existing firm. In one case, RM, as the wife an 
engineer who was also involved in several private companies (construction, cable 
television, consulting) bought a lot in her husband’s home village. She further set 
up a start-up company in her name and successfully applied for EU funding. She 
had never lived in the country and had no intention of doing so in the near future. 
This strategy not only solved the problem of residing in rural areas, but also had the 
benefit of putting a new company on the market with no history of state debts. 
Another case was somewhat more dramatic – Mr. G had accessed EU funds to build 
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a four star hostel in the middle of the town and a historical area;52 he fulfilled the 
criteria of eligibility by obtaining a letter from the town hall which stated that the 
lot of approximately 1, 000 square metres was…outside the city. This particular 
case was quite ironic because it was so visible: the building had a huge banner in 
front which stated that the project was funded by the EU in order to support rural 
development. Mr. G’s social capital was increased by such an advertisement of 
symbolic power (Wedel 1986, Bourdieu 1997). 
 
“The capacity to co-fund the investment is hard to achieve and quite easy to prove” 
(MG – consultant). Despite the fact that the personal contribution can be between 
€5, 000 and €200, 000, most investors aim for the maximum. This is due to several 
reasons that arise from negative anticipatory thinking: “We applied for the max 
because we thought they [the Agency] would cut anyway!” (Mrs. C, applicant) to 
cost-benefit analysis: “My costs are the same irrespective of the fact that I apply for 
€5, 000 or €200, 000. I still have to do the project, pay the consultants, make all the 
trips and get the approvals” (D, entrepreneur). 
 
In any case, the beneficiary either has the money to do the investment or has to 
borrow it. The second option is quite tedious and costly; most banks do not have 
protocols to support EU beneficiaries, the application process is difficult and the 
interest rates are high. In general, the banks are stricter than the EU agency. During 
my fieldwork I encountered cases of daring entrepreneurs who started their projects 
with little amounts of personal money. In one case, S decided to take out a 
mortgage on his house and deposited the money into a bank account for a few days. 
He wanted to show the bank statement to the Agency as proof of his capacity to co-
fund the investment. After showing the document to the Agency, he withdrew the 
money and repaid his mortgage. 
 
In the EU logic of funding, personal and entrepreneurial histories are equally 
important. The potential beneficiary has to be a good citizen both financially and 
                                               
52
 The only thing that Mr M could not achieve was to demolish a 600-year-old wall. The proximity 
to other monuments from the same period led the authorities to suggest Mr M to build “around” the 
monument. Mr M perceived it as an injustice: “C’mon, during the communism that [the ruin in 
question] was a public toilet!!!”  Mr. M’s memory seemed to be attached to the recent history, as a 
few hundred years ago the wall in question was in fact a royal residence.  
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judicially and should present clear records to prove it. One way to overcome any 
problems is to set up a company under the name of a family member (close family 
members with a different surname are usually are preferred). In this case, the use of 
family for economic purposes implies a higher level of trust and a closer degree of 
control from both sides; the ‘front’ applicant aims to make a small profit by lending 
the legal profile and the ‘real’ applicant aims to minimise the degree of control on 
the business while pursuing profitable activities. 
 
The eligibility of the project 
The eligibility of the project consists in controlling both the feasibility study (FS) 
and the budget. These elements apply for both public and private applicants. For the 
public and the private applicants, the FS and the budget require the input of 
specialised actors – consultants and experts. Within the logic of the process, this is 
the first stage at which the second generic actor is involved –the consultant. The 
consultant’s role is to legitimise the investment and prove its feasibility and 
profitability. 
 
The FS is a highly technical document, quite expensive,53 and exclusively prepared 
by specialists recognised by the Romanian authorities. It consists of three main 
parts which show the necessity of the investment, its technical and financial details 
and the impact of the investment. The expert’s role is to “open the beneficiary’s 
mind” (M, broker) regarding extra possibilities which would minimise future costs. 
For example, R wanted to build a small six room hostel; in this case, the consultant 
suggested investing more in making the roof stronger, which would allow R to add 
another floor to the hostel later on, thus halving future costs. 
 
The FS uses the experts’ anticipatory thinking to the maximum: if the technical 
aspects are straightforward, the financial ones are more complex due to the unstable 
and risky environment (Verdery 2004, Wedel 1998, Nordstrom 2007). The FS’s 
financial part contains details regarding the costs of goods or services and the main 
suppliers of each of these. This document draws heavily on consultant’s creativity 
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 For example, in the case of Cornelia’s road, the FS cost was approximately €2, 000.  
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as in a few years’ time the market can be very different (suppliers might disappear; 
the prices are going to change etc.). In an attempt to incorporate future negative 
situations in the budget, the experts tend to slightly over-estimate the prices for 
materials and services. However, there is a limit (Busse 2000), as the EU agency 
has a list with ‘acceptable prices’ – which aims to orientate both the expert when 
designing the FS and the bureaucrat when evaluating it. 
 
The FS and the architectural project are the main documents incorporating the EU 
standards, which often annoyed beneficiaries: 
D: “Seven sinks! I had to put seven sinks in my kitchen! One for meat, one for fish, 
one for fruits, one for vegetables, one for eggs, one for dishes, one for the personnel 
to wash their hands” (D, applicant). 
 
M: “Do you see this window? [He points to a closed 50 cm window in the wall 
between the kitchen and the dining room]. I never use it, but the Agency guy said I 
had to have it because I can’t bring the food using the same door as when I carry 
the dirty dishes. Apparently it is not hygienic. ” (M, applicant). The EU strict 
regulations regarding the technical aspects of the project influence the applicant’s 
perspective regarding the profitability of the investment. This aspect is also 
reflected in the budget design. 
 
The budget is again a function of the consultant’s creativity and anticipatory 
thinking. As a general rule, all the interviewees (irrespective of the category) 
pointed out that the applicant’s contribution is never only 50% of the entire 
investment. The 50% contribution is theoretically possible, but practically 
improbable. First, the EU has clear regulations regarding the eligibility of expenses 
that can be reimbursed. For example, the beneficiary cannot deduct such items as 
taxes, rent, bank commissions, VAT, warranty costs, and costs of buying second 
hand equipment. Second, the beneficiary cannot anticipate all the costs, simply 
because the reality of the field can prove to be quite different from what was 
anticipated through the architectural project (type of soil or rainy season). Even if 
the technical indicators are adjusted later, the cost of changing the documentation is 
high enough to either deter the applicant from doing it, or at least increase the costs. 
Third, between handing in the funding application and starting the building there is 
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a time span of approximately one year in which the financial conditions are likely to 
change (to be more precise, the time span that I have encountered during my 
fieldwork is between 6 months and 4 years). Fourth, the EU reimburses only bank 
payments; however, Romania is still mainly a cash society for historical, 
technological (there are not enough banks in rural areas and no possibility to pay by 
card) and practical reasons (high bank fees). The unstable environment (Verdery 
2004) and the different cultural practices in relation to money (Zelizer 1997) and 
business ultimately increase the financial contribution of the applicant (Chapter 8). 
 
The eligibility of the funding application 
Assessing the eligibility of the funding application entails evaluating the correctness 
of the funding application and the annexes and is the ultimate expression of 
bureaucratic ritualism (Merton 1938). 
 
Getting the approvals is within the job description of the actor applying for funding 
and it represents a difficult exercise in networking. For a typical funding application 
on Measure 313, a beneficiary has to get approximately 15 approvals (such as 
environment, construction, garbage, health and safety, water, gas and electricity). 
The difficulty is that each of them has an expiry date of between two weeks and 
three months. Furthermore, the institutional response time is generally 30 days. One 
viable method is to get the approvals in a certain order and hand in the funding file 
before the first approval expires. The mode of regulation is to rely on solidarity 
networks (Ledeneva 1998, Wedel 1998) and gift giving; the first being the more 
important. The barrier entailed in getting the approval was acknowledged by several 
respondents: 
“D: A common person could not have done that! I mean…nothing illegal, but very 
hard to get! 
R: Did you give anything to get the approvals? 
D: You mean like money or so…No, of course not! Just a bunch of flowers here and 
there! […] Some chocolate too. […] Gave them something for a coffee… ” 
(D, applicant) 
The ‘non-common person’ in this case means a person well-connected, and well-
practised in the etiquette of arrangements, sometimes with high social and financial 
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status. The use of gift giving is normalised and rationalised within the language of 
help and narratives of justifications (de Sardan 2005, Gupta 1995, Haller 2005), as 
also detailed in the methodology chapter. 
 
Filling in the funding application requires a medium level of IT skills (Microsoft 
Office and internet). Technically inexperienced, the future beneficiaries are assisted 
by the brokers who double check all the documents. This is a particularly tedious 
stage, as the legal representative of the project has to sign and stamp each page. The 
bureaucratic rules accept only blue pens and a specific type of stamp. At the 
moment of handing in, the beneficiary has to print four copies of the file; as one 
consultant put it “It’s too much paperwork! When I hand in, I have to take a jeep to 
carry all the papers!” (M, consultant). The close supervision relates to the payment 
– the consultant is usually paid a 1.5–2% commission on the amount accessed. 
However, in an attempt to share the risk, the consultant only receives the entire fee 
if the application is approved. In the case of rejection, the consultant receives only 
half of the fee. 
 
5.2.2. Act Two: down to business – the team 
The second stage in the process is less intense than the first one, but equally 
strategic. Once the funding is approved, the beneficiary has the first unmediated 
contact with the bureaucrats at the moment of signing the contract with the Agency. 
The contract is always signed in Bucharest (the Centre), despite the fact that the 
files are handed in at the regional agencies. The ceremonial aspect of the contract 
signing marks the end of a rite of passage thus increasing the symbolic capital of the 
beneficiary. However, this moment has different meanings for the different actors 
involved in the process. In the bureaucratic understanding, signing the contract is 
the beginning of the process and it is marked as such in all the guides provided for 
the public (see Figure 5.1 in this chapter). For the consultants, this moment signals 
the end of the cooperation with the beneficiary. Their role was to secure EU funding 
and from this point on their services are considered too expensive and unnecessary. 
If the beneficiary wants to maintain the cooperation, another contract is put in place 
and different arrangements are worked out. For the beneficiary, this is an exciting 
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moment which marks the end of a tedious application process, full of unfamiliar 
endeavours, and the beginning of a new one. 
 
The period between signing the contract with the Agency and starting to build is 
extremely important for one reason only: it is the period in which strategies and 
partnerships can be worked out in order to make the most profitable business 
arrangements. The beneficiary has to choose a construction company to do the 
building in a process that has to be as transparent as possible. The EU regulations 
require the beneficiary to make a decision between at least three54 offers and to 
advertise the requirements on the electronic system of public acquisitions, in the 
official monitor and sometimes even in the Official Journal of the EU. The official 
regulations aim to reduce the socially embedded arrangements (Polanyi 1954) and 
push towards a neoclassical representation of markets which brings together 
strangers in the act of exchange (Marshall 1936 in Thompson et al. 1991). 
 
The public beneficiary has to organise a tender for each action (e.g., construction, 
supplier of materials) and in order to do so, should prepare the appropriate 
documents containing the technical and financial details. In Cornelia’s case, this 
stage proved to be challenging due to the instable economic and political 
environment. However, she succeeded in hiring her preferred construction 
company. 
 
The main reason for working with a known partner is a higher level of trust which is 
favourable to doing the job and taking the necessary measures to hide unorthodox 
arrangements. Sometimes, there is a monetary benefit for the public actor 
(according to my informants the optimum price is around €1,000 for small contracts 
with a value below €50,000 and increases with the value of the contract). There are 
several strategies more or less formally employed by actors to win a public tender 
(Chapter 6). They usually involve a two-step procedure: first, a supplier of services 
has to reach an agreement with a public actor. The agreement (even though quite 
detailed, entailing both the technical aspects of the business and the material 
rewards for the contractor) is not formalised in a written contract, but symbolically 
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 I am sure the authorities must have a good reason for choosing this number, but I have not found it 
yet. 
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closed with a handshake (as described also in the methodology chapter). Second, it 
is the consultants’ job to bring in two more friends who will bid higher in the public 
tender. This has been a very popular procedure for ‘selecting the chosen one’ until 
2007 due to its inherently friendly nature. However, in 2007, the Government 
changed the public tender rules and introduced the necessity of advertising the bids 
on the electronic integrated system. This measure reduces the use of the mentioned 
informal strategy as the market is opened to other actors and the bid lacks secrecy, 
but opens up new possibilities described in Chapter 7. 
 
Public procurement gave rise to informal practices in order to bypass the 
regulations. Sometimes, behaviours are on the border of legal practice but 
impossible to condemn legally. One of the beneficiaries I met secured a contract 
with a public institution (town hall) to assist with the construction of a road. In 
order to be able to participate in the bid, s/he had to set up a company. The latter 
was registered at the tribunal within a few days, just in time for the tender. Later on, 
during the EU routine checks, it was discovered that this firm was not registered at 
the Register of Commerce at the moment of the public procurement (in order to be 
registered at the above mentioned institution, a firm has to wait up to 45 days). 
Consequently, even though legally the firm existed, from a fiscal point of view, it 
did not. This is an interesting aspect because later on the beneficiary was under 
investigation for corruption in this particular case. 
 
Ultimately the role of the public tenders is to put together a partnership in order to 
fulfil the next step which involves the building. This process creates a multi-
levelled operational team which aims to control the setting, stage the same routine 
and share responsibilities (Goffman 1969). After the contract signing, the EU 
requires that the project be managed by a team of at least three persons (the legal 
representative, the technical representative and the accountant). Apart from these 
three actors, other laws require the beneficiary to hire a supervisor for the 
construction site. The latter is one of the experts and the beneficiary’s watchdog (M, 
broker). 
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5.2.3. Act Three: the building – doing the job and hiding the job 
The third step is the operational stage of the process involving two aspects: the 
construction and multiple evaluations from the EU agency in order to reimburse the 
expenses. It involves doing the job and hiding the informal, illegal or extra-legal 
practices in order to receive the EU funds. At this stage the beneficiary operates 
more and more within the register of profitability being always aware of the 
necessary narratives of justification. Furthermore, the beneficiary is under the close 
control and supervision of the EU agency. Despite the inherent antagonistic 
positions, the relationship between applicants and bureaucrats was not described as 
tense. On the contrary, the beneficiaries were surprised and pleased by the ease and 
flow of the institutional communication which was unusual in comparison with 
other public institutions. They reported receiving reminders and support from the 
EU agency in order to prepare the reimbursement file (as shown in Chapter 8). 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The reimbursement process as described by the EU Agency in Romania 
Source: APDRP 
 
For the private applicant the building process is divided into smaller time units 
determined by the necessity to have one’s expenses reimbursed (see Figure 5.3). 
The number of instalments and the deadlines is established in agreement with the 
bureaucrats when signing the contract and involve a commitment from the 
beneficiary to reach certain stages in the construction. For example R decided to 
receive the money in three instalments, the first one after finishing the building, the 
second after building the tennis court and the third at the end of the process. If, for 
whatever reason, the beneficiary cannot fulfil the contractual requirements, official 
extensions have to be asked for and granted. In another case, D could not finish the 
Justificatory 
documents
Reimbursement Building 
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first stage in his building because the weather was too rainy which led to postponing 
the payments. 
 
Reimbursement involves two types of auditing by the EU agency (more details in 
Chapter 8): checking the books and checking the reality in the field. For the first 
aspect, the beneficiary has to prepare a file including all the expenses and the 
corresponding invoices. Once the file is approved by the Agency, a field agent 
comes to check whether the building is exactly as designed. There are cases in 
which the controller detects differences from the designed project and makes 
inquiries. For example, C had to build a door 10 cm closer to the left wall than it 
was initially envisioned. The inspector noticed it and asked for clarification and 
justificatory documents. Even though the process in itself does leave room for 
negotiations between beneficiaries and inspectors, the latter usually ask for post 
factum papers. This is because the Agency has a clear mechanism in place to check 
the auditors both by randomly checking the documents for the approved funding 
projects and by doing field checks. Sometimes the field checks are conducted by 
high EU officials who are there to ensure that the European standards have been 
achieved. This mechanism limits how much can one ‘negotiate’ the regulations 
(Bass 2000, Mars 1994, Punch 1996) with the local officials. 
 
It is also possible to change or amend the initial proposal. However, as in Cornelia’s 
case shows, the request for change has to be documented by experts who prove the 
necessity and/or the viability of the new situation. D, for example, forgot to put a 
second set of stairs in her pension and the project had to be changed: 
“Everyone forgot about the stairs: the architect, the Agency, even me! And the EU 
requirements are quite clear: you have to have a second set of stairs for the hotel! 
This is because after cleaning the first floor rooms the maid is not going to come 
down with the dirty sheets using the main stairs as the customers, right?” 
(D, applicant) 
 
The construction business is a ‘money making machine’ (G, construction site 
supervisor) and EU funding is no exception. One of the main reasons for exercising 
a greater degree of control in choosing the construction company is precisely the 
applicant’s desire to minimise costs and maximise profits. The builder has several 
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ways of making profits from paying cash in hand in order to avoid taxation to 
stealing materials or purchasing them from a cheaper supplier (Mars 1994, Punch 
1996, Birdsall 2000). The beneficiary’s double interest is to be part of the deals and 
cover it well enough in order to receive the reimbursements from the EU. The first 
task is within the job description of the supervisor of the construction site. The 
second task is shared between the accountant and the applicant. 
 
During my fieldwork it became apparent that the supervisor of the construction site 
was a key actor. Within an entire county with more than 50 building sites, there 
were only three people who had both the accreditation and the competence to play 
this role. They would supervise several sites at the same time acting both as 
technical advisers and financial brokers on behalf of the beneficiary. This job was 
entirely masculinised, not only because construction industry is a highly masculine 
occupation in itself, but also because it involved doing it in different places, some 
more traditional than others where there was a clear division of gender roles. Other 
skills required were good knowledge of the construction market – including prices, 
main suppliers of the materials – and access to available workforce. The latter tends 
to be quite important since the labour market is poorly structured, with unreliable 
and fluctuating workforce. Last but not least, the supervisor of the construction site 
had to show the capacity to do the business and conceal any informal arrangements 
it in order to avoid difficult encounters with law enforcement. 
 
If the beneficiary has been part of the above mentioned transactions and wants to 
receive the next instalment from the EU agency, he/she then has to find ways to 
conceal the less orthodox arrangements. The typical way is to get invoices that 
prove an increased level of expenses. The easiest way to get invoices is to buy them 
from the bazaar55/ market. For a low price one can get as many invoices as 
necessary to prove the expenses. The downside of this strategy is that the invoices 
bought from the bazaar belong to phantom firms. If the EU experts discover too 
many invoices of this kind, that would affect the reputation and credibility of the 
beneficiary leading to higher levels of control or even refusals to pay further 
instalments. Consequently, in order to avoid closer monitoring, the beneficiaries 
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 I use the concept of ‘bazaar’ in its original sense (Geertz 1973) to denote a space in which 
different sorts of merchandise are sold.  
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settle for getting invoices from friends (who own companies themselves) or other 
trustworthy members of their networks. It is part of the etiquette of arrangements to 
pay the VAT for the provider of the invoice. 
 
5.2.4. Act Four: The five- year plan 
After finishing the construction and receiving the last instalment, the beneficiary is 
still bound by the EU contract. In the case of the public applicant, the requirements 
focus on the maintenance of the investment. For example, if the project has 
introduced flowing/piped water in a village, the requirements involve taxing the 
population for the service and using the difference to maintain the water pipes. The 
private applicant however has a few more obligations to fulfil. The most important 
is to keep the building running as a hotel for the next 5 years even if the property is 
sold. The final obligation relates to introducing the hotel onto the national market 
for tourism. This entails publicity on different official and popular websites, 
participating at tourism fairs and making the business profitable by any means that 
involve attracting customers. 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
 
An important role of EU funding is to Europeanise developing countries like 
Romania that are assumed to have little training in the ‘correct’ market economy as 
shown in the previous chapter. In other words, it aims to offer support for medium 
and small sized enterprises and development of the business sector in rural areas as 
a prerequisite for a market economy and democracy. It is also intended to reduce 
the economic and social differences between various regions, create more jobs and 
support alternative activities for economic growth. Ultimately, the EU funding is 
supposed to be a political exercise in transparency and ethical business practices 
that pushes entrepreneurs away from the informal economy and scandalous corrupt 
exchanges. 
 
This chapter shows that EU funding has impacted positively on the bureaucratic 
sector making front offices user friendly. Furthermore, it has increased the number 
of jobs, but not necessarily within the unit of analysis (i.e. the firm). Applicants’ 
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limited background in understanding the rules and expectations of donors meant 
that a new type of actor was introduced. Consultants operate within a niche market 
and are specialised in decoding/translating the unfamiliar requirements of the EU 
demands into the more familiar language of business. This type of actor mediates 
and intermediates between applicants and bureaucrats and is characterised by 
flexible thinking and technological competence as described in the next chapter. 
 
Despite these improvements, the process of accessing EU funding is more 
complicated than shown by the authorities in the official guides. The ambiguity of 
rules, coupled with their rigidity makes the process difficult for the applicants. The 
highly unstable environment, characterised by fluctuating business conditions and 
political instability, further impacts on the process. Consequently, actors rely on old 
patterns of behaviour, which are adjusted and included in the new repertoire 
employed for the EU funding application. Despite the State’s attempts to create 
formal labour markets, hiring is not necessarily done on the basis of merit. The use 
of old solidarity networks, transfer of capital, favour and gifts exchange co-exist 
with informal economic arrangements thus making the distinction between legal, 
illegal, informal spheres superfluous. 
 
Ultimately, EU funding ended up resembling the socialist system. The requirements 
for anticipatory thinking in a profoundly non-stable environment (to anticipate the 
budget and stick to it even though the price increases and the exchange rate 
changes) and the necessary fictions (paperwork required by the Agency) reinforce 
the ‘us’ – ‘them’ gap (see Chapter 8 for more unanticipated consequences of EU 
funding). The papers are made to be credible and the practices are used to make the 
business profitable. The actors move within multiple spaces and use different 
practices to attract money, to be efficient and to justify their practices. They move 
between narratives of eligibility, profitability and justification, which will be 
explored in the next three substantive chapters. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Commodification of EU funding: Consultants 
 
 
After exploring the process of accessing EU funding in the previous chapter, I now 
turn to the first generic actor – consultants. This chapter discusses the role and 
impact of consultants over the economic area of EU funding. It argues that 
consultants are actors who mediate and inter-mediate between entrepreneurs and 
bureaucrats by translating the bureaucratic requirements into business endeavours 
and vice versa. In doing so, consultants commodify EU funding, through the 
exploitation of its symbolic, technical and economic space as a terrain on which to 
(re)construct market relations. Consultants act as agents of change, being both a by-
product of this tectonic shift of EU integration and its exponent. As by-products of 
European integration, but also entangled in local historicities, consultants decode 
and transmit information regarding EU funding to the applicants. As exponents of 
European integration, consultants act as market-makers by treating criteria of 
eligibility as production factors 
 
I start by describing the legal, economic and social organisation of consultancy in 
Romania and show that this is a quasi-professionalised area of expertise. The 
second section makes the concept of consultant operational, by discussing the 
requirements entailed by the job. In the third section I focus on careers, trainings 
and motivations in becoming a consultant. The fourth section examines the social 
aspects of consultancy and the fifth section establishes a connection between the 
function of brokerage and former patron-client relationships. 
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6.1. The profession of consultancy 
6.1.1. The legal and economic context of consultancy 
The Romanian legislative framework acknowledged consultancy as a profession in 
its own right by including it in the nomenclature of economic activities56 
(henceforth CAEN).57 The Romanian Institute of Statistics classified all economic 
activities by assigning a unique numerical code (e.g., 7021 is the code for 
Consultancy in the area of public relations and communication) and each economic 
entity had to define its object of activity according to this taxonomy. Consultancy 
firms providing services in the area of EU funding were covered by the 7022 CAEN 
code, which referred to ‘Consultancy for business and management’. The 
nomenclature of economics activities has to be updated periodically in order to be 
in line with the international organisations. In Romania, the latest update was in 
2008,58 when all the economic activities were recoded and assigned new CAEN 
codes. The consequence was that all economic agents had to operate the changes in 
firm’s status; these changes were both costly and time consuming provoking an 
entire chain of undesirable events.59 In the area of EU funding, consultancy is also 
recognised as a valid area of expertise, since it is included on the list of eligible 
expenses. Consultancy for business and management can add up to 8% of the entire 
value of the project. However, when various types of expertise are added to 
consultancy, the amount can even reach 20% (e.g., architectural project or 
feasibility study).60 
 
Despite the fact that consultants are acknowledged by the legal and political 
environments/frameworks, they lack a professionalised system of knowledge over 
which they can make legitimate claims of authority. Furthermore, there is no form 
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 The codification of economic activities follows international standards set up by the European 
Union, United Nations Organisation, International Monetary Fund etc. thus ensuring transnational 
coherence on the job market. 
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 CAEN is the acronym for the Classification of the Activities in the National Economy.   
58
 By Order 337/2007 emitted by the president of the National Institute of Statistics.  
59
 Changing the CAEN code was not expensive in itself – 30RON (around £6), but it required an 
entire sequence of new changes: the constitutive act of the firm had to be altered (and that was about 
£70), a re-registration had to be done etc. All the costs had to be covered by the owner, who also had 
to operate the changes quite fast or the activity of the firm would be blocked (a wide range of 
procedures running from obtaining a simple certificate for the firm to getting a bank loan could not 
be initiated without a change in the CAEN codes). 
60
 According to the official guide for measure 313: 
http://www.apdrp.ro/content.aspx?item=1973&lang=RO last accessed on the 12th of April 2012. 
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of accreditation for this type of job and the only distinction is made between 
consultants who have successfully written projects and the rest. On the official 
website61 of the Agency there are separate lists for successful consultants and 
registered consultants with the following specification: ‘There is no accreditation 
given by the Agency or any other public institution for consultancy firms offering 
services in the area of EU funding”. This is a clear indication that at this point, the 
community of practice for consultancy is under construction, because the tools for 
thinking and the scripts for acting are not yet defined and standardised. Since there 
is no objective criteria to assess their level of expertise, consultants construct 
themselves by borrowing from the technical capital acquired in other professional 
areas and the certification of expertise is established through performative devices, 
gut feelings and persuasion. 
 
6.1.2. The economic, social and professional organisation of consultancy 
However, during the past two years (since 2009), the consultants working in the 
area of EU funding have started to show the early signs of becoming a professional 
body. The route towards a new epistemic status has been driven on the one hand by 
the EU itself, by changing the eligibility criteria for consultants. Recently, a new 
prerequisite was introduced62 requiring consultants who participate in the 
implementation of any public project to be certified by the National Council for 
Professional Upskilling of Adults. On the other hand, the tendency to become 
professionalised is also based on the fact that the EU funds are heavily advertised, 
thus creating a highly attractive emerging market. However, the technical 
competences required by the job are not transmitted in a systematic way that 
involves structured knowledge. 
 
Consequently, consultants have started to claim legitimacy in various forms: 
organise schooling, publish guides, obtain accreditation from national and 
international bodies, organise meetings and seminars, associate themselves with 
public institutions, academic establishments and prestigious NGOs etc. At this 
point, the educational offer for consultancy related to EU funding is rather diverse – 
                                               
61
 www.apdrp.ro last accessed on the 12th of April 2012. 
62
 www.apdrp.ro last accessed on the 12th of April 2012. 
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the types of training on offer vary from very short term (one weekend intense 
training) to medium and long term (the latter involves an MSc degree in the 
management of structural funding offered by two universities). For example, the 
National School for Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA) offers an MSc in 
Project Management. The curricula includes courses regarding strategies and 
techniques for attracting EU funding, EU project management, financial analysis for 
EU projects, the management of the project team, evaluation and audits for the EU 
projects, and IT technologies used for project management. The courses combine 
online and face to face interactions, emphasise the practical component, offer a 
quick route to certification and emphasise the international quality of the diploma. 
Another example is Euro-link – House of Europe which is one of the NGOs that 
offers a mid-term postgraduate online course dedicated to experts and consultants 
on EU funded projects.63 
 
Some trainers are certified by international organisations (i.e. InWEnt64) and it 
enhances the reputation of the training if the educators are foreigners. For example 
InWEnt – Capacity Building International Germany is a non-profit organisation 
(strongly connected to the German Federal Government, German business sector 
and the German Länder) who offered trainings and internships for new members of 
the EU. Since 2004, InWEnt has been shifting its focus from countries in Central 
Europe to Romania, Bulgaria and western Balkan states. In 2004, InWEnt 
developed a three-year project aimed at helping the Romanian administration 
become more familiar with the EU structures. One component of the programme 
entailed training higher-ranking officials in the supranational intricacies of the EU 
projects. The project had a top-down approach, which was based on the idea that by 
furthering the education of the elites (called ‘training the trainers’), the entire 
country could benefit, as the elites would go back and pass this knowledge on to 
others in subordinate positions. This indeed happened as former trainees 
participants in this programme are now in visible training positions. For example, 
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 http://www.houseofeurope.ro/ last visited on the 12th of April 2012. 
64
 http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/02-2005/inw_art2.html last accessed on the 12th 
of April 2012. 
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the Romanian Institute for Training offers short term training sessions for accessing 
EU funding making use of trainers previously certified by InWEnt.65 
 
The technical analysis intrinsic to consultancies for EU funding is also transmitted 
through written materials that target both other consultants and potential clients. 
The public institutions dealing with EU funding have published detailed guides 
regarding each area of funding. However, the information is scattered on numerous 
websites, which are not user friendly, reflecting the overloaded bureaucratic mode 
of addressing the public. To counteract this problem, consultants (or consultancy 
firms) have created several portals dedicated to EU funding. They not only put 
together the information from the official sources in a comprehensible manner, but 
act as news agencies, discussion forums and a subtle way of advertisement.66 By 
publishing newsletters (for example the newsletter AgroTerra is published by one of 
the largest consultancy companies in Romania - RGIC67), organising seminars, 
meetings and advertising their credentials from national and international bodies, 
consultants increase their social capital while establishing consultancy as necessary 
and non-illusory expert knowledge. 
 
In order to increase their symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1984), consultants have allied 
themselves with powerful social authorities like academia, public institutions, the 
business community and NGOs. These alliances are usually constructed by strategic 
actors who have interacted with various areas in their professional life. In one case a 
consultancy firm,68 which offers support and training for accessing EU funding has 
a former minister of European Integration as a team member. According to the 
firm’s official website, Alexandru Farcas led the negotiations for European 
integration between 2003 and 2004. He is now the president of this consulting 
company, acting as a senior consultant and coordinating the relationship with 
foreign companies who want to enter the local markets. Another example is a high 
profile member of civil society, who has been part of Transparency International 
Romania and acts as a consultant for the Romanian Institute of Training (which 
acquires most of its clients from public administration). These types of chameleonic 
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 The information is available at: http://www.irt.ro/ro/organizatie/echipa-irt/#trainers.  
66
 Just to give an example: www.fonduri-structurale.ro . 
67
 www.rgic.ro last accessed on the 12th of April 2012. 
68
 http://www.eurobestteam.ro/prezentare last accessed on the 12th of April 2012. 
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actors (Rawlinson 2008) are not important because they transferred their capital 
from one area to another (public institutions to business), but because they used 
their capital to create the market for consultancy. 
 
They have problematized new aspects of existence and, in the 
very same moment, suggested that they can help overcome 
the problems that they ‘discovered’ [my inverted commas]. 
And they have acted as powerful translation devices between 
[the new] ‘authorities’ and ‘individuals’, shaping conduct not 
through compulsion but through the power of truth, the 
potency of rationality and the alluring promises of effectivity. 
(Miller and Rose 1990:5) 
 
These powerful actors are monopolizing the empty space between bureaucrats and 
entrepreneurs by claiming epistemic jurisdiction as ‘professional’ consultants and 
creating a market for consultancy. However, they do not only ground themselves in 
purely technical knowledge, but make use of mystique and ambiguity in order to 
sustain their practice (Power 1991). One way to sustain magic is through language 
and the consultants’ vocabulary has become flooded with foreign expressions 
(English is the preferred language) and technical concepts. By using EU funding 
slang, consultants enter a process of estrangement, separating themselves from 
other categories of participants in the project. 
 
6.1.3. The concept of expertise 
In order to cope with the uncertainties of the risk society (Beck 1992), the business 
environment has become professionalised by making use of external experts 
(Tordoir 1995), who not only possessed advanced knowledge, but were also a 
cheaper and flexible alternative to the internal support departments. The concept of 
expertise refers to the “social authority ascribed to particular agents and forms of 
judgement on the basis of their claim to possess specialised truths and rare powers” 
(Miller and Rose 1990:12). For EU funded projects, the expert is a sine qua non 
element who constructs the ‘reality’ of the project through interpretative work, 
“discerning meaning from events by connecting them to policy ideas and text-log 
frames, project documents etc.” (Mosse 2005:157). Because of their 
representational and instrumental attributes, experts have become key resources for 
the modern European form of governance. The representational side is reflected by 
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the content of expert knowledge and the ability to reference a state of the world 
(Preda 2005). The instrumental side, in contrast, is enacted by the fact that in the 
EU project expertise is mobilised to serve a particular agenda; the complex 
amalgam of set prices,69 truth claims, and technical procedures shape and 
‘normalise’ both the entrepreneurial act and the nature of the expert knowledge. 
Through the above features, the EU is both legitimising and regulating the forms of 
expertise accepted and acceptable, fashioning a highly regulated market for 
expertise whose main role is to ensure compliance with the dominant model (an 
ideology). 
 
The quality of the expert is explicitly recognised in the EU logic if, at a minimum, 
the applicant has a university degree relevant for the particular area in which s/he 
wishes to qualify, at least five years of experience,70 English language skills, the 
ability to evaluate/review projects, and has not been found guilty of professional 
misconduct. Consequently, the legitimisation of experts is achieved through two 
main mechanisms: examination (hence the university degree in a relevant area) and 
on the job training (hence the five year experience requirement). This reasoning is 
valid in the case of established professions that have achieved closure over a 
particular domain of knowledge and have well established mechanisms of 
transmitting and regulating expertise (i.e. accountancy, architecture, engineering 
etc.). In the case of consultancy (which is also expert knowledge), however, this 
reasoning is less sound especially in this particular context. 
 
For the purposes of this project, I make a distinction between experts and 
consultants. The distinction has an empirical rationale grounded in my observations 
and the respondents’ opinions. In this sense, I use the concept of expert to denote a 
professional who belongs to this category by means of examination and on the job 
training and who only participates in the EU project in that capacity (e.g., architect, 
hydrologist). The concept of consultant is used to denote the person who puts 
together the documentation and prepares the funding application without having 
                                               
69
 The EU and the member countries have acceptable prices for categories of experts. In Romania’s 
case, the prices are listed on the Agency’s website. http://www.apdrp.ro/ last accessed on the 12th of 
April 2012. 
70
 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/ict_psp/cf/expert/login/index.cfm last accessed 
on the 12th of April 2012. 
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passed an examination to attest to his/her capacity; nor do they have more than five 
years of on the job training. Even though consultants make use of expert knowledge 
in order to put together the funding application, they are, epistemologically, a 
different category of participants. 
 
This section has discussed the ways in which consultancy knowledge is generated, 
defined and maintained as such in the area of EU funding, touching upon the 
concept of expertise. However, despite strong social relations, this area of work has 
not achieved the necessary epistemic status to become a professional organisation. 
In the next sections, I will explain how consultants work and make sense of their 
roles and status in this environment. 
 
 
6.2. What is a consultant: definition and job description 
 
“C: Let’s think about it this way: one has a Car Repairs and Servicing business, 
right? He might have a lot of good mechanics working for him. Every one of them 
knows how to fix a car – with everything that entails. The question is why isn’t 
every one of them the owner of a Car Repairs and Servicing business? 
R: Because they don’t have the money to invest? 
C: No, that’s not true! It’s because they don’t know the procedures; because a car 
repairs business entails more than some mechanical procedures. These skilled 
mechanics have no knowledge of finance or legislation, they don’t know what it 
takes to set up a business, nor where they could get the money to start a 
business…there are lots of things they don’t know. If they would know these things, 
every one of them would have a business! […]. It’s the same for me, as a 
consultant. In order to have a good business, I don’t need to know how to fix the 
car, but I need to know how to lead the team, where to send the car, which pieces 
do I need for it, what price would I sell the car afterwards at…” 
(C-consultant) 
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“You know what Seneca71 said…‘The philosopher knows nothing about everything 
while the engineer knows everything about nothing.’ It’s the same with a consultant 
who wants to be the project manager – he has to have ideas!” 
(M- consultant) 
 
Consultants define themselves as strategic thinkers who put work routines and 
policy models in relationship to one another. In order to do so, they create their own 
blueprint providing order and coherent interpretations of events for bureaucrats, by 
representing the practice (of entrepreneurs) with the use of normative schema. In 
this sense, consultants are the promoters of this vast project of standardisation and 
normalisation that is entailed by the EU funding, which sets standards for 
performance and creates templates for thinking and talking about events (Mosse 
2005). So, consultants use their anticipatory thinking and translation capacities to 
put in relation various systems of meaning. They guide the behaviour of the staff 
according to prescribed standards of performance, bearing in mind that any 
variation from these standards can be labelled as anything on a continuum from 
inefficiency to crime. 
 
Consultants have a fragmented experience of the project, their importance 
decreasing over time in relationship to the entrepreneur. “For a mayor, it is very 
difficult to do attribution bidding for the first time. He has to use consultants 
because he could never manage otherwise. The second time, consultancy is not so 
necessary… ”(C, consultant). However, in the beginning their role is fundamental in 
designing the project in such a way as to maximise its chances of approval without 
undermining the entrepreneur’s hope for profitability. Consequently, the consultant 
takes responsibility over an area in which moral and legal grounds are constantly 
shifting. 
 
The consultant’s job description is rather complex, entailing both formal and 
informal requirements, manifested as imperatives of the job. I have assembled three 
main roles, detailed below as the imperative of translation, imperative of instruction 
                                               
71
 Mr. M was actually referring to George Bernard Shaw’s famous comparison between a scientist 
and a philosopher.   
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and imperative of brokerage/mediation, that essentially describe how consultants 
commodify EU funding. 
 
6.2.1. The imperative of translation 
The logic of action in accessing EU funding suggests that the first important step in 
a chain of events is to achieve eligibility (for the project and the applicant/ 
beneficiary) and put forward a project that is coherent, standard and accurate. 
Consultants construct eligibility through discursive mechanisms which involve a 
process of translation. “Language, in this sense, is more than merely 
‘contemplative’: describing a world such that it is amenable to having certain things 
done to it involves inscribing reality into the calculations of government through a 
range of material and rather mundane techniques” (Latour 1987a:32). Callon and 
Latour (1981:279) have also used the concept of translation to describe the 
dynamics of the actor-network relations: “By translation we understand all the 
negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and violence thanks to which 
an actor or force takes or causes to be conferred on itself authority to speak or act 
on behalf of another actor or force”. The definition is appealing because it 
emphasises that translation is a political process. At the same time, it opens up a 
vast space of discussion, by mixing human and non-human actors, and various 
processes and rationalities, which make it hard to use from an operational point of 
view. 
 
My view of translation is related more to social anthropology (Olivier de Sardan 
2005) and entails two main dimensions: one related to linguistics, the other one to 
semiotics. The first dimension is related to the fact that the concepts, principles, 
rules and regulations of EU funding were initially constructed and presented in a 
different language than Romanian (usually English or French). When translated into 
Romanian, these devices followed a foreign syntax, sometimes leaving technical 
concepts, which had no correspondence in Romanian, in the original language. The 
consultants then would try to communicate the message to the entrepreneurs “in a 
language vastly revised and corrected by urban intellectuals, whose terms are 
deplorably formal and schoolish” (de Sardan 2005:171). The second dimension is 
related to the fact that consultants need to translate lay business language into EU 
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language, thus bringing into relation two different semantic fields. “I do project 
management, which means coordinating the technical part for the feasibility study. 
This means calculus, predictions etc. based on the information provided by the 
engineers and technologists. They give me the project done 95% and I do the rest of 
[the] 5%. After that, I do the business plan. But I can’t do everything by myself 
because I need to be very careful. For example I need to make sure that the money 
related to one aspect is the same everywhere, because they [the bureaucrats] have 
specialised software to check everything.” 
(M, consultant). 
 
So, at one level, the semiotic dimension of translation facilitates communication 
between the actors involved in the process. Their work means that consultants make 
intelligible the EU language to entrepreneurs, formalise the business endeavour for 
bureaucrats and impose standards of performance upon the project and the 
beneficiary. At another level though, consultants need to protect the client’s 
interests and make the business profitable, which sometimes means disguising these 
intentions in the project, by offering justificatory devices. In this sense consultants 
merely simulate communication because the technical vocabulary is used 
masterfully to hide the standards of conduct instead of enforcing them. 
 
The process of translation aims to put forward to the bureaucrats a standardised, 
accurate and coherent project. Standardisation refers to the use of discursive 
mechanisms that present the information in a comparable, stable, typical, 
combinable form. “This form enables the pertinent features of the domain to 
literally be re-presented in the place where decisions are to be made about them (the 
manager’s office, the war room, the case conference and so forth)” (Miller and Rose 
1990:7). Even though the process of standardisation is necessary for the purposes of 
evaluation, there are cases in which it is pushed too far and takes the form of empty 
ritualism. For example, applicants have to hand in two printed copies of the project, 
with each page stamped twice (with a round and a squared stamp) and signed by the 
project manager in black pen. If these requirements are not fulfilled, the project is 
not accepted by the Agency. 
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Accuracy is related to the necessity of providing truthful information about the 
project and the beneficiary. In coping with this aspect, consultants use second order 
rationalisations by making constant references to the system of control and policing 
(further detailed in Chapter 7). With an eye for loopholes, consultants try to tie the 
facts to legal heurism by adapting their techniques to the methods of control (in this 
sense their behaviour is similar to what Levi (1981) described in his study about 
fraud). Accuracy is closely connected to credibility and in this sense they can both 
be technically constructed. 
 
“You see, a breed milk cow, if well fed, can produce up to 60 litres of milk per day. 
In Romania it never produces that much because of the climate, the avarice of the 
owner, medical issues, the type of food available or whatever other reason. The cow 
produces 35 litres, but the owner is very happy because his mother’s cow only 
produced 5 litres when he was a kid. I can’t make the business plan for 35 litres, 
because it is not efficient, so I make it for 50 litres. So, the papers are done to be 
credible and the fact that the Agency asks for so many papers is bloody useless. 
There is the business plan signed by a consultant who took the responsibility for it. 
The business plan is signed again by a local council. Now this should be enough. 
The consultant knows well how he got those figures… ” 
(M, consultant). 
 
Coherence is also part of the consultant’s ability to tell a good story. It basically 
entails aligning the language of the project (which is a linear progression made of 
inputs and outcomes) with the interests of the beneficiary, with as little discord as 
possible. In providing coherent interpretations of events for bureaucrats, consultants 
simplify the reality of the projects by ignoring resistance and conflicts, and 
replacing them with order and unity. The papers and the ‘reality’ are two very 
different spaces, each with its own canon, requirements and narrative of 
justifications. In writing the project, consultants would no longer limit themselves 
to the calculation of actual costs, but they need to put forward a “disembedded 
conception of money and management relatively free of the burden of social 
obligations” (Mosse 2005:146). In this sense, they need to avoid potential conflicts 
of interests that might arise from the papers – for example a consultant writing a 
project cannot participate in the same project as a constructor. Furthermore, when 
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implementing the project, the consultant works with various temporal cycles with 
few chances to coincide (the project cycle, the construction cycle, the profit cycle, 
the accountant cycle and so on). The multiple temporalities make the consultant’s 
job more difficult because of the close association with money cycles. So, money 
and time are two important disciplining metrics of the EU funding labour market. 
 
6.2.2. The imperative of instruction 
Consultants fulfil a pedagogical need of the entrepreneurial community by 
appropriating a communication gap between bureaucracy and the applicants. They 
instruct potential beneficiaries how to integrate the EU funding eligibility criteria 
with the practice of doing business. An essential point of the pedagogical 
imperative is that teaching is conducted within a market environment. By assuming 
the role of instructors, consultants commodify EU funding. In this sense, they make 
use of two different conceptions of teaching, one relating to giving professional 
instruction, the other one to mentoring and transmitting traditions (Khaldun 1967). 
In giving professional instruction, consultants act as agents of development, 
assuming some of the bureaucratic burden by transmitting the EU accepted scripts, 
patterns and modes of behaviour (de Sardan 2005, Mosse 2006). Thus consultants 
teach the applicants how to translate their desires and plans into EU objectives and 
values to the extent that the two become consonant. Indirectly, consultants also train 
the entrepreneurs in the ‘correct’ market economy by making them acquainted with 
the disentangled and quantified state of the world entailed by the funding 
procedures (Miller 2002), and by making them aware of the auditing procedures 
and the boundaries of acceptable behaviour. When acting as mentors, consultants 
envisage more than the register of profitability in relationship to the funding 
process. So, they move beyond the technicalities of EU funding into the practice of 
business, teaching the beneficiary a mode of self-regulation that is in accordance 
with the EU. In this sense, the consultant’s knowledge about the area of EU funding 
is predatory (Klockars 1974, courtesy of Sutherland) because it entails exploiting 
their familiarity with the domain in order to help the entrepreneur hide the 
unorthodox arrangements. But while predatory, the consultant is also an agent of 
change, by redefining opportunism and the grey areas of behaviour. 
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6.2.3. The imperative of mediation 
The role of brokerage is closely connected to the previous imperatives because 
“knowledge provides resources for action, but […] these are not only of a technical 
nature and do not simply entail an application of popular technical knowledge. 
Practice and modes of behaviour also involve social evaluations, various logics, 
tactics and strategies.” (de Sardan 2005:172). So, consultants mediate and inter-
mediate between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, mobilise other experts and guide 
the behaviour of the project staff. As by-products of local histories, consultants are 
familiar with the social and symbolic stakes and make use of various logics and 
strategies to position themselves on the market. In this sense, there is room for the 
concept of politics of consultancy/expertise, which refers to all informal 
negotiations, transactions, acts of persuasion and calculations used by consultants to 
manage socially the participants in the project. This concept is very close to Callon 
and Latour’s (1987) definition of translation, but it moves away from it by denying 
the pure calculative nature of mediation. The function of brokerage (de Sardan 
2005), in its political version, includes also calculation, but is based more on “the 
half-formed, taken for granted, indifferently systematized notions that guide the 
normal activities of ordinary men in everyday life” (Geertz 1973:362). 
 
 
6.3. Biographies, training, motivations and career in consultancy 
 
Consultants’ biographies and itineraries displayed a cacophonic reality, in which 
expert knowledge took either implicit or explicit forms. Most participants 
acknowledged that accessing EU funding was a developing area of business of 
which they had not yet had a systematic view, and had little claims of epistemic 
authority over the field. However, competence was constructed symbolically by 
transferring or borrowing from the professional capital gained in other business 
ventures. 
 
There are several categories of consultants, if their biographies are taken into 
account. The first category is represented by academics, whose entry route into 
consultancy is facilitated by their high level of expertise in a particular area, along 
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with a flexible schedule and easiness in communication. D was a senior lecturer in 
Management at a private university in Bucharest who had successfully concluded a 
few EU projects. He worked mostly on his own and decided to try out this line of 
work because he was entrusted to teach a course about the management of EU 
funding at the university. Since he had no experience whatsoever, he decided to get 
a bit of training first and selected his first customer while on vacation. After 
concluding the first project successfully (he obtained funding through the PHARE 
programme), D decided to be bolder by approaching various clients, including 
mayors, and write projects on SAPARD too. 
 
Academics usually combine both careers successfully, but sometimes opt out of 
academia in order to work as full time consultants. For example, C, a full time 
consultant, confessed that he had stumbled across consultancy by accident. He had 
been an academic all his life, had a full time position as a reader in the Physics 
Department in the Construction University in Bucharest, married, and had three 
children, when he met his present boss. They decided to cooperate on part-time 
basis for a year or so, and after that C resigned from his position at the university in 
order to be a full time consultant. His entry to the labour market as a consultant was 
based on meritocracy, but not in the area of consultancy. On the contrary, his 
employer inferred from C’s past experience as a successful academic, that he would 
be a good consultant too. 
 
“C: You see, I had a chance. A second chance. At 38 years old, nobody would have 
hired me, even if my level of education was way above average. 
R: Why? 
C: Because I’m just a Reader. Who would hire me? Would you hire me? 
R: Of course. 
C: That is only because we sat down and we talked! However, if you would see my 
CV, you would not hire me. You see, before an employer evaluates me, s/he 
evaluates my CV. My present boss hired me only on the basis of the interview. He is 
a very intelligent guy and decided to give me a chance. So…just to come back…I 
have a lot of courage, because I know I can do things and I believe God can help 
me to do a good job!” 
(C, consultant) 
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A second category of consultants comprises people who already have other 
businesses and perceive consultancy as a new area worth of investment. These are 
usually highly qualified actors in the business area, whose skills and social capital 
make their lack of expertise in a new area irrelevant. They make use of the same 
entrepreneurial skills as in any of their other businesses. For example, L was trained 
as an engineer and an economist and worked in import-export. Before the 
Revolution, the factory where he worked (‘23rd August’) sent him abroad to 
Mozambique. Then he travelled to Argentina, Brazil, Cuba and Poland until 1993. 
 
“When I got back in 1993, the games were done: the factory where I worked had 
been privatised by the director without taking me into account. What was I 
supposed to do? I started from scratch. I set up a firm (well, in time they multiplied) 
and since my last commercial relationship was with Poland, I thought I’d start from 
there.” 
 
 He started to import coffee and products containing coffee (cappuccino) and 
distributed them in Romania. 
 
“You see, I created the market for these products. In 1996, we had been importing 
for two years. I was the main sponsor of the back-then famous TV show ‘The 5 
o’clock tea’ on the national channel. The problem was that in 1996, the Romanian 
government decided to put taxes on the coffee. Unfortunately, instead of taxing only 
the coffee, they were taxing the final product – and in my case, my product only had 
20% coffee. So, it became too expensive to import the merchandise [he was also 
competing with illegal importing of the same products]. Consequently, I decided to 
produce it here. I found some partners and we set up a factory. The total investment 
was 1 million euro. Eventually I had to give up this business, even though I was 
sorry, but there was no other way. 
R: But how did you end up doing consultancy for EU funding? 
L: Oh, that… I told you that my last job abroad was in Poland. When I got back to 
Romania, I helped a lot of Polish companies to enter the Romanian market. I spoke 
Polish, everybody knew me… I had some pedigree. So, people kept calling me and 
asking what to do, how to do and so on. At some point I thought…well, this calls, 
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the other one calls…but my time is limited. So I told everyone that I would act as a 
consultant and I put a price on my time. 
R: So that is how you got in touch with the area of consultancy. How about EU 
funding? 
L: I supplied materials for a construction company working for someone who had a 
PHARE grant. 
R: You have a construction company too? 
L: Not really. I have a company that supplies materials for construction. And I 
know enough people who want to access the EU money.” 
(L, consultant) 
 
L explained well that his entry route into EU consultancy was accidental. His 
entanglement with the local business environment and his network of foreign 
partners gradually led him to EU funding. From L’s point of view the emergence of 
consultancy market is captured by two sentences: “At some point I thought…well, 
this calls, the other one calls…but my time is limited. So I told everyone that I 
would act as a consultant and I put a price on my time”. However, he did not 
consider this his main activity. Similarly, a female consultant (A) was educated at 
the LSE and returned to Romania to work first in a bank and then to set up her own 
consultancy company helping small businesses to prepare their documents in order 
to obtain financial support from the banks. She came across EU funding, through 
some customers and then started to gather more information about the matter. 
 
A third category of consultants is represented by the actors who dedicate their full 
working day only to this activity, either pursuing it on their own, or in an 
institutionalised environment. For example, M was one of the first five people who 
have worked on EU funding from the very beginning. He majored in Economics at 
the Academy of Economic Studies in 1971, worked for about two years in the 
Ministry of Finance, then for 15 years in one of the biggest factories (‘23rd 
August’). After the Revolution he moved to a research institute until 1994, when he 
started to work for the Ministry of Agriculture (PHARE programme). 
 
“Those were wonderful years, because the nucleus was under the direct supervision 
of Brussels. We did a lot of trainings. And when they started the PHARE 
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programme to set up the SAPARD Agency, I kept in touch with the people and I 
ended up working for SAPARD before it was set up. I was one of the five people 
who set up the Agency. It was extremely hard. We started from zero to do all the 
procedures. We never worked less than 16 hours a day including weekends. In 2002 
we got the accreditation and started to work only 40 hours a week. 
R: Why did you leave the Agency? 
M: Political reasons. The Social Democrats were in power and they sent in one of 
their men as a director. He did not like the old people in the Agency. I was the last 
one to leave out of the five people who have started the Agency. It was unfortunate 
because the director only lasted three more months! But I discovered consultancy!” 
(M, consultant) 
 
Thus the range of motivations to enter the market for consultancy covers a large 
spectrum and is interlinked with people’s biographies. Some had a desire for quick 
success; others were well-connected and decided to explore a new dimension in 
their social encounters. Some have retired and consultancy was a highly valued 
source of extra income (along with pensions and other benefits). Others have 
become professionalised and decided to invest all their time and resources in this 
area. Along with the financial motivation (consultancy pays well, as opposed to 
other economic areas in Romania), consultants talked about other things that 
motivate them: the desire to help their country, the professional pride to achieve 
something new. C was talking about his desire to help the community. “There are 
lots of people who live in the country and need water or electricity or roads. I want 
to help! I want to do something for this country!”. M, on the other hand, talked 
proudly about ‘a job well done’ and his involvement in setting up a salami factory 
that was so technologically advanced that “not even a fly could go in”. D (whose 
sister became a nun and was living in a monastery) offered to help the institution to 
get EU funding in order to introduce tap water. He offered to work pro bono, but 
was refused by the mother superior who considered charity a far easier and more 
reliable way of getting the necessary funds for the works (not to mention that the 
money would have been outside the vigilant eye of the EU control agencies. More 
information regarding entrepreneurs’ decisions to access EU funding can be found 
in Chapters 8). 
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The EU has put forward a neoliberal model of economic exchange and enterprise, 
which forced upon the consultants the reorganisation of work methodologies. The 
career path of a consultant can be pursued as a freelancer or as an employee. The 
decision between individual or organisational participation lies ultimately with the 
consultant and depends on a multitude of reasons. In most of the cases that I came 
in contact with consultants already had a full time job or found the market for 
consultancy too unsettled for building up a career. One person suggested that 
consultancy was not for beginners: “Consultancy is the type of thing you do after 
you have established yourself in your professional area. Otherwise people do not 
trust you!” (A, consultant). In order to avoid the unpleasant situation of being self- 
employed in a relatively unregulated business, some consultants choose to become 
part of a company dealing with EU funding. They may either set up their own 
company or join a well established firm. In this way, the consultant benefits from 
the reputation of the company, while getting trained and exposed to the trade. 
 
“If I want to work with a public institution, I need to prove my expertise. But I have 
no experience in working either with EU funding or public institutions. However, in 
our company there are people who have done that. They prove it by showing their 
CVs and how they work in the project. Obviously if you have no experience you 
need to find people willing to work with you…and if you are a nobody, people won’t 
want to do it. We are a company who has done work for Orange and Rompetrol. 
This proves that the people working here are not just anybody. You see, there are 
some possibilities here, some potentialities… People start working with you if you 
have a business card. And this is quite a business card. Wherever you go, you need 
to show your business card from the company you work for…” 
(C, consultant). 
 
The skills are obtained both by formal training and on the job training. The formal 
training is rather expensive, risky and difficult to obtain. The obsession with 
obtaining formal training is based on the idea that the beneficiary might not be able 
to recover the money spend on consultancy (if the project is approved), given that 
the consultant was seen to be specialised, but not authorised by the state authorities 
to do the particular activity. In this sense, consultants speak about ‘hologram 
degrees’, for courses ran by the Work Ministry. A course in project management is 
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typically around €700–1, 000 per person for two weeks/one month. However, given 
that for the past four years, the regulations have been in flux and the market so 
unsettled, attending one course was never the end of story. Consequently, keeping 
up to date became a business in itself which required heavy investment. The 
investment was rather risky, because for a few years, the Romanian administration 
did not release the EU guides for funding, which basically meant that the market 
was closed and the consultants could not get their investment back. This stagnation 
made several consultants re-evaluate their options and re-orient their economic 
endeavours. The survivors were the more experienced ones or the ones who had 
already been known (as consultants working on the pre-accession funds!). 
 
“R: So, for how long have you been doing consultancy for EU funding? 
L: Just for the EU? One year. 
R: How about pre-accession funding like PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD? 
L: No, I have not done this, but I have some employees who have worked on that 
before. 
R: How many people like this do you have in the company? 
L: Three. I sent them to school. They took the courses…there is this Italian-
Romanian company that organises courses for writing a project. The company is 
recognised [accredited] by the Ministry of Labour. The course lasts for three 
months and it’s pretty serious, with teachers from Romania and Italy…In the end, 
they give diplomas, you know the diplomas with hologram…it basically shows that 
the people who have finished the course are authorised to write projects. 
R: And how much did you pay for the course? 
L: €700 per person 
R: It was not cheap 
L: Well, in the beginning you have to invest because…now is the time to access EU 
funding. They are just beginning! […]I was one of the students myself, just to know 
what to tell them to do […] no matter how experienced you are, you still need to 
know what exactly is going on.” 
(L, consultant) 
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Despite the obvious need to be authorised, hence to take expensive courses, 
consultants acknowledge the value of specialisation. Consequently, on the job 
training constitutes a valuable preparation (both paid and tuition free) for the future. 
 
“My first big project was a salami factory in C [a big city in Romania]. Four 
million euro. Ultramodern. Everything was controlled by the computers. The 
recipes were standardised. If the technologist logged on any computer from the 
factory and changed the production plan by introducing one more salami, the entire 
factory would adjust. In the same place I did an abattoir; it was a window-less 
building with artificial illumination system. There was no question to find a fly in 
that place…not even theoretically. The only place where one could see a fly was in 
the first room where they sacrificed the animals […] So, you see, a little bit here, a 
little bit there…you learn. You need the minimum knowledge in order to manage the 
entire project. “ 
(M, consultant) 
 
In general, consultancy takes place in small and medium enterprises (SME). The 
organisational setting suits this type of job as SMEs are flexible entities, easy to 
manoeuvre, open and closed at will, with low investments required for set up and 
management (Aidis and Sauka 2005). Beyond the transfer of symbolic capital and 
learning opportunities, the firm setting offers access to information, job security and 
the possibility of career development; in other words, it offers structured access to 
the market by rendering the actors better equipped to tackle economic uncertainty. 
 
“For me the most important thing was to find people to work with…and I found 
them through my colleagues who have introduced me to their former co-workers or 
friends. In this way, I found out a lot of valuable information. For example, I heard 
that consultancy services decreased from 10% to 8% [in terms of EU eligible 
payments for a project]” 
(A, consultant) 
 
As a social mechanism of coordination, networks seem to function extraordinary 
well for small and medium sized enterprises, as the information provided through 
networks is ‘thicker’ and more reliable (Kaneko and Imai 1987). Furthermore, some 
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of the environmental risks are absorbed by the organisation while providing support 
and resources for action. “I have three consultants working full time for me. Up to 
now they have not done much [the interview was conducted before the funding lines 
of interest in this case were open]…I’ve only sent them to school to get trained 
[…]Yes, of course I paid for the courses. It was €700 per person […]. It does not 
matter that they have not anything so far, they will. They have a portfolio of clients, 
they know what to do and when the funding lines will open, we’ll just hand in the 
projects.” 
(M, consultant) 
 
Due to shortage of staff, small and medium consultancy firms have a fluid 
organisation, sometimes lacking a clear compartmentalisation of tasks. Instead, 
employees tend to fulfil a series of attributes related to marketing, operations, 
customer service, human resources and so on. The only exception to this rule tend 
to be the legal and accounting departments, as they require special training and 
authorisation. For example, M was the owner of a firm who acted as marketing 
director when advertising the company and finding customers, as a human resources 
director when employing people and deciding to send them to trainings, and as 
customer service director when ensuring that the quality of the service provided was 
consistent with the contract. He mostly needed people on the operational side, 
which entailed writing the projects, liaising with the public institutions for routine 
checks and getting the approvals for the project. M retained for himself what he 
considered to be the most prestigious tasks (which were incidentally related to 
networking) and delegated the ones that were either highly skilled (like 
accountancy) or involved a low level of skills (getting the approval from public 
institutions). The situation is similar in the case of consultants who get a foreign 
expert to work on the project: 
 
“ In Romania the language barrier is visible, even if we manage to communicate in 
English. They [the foreign consultants] have experience and having a PhD was a 
plus [the Romanian consultant was an academic], but it was not enough. Their name 
is very prestigious. We can consult them when we have problems…they can give us 
valuable information, they can help us evaluate various work offers. These are all 
important because we live in a society that requires you to have some international 
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experience. On the other hand these people cannot be too involved in a project. 
They are very expensive and I can’t pay too much. Also, it would not be good for me 
to let them do the fieldwork and search for information. Their role is to create the 
structure of the project: the main activities, the calendar of the project, the 
manpower, the team….They can do all these from abroad. However, you need to 
have a few Romanian consultants in order to be operational. They need to have 
experience and know exactly what to do. In a typical project you need at least two 
competent consultants to take responsibility for the project. At this point we have 
several people who can work with us. We have their resumes and they are ready to 
work. It is good for them too, because consultancy pays well. In general they will do 
the trips, the papers, the documents…you see we need people who can do that… 
R: and how will you hire them? 
C: Full time contracts…I need them full time!” 
(C, consultant) 
 
In terms of work ethic and work load – there are no illusions. Consultants know that 
there is an enormous amount of work involved in putting together a project. “A 
consultant cannot do more than 4-5 projects at the same time. It is impossible. 
There is too much bureaucracy, too many trips, too many phone calls to 
make…”(C, consultant). Their work ethic is affected by the job demands: they need 
to display coherence in the project, translate the beneficiary’s requirements into EU 
language, while keeping in mind that this is a business and they need to make sure 
to get the maximum results with the minimum investment from the beneficiary. 
 
The transfer of capital between company and employee works both ways affecting 
the credibility of the company on the market. In general, a consultancy company is 
assessed by a number of criteria: size and reputation, seniority, price (system of 
pricing) and share of the market. Reputation is constructed by retroactively showing 
a list of former clients: “I have done work for BRD, Connex and Rompetrol. These 
are big companies, everybody knows about them”(A, consultant), by making 
reference to present cooperation (“I’m actually busy now because I have two 
contracts with some town halls” (K, consultant) or by dropping names of well- 
known people who are somehow affiliated to the consultancy company (as in the 
case of a former minister who is part of the board of directors). When one’s 
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reputation is not clearly established, clients ask explicit questions about the 
affiliation of the consultancy company: “You are a consultancy firm from 
Bucharest? Who are you working with [making reference to the big players in the 
market]?”. The concept of seniority denotes a solid reputation built upon both social 
and technical capital, in which the latter is proved by repeated and successful 
interactions with clients and bureaucracy. In the case of consultancy for EU 
funding, seniority is hard to prove, as the funding lines were only opened in 2009. 
Consequently, companies advertise themselves by using transfer of capital. Some 
firms have offered consultancy for pre-accessing funds (PHARE, ISPA and 
SAPARD) and use this to advertise themselves even though the process of 
accessing structural funds is rather different. Other companies have offered 
consultancy in other areas like accountancy, marketing and decided to expand their 
area of activity. In the case of newly established firms, a typical way to claim 
seniority is by inviting a senior consultant to be part of the board of directors. 
Reputation and seniority established by the above mentioned mechanisms play a 
very important role in granting access to clients and establishing a firm’s presence 
in the market. 
 
Another very important element that contributes to a firm’s competitiveness is 
pricing. In an attempt to share the risks with the applicants, some consultants are 
paid in three instalments: “We take some money when we sign the contract with the 
entrepreneur, we take the second instalment when we hand in the project to the 
Agency and the third one when the project is approved” (B, consultant). In this case 
the price is higher (approximately €3,000), because it entails not only preparing the 
file, but also coaching the beneficiary in the process of accessing funding. In the 
case the file is not approved, the applicant and the consultancy firm would rework 
the project and hand it in at a later date. Other consultancy firms offer readymade 
files for a lower price (around €2,000) the client being charged fully when the file is 
handed in to the Agency. In this case, however, the consultancy company has no 
further obligation towards the applicant. There are also rare cases, of very 
prestigious consultancy firms that also offer other forms of specialised work, and 
who would charge the client upfront (a rare case of client too – usually the State!). 
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Despite their flexibility, consultancy firms, like any other SMEs in transition 
countries face great challenges among which is the complex issue of taxation (– 
either high level of taxes, the frequent changes to tax policies, the ambiguity of tax 
policies) (World Bank 1995, EBRD 2002, Aidis 2006), bureaucracy, corruption, or 
unfair competition from a large informal economy (Glas et al. 2000). As small 
businesses, they are more likely to be more vulnerable in the face of environmental 
challenges, as they do not have the economic power to sustain activity in periods of 
economic crisis (EBRD 2002, Pissarides 2004). In order to counteract these 
challenges, some actors have started to associate themselves thus creating strong 
alliances which act as a safety net. For example, A had a consultancy company 
specialised in helping the client to prepare the file for bank loans. As she had no 
experience in accessing EU funding, she associated with four other consultancy 
firms with various competences (one was specialised in preparing the funding 
application, another firm was specialised in providing feasibility studies and 
architectural projects and the last was specialised in communication and marketing). 
The agreement was that each firm would rely on the others for specialised services 
and would recommend the partners for potential clients. At the opposite site on the 
spectrum, there is another example of three consultancy firms with similar 
competences (in writing EU funding projects), who have associated themselves in 
order to split the market. If one of the firms obtains a contract with a public 
institution that was required to organise a public tender with at least two more 
competitors, the other two were called in to put in courtesy bids (which were 
usually higher), so that the one who had negotiated the contract could legally win it. 
These two cases exemplify the bright and dark side of social capital, as well as the 
actors’ ability to switch from formal to informal arrangements easily and 
competently. 
 
After discussing the organisation of consultancy as a business, the work 
methodologies and trainings, the next section turns to analysing the social 
interactions between consultants, applicants and bureaucrats. It looks at the ways in 
which consultants construct their presentation of self, evaluate their clients, relate to 
bureaucracy and work together with other consultants and experts. 
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6.4. Social aspects of consultancy 
 
In evaluating their (potential) clients, consultants assess three main aspects: 
credibility, capability and commitment. These aspects are also the basis on which 
consultants present themselves to the world, by employing persuasion in actively 
searching for clients. Furthermore, the same aspects form the basis of consultants’ 
reputation, which is a complex mix of social, symbolic and professional capital. 
These aspects are by no means the only elements involved in selecting clients, nor 
are they used consciously and explicitly in most interactions. In fact, more 
experienced consultants invoke a sixth sense, an extraordinary capability that helps 
them detect instantly if a new economic association would be successful or not. “I 
smell potential clients!” said one consultant making reference to exactly this 
capacity (M, consultant). However, novices are less inclined to build their expertise 
on the basis of a gut feeling. 
 
Credibility is the sum of verbal avowals and nonverbal signs regarding the intention 
to follow a particular course of action (Goffman 1970). In the first instance, the 
consultant makes a prima facie assessment of the client and enterprise, analysing 
the eligibility of the proposed project and the seriousness of the client’s purpose. 
There is no point in starting to work on a project if the beneficiary is not convinced 
that the project is worth pursuing. This is usually the case with public actors who 
are inexperienced and find accessing EU funding too risky and time consuming, 
despite the fact that, in case of failure, there are few financial losses for the public 
actors (as the EU funding and the government cover most of the investment). The 
opposite is also true: sometimes the clients are so certain that they want to do the 
project that they avoid the services of the consultants. 
 
“Out of the six mayors [that replied to his proposal], one is so certain/convinced 
that he said to me: “Why should I spend money on consultancy? I better do it 
myself. I will work and finish it in six months, ‘cos I know how it works.” He had 
done other projects on the pre-accession funds and he knew what it was about. The 
other mayors have never done a project and have no idea how to put together a 
procurement file. They are mayors and that is enough for them!”(C, consultant) 
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After assessing the willingness and seriousness of the client, consultants consider 
their capability to do the project. “Since words can be faked, self-respected” 
consultant need to have some grounds in order to put their faith in the client 
(Goffman 1970:105) and that means evaluating whether the client has the resources 
to execute the project: 
 
“I can’t lie to people! You don’t need 50% funding. You need about 65%! Have you 
got the money? No. Well, let’s go to a bank and talk. This is completely free of 
charge [M actually said free of charge in English despite the fact that the interview 
was in Romanian]. I do not start working with people until I’m certain that the 
client responds to at least 75% of the bureaucratic issues.” 
(M, consultant) 
 
Most consultants are mainly concerned with the financial resources of their clients. 
In the case of private clients, the beneficiary needs to co-fund the investment by 
50%. If they do not have the money, or they have less money – the project might 
not be approved, might be delayed and, in extremis, the funding could be 
withdrawn. For the public actors, consultants need to make sure that the mayor will 
obtain all the necessary approvals from the local council on time, or the risks are 
those described above. 
 
The third aspect is commitment, which is the client’s willingness to sign the contract 
of the consultancy. Despite the fact that the very soul of the economic transactions 
is the contract, it is not atypical for consultants to start working before signing the 
contract (see Chapters 2 and 5). Furthermore, the taken for granted assumption that 
the contract would represent the encounter of free wills is an overstatement to say 
the least. There are cases, especially involving the public actors, in which clients are 
forced or lured into commitment. In one case, a president of the county council set 
up a consultancy firm and advertised it throughout the entire county. All the mayors 
‘preferred’ this company because it was rumoured that whomever works with other 
consultancy firms might not get the necessary approvals and would have the project 
delayed. I was never able to verify this rumour, so there is no way to comment on 
the reliability of this type of data. However, the importance of this data does not lie 
in its truth value, but in its widespread acceptance – most of the consultants and the 
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clients that I spoke to, believed this to be true – and their belief shaped the market 
for consultancy in a dramatic way. It discouraged new consultants from entering the 
market, allowing room only for those who were in more powerful company than the 
president of the county council. Consequently, the ‘free market’ became a 
‘hierarchical market’ that reproduced the bureaucratic ladder in a different setting 
(see Chapter 3 for a theoretical discussion). 
 
Commitment relates to the likelihood that the clients would fulfil their contractual 
obligations and pay the consultant without any physical or psychological risks for 
the latter. One consultant recounted how she refused to work with some customers 
even though they obviously fulfilled all the technical requirements (i.e. they had 
more than enough money, were keen to do the project, and so on). However, the 
potential beneficiaries were obviously involved in illegal activities of a violent 
nature and did not have the conventional understanding of the law (from the first 
meeting they laid out their plan to get only some of the approvals necessary for the 
construction and forge the rest so as “not to waste so much time”). A, the 
consultant, declined the job as she was afraid that the clients’ critical spirit was 
more prone to produce bruises than reflection. 
 
In order to recruit potential customers, consultants employ a number of different 
strategies. I used two main criteria to make sense of the data. The first one was 
related to the type of contact that was first established between consultants and their 
clients. The second one takes into account how active or passive the consultants 
were in pursuing clients; (it should be mentioned that all consultants are active one 
way or the other, but here the concept of ‘active’ refers more to an above average 
level of aggressiveness in discovering new clients).72 The preferred strategy or the 
preferred mix of strategies is a function of how developed the consultancy firm is 
and how well established on the market. 
 
The first type is DA (direct and active). It is well depicted by the case of C, 
described in the previous section. Even though he was a newcomer to consultancy, 
                                               
72
 As opposed to the economists’ idea that entrepreneurs prefer to have access to a wide range of 
suppliers, the economic research shows that this is not the case (see Maklan et al. 2004).  
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the company that employed him has done projects involving pre-accession funds. In 
order to recruit clients, C focused on public actors, actively pursuing them. 
However, his strategy would have been more at home in an urban environment, 
than in a highly traditional rural area, which “has room only on the margins for 
achieved relations of friendship” (Bearman 2005:234). 
 
“You know, I did a very interesting market activity. I wrote a beautiful letter, 
printed it in colours on excellent shiny paper. Three pages. I sent it to 300 mayors 
from six counties. I received six answers. So I basically got a 2% response rate in 
an interval between a week and a month. From these six mayors who got back to 
me, some already had the approval of the local council to start the project and told 
me to start preparing the funding file”. [Initially C sent out emails because it was 
cheaper and he wanted to save the resources of the company. When most of the 
emails were returned to him with ‘fail delivery reports’, he realised that the country 
town halls are not so well established technologically. The next time, C tried to use 
the fax, but it was the same problem. Eventually he settled for sending the letters by 
post]. C chose to contact the mayors directly, despite using an atypical approach 
mediated by technology. The reason for preferring this strategy over face to face 
interactions, even with such a low response rate lies in the fact that it is less time 
consuming, as shown below: 
 
“I can get a meeting with a mayor from my first attempt. But I don’t want to meet 
the mayors from the beginning because there are lots of mayors in this country. I 
talked to ten mayors and got ten meetings. It’s not hard to get meetings. It’s very 
easy. It’s a lot harder to get a meeting with a businessman. With mayors it’s not 
hard. What do you think they do all day in the town hall? I can go and hand in a 
flyer with my prices. But this is not useful for me; for me, my time is more precious. 
My time is too precious to waste it on the road. What I need to do is to find the 
people who really want to do something […]. For example, now I work alone and 
when I’m away with things to solve, there is nobody to cover for me. Besides I need 
to find people that I can collaborate with, I need to set up a working team, I need to 
make a notebook detailing all the steps involved in the process…” 
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Since C did not benefit from a well established reputation on the market, he had to 
pay particular attention to establishing his credibility in the eyes of the clients. This 
process involved a highly performative component enacted initially in face to face 
interactions and subsequently mediated by technology. However, he realised that 
this activity was too time consuming and he was neglecting other important areas 
like establishing a network of peers and developing his capability thus jeopardising 
the future commitments. 
 
The second type of consultant, IA (indirect and active), prefers to recruit clients 
through mediated contact. Despite the fact that her company had a functional 
website, A got most of her clients through mediated contact. She advertised her new 
business orientation heavily both in her professional and personal circles. Her 
marketing activity was more traditional than in the case of C, involving heavy use 
of word of mouth. As a versatile businesswoman, A operated a transfer of capital 
from her previous professional arrangements to the consultancy firm (the transfer of 
capital involved not only the financial dimension, but also the social and symbolic 
elements), joining a partnership with several prestigious firms. This was highly 
advantageous because it did not put any burdens on her yet gave A access to new 
clients. In this joint venture, each partner had a different specialisation, so there was 
no internal competition and no replication of competences. The informal agreement 
was that whenever one of the partners would get a client, they would recommend 
the other partners for different parts of the project. In this case A did not have to go 
to extreme lengths to establish her credibility or capability in front of clients and she 
could afford to be more selective, thinking twice before entering into commitments. 
 
The third type is represented by the DP (direct and passive). This is the case of L – 
a businessman who had several firms with very different types of activities. He had 
decided to set up a consultancy firm for EU funding in 2008. Despite the fact that 
his company was advertised on the internet, he was not interested in selecting 
clients, because he already had a portfolio of clients from his other businesses. 
Moreover, his employees brought with them clients from their previous jobs. L 
made it clear that he would not work with the public actors: “I only work with 
private entrepreneurs […] because the public sphere involves costs that I cannot 
afford!”. At the time of the interview, things were in standby mode because the 
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official guides had not been published, which would explain his relaxed attitude and 
his lack of interest in pursuing new clients. L’s reputation is very solid and so are 
his relationships with his clients (because they have done business before). 
Consequently, L’s credibility and capability are well established and reflected in the 
terms of the commitment (although the price is sometimes higher). L does not need 
to enter into a partnership because his constellation of firms already includes most 
of the possible specialisations of potential partners (he had a company to produce 
construction materials, a legal firm and a consultancy firm). 
 
The last type of entrepreneur comprised by the proposed typology is IP (indirect 
and passive). This is the case of highly specialised firms/consultants who recruit 
their customers with the help of former customers (a former client introduces a 
potential client). In this case, the person who makes the introduction is the 
guarantor of the consultant, vouching for their credibility and capability. This type 
of social arrangements is propitious for illegal/out of the ordinary requirements. It 
might be the case that the client is looking for someone reliable and competent to 
undertake the necessary proceedings in order to make an EU project profitable, but 
does not have the time to develop a personal relationship and test it over a 
reasonable period. Consequently, the social network absorbs this demand and acts, 
in this particular case, as a human resources department (see also Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 5). 
 
Persuading clients to enter into commitments is a complex endeavour. Consultants 
socially seduce their clients by invoking substantive rewards despite the restrictive 
situational environment and by making use of well-established ceremonial devices 
(as detailed in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 5). These require social care in handling the 
clients, who are seen as “ritually delicate objects” (Goffman 1970:31). 
 
“So, until I learned how to approach the mayors, it was really hard. I had to learn 
what the mayors want to hear…but this is a whole story! Firstly, the mayor is a 
person who wants to know how things will be from the very first meeting. But 
without any details. To me, it seemed very important to communicate the details. 
The more I knew, the more I felt it was important to tell the mayor everything I 
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knew. Wrong! They want to know that things are simple and they won’t have any 
headaches.” 
(C, consultant). 
 
C’s explanation shows that 
 
The ritual code itself requires a delicate balance, and can be 
easily upset by anyone who upholds it too eagerly or not 
eagerly enough, in terms of standards and expectations of this 
group. Too little perceptiveness, too little savoir-faire, too 
little pride and considerateness, and the person ceases to be 
someone who can be trusted. (Goffman 1970:40) 
 
During the first exploratory meetings between the consultant and the beneficiary, 
the interaction is loaded with uncertainties, potentialities and fuelled by an unusual 
diffusion of power between the actors. Consultants are generally better educated, 
younger, better informed, in a nutshell better equipped to deal with this type of 
funding, as compared to their clients. However, clients are in a powerful position 
(especially the public actors who are gatekeepers for their communities). The 
interaction can be thwarted by the obvious social distance, but as long as the 
participants understand the ceremonial significance of the way they are treated and 
are capable of responding without abusing the symbol system, there is hope for 
cooperation (Goffman 1970). “Tact in regard to face-work relies for its operation on 
tacit agreement to do business through the language of hint – the language of 
innuendo, ambiguities, well-placed pauses, carefully worded jokes and so on” 
(Burns in Goffman 1970:30). Expressions like “let’s understand each other”, “let’s 
reach an agreement like proper human beings”, “we also know how to take care of 
things” signal the availability to negotiate, the willingness to do business and to 
achieve a win-win state of affairs. The beginning of cooperation is celebrated with a 
drink, usually a sample from the local production of alcohol in the case of rural 
areas produced by the participants in their backyard (as detailed in Chapter 2).73 
 
The situational environment is highly restrictive (see Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) on 
the one hand because of the elevated degree of control from the bureaucrats (control 
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 There are several expressions in the language that make reference to the social ritual of sealing a 
deal with a drink – e.g. A bea adalmasul.  
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of the papers, field checks with both national and international teams). On the other 
hand, the situation is highly structured (because EU funding applications are over-
standardised leaving little room for innovation), but highly uncertain (there is very 
little general agreement as to what, how and when should be done).74 The 
unavoidable mistakes that accompany any economic activity, which would 
normally be absorbed by the social field, become too expensive. Furthermore, the 
familiar ways of doing business are challenged, as the EU projects impose 
standardised ways of conduct (for example starting to build without all the 
approvals or not having insurance for the workers lead to withdrawal of funding). In 
their efforts to secure commitments and without affecting the client’s productive 
capacity, consultants use their creative spirit to bypass the situational constraints. 
Ultimately, the written projects are an expression of the profound mystery of 
creativity (Chapman et al. 2009) - they are inventions, not inventories: 
 
“The final project has little to do with reality! You need to make the papers to be 
credible!! Let’s say a beneficiary wants to build a greenhouse to produce 
vegetables. Of course, I make the project in such a way that he looks good. In order 
to look good and be eligible, I put ten kilos of tomatoes extra, because tomatoes are 
more expensive than kohlrabi and more profitable. And that’s it! Or how I did with 
a timber factory…when I saw that there was no way to reach the profitability 
indicators with hornbeam, because of the rains, I put everything on oak…and 
everything worked like magic!” 
(M, consultant) 
 
Obviously, consultants need to pay attention to the ‘magic of the project’ because, 
as Goffman put it (1970:166), “there is a difference between holding a job down 
and pulling a job off; here an act becomes a deed”. 
 
The interaction between brokers and clients is successful only if there is an 
agreement regarding the substantive rewards for the client. For private actors, things 
are more straightforward, as the client already knows the desired outcome, which is 
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 The EU project management is the first area in which a highly structured situation is also highly 
uncertain (despite the apparent contradiction in terms, this seemed the best way to describe the 
situation). 
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a reward in itself. However, for the public actor things are not as clear. If 
successful, the project might bring substantial benefit to the community; however, it 
is the mayor, not the community that signs the contract and takes the responsibility. 
For assuming these risks, the mayors need to be highly motivated. The strategies of 
persuasion employed by consultants include moral, social and financial arguments. 
 
The moral argument invokes higher loyalties and the demand to do one’s duty.75 
The ultimate judge of fulfilled obligations is the divinity, which is accepted and 
relied upon even in its institutional form (according to the 2007 Barometer of 
Opinion, in Romania the most trusted institutions are the church and the army; on 
average 80% of the people said they trusted them, as opposed to 5% of people who 
expressed their trust in government and parliament). Once the mayor has decided to 
start the cooperation, the priest is called in to give the blessing and hold a short 
service. This tradition has several functions among which to signal the beginning of 
an event, to mobilise the community in case help is needed and last, but not least, to 
publicise the event to the entire community. 
 
The social arguments relate to the status of the mayor and the desire to increase 
social prestige. By accessing EU funding, the mayor has the opportunity to make 
fundamental interventions in the life of the community. Introducing gas, electricity, 
current water, building roads are major, historical events that affect the everyday 
life of the community and change the nature of work. The alterations are dramatic, 
as the rhythms of life and work are inherited from the previous generations. Despite 
the aura granted by supporting a project with such important effects, in particular 
moments, mayors need extra support to enhance their social status. Such a key 
moment is the electoral campaign and in this case, consultants can be 
instrumental.76 They can make financial contributions to the campaign, offer their 
services for specific tasks or even run the campaign themselves. This type of 
association between consulting for EU funding and getting involved in the mayor’s 
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 In this case, the concept of duty is related to the role that the mayor should fulfil in the community. 
In traditional rural areas the mayor is one of the three most important people in the community (the 
other two being the priest and the teacher). Living in the community and being directly related to the 
entire village, the mayor’s role has little in common with the modern understanding of the term as 
transcribed in the typical job description for the position. 
76
 Given that accessing EU funds takes a long time (in some cases more than two years), the mayor 
might finish the mandate before the project is approved.  
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campaign is not seen as problematic by the consultants. As C told me: “What is the 
big deal about getting involved in the electoral campaign? I don’t get it! It is legal 
to fight for what you want! It is actually moral!”. Favour exchange is based on 
noblesse oblige. “Since social relationships are defined partly in terms of voluntary 
mutual aid, refusal of a request for assistance becomes a delicate matter, potentially 
destructive for the asker’s face” (Goffman 1970: 29). 
 
The efficiency of moral and social arguments is sometimes enhanced by bringing in 
the financial arrangements. If money is involved, the negotiations regarding the 
undisclosed commission paid to the mayor take place at the beginning of the 
process, before the consultancy contract has been signed. This commission (some 
researchers refer to it as bribe (Wedel 1986, Yang 1994, Gupta 1995, Ledeneva 
1998, Wedel 1998, de Sardan 1999, de Sardan 2005, Haller 2005, Blundon 2006) 
can take various forms.77 
 
First, there is the option of an upfront bribe offered to the mayor in return for 
committing to work with the consultant who offered the bribe. Despite the fact that 
this is the most debated option in the literature about corruption (Rose-Ackerman 
1999, Van Klaveren 1999) it was almost non-existent in my fieldwork. Offering 
money to unknown people in the hope that they would become business partners, 
without anyone to vouch for the transaction is unthinkable (not only for obvious 
economic reasons, but also for social ones: it is considered rude to offer money in 
the first encounter. Besides, people are suspicious that this might be a set-up from 
some TV channel or the police). The only case of this type that I have come across 
was while I was doing the media review. Some journalists travelled to the eastern 
area of the country getting in touch with numerous mayors and pretending they 
were consultants for EU funds. There was only one case in which the mayor 
accepted the bribe and he was filmed while making plans to talk to some of his 
friends who were mayors in the neighbouring villages to introduce the consultants. 
 
                                               
77
 This information was obtained while I was doing my ethnography, in un-recorded interviews or 
while doing participant observation. In order to protect the identity of those involved, there are no 
references in the text.  
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A second strategy, more economically viable than the first one, would be that the 
consultant offers to give the mayor a commission if the project is approved. This 
acts as an incentive for the mayor who has something to gain at a personal level 
after carrying all the responsibility for the public institution. This arrangement is 
decoded as a bribe by the consultant and as a commission by the mayor. 
 
A third option relates to the 1% of the money that can be spent on organising public 
procurements. Legally the consultant can claim the money, but it is considered rude 
to deprive the town hall of this small sum. However, the mayor can only use the 
money for the public interest, in the same project, for the same purpose. 
Consequently, there is little benefit to the mayor’s pocket (as the money goes to the 
local budget) and even though this is part of the shadowy financial arrangements 
between the consultant and the client, neither would define this as corruption. 
 
Fourth, it is the 2 for 1 campaign. The consultant might agree to do extra work for 
the town hall without being paid. For example, in one case a consultant was told by 
the mayor that he would only sign the contract if the consultant would write a 
second funding project for the same money. There are situations in which 
consultants are not forced into such commitments, but choose to pursue this course 
of action themselves. So, when they approach mayors, the consultants advertise 
themselves in this way. However, it would be highly inappropriate for the mayor to 
suggest such a course of action, as consultants would consider it abusive. The 
opposite situation became frequent after the financial crisis which heavily affected 
private entrepreneurs (who could not afford to co-fund the investment anymore), 
but it had little impact on public actors (except for the fact that the state had less 
money to co-fund the investment and the mayors had to rely more heavily on local 
budgets hoping that they would be reimbursed). 
 
Fifth, the sign of a truly successful partnership between the consultant and the client 
is when they agree on the constructor because that involves “real money”. 
Sometimes the consultant introduces the construction company and then new 
arrangements can be made. If construction is involved, then the mayor can be paid 
more cash; he can receive materials and even the workforce to build some parts of 
his/her private residence. Alternatively he can have the construction company do 
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extra work for the same money (one mayor had funding to build a number of 
kilometres of road in his area. He asked the construction company to build the main 
roads and as a bonus, the constructor built a road up to his house). Last but not least, 
if a partnership is considered profitable for the parties involved, everyone will want 
to repeat the experience, so they may find ways to cooperate again (in the case of 
private entrepreneurs there are no problems in this regard. For public actors some 
questions might be raised by central authorities if there is little or no variation in the 
companies that are chosen to conduct various works. The process of selection is 
supposed to be transparent through the public procurement system, but this can also 
be bypassed as explained in Chapter 5). 
 
Up to this point, the section has only focused on the social aspects of brokerage 
involved in attracting or dealing with clients. The main reason for dedicating so 
much space to this aspect lies in the pivotal importance of the client for the 
economic arrangements. There is little use in developing a strong network of peers 
and experts and investing in a good relationship with the bureaucracy if the 
consultant has no contracts. Once the client is secured, the consultant turns his/her 
attention to other categories of professionals that might prove useful. Consequently 
the next few paragraphs focus on the social interactions with the bureaucrats, peers 
and experts. 
 
Ideally, the relationship between bureaucrats78 and consultants should be open and 
honest; the bureaucrats should provide the necessary information, keeping 
consultants up to date with the latest policy changes, and consultants should feed 
back to the bureaucrats some information about the dysfunctionalities encountered 
in the field. There are very few consultants that enjoy this type of equal relationship 
with the bureaucrats. Most of the time, consultants perceive the bureaucrats as being 
in a position of power. This provokes all sorts of negative feelings: fear, humility, 
revolt or anxiety. The feelings of impotence are related to the unpredictable nature 
of the bureaucratic response and the impossibility to change anything (neither the 
person, nor the behaviour). “For example, there is an agronomist at the County 
Direction for Agriculture. If he does not like you, he kicks your ass” (M, 
                                               
78
 For the purposes of this section I make no distinction between different categories of bureaucrats 
(working for the EU or not).   
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consultant). This also contributes to a widespread perception of corruption in the 
system: 
 
“You see, a bureaucrat who has the necessary negative moral structure and is in a 
key position can make a lot of money. An example of a key position: anywhere they 
give approvals. Any kind of approvals…in a ministry, like the Construction 
Ministry…given the fast pace of construction industry right now. Wherever there 
are approvals to give, there are some blotting papers who drain the money…that’s 
what they do! Another ministry that had problems at the time was the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Of course it’s the same thing…I’m sure nothing has changed to this 
day. Why do you think they are changed nowadays? [The interviewee was referring 
to a corruption scandal at the time that involved changing/firing/sending in early 
retirement a number of public servants]. Because there comes a moment when 
someone goes over the top…and the person who was holding him can’t protect him 
anymore…” 
 (L, consultant). 
 
In order to overcome the administrative shortcomings, consultants prefer to have 
mediated contact with the bureaucrats. The status of the mediator is very important 
for the future relationship, because the social and symbolic capital of the mediator is 
bestowed on both the protégée and the bureaucrat doing the favour (who can expect 
gratitude from the asker). “It really depends on the person who makes the 
introduction” (M, consultant), or “Well, I witnessed an extreme case which 
required the direct intervention of a minister!” (C, consultant). Bureaucracy is thus 
fragmented and approached with the use of social networks (Gupta 1995). 
 
When a mediator is not found or the consultant is not intimidated by the 
bureaucratic power, braver strategies are employed: 
 
“If you know how to approach the people who can solve your problems…things are 
ok. Because you see, human beings are very strange animals. In order to solve your 
problem, you can enter the public servant’s office with a big smile on your face and 
a confident manner … decided and slamming the door. Then, the public servant will 
think: ‘Who is this one? Maybe he is someone important! Why is he so relaxed? In 
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this office everyone enters bending and bowing and here he comes saying: “How 
are you madam? You look very good today!” How does he know me?’ The other 
option is that the public servant takes pity on you and solves your problem. Other 
times you need to act a little bit crazy to solve it…depends…But when you do this 
every day, you are not afraid anymore”. 
 (C, consultant). 
 
The ceremonial aspects involved in approaching the public servants display care for 
staging deference that is required for the success of the action. In order to maximise 
his chances of success C caricaturised the spirit of power by using the same external 
signs without having the substance. As Goffman explained: 
 
By easily showing a regard that he does not have, the actor 
can feel that he is preserving a kind of inner autonomy, 
holding off ceremonial order by the very act of upholding it. 
And of course in scrupulously observing the proper forms he 
may find that he is free to insinuate all kinds of disregards by 
carefully modifying intonation, pronunciation, pacing and so 
forth. (Goffman 1970: 58) 
 
The interaction with other consultants is governed by the law of quid pro quo, 
which makes the relationships less loaded. A consultants’ most important need is 
information and when the bureaucracy supplies little or unreliable information, 
peers are a reliable (re)source. The paradox of information lies in the fact that there 
is too little information in an ocean of information. Basically the media, public 
institutions, internet have an abundance of information regarding EU funding; at the 
same time, nobody knows if the information is reliable. One consultant expressed 
this frustration: “It’s hard to find out information. For example I have heard that 
consultancy will only be paid up to 8% from the project, instead of 10%, as it was 
before. But this is just what I’ve heard. I need to double check. There are too many 
sources of information, some of them are contradictory. I prefer to ask people who 
are on the market” (C, consultant). So, other consultants act as a source for double-
checking what the public institutions withhold. 
 
The labour market for consultancy is not well structured, thus the hiring system is 
not based on impersonal criteria. Consultants prefer to work with people they know 
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from previous jobs, conferences, childhood. “While at my post in Poland, I met a lot 
of people, with some I worked. The human relation is important…and that 
remained. I kept in touch with those who worked in the system at that time” (L, 
consultant). By following each other’s career paths over a number of years, 
consultants end up building a strong network with acquaintances in surprising 
social/professional positions: “I’m telling you…go and talk to Mr. V from the 
Ministry of Interior. Tell him I sent you. His son in law or his son will soon get a 
managing position in the area of EU funding” (M, consultant). Under such 
circumstances, it would be difficult for the person in the public office to refuse a 
favour to an old friend. Besides, the bureaucrats know that positions as managers 
are not kept for long, because “there are other people waiting in line”. However, 
there are situations in which favours are denied and the effects are drastic. The 
unfulfilled expectations have the value of a social delict, “throwing the persons out 
of gear with the social system” (Goffman 1970: 119). L had this experience: 
 
“R: Do you have friends working for the public institutions? 
L: I do, of course, but I’d rather not use them when I have a problem. 
R: Why not? 
L: Because of the inevitable debts that appear for both me and them and these put 
us both in uncomfortable positions. 
R: So what do you do if you really need their help? Or what did you do in the past? 
L: In the past I did call on them when I needed to and they refused to help so I 
broke up a lifetime friendship. They did not help because they were afraid they 
might lose their chair! [their position]” 
(L, consultant). 
 
Another option is to choose co-workers on the basis of referencing: “Always and 
for anything I choose people who have been recommended to me. If it works…fine; 
if not…fine again. I don’t have time to waste.” (D, consultant). However, 
referencing is just the beginning of a working relationship. Consultants also need to 
enter into commitment and sign contracts to reduce uncertainty by establishing a 
course of action and coerce the parts into fulfilling their obligations. The 
assumption that “all the parties would be bound by incorporated social norms 
regarding the absolute necessity of keeping one’s word” (Goffman 1970: 132) is out 
 208
of the question. However, the strong personal relationship acts as a buffer by 
securing a safe space in which consultants’ innovative (even delinquent) productive 
capacities remain unaltered. 
 
There are cases in which excellent working relationships between consultants come 
to an end, not necessarily because the business venture was not successful. Quite 
the opposite – consultants reported that they ended their partnerships after the 
business had become successful: “You see, not all friends remain friends until the 
end. [This is] because of the money. When you have to split the money, things are 
different.” In this case, L was recounting a challenging episode from his past: he set 
up a business with foreign partners contributing with 4% in financial terms and 
100% in work terms. His partners had the funds to invest and the know-how 
(sending specialised engineers to train the Romanian workers). However, the 
business was much more successful than anyone anticipated and eventually the 
foreign partners decided to exclude L from the business. They built a new factory 
which was making exactly the same products in a new area and withdrew their 
investment from the old factory. L could not afford to buy out their shares, so he 
had to sell his shares; he felt that his efforts to build up a business had been 
undervalued. 
 
Working with foreign counterparts seems to raise various problems for Romanian 
consultants. Despite the fact that the foreign counterparts are far more experienced 
with EU funding and have more financial capital, the working relationships are not 
always successful. The social context in Romania is very different from the 
countries where the foreign consultants gained experience. This is an important 
point, because EU funding is highly dependent on the bureaucratic component and 
bureaucracies work at different paces in different countries. Furthermore the 
business culture is also remote, making it hard for Romanian consultants to explain 
why a bribe might be illegal, but it is not a social crime. One of my respondents put 
it nicely: “How can I explain to my German partner that I need to pay some 
bribes??? He does not get it. So, what I need to do is either pay from my own pocket 
(and I’m desperate, but not an idiot!), steal from my partner (I’m not that good) or 
drop the partnership (because if I don’t pay, setting up the contracts will take me so 
long that my German partner would want out!)”(K, consultant). On some 
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occasions, brokerage firms from Romania hire foreign consultancy firms to teach 
them the necessary skills for managing EU funding. However, the language barriers 
and the spicy prices raise new problems. 
 
In the economy of a project, the work of a consultant is credited with less than 10% 
of the funding. By their own admission, the job entails putting together the project 
in a coherent manner: ‘I do project management which means coordinating the 
technical part for the FS (feasibility study). They [the experts] give me the project 
95% ready and I do the rest of 5%.’ (M, consultant). Ultimately, the consultant 
builds up his/her work on the preceding expert knowledge. There is a fundamental 
difference between consultant knowledge and expert knowledge, not only because 
the two categories have dominance over different epistemic domains, but also 
because of the legal requirements for authorisation. In doing an EU project, 
consultants need experts who are authorised and specialised to do the work. These 
two requirements are not always met by one person, so the brokers need to be able 
to deal with the politics and protocols of expertise. Specialised experts are not only 
cheaper, but have a wider set of skills: “I had this engineer, a ‘golden hand’! He 
could fix the equipment on the spot, so that there were no losses in the system” (L, 
consultant). However, the project has to be approved and signed by an authorised 
expert, which involves new financial arrangements. The world of experts is 
unusually small and it would be common for people to know each other either 
personally or by reputation. If the authorised expert trusts the one who did the job, 
then there is no need to double check the details (see also Chapter 5); otherwise the 
work is done twice, as the authorised person is not willing to risk his/her job for a 
contract. When consultants become more established, they build a portfolio of 
professionals with various types of expertise, and try to personalise the relationships 
to smooth the interaction in future contracts. 
 
6.5. Brokerage and former patron-client relationships 
 
In the Romanian environment consultants, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats share the 
same culture (like Hobbs (1988) showed for East London) and are familiar with the 
cultural codes of favour exchange and the 
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atmosphere of generalized obligation, which can be redeemed 
by no accomplishments whatsoever. This atmosphere of 
obligation belongs among those ‘microscopic’, but infinitely 
tough threads which tie one element of society to another and 
thus eventually all of them together in a stable collection of 
life. (Klockars 1974:395) 
 
In this sense a link can be established between consultancy for EU funding and 
patron-client relationships. The success of consultancy depends not only on the 
technical capacity of writing a good project, but also on the social capacity of 
negotiations and partnership (de Sardan 2005). The set of relations established 
between participants on the market are greatly facilitated by a fluid institutional 
framework which lacks predictability and transparency. In order to counteract these 
shortcomings, successful consultants rely on social mediation sometimes making 
use of bribery and influence. It is precisely this embeddedness in the social and 
cultural frames that makes them particularly well equipped to deal with the market 
arrangements. Consultants have no need to change their ways of calculating (Callon 
1998) to a neoliberal version of the market; they just need to adjust their 
performance to the prescribed standards. 
 
Thus, by using familiar social mechanisms in a new economic area, consultants 
construct the market of EU funding (which, contrary to any expectation, is not the 
province of elites), while reinforcing their role in the social arena (de Sardan 2005). 
However, this process of market-making has nothing to do with learning the 
‘correct’ way to do businesses. This is a historically contingent process based on 
hybrid forms of behaviour and alternative conceptions of legitimacy. Consultants 
give stellar performances working on the conventions of the business and making 
use of the subtleties of EU funding law, while remaining unconstrained by 
conventional faiths which would impede him/her seeing “what ought not to be done 
in what others believe one is supposed to do” (Klockars 1974). 
 
Consultants resist the EU funding ideology by making a clear distinction between 
work routines and policy models. Instead of framing (Callon 1998) their actions 
according to the European regulations, consultants create as-if scenarios that 
perform eligibility for the bureaucrats (Miller 2002). In this sense consultants are 
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the exponents of the culture of representation in the area of EU funding, which 
shows that even though the ideology has changed, the practice of economic life 
remains the same (Miller 2002, Mosse 2006, de Sardan 2005). However, the EU 
funding new meta-narrative brought about variations regarding the boundaries of 
acceptable behaviours, criminalising formerly accepted strategies of action (see 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 7 for details regarding crimes in relation to corruption and 
EU funding). This forced the actors to use covering strategies at the documentary 
level, to disguise their practices. Despite the lack of congruence between social and 
accountancy practices, consultants are not seen and do not regard themselves as 
criminals. In their work, formal and informal economic transactions or social and 
criminal work routines are inseparable (Ditton 1977, Nordstrom 2007). And even 
though their activities might be known to their counterparts, consultants do not have 
a collective identity as criminals. 
 
In this particular case, the actors do not resist ‘the market’. What the consultants 
resist, contest and mock is the ideology of the ‘free market’ put forward by the EU 
regulatory framework and the fashionable discourse regarding corruption sustained 
fervently by the transnational organisations. This “neoliberal conception of 
individual conceals or denies the importance of social protection and relations 
patronage, obligation or even employment” (de Sardan 2005:322). Consultancy 
practice in the area of EU funding in Romania shows that the modern concept of 
organisation and money brought about by the modern institution of project funding 
is an unfamiliar territory for all the actors involved in the process (entrepreneurs, 
consultants and bureaucrats). 
 
The socially disembedded conception of money and management that excludes or 
minimises social obligations is the object of frustration, contestation and mockery. 
However, it is also the object of moral and social aspiration. The ideology of ‘free 
market’ and the EU have become the symbols of cleanness and purity as opposed to 
the corrupted communist practices (see Chapter 7 which shows how locals 
capitalise on this aspect). Thus references to consultancy are sometimes met with 
suspicion or resistance due to the possible use of patron-client relationships. “I hate 
to give bribes…I have a small business and don’t see why would I have to give 
5,000,000 lei here or there [approximately £100]. I’d rather live out of charity than 
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give the bribes!” (B, consultant). “There is so much corruption in this country that it 
is better to live abroad. If I would have wanted to give bribes, I would have been 
really far now” (C, consultant). 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the market of consultancy related to EU funding is in 
fact a by-product of the EU funding process and over-regulation. It was triggered by 
the necessity to decode the rules associated with the process of EU funding. In this 
sense, consultants mediate and inter-mediate the relationship between entrepreneurs 
and bureaucrats. However, consultancy is also a niche market, in which supply and 
demand intersect with the purpose of constructing eligibility, while increasing 
profitability. Consultancy is a newly established area of expertise that shows the 
early signs of professional organisation. Due to the lack of adequate training and for 
the purposes of establishing themselves on the market, consultants make use of 
transfer of capital from other areas of work. Thus, the world of consultancy is very 
heterogeneous in terms of professional backgrounds, trainings and motivations. 
 
An essential feature of consultants is their quality of being social brokers. They not 
only teach entrepreneurs to actively exploit the EU funding rules to achieve 
profitability, but also broker among various types of experts, entrepreneurs and 
bureaucrats. Thus, the success of consultancy depends not only on the technical 
capacity of writing a good project, but also on the social capacity of negotiations 
and partnership. Sometimes, partnerships might be based on bribing officials or 
making use of solidarity networks. Such techniques might be illegal, but they are 
not socially condemned. This particular aspect shows that the morality of 
consultants (similar to applicants and beneficiaries) is divorced from the morality of 
the state; they do not decode their acts as crimes and do not have a collective 
identity as criminals. On the contrary, circumventing the laws to achieve eligibility 
is a pragmatic decision made possible by their high levels of social, financial and 
symbolic capital. Thus, when consultants complain about corruption, they also 
complain about the lack of symbolic capital to successfully complete their tasks. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Governing EU funding through corruption control: 
Bureaucrats 
 
 
 
After discussing the register of eligibility and consultants, this chapter turns to the 
second generic actor – bureaucrats – and the register of compliance, by analysing 
the EU institutional establishment and its impact on the process of accessing EU 
funding. It argues that transnational anxieties regarding possible abuses of EU 
financial interests have put in place numerous new routines of control conducted by 
‘elite squads’. The institutional design of EU funding control was sustained by the 
specialisation of the justice circuits based on the systematic association between 
corruption and protection of the financial interests of the EU, as described in the 
first part of the chapter. However, the transnational-led control framework clashes 
with vernacular work routines creating its own informality. The second part of the 
chapter discusses the unanticipated consequences of the establishment of EU 
funding control through three paradoxes that relate to the discursive power of EU 
funding, informality and the costs of compliance. 
 
 
7.1. Transnational control in the area of EU funding 
 
 
Designed in Brussels through direct negotiation with individual states, taking into 
account international interests and corporate assessments, EU funding is governed 
through administrative and criminal means that exercise overt control through new 
bureaucratic arrangements. This section looks at the new technologies of governing 
promoted in relationship to development, Europeanisation and international aid. It 
shows that the design of the EU funding institutional establishment is based on 
systematic associations between development aid and corruption expressed through 
legal narratives, institutional expansion and law enforcement priorities. I start with 
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an example of case prosecuted by Directia Nationala Anticoruptie (DNA) in 2009 
(DNA 2009), and then I provide a picture of the EU anti-fraud establishment in 
Romania. 
 
A case: 
“S.I., in his capacity as the legal representative of a firm, unjustly obtained 
€68,288.48 and 91,824.45 RON from the EU budget through a PHARE programme. 
In order to secure the funding, he had faked a number of tenders in 2004, presenting 
false and inexact documents (in the form of three signed contracts with other firms 
and all the documentation relating to the tenders) and changed the destination of the 
funds. Instead of using the funding according to the aims of the project, he 
transferred the above mentioned sums in three business accounts that belonged to 
firms administrated by D.S.F., P.A.M., B.L. and P.E. The transfers were officially 
registered as payments. However, such payments were related to fictitious 
commercial operations and hence not due to be paid. Later on, the money was 
transferred to another firm where S.I. was administrator and associate. During the 
investigation, P.E. put moral and material pressure on two witnesses in order to 
make them provide false testimony. The other defendants helped S.I. to access 
PHARE funding by facilitating the use and circulation of fictitious documents. 
 
The territorial branch of DNA from Craiova charged the five defendants: S.I., 
D.S.F., P.A.M., B.L. and P.E. under Act no. 84/P/2008 and sent them to court S.I. 
was indicted for committing crimes against the financial interests of the EU (Law 
78/2000 Art.18,1 paragraphs 1 and 3, Art.18,2 paragraphs 1 and 2) and forgery 
(Criminal Code, Art.290 paragraph 1). The other defendants were indicted for 
criminal complicity in the above mentioned crimes and the last one was also 
charged with attempt to determine false testimony as defined by Art.261 paragraph 
1 of the Criminal Code.” 
Source: Translation from the DNA 2009 report – section regarding crime against the financial 
interests of the EU 
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This case, typical of the DNA’s activities, uncovers a few important aspects about 
the control of EU funding in Romania: 
1. The indictments issued by the prosecutors were based on special legislation 
designed to protect EU financial interests and the Romanian Criminal Code. 
2. The case entered the justice system through DNA – which is a special 
branch of prosecution that deals only with grand corruption and EU funding 
crimes (as detailed in Chapter 4). This entry route established the case as a 
priority, ensured a high level of prosecutorial expertise and enhanced 
supervision by the European institutions. 
3. The investigation lasted four years (the offences were committed in 2004 
and the indictment was finalised in 2008) showing the complexity of the 
case and the inevitable challenges in gathering evidence. It is to be expected 
that a number of years would pass before a final conviction would be 
obtained in court. 
4. The value of the financial loss to the European budget is high (€68,288.48 
and 91,824.45 RON). 
5. Even though we do not know much about the social and economic status of 
the offenders, the modus operandi shows proficiency in conducting financial 
arrangements through both legal and illegal means. 
 
These elements are excellent indicators of EU funding control apparatus in 
Romania, and lead us to wider implications that will be discussed in the following 
subsections. 
 
7.1.1. A new legal order: Implementing EU funding 
When Weber ([1922] 1968) discussed the ways in which states influence economic 
and social arenas, he contended that laws and regulations were linked to the concept 
of order, which was essential for the well-functioning of any economic activity: 
“An order will be called…law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that 
physical or psychological coercion will be applied by a staff of people in order to 
bring about compliance or avenge violation” (Weber [1922] 1968:34). He further 
argued that duration in time and political legitimacy are crucial for the concept of 
order. Weber’s insights are a good place to start for an understanding of the EU 
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funding governance structure because the criminalisation of EU funding misconduct 
is part and parcel of the political order that shapes the control efforts that aim to 
protect the financial interests of the EU. I contend that the process of criminalisation 
is driven by the European agenda, which prioritises European regulations over the 
national legislation and makes systematic associations between corruption and EU 
funding misconduct. In practice, this new legal order is confusing because it lacks 
what Weber described as essential: temporal continuity and legitimacy. 
 
In Romania, crime in relationship to EU funding has a short history. All the 
legislation for the protection of the EU’s financial interests was adopted between 
2003 and 2011. This type of misconduct was first criminalised through Law 
78/2000 (Articles (18)1, (18)2, (18)3, (18)4, (18)5. Interestingly, Law 78/2000 is also 
the first and foremost legal instrument of criminalising corruption in Romanian 
legislation (Law 78/2000 on the prevention, discovery and sanctioning of corrupt 
acts). Consequently, by default, crime in relation to EU financial interests is also 
associated with corruption. However, the section regarding crime in relationship to 
the financial interests of the EU was introduced only in Law 161/2003, which 
means that the anxieties about corruption preceded concerns regarding the 
possibility of defrauding the EU budget. 
 
In Article (18)1, Law 78/2000 incriminates the use or presentation of false, inexact 
or incomplete documents or statements if such use led to the illegitimate access of 
EU funding. In the following paragraph, it also incriminates the act of omitting to 
communicate legally-required information, which leads to the unjust acquisition of 
EU funding. The punishment for these crimes is 3 to 15 years imprisonment and 
withdrawal of certain rights. If the consequences of these acts are very serious (this 
aspect is to be decided by a judge), the punishment is imprisonment from 10 to 20 
years and the withdrawal of certain rights. Essentially this offence relates to forgery. 
 
The second article (18)2 criminalises any changes in the destination of EU funds 
that have been conducted without the careful consideration of the legal 
requirements. It is also punished the illegal change in the use of any due goods if 
this leads to an illegal diminution of the EU budget. The punishment for this crime 
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is 6 months to 5 years imprisonment or, if there are serious consequences, 5 to 15 
years imprisonment and withdrawal of certain rights. 
 
The first two articles correspond directly to Corpus Juris79 article 1, which 
incriminates fraud to the EU budget. Fraud here generally refers to the use or 
presentation of false (or incomplete/inexact) documents or declarations that cause 
harm the EU budget. Alternatively, this offence can take the form of omitting to 
present the required documents/declarations to the competent authorities in breach 
of a requirement to provide such documentation. 
 
The third article (18)3 prohibits the use or presentation of fake, inexact or 
incomplete documents or declarations which result in the illegal reduction of 
resources from the EU budget. It is also incriminates the omission of supplying the 
required information if this act has the same effects as described above. Such acts 
are punishable by 3 to 15 years imprisonment and the withdrawal of certain rights 
or, if the consequences are very serious, by 10 to 20 years imprisonment and 
withdrawal of certain rights. This article draws on the PIF Convention Art.1, lit b. 
Attempting to carry out the acts are covered by Articles (18)2, (18)3 and (18)4. 
 
Finally, Article (18)5 incriminates the misconduct of the director, administrator or 
any person in a position of responsibility in a company if it leads to any of the 
above mentioned offences. The law specifies that the misconduct should be related 
to the guilty failure to carry out a duty of office or to carrying it out deficiently. 
Furthermore, the article also incriminates acts committed by a subordinate who acts 
on behalf of a specific economic agent if in connection with corruption or money 
laundering offences in relation to EU funding. Such acts are punishable with 6 
months to 5 years imprisonment and restraining certain rights.80 
 
                                               
79
 Corpus Juris is a set of European common rules regarding unification on criminal matters that are 
to be followed by every member state (see Appendix II: Guiding principles of Corpus Juris 2000. 
Draft agreed in Florence).  
80
 The restraining of certain rights refers to the rights mentioned in the Romanian Criminal Code, 
article 64 which reads: “The complementary punishment of restraining certain rights means the 
restraint of one of more of the following: a) the right to elect and be elected to public authorities or 
to a public position; b) the right to occupy a position presuming the exercise of state authority; c) the 
right to occupy a position or practice a profession or activity similar to the one that the offender used 
to commit the offence; d) parental rights; e) the right to be a guardian or a curator.” 
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Romanian legislation follows Corpus Juris closely as regards to sanctions too. 
Corpus Juris establishes as the following main types of punishment: imprisonment 
up to five years and/or fine; confiscation of the instruments, products or profits 
obtained through criminal actions; and publishing the conviction. The 
complementary punishments are: exclusion from future subventions for 5 years; 
exclusion from future transactions for 5 years; and prohibition for 5 years (at the 
most!) from holding public national or community office. In the Romanian legal 
system, the main punishment is imprisonment and the complementary punishment 
is exclusion from certain rights (as established by Art. 64 Criminal Code). The 
sentencing judge has latitude in deciding if the decision should be published in local 
or central newspapers. One missing aspect that might be useful would be 
introducing restrictions on participation in public bids for a certain period or 
limiting access to financial resources for a period (Rosita 2009). The punishment is 
individualised according to the gravity of the act, the degree of participation or 
guilt, as in Corpus Juris. 
 
As already discussed, fraud is a general term that covers a range of behaviours. 
However, such behaviours are codified separately in the Romanian Criminal Code 
as the Code does not include the term per se. The panoply of behaviours associated 
with fraud may include: fraudulent management81 (Art.214), deceit82 (Art.215), 
                                               
81
 Art. 214. (1) The act of causing loss to a person, in bad faith, on the occasion of administering or 
preserving his/her assets committed by the person charged with the administration or preservation of 
those assets, shall be punished by imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years. 
         (2) Fraudulent management committed in order to acquire a material benefit shall be punished 
by imprisonment from 3 to 10 years, if the act is not a more serious offence. 
          (3) If the asset is in private property, except for the case when it is wholly or partly State 
property81, criminal action for the act in para.(1) is initiated upon prior complaint from the injured 
person. 
82
 Art. 215. (1) The act of deceiving a person, by presenting a false fact as being true or a true fact as 
being false, in order to obtain unjust material benefit for oneself or for another and, if damage was 
caused, shall be punished by imprisonment from 6 months to 12 years. 
          (2) Deceit committed by using untruthful names or capacities or other fraudulent means shall 
be punished by imprisonment from 3 to 15 years. If the fraudulent means is in itself an offence, the 
rules for concurrence of offences shall apply. 
          (3) The act of deceiving or maintaining the deceit of a person, when concluding or executing a 
contract, if without this deceit the person would not have concluded or executed the contract in the 
conditions stipulated, shall be sanctioned by the penalty provided in the previous paragraphs, 
according to the distinctions shown there. 
         (4) The act of issuing a cheque with regard to a credit institution or a person, while being aware 
that the supply or cover necessary for its  realisation does not exist, as well as the act of withdrawing 
the supply, wholly or in part, after the issuing, or of prohibiting the acceptor from paying before 
expiry of the presentation term, for the purpose in para.(1), if damage was caused against the owner 
of the cheque, shall be sanctioned by the penalty provided in para.(2). 
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embezzlement83 (Art.215), material forgery in official documents84 (Art.288), 
intellectual forgery85 (Art.289), forgery of documents under private signature86 
(Art.290) use of forgery87 (Art.291) and forged statements88 (Art.292). Just to 
confuse things further, the new Criminal Code adopted through Law 301/2004 
devoted an entire chapter to offences regarding the financial interests of the EU. 
However, this Criminal Code never been implemented, as successive governments 
have postponed its adoption. 
 
So far, I have shown that Romania designed a special set of offences to protect the 
financial interest of the EU instead of assimilating them into corresponding offences 
already in the national criminal law, even though the crimes have the same logical 
content (Neagu 2010). This route of action was grounded on the one hand in the 
Romanian political desire to show commitment to protecting EU citizens’ money. 
On the other hand, Romanian legal experts have long noticed an informal European 
trend to convergence in criminal matters (Antoniu 2009), despite the fact that 
 
          (5) Deceit that resulted in particularly serious consequences shall be punished by 
imprisonment from 10 to 20 years and the prohibition of certain rights. 
83
 Art. 2151 (1) The act, committed by a clerk, either for him/herself or for another, of appropriating, 
using or trafficking money, values or other assets in his/her management, shall be punished by 
imprisonment from one to 15 years. 
          (2) In case the embezzlement had particularly serious consequences, the penalty shall be 
imprisonment from 10 to 20 years and the prohibition of certain rights. 
84
 Art. 288. (1) The act of forging an official document by counterfeiting the writing or the 
signatures or by altering it in any manner, likely to produce a legal consequences, shall be punished 
by imprisonment from 3 months to 3 years. 
            (2) The forgery in the previous paragraph, if committed by a clerk during the exercise of 
service prerogatives, shall be punished by imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years. 
            (3) Tickets or any other printed documents producing legal consequences are equated with 
official documents. 
            (4) An attempt is punishable 
85
 Art. 289. (1) The act of forging an official document when it is drawn up, committed by a clerk 
during the exercise of service prerogatives, by certifying untrue acts or circumstances or by omitting, 
in awareness, to insert certain data or circumstances, shall be punished by imprisonment from 6 
months to 5 years. 
         (2) An attempt is punishable. 
86
 Art. 290. (1) The forgery of a document under private signature by any of the means in Art. 288, if 
the perpetrator uses the forged document or gives it to another person for use, in order to produce 
legal consequences, shall be punished by imprisonment from 3 months to 2 years or by a fine. 
           (2) An attempt is punishable. 
87
 Art. 291. The use of an official document or of a document under private signature, while 
knowing that it is forged, in order to produce legal consequences, shall be punished by imprisonment 
from 3 months to 3 years when the document is official and by imprisonment from 3 months to 2 
years or by a fine when the document is under private signature. 
88
 Art. 292. The act of making an untruthful statement before a body or institution of the State or 
another unit in Art. 145, in order to produce legal consequences either for oneself or for another, 
when, according to the law or to the circumstances, the statement made is used to produce that 
consequence, shall be punished by imprisonment from 3 months to 2 years or by a fine.     
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European conventions specifically recommended the opposite, leaving criminal 
matters in the regulatory realm of the member states. However, choosing to 
establish new legal categories for EU funding misconduct was not followed by an 
“‘objective’ allocation of guilt” (Bauman 1997:70). Instead, it created confusions 
for law enforcement that had difficulties categorising offences in which both 
national and European financial interests were prejudiced through the same act. As 
most EU grants work on the principle of co-funding, it was unclear if the offenders 
were to be investigated according to the special legislation regulating EU funding or 
to the Criminal Code. 
 
7.1.2 Expansion and specialisation of EU funding control apparatus 
EU funding is conditioned by institutional redesign at central and local levels, 
driving the implementation of new technologies of government as part of a 
‘modernisation’ process. Following the EU recommendations (EC 2004), Romania 
devised a national anti-fraud strategy that aimed to coordinate anti-fraud efforts at 
the national level. Updated in 2006, this strategy had six main areas of intervention: 
prevention, financial public control, fiscal control, criminal investigation, financial 
recovery and coordination of anti-fraud efforts. Symbolically, the Anti-Fraud 
Strategy shows Romania’s commitment to stepping up its efforts in protecting EU 
and the national financial interests. In this context, the anti-corruption agenda plays 
a major role, aiming to restrain bureaucratic discretion and strengthen external 
supervision through a credible, apolitical monitoring system (Rose-Ackerman 1999; 
Klitgaard 1988). The new agencies created (e.g., auditing agencies and integrity 
organisations) as part of the anti-fraud movement are embedded in a broader system 
of checks and balances where effectiveness depends on the separation of political 
powers. Thus the dynamics of anti-fraud rhetoric and practice are part of a wider 
political economic context that emphasises corruption as an underlying theme 
moulding EU funding. 
 
Coordinating anti-fraud efforts 
Departamentul pentru Lupta Antifrauda (Fight against Fraud Department – 
henceforth DLAF) is the institution designated to implement the Anti-Fraud 
Strategy by coordinating the adoption of laws and regulations that are in accordance 
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with the EU conventions while ensuring their harmonisation with the domestic legal 
framework. This organisation was set up in 2005 as a response to the European 
Commission’s Monitoring Report (EC 2004), which urged Romania to pay special 
attention to the protection of EU financial interests by setting up adequate 
mechanisms for investigation and the implementation of appropriate legislation. 
Despite a rough beginning marked by political instability, DLAF consolidated its 
strategic position in the anti-fraud institutional puzzle in 2011. Law 61/2011 and 
HG 738/2011 extended DLAF’s powers to conducting administrative investigations 
of possible irregularities, frauds or other illicit activities that impact on the financial 
interests of the EU. The new legal framework also introduced new sanctions for 
offences in relation to EU funding (Art.8c Law 61/2011). 
 
An important part of the control process is in the realm of auditing agencies. 
Auditing is a form of symbolic action that contributes to the production of order 
legitimising the process of accessing EU funds. According to the Anti-Fraud 
Strategy, financial public control is within the job description of the agencies that 
implement EU funding. In Romania, the main institution that ensures the technical 
and financial implementation of the European Fund for Rural and Agricultural 
Development is Agenţia de Plăţi pentru Dezvoltare Rurală şi Pescuit (APDRP). 
This hierarchical structure was set up in 2006 (OUG 13/27/02/2006), just before 
Romania joined the EU, but it was accredited by the Ministry of Agriculture one 
year later (on the 15th of December 2007). APDRP was built on the skeleton of 
SAPARD Agency (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development), which lost its reason for existing after Romania’s accession in 
January 2007. APDRP inherited SAPARD’s former employees and subsequently 
expanded its area of activity and its structure by establishing local branches at the 
regional (8) and county level (42)89. APDRP coordinates audits through the Control 
and Anti-Fraud Division (DCA). DCA is entitled to conduct control checks not only 
during the implementation phase, but also for a period of five years after the project 
has finished (ex-post control). The control activities relate to: conformity, eligibility 
and selection of the project, and the acquisition of goods and payments. 
 
                                               
89
 According to the organisational scheme approved by Order 123/2009. 
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Directia Nationala Anticoruptie (DNA) is the only investigatory body that can 
prosecute offences against the financial interests of the EU. The investigations are 
conducted by the ‘Service for fighting crimes against the financial interests of the 
EU’, which is a subdivision of the ‘Corruption Section’ set up by the order of the 
DNA chief prosecutor in 2005. According to the DNA, in 2006, tackling EU 
funding misconduct was conducted by a team of four prosecutors, five police 
officers, three registrars and three experts (DNA 2006). Essentially, in 2006 only 
3% of DNA’s human resources were dedicated to EU funding related crime – and 
the proportion has not changed dramatically over time. Such an allocation of human 
resources might indicate that, politically, this type of crime was not considered a 
priority as opposed to ‘grand corruption’ that absorbed nearly 97% of the resources. 
 
Vertical and horizontal integration 
The academic debates regarding foreign aid discussed in the theoretical framework 
of the thesis showed that financial support is crucially linked to the role of 
corruption (Sachs 2005, Easterly 2006). Easterly (2006) argues that foreign aid has 
been lost due to mismanagement, lack of supervisory capacity, fraud and 
corruption. He thus contends that the countries receiving aid should be well 
governed (e.g., strong institutions, powerful civil society, free media) and 
supervised by other agencies in order to ensure that the money reaches the poor. In 
Romania, both trends are visible, but the most important is the latter. The EU 
assumed the supervision role through a series of instruments that regulate law 
enforcement working routines and institutions. 
 
OLAF has an important supervisory role for investigative matters at the European 
level. In the case of EU funding the ‘supervision’ of OLAF is politically displayed 
in the narratives of ‘cooperation’, even though, according to European regulations, 
OLAF can conduct spot checks in every EU member state. Secondary data analysis 
and the media review conducted for this research indicate that liaising with OLAF 
is a top priority for DLAF and DNA. Successive DLAF annual reports and 
European officials’ statements indicate close cooperation between OLAF and 
DLAF (DLAF 2012). On the one hand, this involves transfer of knowledge from 
OLAF to DLAF through training and technical assistance. On the other hand this 
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relationship was shaped through joint investigations. For example, in 2007, 
Romania participated in investigating two EU funded projects: one of them was 
financed through the PHARE programme and the other through a European 
Investment Bank loan. DLAF offered support and technical assistance to OLAF in 
104 cases in 2011 (DLAF 2012) in an average timeframe of 19 days per case. 
Furthermore, an important part of DLAF’s mission is to centralise and report to 
OLAF the irregularities that appear in relationship to EU funding. APDRP and 
DNA also respond to OLAF’s requests by investigating possible cases of fraud 
according to their legal competences and transmitting the results to the European 
body. 
 
Vertical integration is doubled by a horizontal integration that ensures 
communication between the main control institutions dealing with EU funding in 
Romania. For example, in 2009 APDRP conducted eight controls requested by 
DLAF, DNA and the Ministry of Public Finance; 10 file checks in response to 
OLAF requests; 137 document responses to DNA and DLAF; as well as 4 
responses to the General Police Inspectorate. Also the Romanian Court of Accounts 
and Direction for Internal Audit had five audit mission and seven information 
requests. APDRP received 40 control notes from DLAF and started the procedure to 
recover debits (APDRP 2009). 
 
The examples above show that the EU funding control apparatus is a hybrid form of 
hierarchy that reflects the contemporary changes impacting on the workplace that 
rejuvenate bureaucracy (Courpasson and Clegg 2006). It combines traditional 
hierarchical organisational principles (as described by Weber ([1922] 1968) with 
post-bureaucratic forms of coordination (Cascio 2000), in which people are not 
physically located in the same place but cooperate with supervisors and co-workers 
through technological means, mixing various traditions of civil service under the 
notion of ‘supranationalism’ (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). The unique features of 
this bureaucratic arrangement impact on the definition of crime as a ‘transnational’ 
process, despite the fact that a crime can only be committed in a particular location 
at a particular time (Woodiwidis and Hobbs 2009). In fact, control has become 
transnational, because it is driven by international conventions and institutional 
supervisory arrangements, while crime has remained local. This gap between crime 
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and crime control has been widened by European anxieties, stereotypes and 
perceptions of the situation that essentially define Romania as a ‘systemically 
corrupted country’ (EC 2002, 2004, 2006; TI 2005, 2006, 2009). 
 
Emergent bureaucratic identities 
The institutional arrangements described so far have created a particular work 
environment that inevitably impacted on the employees’ professional identities. I 
argue that institutional prestige derived from political interpretations of Romania’s 
state of pervasive corruption coupled with repeated positive evaluations from the 
European Commission (expressed through country reports) have transformed these 
institutions into ‘elite squads’. For example, DLAF or DNA symbolic capital is 
constructed through repeated interactions with OLAF and other European 
institutions and their position as the unique administrator of the Romanian Anti-
Fraud Strategy and the unique investigative body for EU funding misconduct. This 
symbolic capital is further reflected in the composition of its staff – very young 
people, with postgraduate degrees preferably obtained abroad. For example, in the 
2006 DLAF Report Activity, the former chief of DLAF, Mr Tudor Chiuariu stated 
that the average age of the staff was 30 years. Quirke (2010) reported that all the 
staff was “well under the age of 40!” and that the Romanian authorities did not 
perceive the lack of professional experience as a problem. In his research Quirke 
(2010) also tried to advance the hypothesis that the lack of seniority of DLAF 
employees might have been “a conscious attempt to avoid employing older 
investigators who may have been compromised by a culture of corruption”, but 
reported that “Romanian officials were a little evasive when asked to confirm if 
there was any substance to this observation” (Quirke 2010:18). My research shows 
the investigators’ lack of seniority is closely related to the job description as put 
forward by the authorities. As DLAF was designed from the beginning to be the 
main point of interaction with OLAF, there was a need for people who could speak 
at least two foreign languages, who were adaptable and willing to travel abroad (for 
training and investigations). It was simply more difficult to find such qualities in 
more experienced investigators. Finally, the last important aspect that contributes to 
the quality of elite squad of DLAF/DNA is the payment scheme. DLAF 
investigators have always been paid more than their counterparts (Quirke (2010) 
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reports that they were paid 75% more). The justification for such high payment is 
related to incentivising highly specialised practitioners who might be conducting 
their activity under political pressure. This quality of ‘elite squads’ tends to impact 
on employees’ career mobility opportunities. Such relatively stable occupational 
and organisational structures tend to favour on the one hand ‘bounded careers’ 
(Arthur and Rousseau 1996) that attach people to the organisation; on the other 
hand they favour the development of a ‘career capital’ in the form of professional 
networks without geographical boundaries and a capacity to learn and develop new 
skills through repeated training (Weick 1995). 
 
Patterns of control 
Within the general EU anti-fraud framework, policies related to regulation generally 
aim to increase the level of control and criminalisation through higher control rates, 
higher crime rates, harsher sentences and high profile offenders. 
 
Higher control rates 
Within DLAF, two main units are important for EU funding control routines: 
Information Management Direction and Control Direction. The first is generally 
focused on preliminary verifications and cooperation with other institutions, while 
the second can initiate operational control activities to identify EU funding 
misconducts. According to the 2012 DLAF activity report, in 2011 the first unit 
received 645 notifications and requests from national or European authorities and 
solved 602 (in 225 cases controls and verifications were conducted, 151 were 
redirected to other institutions and in 226 cases other measures were taken). The 
second unit conducted 178 investigations of which 97 were finalised (53 began in 
the previous years and 125 began in 2011). The average time for an investigation 
was 110 working days (DLAF 2012). Such a time span is not unusual for economic 
crime - for example Levi (1988) reports comparable time frames in his study of 
fraud in the UK. In the 53 cases begun before 2011 there were serious indications of 
fraud; in 7 cases the inspectors found irregularities and in 37 cases there were no 
indications of misconduct. Thus in total, a number of 823 irregularities were 
investigated in 2011 by DLAF. The trend is increasing as compared to the previous 
years’ trends, but it is not significantly different (DLAF 2007, 2008, 2009). 
Interpreting these trends, Ovidiu Dobleaga, the former DLAF chief remarked: 
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“A high number of irregularities does not necessarily show that a state is more or 
less vulnerable to fraud. In fact, it shows that the control system has done its job. 
One can interpret irregularities in various ways. If the number increases yearly it 
shows that we control more and more. If the number decreases it might show that 
the beneficiaries become more competent and not necessarily that the authorities do 
not pay attention to fraud. One should not infer from a high number of 
irregularities that Romanians are ‘champions of fraud’ as it was interpreted last 
year, even though the European Commission brought clarifications on this matter. 
This is a bit of a sensitive aspect.” (Gandul, July 200890) 
 
Doblogea was certainly right in pointing out that “we control more and more”. 
Figure 7.1 shows the results of the control activities conducted by APDRP between 
2004 and 2009. There is a wide gap between the number of project verified and the 
number of project that have been found to display irregularities with financial 
implications. An interesting result visible from Figure 7.1 is that whereas control 
seems to increase (see the blue and red line), the number of irregularities with 
financial implications seems to decrease (the green line). 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The control activities conducted by APDRP during the implementation and execution 
phase before the last payment during 2004-2009. 
Source: Compilation from APDRP Manual/Activity Report 2010 
 
                                               
90
 http://www.antifrauda.gov.ro/ro/presa/interviuri/interviu_ovidiu_dobleaga_22_07_2008/ last 
accessed on the 17th of December 2013.  
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Year No. of 
projects 
verified  
Sample 
size 
Measure No. of 
irregularities 
without 
financial 
implications  
No. of 
irregularities 
with financial 
implications  
No. of 
cancelled 
contracts 
as a result 
of control 
No. of requests 
submitted to the 
police/ 
DNA for further 
investigations 
2004 14 10% 1.1 12 (86%) 2 (14%) 0 0 
2005 62 10% 2.1 41 (66%) 21 (34%) 0 0 
2006 54 10% 3.1 50 (93%) 4 (7%) 0 0 
47 3.4 36 (77%) 6 (13%) 2 (0.04%) 3 (0.06%) 
2007 17 5% 1.1 16 (94%) 1 (6%) 0 0 
 27 3.1 21 (78%) 6 (22%) 0 0 
2008 29 5% 3.1 26 (90%) 2 (7%) 0 1 (3%) sent to the 
Financial Guard 
 26 10% 2.1 23 (88.5%) 3 (11.5%) 0 0 
 13 10% 3.5 13 (100%) 0 0 0 
2009 63 15% All 
measures 
60 (95%) 3 (5%) 0 0 
Total 352 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Table 7.1: Summary of control activities conducted by APDRP during the implementation and 
execution phase before the last payment during 2004-2009. 
Source: Compilation from APDRP Manual/Activity Report 2010 
 
 
As detailed in Table 7.1, during this period APDRP controlled 352 projects ex-ante 
and in most cases there were found either irregularities without financial 
implications or no irregularities at all. In more than 75% of the cases, the projects 
were conducted correctly, which shows that EU funding anxiety about misconduct 
is not justified. The number of instances of misconduct peaked in 2005, when 66% 
of the projects were found eligible to continue their activity. In this case, the high 
number of irregularities with financial implications (34%) might be related to the 
sample size (which was unusually large including 62 projects) and to the nature of 
the measure investigated (Measure 2.1 envisages projects related to aquaculture). 
There were only two contracts cancelled as a result of the auditing activity in 2006 
and only four projects were sent to the police for further investigation. This means 
that out of the 352 projects in only four cases there were serious suspicions of fraud, 
which represents 1.13% over the five years under discussion. It should be taken into 
account that of the four cases, possibly fewer cases would enter the judiciary 
process and in even fewer cases would there be convictions. As compared to the 
number of cases where fraud is suspected, the size of the auditing efforts seems 
rather disproportionate. It would have been very interesting to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis of the auditing system, because it seems to be based on important 
financial and time resources, but it was impossible to have access to such data, 
despite my efforts. The size of the control machine might save EU citizens’ money 
 228
in the long run, but “that proposition has not been examined, much less proved”, as 
Anechirico and Jacobs (1996:75) remarked in the case of corruption vulnerability 
assessments in New York. 
 
The ex-post control (auditing after the beneficiary has received the last payment) 
only became possible in 2006 through OG 13/2006. The aim of ex-post control is to 
monitor: 
• the location of the productive activity co-funded by EU 
• the distribution of property rights over the means of production 
• the implementation conditions as shown in the contract 
• the specific activity as specified in the contract and the funding application 
The results of ex-post control between 2006 and 2008 conducted by the APDRP 
(Figure 7.2) are consistent with the previous table and show that there are in fact 
very few irregularities (only 7 out of 164) with financial implications discovered 
during the ex-post control, even though arguably more than in the previous table. 
This might be related to the fact that the ex-post control was in fact conducted on 
the first projects approved in Romania, probably around 2004. At the time, neither 
the beneficiaries nor the employees of the SAPARD Agency were familiar with EU 
funding procedures. It would not be surprising if future ex-post controls would 
reveal fewer irregularities with financial implications. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Control activities conducted by APDRP after the last payment during 2004-2008. 
Source: Compilation from APDRP Manual/Activity Report 2010 
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Higher crime rates 
As the only prosecutorial institution able to investigate and issue indictments related 
to EU funding crimes, the DNA reported 97 cases solved in 2011 (DNA 2012). 
Compared to the number of corruption cases solved in 2011, the EU funding crimes 
represent 4% of the indictments that DNA issued. In its 2012 activity report, DNA 
indicated that the prosecutors have issued 648 indictments for corruption crimes 
(25%), 364 indictments for crimes associated with corruption (14%) and 590 
indictments for crimes directly related to corruption (23%). Table 7.2 shows the 
evolution of DNA activity in relation to the protection of the financial interests of 
the EU between 2005 and 2011. 
 
Year  Total 
number of 
cases  
Number of 
solved 
cases  
Number of 
indictments  
Number of 
defendants 
sent to court 
Value of 
the loss 
Measures 
to recover 
the loss 
Number of 
cases solved 
as a result to 
DLAF 
notification 
2005 43 19 5 7 Not known Yes in all 
cases 
0 
2006 Not known Not known 11 8 598873339 
lei 
 
 
Yes in all 
cases 
0 
2007 Not known Not known 26 51 1,573,585 
euro 
Yes in all 
cases 
0 
2008 95 49 32 77 2.669, 
285.64 
Euro + 
1,874,599.4
7 lei 
Yes in all 
cases 
16 
2009 266 (132 
new cases) 
109 23 46 7, 127, 
000.71 
Euro + 
1, 510, 933. 
64 lei 
Yes in all 
cases 
9 
2010 545 (281 
new cases) 
222 29 62 446, 920.97 
Euro + 
6, 859, 
077.7 lei 
Yes in all 
cases 
8 
2011 714 (363 
new cases) 
276 45 95 1, 539, 955. 
91 euro + 
16, 133, 
976.46 lei 
Yes in all 
cases 
9 
Table 7.2: The DNA’s activity in relationship to the protection of the financial interests of the EU 
between 2005 and 2011. 
Source: Compilation from the DNA annul reports 2005-2012 
 
 
Compilation of data from the DNA reports shows a dramatic increase in the number 
of cases investigated by this organisation - from 43 cases in 2006 to 714 cases in 
2011 (in 2011 the prosecutors’ volume of work was 16 times higher than in 2006). 
Since 2008, the number of cases investigated has almost doubled every year, which 
means that the institutional cooperation between the organisations that are part of 
the anti-fraud network is functioning well. It could also indicate extreme 
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institutional caution on the principle ‘better safe than sorry’. Such supposition might 
be sustained by the very small number of indictments compared to the number of 
cases investigated. For example, in 2011 only 0.06% of the total number of cases 
was completed with indictments and 0.16% of the number of cases was actually 
solved by the DNA prosecutors. This is not an unusual situation considering the 
complexity of these investigations and the difficulty of obtaining evidence. 
 
The number of indictments issued has also increased over the six years, but not as 
dramatically as the previous indicator. In total, roughly 200 cases qualified as 
crimes in relationship to EU funding between 2006 and 2011, which is very similar 
to the Polish patterns as reported by Nowak (2013) and Makowski (forthcoming). 
However, DNA prosecutors progressed from five indictments in 2005 to 45 in 2011 
(9 times more in 2011). This increase could be the result of accumulated experience 
and access to various training, professional meetings and informal support offered 
by both national and European institutions. As a validation of institutional 
cooperation with DLAF, the DNA included in their annual reports the number of 
cases that were finalised with indictments based on the evidence supplied by DLAF. 
The statistical analysis indicates stable patterns of horizontal cooperation between 
the two institutions probably sustained by the bureaucratic practice of ‘lending 
prosecutors’ from DNA to DLAF91. The number of defendants sent to court has also 
increased from 7 in 2005 to 95 in 2011, which shows that in 6 years DNA 
prosecutors have found thirteen times more offenders for EU funding related 
crimes. 
 
Sentencing patterns 
The sentencing patterns displayed in Table 7.3 show a rising trend - from only 9 
convictions in 2009, to 20 in 2010 and 54 in 2011, which might indicate that earlier 
investigatory activity has just started to produce visible results. It is expected that 
the number of definite sentences would increase in the next few years. A proxy 
indicator for the quality of the prosecution can be the number of cases sent back to 
the prosecutor (only one in five years). An important observation related to 
                                               
91
 According to the 2010 and 2011 DNA annual reports, the Unit for Combating the Corruption 
Crimes committed against the Financial Interests of the European Community from DNA had to 
perform its activity with only two prosecutors as one was detached to DLAF. 
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sentencing is the tendency of courts to impose suspended custodial sentences. This 
seems to be the case especially if the embezzled funds are partially or fully 
recovered (Neagu 2010). In total, over the five years 20 offenders were sent to 
prison for EU funding fraud and received sentences of between 6 months and 4 
years. Given the offenders’ high levels of financial, social and symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu 1986), some important consequences might arise from the investigations 
or even the adverse publicity alone, irrespective of the sentence: for this sub-set of 
fraudsters, the “process is punishment” (Levi 2006:18). 
 
Year Number of 
definite 
court 
decisions 
Number 
of 
convicted 
offenders 
Number of 
indefinite 
court 
decisions 
Acquittals 
and reason 
Number of 
cases sent 
back to the 
prosecutor 
Punishment Custodial 
sentence 
(prison) 
2006 Not known 4 Not known Not known 0 Not known Not known 
2007 4 Not known Not known Not known 0 In 3 cases the 
punishment 
was suspended. 
2 years and 
6 months 
(1 case) 
2008 1 Not known 10 Not known 0 3 years 
suspended. 
0 
2009 7 9 11 2 offenders 
Art.10 Code 
of Criminal 
Procedure 
1 From 1 year 
and 6 months 
to 3 years.  
1 offender 
was sent to 
prison 
2010 14 20 17 2 offenders 
Art.10 Code 
of Criminal 
Procedure 
and Art.181 
0 18 offenders 
suspended 
sentence.  
2 offenders 
for 4 years 
in prison 
2011 31 54 20 6 offenders 
on at 181 
0 38 suspended 
sentences. The 
punishment 
ranged from 
less than a year 
(10 offenders) 
to six years (3 
offenders). 9 
offenders were 
convicted to 
less than 2 
years 
imprisonment 
and 33 to less 
than 3 years.  
16 
Table 7.3: The courts’ activity in relationship to the protection of the financial interests of the EU 
between 2006 and 2011. 
Source: Compilation from the DNA annul reports 2005-2012 
 
 
High status offenders 
Secondary analysis of the DLAF, DNA and APDRP annual reports reveals that EU 
funding misconduct can be assimilated to Sutherland’s concept of ‘white collar 
crime’ (1983), which refers to “a person of respectability and high social status” 
who commits crime “in the course of his occupation” (Sutherland 1983:7). For 
example, according to the DLAF data, most offenders were public servants that 
would qualify as members of the local elites: seven mayors from rural areas, three 
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local councillors, two deputy mayors from rural areas, one deputy president of the 
county council, and one council secretary from an urban area. Other persons 
involved in defrauding EU funds were a director of a penitentiary facility, a 
university director, an educational general inspector at a county level, employees of 
the Medical School, an inspector in the County Construction Inspectorate and a 
local director of APIA (Agency for Payments and Intervention in Agriculture). 
 
Unsurprisingly, the profile of the offender displays high levels of financial, social 
and symbolic capital. This is due to the specifics of this economic arena, which is 
mostly accessible to high status individuals (as already discussed in Chapter 5), that 
combine professional competences with strong social reputations. For example, in 
2005, the DNA sent to court two defendants: BDE was the executive director of a 
firm and CM was the supervisor of a construction site. In order to win a 
construction contract BDE participated in a public bid and presented inaccurate and 
incomplete documents about his firms’ debts to the state budget, social security, and 
commercial litigation. BDE won the bid and obtained €5,709,791.67 from PHARE 
funds. With the help of CM, BDE prepared fictional records on the work in progress 
and submitted them to the Contracting Authority for payment. In reality the PHARE 
funds were used to cover other debts of the firm. In order to recover the loss, the 
prosecutors seized some immobile goods. 
 
In another case, the value of the loss was much lower, but the case proved to be 
more complex. RZ was the administrator and legal representative of a firm that was 
implementing an EU funded project that involved building a small hotel. He was 
indicted by the DNA prosecutors for making repeated use during 2005-2006 of 
forged, incomplete and inaccurate documents annexed to the funding application, 
acquisition and payment files. First, in order to obtain EU funding, RZ signed a 
document that attested that the construction work had started on the 17th June 2006. 
In fact the work had started nearly a month earlier. Second, he persuaded three chief 
engineers from the construction company to draw up and sign various documents 
that did not correspond to the truth. In November 2006 he persuaded MH who had 
the position of inspector in the County Construction Inspectorate to forge an official 
document registered at the Inspectorate by changing the date (to put “20.06.2006”, 
instead of “25.05.2006”). Third, he had not informed the SAPARD Agency about 
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the changes in property rights over the terrain/land. Fourth, he did not inform the 
Contracting Authority about the conflict of interests created because a part of the 
wood used for construction had been bought from another company of which he 
was the administrator. The DNA prosecutors argued that the defendant had received 
€85,931.78 to which he was not entitled from the EU budget and in order to recover 
the debt seized the hotel. 
 
As the previous examples show, the high profile of the offender is usually coupled 
with significant financial losses. DLAF (2012) for example estimated the value of 
financial losses to EU funding from irregularities and crimes at €28,883,658.88. 
After conducting its own investigations on the basis of DLAF data, the DNA 
estimated the value of the financial loss at €4,615,302. The discrepancy of the 
estimates is normal, because the number of reported crimes is always higher than 
the number of investigated, prosecuted, sent to court and convicted crimes due to 
the level of evidence required and the technical procedures related to the justice 
system. Without downplaying the importance of the control activities, it should be 
noticed that value of financial loss is not a reliable indicator of EU funding 
misconduct. Until a case reaches the final stage of the judiciary procedures – a final 
court decision – there is little point in estimating possible financial impacts on the 
EU budget. 
 
So far, I have described the newly set up institutional establishment designed for 
protecting the financial interests of the EU, showing that through its organisation 
and work arrangements, this bureaucratic apparatus was based on systematic 
associations between EU funding and corruption. The next section shows the effects 
of this control apparatus on the ground arguing that the gap between control 
routines and vernacular entrepreneurial practices creates relationships of complicity 
rather than competition between applicants, consultants and bureaucrats. 
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7.2. National and local practices of control 
 
 
With its new regulatory framework, EU funding brings into being a space of 
interdependence created by money flows, cultural transmissions and socio-
technological routines, characterised by plurality, constant innovation and 
pragmatic use of rules and prescriptions (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). Such trends put 
forward an “EU funded capitalism” the economic dimension of which is interpreted 
and enacted through cultural practices and symbolic images that fragment 
traditional entrepreneurial identity because of constant association with the anti-
corruption institutional establishment. EU funding is a unique form of enhancing 
political legitimacy (for local governments) and transforming it into financial 
capital by fetishising anti-corruption. 
 
The first paradox of the EU funding control apparatus is that it makes EU funding 
a semantic of governance by constant association with corruption. “Politics often 
demands the manufacturing of useful clichés” (Krastev 2010:11). So when political 
elites refer to EU funded projects accessed they are increasing their symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu 1997) through positive associations with the EU. Similarly, when 
political elites employ corruption narratives in their political campaigns to blame 
their opponents, they are in fact practising good politics. The discursive power of 
corruption is a very recent key anthropological theme (Shore and Haller 2006, 
Torsello 2012), which refers to practices that frame political action through 
corruption talk (allegations or facts). Building on high levels of perceived 
corruption and media reports, this typical practice becomes a common way to make 
sense of politics. As a result, political competition is “reduced to a confrontation 
between a government accused of corruption and an opposition that claims to be 
slightly less corrupt” (Krastev 2010:10). The discursive power of EU funding refers 
to practices that frame political action through development and anti-corruption, 
with the effect of enhancing user’s symbolic capital. For example, in one village, a 
candidate for the position of mayor accused his opponent of corruption by claiming 
that he had illegally distributed some parcels of land to his distant relatives. His 
opponent defended himself by arguing that if he had been corrupt, he could not 
have accessed EU funding twice because everybody knows that “DNA is watching 
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you as if you were a gas tank”. The reference to the gas tank indirectly pointed to 
one of the EU funded projects that aimed to introduce for the first time a gas line to 
the village, which made the demand for gas tanks unnecessary. For the locals, this 
was a massive change that impacted on daily work routines because refilling the gas 
tanks could only be done in the nearest city ten kilometres away. For elderly 
members of the community who had no cars, refilling the gas tank was a major and 
expensive endeavour. They tried to postpone it as much as possible by using wood 
from the nearby forest for cooking and heating. The gas line along with the EU 
funding publicity banner became two major symbols testifying that the mayor was 
un bun gospodar [a thrifty husbandman]. If the discursive power of corruption leads 
to ‘dirty politics’ through negative discourses based on accusations, in the case of 
EU funding, it builds on positive associations with development, anti-corruption 
and modernity. 
 
For unsuccessful EU funded projects, narratives of corruption can become partial 
explanations of failure. In one case, the locals were unhappy with the mayor 
because he “did not even manage to pave a three kilometre road, much less 
introduce a water supply. Why not? How come all the other villages around us have 
water on tap and we don’t? It is because he is corrupt! The other mayors also steal, 
but ours steals too much!” 
(E, teacher) 
 
If at local levels, direct contact with the ‘reality’ on the ground provides enough 
evidence to distinguish between practices and narratives, at regional or national 
levels corruption discourse becomes a way of attaching labels to entire 
communities. For example, allegations of corruption related to EU funded projects 
can lead to municipalities/villages losing their legitimacy and trustworthiness. At 
the national level, the same practice can destabilise entire regions, which once they 
have been labelled with corruption and misuse of EU funds, can be allocated less 
funding in the subsequent year. In some cases, high profile actors can use the same 
strategy to denounce less ‘virtuous’ regions at the European level. 
 
The second paradox of the EU funding control apparatus is that it simultaneously 
deters breaking the law and accessing the funds. Polanyi (1954:140) argued that 
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“the road to free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in 
continuous, centrally organised and controlled interventionism”. Conversely, my 
research shows that ‘the centrally organised and controlled interventionism’ as 
expressed by the EU funding regulatory framework is intimidating because it comes 
with imperatives that impose absolute obligations irrespective of the social and 
economic realities. Under such circumstances highly successful local entrepreneurs 
simply refuse to get involved with the complicated EU bureaucratic procedures. 
Essentially, EU funding regulations encourage thrift and control, while the engine 
of enterprise is profit and freedom (Schumpeter 1942). Such discrepancy makes this 
type of funding unattractive for most locals explaining to some degree the low 
absorption rate of Romania (33% in December 2013). 
 
The strictness of EU funding rules is, in time, internalised by applicants who 
display extraordinary levels of knowledge, sometimes higher than that of 
consultants or bureaucrats. During my fieldwork I encountered shepherds and 
cowherds who mocked the public servants in the village halls who did not know 
how to supply them with the necessary documentation to apply for EU funding. 
However, unpredictable factors typically postpone the completion of projects. In the 
case of EU funding, delays are translated into financial penalties borne by the 
beneficiary. As one respondent put it: “This waiting…burns my pockets” (S, 
applicant). In one project that aimed to build an after-school centre unexpected new 
work required by the local terrain, and some irregularities discovered by the EU 
inspectors, not only delayed the project, but also imposed financial penalties. In 
order to complete the work, the village hall applied for a bank loan. In another case 
– of a 10 million euro project to repair a road - the technical documentation had to 
be changed three times. Initially, the costs were estimated at 15 million euro but 
then they were reduced as the EU Agency considered the amount too high. After the 
construction had begun, it became obvious that the approved funding would not 
cover the costs of the project. The village hall could not co-fund the investment and 
had to drop the project until a bank loan or the state budget could cover the costs. 
For a long time, the local council voted against a bank loan arguing that the low 
income of the village hall would make repayment impossible. One of the locals 
recounted that “the project was badly designed from the beginning because they did 
not have enough money. So, they took out some works which were absolutely 
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necessary. For this road, they had no money for traffic signals, sidewalks and road 
consolidation. It was only after they started the works that they realised that…” 
(F, engineer). 
 
A typical example of EU funding rules ‘irrationality’ is the requirement to indicate 
at the time of application the names of the suppliers of materials and services. Local 
markets are not fixed and trades go out of business unexpectedly sometimes 
because they have to. For example, in two cases, the projects were delayed for over 
one year because the builder became insolvent. Excessive red tape, the length of 
time needed to obtain approval for refunds, the difficult procedures for organising 
public bids that involve long deadlines and the possibility of appeal are further 
reasons that many applicants are discouraged: “The circuit of the documents makes 
it easier to win a project than to implement it. We met with the other mayors on the 
halls of the county institutions for six months for our European projects….and 
then…if you are not in time, you have to pay penalties. We paid these, but it was no 
small money…Nobody knows much…In one place you are told one thing, in another 
place …another thing. Eventually you find out, but it takes a while until the waters 
become clear. In any case, we keep going! In the end, when you look back you like 
the result!” 
(D, mayor). 
 
The EU funding institutional framework clashes with the fluidity of the local 
contexts. Understaffed EU local and regional offices, the never-ending fluctuation 
of the regulatory framework, consultants’ lack of know-how, mayors who do not 
know how to manage projects, consultants ‘who are not serious’ and deficiency of 
available technical expertise are typical reasons for avoiding EU funding, despite 
the regional pressures exerted on the local mayors to “be proactive”. In one of the 
counties where I conducted my research, the local mayors had submitted to the 
prefect’s demands/gentle threats and all accessed EU funding. In a very short time 
every second village in the county had a tourist centre. The villages barely had any 
tourist potential, but one mayor had obtained EU funding for that project and all the 
others felt encouraged to apply following closely his example and his project (they 
literally copied and pasted the project details, just changing the name and location 
of the centre). 
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The third paradox of the EU funding institutional framework is that it creates its 
own informality through the proliferation of rules and controls that often expand or 
create the very conditions for carrying out simultaneously licit and illicit activities. 
At one extreme hidden exchanges between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs appear in 
the brute form of cash on the principle “Cash is the best type of lobbying”. At the 
other extreme market exchanges are so embedded in a mutual web of assistance that 
the distinction between public and private spheres becomes superfluous. Social 
networks favour a scant separation of formal business and personal roles, because 
as Powell noticed (1990:317) “one’s standing in one arena often determines one’s 
place in the other”. Thus the markets and hierarchies are decoded, interpreted and 
approached through personal relations. In between there are a lot of forms of 
negotiation (see Chapter 6) – e.g., ‘investment in electoral campaigns’ hoping to be 
rewarded at a later stage with public contracts. When officials insist on the 
separation of spheres, refusing food or drink gifts are described as “more catholic 
than the Pope”. This type of behaviour stands in contradiction to the local culture 
where conviviality and participation in social gatherings is natural. If lack of 
participation in local exchanges is punished, so is over-participation, which is 
perceived as greed. Public servants who use their offices as rent-seeking units are 
strongly disliked and avoided. 
 
As EU and national regulations forbid public servants to conduct entrepreneurial 
activities on the side, regional and public officials have established small businesses 
under the names of their family members. Most attractive are consultancy 
companies set up under partners’ or children’s names. The route of getting EU 
funding, as described in Chapter 5, involves writing a project and a funding 
application, getting approvals and then, if the funding is granted, executing the 
project according to the EU regulations. In one area where I conducted my research 
the wife of a high profile county official was the consultant for five different village 
halls. She was charging around €5,000 per project. In another area, the market of 
consultancy was shared by the wives of two officials, who sometimes consulted in 
partnership and other times separately. For the village mayors, getting a well-
connected consultant meant less time spent on approvals, but not necessarily a 
better or timely conducted project. An alternative route for the relatives of public 
servants is to set up NGOs that then obtain public funds for various educational, 
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publicity or community projects. For example, a young couple who had a county 
official as godfather received as a ‘wedding gift’ a €50,000 public contract with the 
town hall that involved creating and distributing publicity materials to promote the 
city. 
 
An EU funded project brings in contact different actors who have various types of 
access to the political decision-making process and different interests. The 
examples given so far relate to a form of vertical integration between locals who 
want to access funding and high level county officials who have the power to grant 
approvals and check the compliance of the project. An essential point is that vertical 
integration is typically achieved through interpersonal networks that give access to 
information, pave the way for personal interaction and reconcile different priorities. 
The bureaucracy is essentially approached and dissembled with the use of social 
networks such as those that give access to a prefect through his wife’s consultancy 
company, to a mayor through his godson’s publishing house or to a judge through 
his wife’s NGO. 
 
However, different layers of bureaucracy are approached through different 
practices. At the local level, links are established through personal ties and 
continued through informal networks. Husbands, wives, godfathers and sons 
represent strongly emotional links that smooth an EU funding applicant’s way in a 
very direct, trustworthy and non-complicated manner. Money and goods exchange 
hands under the state’s radar. At the county/regional level interaction is framed by 
an organisational form that can be a consultancy company, NGO or a firm. In this 
way, the interaction becomes more structured entering the realm of the market. The 
relationship of the ‘front’ or official owner with the powerful public servants is an 
‘open secret’ (Ledeneva 2011). When an applicant signs a contract with such a 
consultancy company, there is an expectation of ‘no headaches’ – e.g., getting the 
approvals very fast, being provided the right kind of information, having the file 
analysed in time. Establishing personal contact and close links at the national level 
(e.g., the EU Agency, DNA, and DLAF) is more difficult, because the control 
agencies are too professionalised. The risks of being exposed for professional 
misconduct at this level are very high due to the EU’s close supervision. During my 
fieldwork, I noticed that when audited or inspected by national authorities, the 
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beneficiaries behaved according to the bureaucratic rules: there were few or no 
attempts to bribe or influence the EU bureaucrats on the one hand because of fear of 
refusal, on the other hand because they had a good reputation and people felt there 
was no need for that. There were two exceptions throughout my entire fieldwork: in 
one case a beneficiary made the EU inspectors an offer they could not refuse. 
Living by the Danube, he had cooked freshly caught fish according to a local recipe 
and mamaliga (polenta). In another case a beneficiary had an unexpected 
biographical link with an EU inspector – they had illegally traded petrol together 
during the Yugoslavian war. 
 
A typical way to formally fulfil the EU criteria is to ‘manaresti’ (fix) the public bid 
by designing the technical proposal in such a way that only one company fulfils all 
the criteria. This document details the special competences of the supplier of 
services. When one mayor wanted to hire a particular company to remove the snow 
in a town, he requested in the technical proposal a specific number of employees, a 
particular entrepreneurial background and a certain business maturity. The bid was 
publicly advertised through the electronic system. Several companies participated in 
the bidding, but did not fully fulfil the technical requirements and the “right” 
company won the bid. Some mayors refuse to organise public bids altogether, 
preferring to divide the work into small subsections that do not reach the official 
financial limit. This allows them to contract the service providers through the direct 
award of the contract, instead of through the public bidding process. 
 
A side effect of EU funding regulatory framework is its influence on the public bid 
market due to the necessity of organising public bids for almost every activity 
conducted through an EU project. For example, in Poland the public procurement 
market was estimated at 33 billion euro in December 2012, which accounted for 
around 8% of the GDP (Makowski forthcoming). Ad hoc audits of tenders 
involving EU funding detected irregularities in 36% of the cases. Most of 
irregularities related exactly to artificial divisions of work, unjustified rejections of 
best offers due to minor documentation errors and setting special conditions for 
tenders that violated the principles of fair competition. Despite the fact that Poland 
is considered the Eastern European ‘champion’ of EU funding, in stark opposition 
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with Romania (see Chapter 4), the typical routines of doing business in the area of 
EU funding seem to be very similar. 
 
7.3. Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on the construction and the effects of the EU funding 
institutional establishment in Romania, showing that the register of compliance, as 
well as the register of eligibility (Chapter 6) is framed by transnational anxieties 
that put in place extraordinary levels of supervision with ambiguous effects. The 
empirical analysis of the hierarchical machine indicates that in Romania, EU 
funding is controlled and investigated by high profile anti-corruption and anti-fraud 
institutions constructed as elite squads. However, on the ground, compliance takes 
the form of “interpersonal bargaining within the context of a licence, a consent or 
permit, and often takes place in morally uncertain territory in which values, 
technology and business intersect” (Manning 1987:298). 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
The informal economy of EU funding: Entrepreneurs 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 described the process of accessing EU funding, while touching upon the 
distinction between the EU imagined actors and the Romanian actors who access 
this type of funding. This chapter will take that dichotomy a step further showing 
that while the EU regulations try to make the process of accessing funding a rational 
calculation based on standardised routines that produce predictable outcomes, the 
actors engaged in the process invent, innovate and combine their patterns of 
behaviour in order to adapt to unpredictable markets. The chapter starts with a short 
description of entrepreneurship in Romania based on quantitative assessments, 
moves on to describe the characteristics of the local actors and some unintended 
consequences of EU funding on the local contexts. In the second part of the chapter, 
practices of compliance are contrasted with typical profit making routines. The 
conclusion shows that the perceptions of profitability of this economic process 
change as EU funding moves from ‘free money’ to ‘expensive money’. 
 
 
8.1. Entrepreneurship in Romania 
 
According to the official statistics, in Romania, entrepreneurship is not well 
developed. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Matis et al. 2010) ranks Romania 
among the lowest countries in the efficiency driven economies. The early stage 
entrepreneurial rate is only 4.29% which represents the lowest value recorded in 
Central-Eastern European countries. The rate of owner–managers of a business in 
2009 was 2.3% and it decreased in 2010 to 1.09%. At the same time, the established 
business ownership rate was around 2.08%. With respect to gender, the female early 
stage entrepreneurship was 3.19% (the same value as in the previous year), but the 
male early stage entrepreneurial rate dropped to 5.13%. Between 2007 and 2010, 
the business discontinuation rate (measured as the percentage of the population 
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between 18–64 who had sold, shut down or discontinued the owner/manager 
relationship with the business (Kelley et al 2011:64 in Matis et al 2010) was around 
2% almost reaching 3% in 2009. In terms of motivations to start a business, more 
than one third of the respondents indicated increasing income as their main reason 
while 10.82% were more attracted by independence. 
 
The bleak picture of entrepreneurship in Romania offered by surveys like the one 
described above is based on assessment of the activity in the official and formal 
sphere. In other words, the informal economy is not taken into account. Thus, the 
results of such surveys need to be interpreted with great care and conclusions 
should be drawn with reluctance. It would be a mistake to infer from the above 
study that entrepreneurship in Romania is reduced to a mere 4% (in the above 
context the figure encapsulates the early stage entrepreneurship) or that the 
discontinuation rate was only 2% between 2007 and 2010 (the number of firms that 
are closed down during a year). On the contrary, this research shows that, in 
Romania, entrepreneurship is thriving in the informal area, taking a variety of forms 
that range from practical competence in dealing with the state to the use of the 
informal workforce for tax avoidance purposes. Such practices become more visible 
when contrasted with the official narratives that regulate access to EU funding. 
 
8.2. Bani garla: ‘Free money’ 
 
‘They said on TV that after 2007 there will be bani garla [a river of money] from 
the EU for rural development. Apparently, Brussels people love rural tourism. All 
we need to do is prepare some projects. Now I am panicking because I did the 
project for a small bed and breakfast, but there is no money…’ 
(G, applicant) 
 
‘There is a lot of work, but in the end it’s worth it. After all, someone gives you 
money for free. Think about it: if you would take a loan, you would have to pay 
back the interest and the loan. With EU finding, you don’t pay any interest and get 
to keep the money. Yes, it’s a hassle, but who would give you money just like that?’ 
(RM, beneficiary). 
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At the beginning of the process of accessing EU funding, Romanian actors perceive 
this type of funding as a gift. The quotes above describe EU funding through an 
unusual concept – free money – which responds to every entrepreneur’s dream of 
making profit. This concept brings together the financial and symbolic dimensions 
of money through the association with the EU and Brussels officials. Such an 
approach resonates with Viviana Zelizer’s conceptualisation of money that 
describes “remarkably various ways in which people identify, classify, organise, 
use, segregate, manufacture, design, store and even decorate monies as they cope 
with their multiple social relations” (1994:1). Thus money and by extension EU 
funding is not a universal measure of value as Simmel ([1907] 1978) argued. 
Starting from this point, the rest of the chapter will show that accessing EU funding 
is not only an economic activity, but it becomes a dazzling, elusive process when 
seen in its interactions with the social. It profiles entrepreneurial characteristics and 
defines particular profit making routines. 
 
8.3. Serial entrepreneurs 
 
The fieldwork conducted for this research shows that private actors who are 
successful in accessing EU funding are not only small entrepreneurs, but serial 
entrepreneurs. In some cases they run multiple businesses concomitantly while 
sometimes retaining their position in a state corporation. In other cases they have a 
history of changing various firms and/or professions. Instead of increasing the scale 
of their businesses vertically, by developing the magnitude of the enterprise, many 
actors prefer to start entirely new businesses. This is a risk reducing strategy used 
for preventing bankruptcy. Jobs in public companies provide a more regular and 
calculable income while the diversification of portfolios by opening up new 
companies offers insurance against the disruption of activity if one business fails. 
Serial entrepreneurs show flexibility by moving between jobs and the willingness to 
put up new companies on the market. For example, a pilot survey comparing 
Russian entrepreneurs with non-entrepreneurs (Djankov et al. 2004) suggested that 
entrepreneurs are more inclined to change professions, explore new avenues, and 
have greater confidence and a broader set of skills than other people. They also 
appear to be driven by wishful thinking (Bernardo and Welch 1998, Arabsheibani, 
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de Meza, Maloney, and Pearson 2000), behaving as if they understand the present 
fairly well, but have a special outlook of the future. Thus opening up a company 
and closing it down is no more a failure than finding a job and then leaving it. In 
many cases the firms are the legal embodiment of the owner, are organised around 
the skills of the owner–manager, and consist mostly of relations rather than assets. 
Since the owner-operator and the business are the same entity, it is of little 
importance if one firm is closed and another one is put on the market, because in 
this case the capital is linked to the individual, not the company. Hence, the impact 
on the business is only tangential as the other players on the market would be 
indifferent to the existence of the corporation when initiating a new business 
venture. Successful business relationships tend to be reproduced in different legal 
and commercial settings. The next two examples reflect all these trends while 
contextualising entrepreneurial careers in the Romanian environment. 
 
Raluca’s story 
 “It all started from my inability to stay at home and do nothing […]. I trained as 
an engineer at the Bucharest Polytechnic and worked for almost 20 years in the 
local factory for electrical equipment. In the spring of 1999, the management 
conducted the first mass layoff. I was among the first to go, because my husband 
had a small company and they [the management] thought we had enough means of 
survival. It was a matter of social protection in the end, as they had to take care of 
all the people. Anyway, I was made redundant and received the unemployment 
allowance. I was 49 and looking for a job in this very small town. You can’t find 
many opportunities here. Besides, I was driven mad all day in my house doing 
cooking, cleaning and laundry; even my two children were gone – they were 
already in College. Something had to be done! During that period, some of our 
friends wanted to do a mountain trip. I love travelling and since I had no job, I 
organised the trip. Everybody loved it and I realised that this was a nice activity, 
something that would suit me. Consequently, I enrolled in a six months course as a 
mountain guide. It was excellent, but this was no substitute for a real job. After six 
months, I was back to point zero: no job and staying at home. In the meantime, my 
husband’s company (I mean him and his associates) installed cable television 
throughout this town. The board of directors decided to set up a radio channel also 
and I was appointed manager for the new born local radio channel. I did the job for 
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a year and loved every second – my team was young, the work was fun, new and 
challenging…it was great! The problem was that after a year, my husband, who had 
retained his position at a state company [apart from setting up a few private 
companies], was relocated to Bucharest. We had to move there for a year and I 
could not work anymore. When we came back, I was again jobless. However, this 
time I decided to do things differently. I wanted to have a business that I could 
control and do something that I liked. We [Raluca and her husband] thought a lot 
about what to do. I had two passions: tourism and interior design. The question was 
how to combine them. We considered opening a small boutique or setting up a 
small hotel. There were pros and cons for both, but I decided to go for the hotel 
because I found out about the EU funding in the end. We started to think about this 
in 2004 and accessed the funds in 2005.” 
(Raluca, beneficiary) 
 
Like most actors who I encountered during my fieldwork, Raluca’s entrepreneurial 
career started out of need. When recounting her story, she starts from the 
privatisation of the factory, which she considers the beginning of her new career, as 
it gave her the freedom to shape her course of action. Her trajectory seems to 
involve moving between different business attempts until she found a match. This 
fluidity, which resembles some sort of ‘firm shopping’, is based on the fact that the 
transferable skills are more important than firm specific skills. Despite the fact that 
she was forced into self-employment, Raluca easily acquired the taste for running 
her own business. Her husband’s private companies along with his regular job in a 
state corporation must have represented a strong incentive for Raluca. She might 
have made more money elsewhere, without tying up a big part of the family wealth 
in this endeavour. However, she seemed to be driven by non-pecuniary motivations. 
In this sense, Raluca resembles Schumpeter’s idea of an entrepreneur: 
 
First of all there is the dream and the will to find a private 
kingdom, usually, though not necessarily, also a dynasty. 
[…] Then, there is the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, 
to prove one-self [sic] superior to others, to succeed for the 
sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success itself. From 
this aspect, economic action becomes akin to sport […] The 
financial result is a secondary consideration, or, at all 
events, mainly valued as an index of success and as a 
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symptom of victory, the displaying of which very often is 
more important as a motive of large expenditure than the 
wish for the consumers’ goods themselves. […] Finally, 
there is the joy of creating, of getting things done, or simply 
of exercising one’s energy and ingenuity. [...] Our type 
seeks out difficulties, changes in order to change, delights 
in ventures. (Schumpeter, 1934: 93-93) 
 
However, Schumpeter’s romantic description of entrepreneurs should be carefully 
considered and re-interpreted in the context of the following example, in which the 
‘joy of creating’, ‘exercising one’s ingenuity’ or the ‘delight in ventures’ acquire 
slightly different meanings. Mr G is a man in his 50s, married with two children. 
His wife is the director of the local branch of a well known French bank. Mr. G is 
involved in tourism, as the manager of a few hotels, all of which are strategically 
positioned in the mountains. Before the 1989 Revolution he was an engineer in a 
local factory. Immediately after 1989, he changed jobs and started working in the 
biggest city hotel, first as an accountant, then rising to the board of directors, and 
later becoming one of the owners buying shares of the company. Like every 
company in the communist period (or immediately after the Revolution), the 
tourism company as well as all the hotels were owned by the state. The company 
possessed a chain of hotels and B&Bs in the mountains, which made them the only 
available resorts for tourists who had no alternative private accommodation. 
 
Supported by the local bishop, who is a major shareholder in the tourism company, 
Mr. G became a board member and then executive director. He managed to remain 
in that position for more than ten years. During his time as executive director, Mr G 
led the company close to bankruptcy by letting the buildings deteriorate, destroyed 
the local market for tourism by closing down the hotels in the mountains for years, 
or kept them open but without electricity or heating, transferred or bought formerly 
state-owned property disregarding the true owners (hence the numerous subsequent 
court cases in which he was involved). 
 
He was forced to resign from the position of executive director in 2006. In the 
meantime he had managed to build his own hotel in the proximity of the hotel he 
used to manage, thus attracting a share of the market. His exit from the state 
company was very profitable, as he managed to become the sole owner of a big 
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hotel located in the nearby mountains at over 2,000 m altitude. This hotel used to be 
the meeting point of the local and national male elite working in the area of 
electricity. 
 
Mr G’s humble origins were captured by one of his employee’s remark that “he was 
the first generation wearing shoes in his family” and his astonishing upward 
mobility would have been difficult to conceive during communist times. His 
accession to a higher status was based on constant increase in his financial capital 
through careful exploitation of opportunities offered by transition. A very wealthy 
man, a millionaire in euros, as he likes to say to his employees, Mr. G has turned an 
eye towards EU funding. He has bought a piece of land in the very centre of the 
town and has applied for SAPARD funding to build a small hotel. Even though this 
type of funding was directed to rural areas, he managed to get a document from the 
town hall attesting to the fact that the piece of land he had built on was outside of 
the town. With his wife as the director of a local bank he easily accessed 
preferential credits and comfort letters documenting his financial status. 
 
Mr G’s story shows that informal economy is a consequence of the social and 
economic context, carrying both the characteristics of the communist regime and 
the traits of the newly born capitalism. In this sense, the changing geometry of 
informality is based on embeddedness in social and economic networks, and the 
reorganisation of the economy on different principles. Existing social networks 
provided Mr G. with ideas about opportunities and sources of funding (Burton et al. 
2002). In itself the context favours the existence of nuanced ethical systems due to 
the blurred boundaries between legal and illegal. Privatisation for example, proved 
to be a lucrative business for Mr G, who brought his contribution to the dismantling 
of the tourism state company in his area. Using insider information he privatised a 
company over which he was responsible, in order to create profits for himself and a 
close circle of business partners. Abuses were noticed by the judiciary who opened 
up various investigations but pardon was obtained at a price from sympathetic 
judges. Mr G’s personal history can be read as the story of a guilt free predator 
(Sutherland in Klockars 1974) who allied himself with powerful actors in order to 
acquire wealth. However, according to Schumpeter’s definition (1939) he is a 
successful entrepreneur involved in ‘creative destruction’, having contributed to the 
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destruction of the previous socialist economic order and the creation of the capitalist 
alternative. Mr G’s own opinion about his activities is that: “I give jobs to people! I 
help the local economy!”. In a twisted way, Mr. G is both a crook and a benefactor 
because while he clearly benefited personally by acting outside the law, his actions 
contributed to local development (Nordstrom 2007). 
 
8.4. EU funding’s perverse local effects 
 
8.4.1. Cultural capital: EU funding as an ‘electoral steam engine’ 
For serial entrepreneurs, building up new business ventures means relying on 
various forms of capital (Bourdieu 1997). Social and cultural capitals discussed so 
far for private actors are directly linked to their capacity to secure cooperation 
(Johanesson 2002), which is essential for framing issues and communicating goals. 
Cultural capital is a key variable in explaining which entrepreneurs mobilise the 
resources needed for accessing EU funding, and how they use EU funding to 
enhance their cultural capital. This aspect is visible in the case of public actors who 
are involved in major EU funded projects (Chapter 7). Setting up partnerships for 
the purposes of obtaining EU funding is a desirable, but not sine qua non condition 
for accessing such funds. As a general rule, projects that involve partnerships are 
more difficult to set up and implement because they alter the boundaries of local 
economies and involve heavy networking. 
 
For example, in 2011 a major project was set up in the southern part of Romania. 
The project involved setting up current water and a sewer system in a few 
communities; it had an estimated value of €180M. The financial distribution was 
roughly the following: 77% EU funding, 12% funding from the state budget, 2% 
contributed by the county office and the rest was the input of the regional water 
company. This project was not set up at the initiative of the locals, but it was 
designed in Bucharest and it was part of the national strategic design to improve the 
water system in Romania. The negotiations about which towns/communes should 
be added/left out of the project were not only related to the technical aspects of the 
project, but also to the political affiliations and activism of the community leaders. 
The area did not suffer from deprivation by comparison with other regions but such 
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an investment was indeed necessary to improve the standard of living. However, 
participating in this project proved to be an image coup; given the high value of the 
project and the visibility of the investment, the endeavour was heavily publicised. 
The local leaders were photographed over time by the side of the responsible 
minister and constant associations were made with the party in power. This project 
was described by the local press as an “electoral steam engine”, which points to the 
high levels of cultural and symbolic capital associated with narratives of 
development, that make EU funding a semantic of governance (as shown in Chapter 
7). For public actors, securing EU funding is very much a political process that 
makes use of resources developed over time92 and not a simple matter of technical 
implementation. 
 
8.4.2. Reproducing and challenging the existing order 
Stinchcombe (1965) had argued that entrepreneurs both reproduce and challenge the 
existing social order by constructing organisations that are embedded in social and 
cultural environments. The organisational settings reflected the distinctive societal 
situation under particular historical circumstances. In the case of EU funding this 
argument is valid for both public and private entrepreneurs. The next example 
shows how EU funded entrepreneurial work routines are assimilated and integrated 
into the vernacular practices of doing business through the story of a village mayor. 
 
Mr Money Chopper’s story 
Mr. F has been the mayor of a village in a mountain area for the last ten years. The 
area is well known for its tourist potential, wood quality and quantity, and mining 
potential. Mr. F’s history is full of dubious arrangements, successful networking 
with high profile political leaders (or their immediate families), police 
investigations and court decisions that have never been enforced. His capacity to 
spend public money according to his personal taste without being convicted earned 
him the nickname of ‘Mr. Money Chopper’. His entrepreneurial endeavours 
                                               
92
 For example, on the 6th of April 2012, the Government issued a decision (GD 255/3rd April 2012) 
regarding the allocation of the Prime Minister’s reserve fund to the local budget. Most funds were 
directed to the communities with Liberal-Democrat leaders, despite the fact that there were other 
areas that were involved in EU projects. For example in Suceava county, out of 49 commune that 
received funding, only 3 were from the opposition. (http://www.contributors.ro/politica-
doctrine/%C8%99i-tu-fiul-meu-mru/ last visited on 8th April 2012).  
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involved hiring a few fictive employees for whom he cashed the wages, paying his 
phone bills out of the town hall’s money and reimbursing some construction 
companies for works that were never done. He released property titles to his son 
over a terrain (about 10 hectares) that belonged to the community, while validating 
himself as the rightful owner of 2.5 extra hectares (as the grandson of the initial 
owner with whom he had no blood relationship). 
 
His management style has always been rather directive as he has little patience for 
democratic debates. Several deputy mayors chose to resign after escalating conflicts 
with F; the local police chief was threatened with losing his job and the members of 
the local council were subject to intimidation. In a council meeting he attacked the 
secretary with his desk, because there was no unanimity to vote on a decision that 
he supported. Some local newspapers covered the story and F even gave an 
interview: “So what if I turned over the desk? The secretary had not written the 
minutes of the meeting. Anyway, he is crazy, old fashioned, from Ceausescu’s time. 
Let me tell you what happens…I want to do a good job at the town hall, but there 
are a lot of dogs who want to drive me crazy. They have no chance with me! They 
are all complainers, all dreamers who want to take my place. I did everything right, 
I had money before coming to the town hall and I will leave this place with money 
too – because my wife has a company that goes really well. If I were not honest, I 
would have never received a diploma from the National Democratic Association of 
Fighting Corruption!” (interview, mayor F93). In his interview, Mr F contrasts two 
major ideologies through their local stereotypes: communism is associated with a 
‘crazy’, ‘old fashioned’ time/ individual, while he positions himself as a capitalist 
who ‘wants to do a good job’, ‘has money’ and is ‘honest’. 
 
Despite his violence and love of alcohol, F is well practiced in networking with 
other official figures, sometimes even using them as tools in his personal vendettas. 
For example, after the meeting mentioned above, two of the councillors who voted 
against him received a team from the Financial Guard who came for a ‘routine 
check’. The only problem was that the Financial Guard inspectors were driven to 
                                               
93
 http://www.coruptiainarges.ro/intamplari.php?id=328&id_i=595&data=2008-05-10  last accessed 
on the 11th of April 2012. 
 
 252
the councillors’ shops by the mayor himself. F’s entrepreneurial skills, his 
pragmatic approach to the concept of legality and his social dexterity helped him 
find powerful allies in high public positions, who offered their protection and a 
hand in need. Their services were not repaid in money, but in wood (which is rare, 
expensive and easily disguised in a construction site). As F was a public servant, he 
could not have other businesses on the side. However, his wife did not have the 
same restrictions. She is the front of a company dealing with wood exploitation, but 
her husband is the one that does the business. A cerebral stroke in the autumn of 
2008 left F incapable of working for some time and he never recovered his full 
capacity. This gave others access to the management of the town hall and impacted 
on his business arrangements by limiting his power to sell wood or the right to 
extract coal as he pleased. In 2011, his collection of criminal files was enriched by a 
new investigation of abuse in service, for allowing a company to extract coal in an 
area which was not in his jurisdiction. Despite his intentions he had not managed to 
access EU funding (so far), but he did hire someone to write projects for him. He 
decided to ‘go European’ by having his own employee at the town hall dealing with 
such issues. He could deal with ‘implementation’, as he was practiced in the 
netiquette of local arrangements, but writing the project was beyond his 
understanding. However, he considered the high degree of control involved in EU 
funding “distasteful” and thus refrained from any further action in this area. F did 
not resent the financial dimension provided through EU funding, but the regulatory 
routines associated with it. The following paragraphs from my field diary describe 
the process of hiring the right person. 
 
“It is a bright March morning and we are travelling again to B. By the end of the 
day, one of us will have a job as an EU expert in the village hall. Mr F, the mayor, 
was really forward last month when we approached him about the possibility of 
writing a bid to get EU funding for the renovation of the local social club building. 
He agreed to work with us and even more. In the name of his friendship with one of 
our fathers he suggested to hire one of us in the village hall. Two weeks later 
everything was made official – following the letter of the law, Mr F had obtained 
the approval of the local council, put an announcement in the relevant newspapers 
and official websites, and even arranged a date for the exam. To make things even 
more official and give them an appearance of legality, he suggested that his 
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employee to be should have some competition in the exam and the other one of us 
generously offered to step in. 
 
By the time we reach the village hall it is already 9.30am. There is little movement 
in the building – only the porter and the cleaning lady seem to be around. The other 
employees will come later, around 10am and the mayor maybe around 11, we are 
told. In a short while two ladies who work in the hall appear and we are invited to 
share their office. The office is a large, cold room with old furniture made of 
massive wood on which lie a few prehistoric PCs. After the first few moments of 
curiosity and a polite invitation to have some coffee we are left on our own. The 
ladies are busy discussing the latest episode from a Latin American soap opera, 
while connecting to yahoo messenger to chat with their friends. 
 
Hours pass and around 1pm the mayor shows up. He has a preoccupied air as he 
enters the room and without much ceremony asks if we are well prepared and have 
learned the material for the exam. Rather intimidated, we stare at him and mumble 
something which he chooses to interpret as a yes. On his way out, he calls my friend 
to fix the computer in his office, while we waited for the examiners to arrive. 
According to the new regulations issued by the Government earlier that year, the 
hiring policy for the public institutions had changed; in order to reduce corruption 
and nepotism, the Government had ruled out that hiring was to be supervised by 
officials from the County Office, who were to come to the hall with a sealed 
envelope that contained the topics for the exam. Thus, we were waiting for the 
officials to show up. Meanwhile, as my friend returned from the mayor’s office he 
asked for my help in preparing three different topics for the exam. The mayor had 
suggested to him he should make the examiners’ job easier and prepare some 
questions we could actually answer. As we were rather inexperienced, it took about 
one hour to come up with something. 
 
Around 3pm a car stopped in front of the village hall and the officials from the 
County stepped out. They were quickly shown to the mayor’s office, as by that time 
everybody was in a hurry to go home (Mr F was rather impatient as he had more 
important business to attend, the employees were annoyed that the mayor was still 
there and so they could not leave, the officials from the County wanted to be at 
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home already and we…wanted a job). After about twenty minutes the examiners 
came to our office. They were two: a middle aged man and a younger woman. They 
were accompanied by the mayor who made the introductions and wished us good 
luck. The young woman checked our IDs, waved a sealed envelope in front of us, 
opened it and read the exam questions. She asked us if we understood the questions, 
asked us to choose one to answer, wrote it down and remarked that ‘the conditions 
of the exam have been fulfilled and I wish good luck to the candidates. You have 
one hour to write your answers’. Then the board left the room and I could finally 
smile as the questions were exactly the ones formulated by us a few hours earlier. 
Some thirty minutes later, the mayor lost his patience and sent the secretary to ask 
us to hurry and write the answers. We handed in our papers and in less than half an 
hour one of us had the job, the examiners were happily going home and the mayor 
was on his way to lunch.” 
(field notes, March 2008) 
 
The above excerpt from my field diary shows that even though accessing EU funds 
imposed the development of new organisational initiatives to secure the resources 
needed for accessing this type of resource, the strategies used are, in fact, 
adaptations of typical entrepreneurial routines. Indeed, the complexity of the 
process pushed councils to employ professionals or create specialised teams to work 
with EU funding. However, the employment of such teams was not done according 
to meritocracy and the process of employment mocked the anti-corruption 
regulations, thus ‘contaminating the purity’ of the EU funding process. The art of 
locality here lies in the assimilation of this new economic space and its integration 
with the dominant cultural norms. Creating EU offices in public administration 
might not necessarily lead to a behavioural change, but could be just a vivid 
representation of the saying ‘the more things change, the more they remain the 
same’. 
 
An important point uncovered by Mr G’s story and the excerpt from my diary is 
that informal profit making activities are not solitary enterprises. They are 
conducted in plain daylight with the willing co-participation of other civil servants. 
The bureaucratic formalism expressed by the examiner’s assertion: “the conditions 
of exam have been fulfilled and I wish good luck to the candidates” is a 
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counterpoint to the previously described arrangements, which points to the nature of 
risks that local entrepreneurs take in order to make a profit. In Schumpeter’s view 
(1939) risk and uncertainty formed the basic conditions of individual 
entrepreneurial affairs. Ruggiero (1996) remarked that contemporary scholarship 
redefined risk as a potential social loss. In this case, risks are related to compliance 
– the civil servants enacted a compliance performance while getting ready to 
provide one at the documentary level. The use of creative skills in handling both the 
formal and informal norms makes the job of control difficult for various reasons as 
explained in the following section. 
 
8.5. The price of compliance: Control in the area of EU funding 
 
When applying for EU funding reimbursement, entrepreneurs need to justify their 
expenses using a multitude of documents. These documents have to present a 
coherent story about the project; in fact all the papers are independent signs that 
contribute to the general narrative that aims to create trust. As part of a ritual of 
purification, audit reports become social constructs useful for the production of anti-
corruption/anti-fraud narrative. After all, as Braithwaite remarked (1984:139) 
“government inspectors ensure the quality of your records, not the quality of your 
deeds”: 
 
“When you ask for reimbursement, you need to justify all your expenses with a 
thousand papers [my emphasis]. The main part of justification is to respect the 
initial project and most importantly the financial part. Of course you also had to 
respect the architectural project and so on. When we changed the door from the left 
to the right wall, we had to bring in justifications for that”. 
(G, applicant) 
 
EU funding is schizoid by default, as the authorities are mainly interested in the 
share of funds obtained from the EU. This dichotomy is expressed in the necessity 
to keep separate ledger accounts to record separately the circuit of money from the 
EU and the private investment (both for public and private entrepreneurs): 
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“You have your accountant who keeps separate files. There is this account for 
investments where you put everything that relates to this business and then this 
account is divided in two: the total investment and the EU investment. In the end 
you need to make sure that the value from your account is the same as the one 
granted initially through EU funding. Just make sure it is exactly the same! Not 
more, not less!” 
(R, entrepreneur) 
 
Good accountants are a necessity in order to provide good descriptions and 
justifications of decisions or to disguise any unorthodox arrangements. 
 
Accounts are a way to display the rationality of decisions and thus 
enhance their legitimacy. They help to demonstrate that 
alternatives were considered, trade-offs were made, and potential 
outcomes compared. Business accounts, as a ‘rhetoric of numbers’, 
engender legitimacy because they document the rationality of 
decisions in an age when that form of rationality is 
legitimate..(Carruthers and Espeland 1991: 61) 
 
All entrepreneurs that I encountered during my fieldwork did their own accounting 
while using a trusted professional on the side who could sign the balances at the end 
of the month and provide advice on how best to present financial transactions. 
 
“R: How about accountancy? Did you do keep the books by yourself? 
D: Well, together with someone else. I mean in the first instance I did the work and 
he just came along to sign it, as I was not authorised back then.” 
(D, entrepreneur) 
 
This need to control the financial records might indicate that budgeting is also a 
performative process (or simply a fiction) carefully constructed with the use of 
specialised idioms. The complex nature of the business and the intricate 
arrangements are concealed by the work of professionals who know well the 
weaknesses of business regulations. In this sense, accountancy and everyday 
practices might have little in common despite the fact that they are supposed to be 
congruent. “As a symbol of rationality, double-entry bookkeeping legitimized 
business activities even when the actual accounts did not conform, or conformed 
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only loosely to the strict method” (Carruthers and Espeland 1991: 61). Due to the 
high levels of control involved in EU funding, some actors choose carefully the 
direction of the public funds. They rely on big investments (e.g., the heating 
system) for which the costs are difficult to manipulate leaving the more volatile 
aspects to be dealt with in their private accounts. For example, the payment for the 
workforce is easier to manipulate and it is usually paid from the private 
contribution. 
 
EU funding is based on two types of control and both of them are normally related 
to the reimbursement process. First, bureaucrats carry out careful document 
verifications and second, they conduct thorough field verifications to ensure that the 
building is identical to the architectural plans. Field checks are usually within the 
job description of county bureaucrats, while the papers are verified in the regional 
office. 
 
“First, the people from T [regional centre] had a list with all the documents that 
you needed to submit for reimbursement and they checked your file in front of you: 
‘Let’s see, do you have this…do you have that’. You see, they just checked first to 
see if you have all the documents. At the second stage, they checked thoroughly with 
the initial project to see if there are the same quantities, the same prices, if we 
added anything extra […]. Then they also checked the documents regarding the 
materials – I mean the certificates of quality, provenance, conformity with the EU 
standards […] We had a close relationship with the regional office, but it wasn’t 
hard as the people working there were nice and understanding. You could talk to 
them. They weren’t the kind to send you back home if you have done something 
wrong or so. They really helped us, they taught us: you need to do this, you need to 
bring that…they cared about what they did.” 
(D, beneficiary) 
 
Field checks are also very strict: 
 
“R: When did the county bureaucrats conduct the verifications? 
D: At each instalment of money. They could also have come in between payments, 
but most of the times they came whenever we asked for reimbursement. 
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R: How about the regional office? Did anyone come to visit the place? 
D: No, for field checks it was only the county people. When we did the refund file, 
we sent copies of some documents by fax, so they came here to check the originals 
and stamp the copies. Then they did the field checks looking at the design […]. 
‘Right…according to the architectural plan, here you have a wall. Is there a wall in 
reality? OK, we can move on.’ For example, we had to build a wall that was not in 
the initial design. We had to put it in the basement, some sort of additional support 
for the ceiling or so. When they checked the plan…‘You have no wall in the plan. 
What have you done? You spent more money for cement and stuff. You spent EU 
money!’…as if we hadn’t spent enough money on that building! Or we had 
something else with a door – I don’t remember exactly, but I think we moved it a 
few centimetres to the left or to the right…We weren’t allowed to do that, so we had 
to change the project. They approved the changes and we could move on. Otherwise 
you can’t change anything. They really do check – I mean with the architectural 
plan in their hand they check the rooms, the surfaces, the positions etc – everything 
has to be conformed to the initial plan. If everything was OK, you received a letter 
saying that the construction was conforming to the plan and the next payment was 
approved. You know you have a successful project if you receive the 
reimbursement!” 
(S, beneficiary) 
 
The above quotes point to a dramatic change in the bureaucratic culture in stark 
contrast with the local practices. The change is decoded and explained through 
enhanced communication, professionalisation, predictability, lack of traditional gift 
giving routines, but it also acquires an emotional note when bureaucracy is 
humanised through ‘care’ and warmth (e.g. “they were nice and understanding”). 
For entrepreneurs used to exploiting their superior status in order to deal with 
bureaucracy, this was a surprising approach which enhanced the symbolic capital of 
EU funding. All these aspects make entrepreneurs sympathise with bureaucrats: 
“They sent some reminders every once in a while […] I told you, they had their own 
monitoring, they needed to show that the money was spent […] Otherwise they had 
problems with the EU because they don’t spend the money. So that’s why they sent 
those reminders – just to see if we had started, if we were on track etc.” (D 
entrepreneur). In another case, the reimbursements were received earlier than the 
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deadline: “They paid me…I got all the money that was approved…they cut nothing. 
Also, I got the money quite fast in about a month and a half after submitting the 
request” (R entrepreneur). Towards the end of the project, the relationship between 
entrepreneurs and bureaucrats almost enters a regime of affection: “Everything went 
well in the end – the representatives from the Ministry of Tourism came over to give 
me the classification and were very satisfied.” (R entrepreneur) 
 
The relationship between entrepreneurs and EU bureaucrats becomes closer as the 
project progresses. In the beginning, the rapport is characterised by distance and it 
is an almost faithful depiction of the Weberian model of impersonal contact. 
Towards the end of the project though, entrepreneurs and bureaucrats become closer 
due to repeated interactions. Despite the fact that field checks are very strict, 
surprisingly the bureaucrats are not blamed for that. On the contrary, they are pitied 
for the work they need to do as it is considered stressful. The blame is directed 
towards higher institutions expressed in an undefined they. It was never clear for me 
if they were the central office of the Agency or the EU itself, but it was obvious that 
the local bureaucrats and the entrepreneurs had formed an alliance against them. 
Such an alliance was based on geographical proximity, shared cultural codes, social 
ties and the need to avoid any problems in the face of hierarchical control. 
Sometimes, the narratives of justifications employed at the papers level were 
carefully constructed with the assistance of the bureaucrats. The natural tendency 
was to employ negotiations and avoid conflict, as the latter was bad for business. It 
affected not only the applicant, but also the bureaucrats since any unspent money 
was interpreted by central bureaucracy as a personal failure. Thus, entrepreneurs 
and bureaucrats created coalitions to put a gloss on their performance. Everybody 
wanted to ‘look good’ (entrepreneurs for bureaucrats, local bureaucrats for central 
bureaucrats, central bureaucrats for European bureaucrats, European bureaucrats for 
the European MPs, European MPs for their governments and the voters). This 
process of plastic surgery that portrays a perfect way to do business at the 
documentary level has little in common with the realities of daily transactions or the 
work entanglements. 
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8.6. Profit making routines 
 
 
An essential part of the EU funding profit making process relates to keeping the 
‘normative’ and ‘factual’ orders (Parsons 1982) separate at the documentary level. 
Whereas the EU regulations will provide only one way of conducting transactions, 
(which is usually as impersonal as possible), entrepreneurs will try to make them as 
personal as they can by entering informal arrangements, bribing, getting discounts, 
making use of their social capital to get favours and so on. Such practices lie outside 
the orthodoxy of the market exchange as understood by the EU Agencies. However, 
they do not challenge the orthodoxy of the local market in any way. As Ditton 
(1977), Mars (1982) and Henry (Mars and Henry 1978) have shown in relationship 
to fiddling, such practices are bastards of capitalist economy who subvert the 
system of distributive justice implicit in the pricing of goods by confusing the 
spheres of exchange. However, such confusion is not out of the ordinary in this 
particular context marked by communism and transition to the market economy. 
 
From the beginning of the process, entrepreneurs think about how to get more than 
what they are paying for from the EU. 
 
“P: I want to do an asylum for elderly people. It is needed, as there are lots of old 
people in Romania! They are usually very lonely after their children have left home. 
They went to work abroad and come back twice a year – for Christmas and Easter. 
In my asylum their parents would be well taken care of and would never get bored 
or lonely, since they would have other people of the same age to keep them 
company. 
R: So, you would offer free accommodation for elderly people. This sounds great! 
P: Free accommodation? Who said anything about ‘free’??? Nooo, they would 
have to pay! I mean their children of course. If they work abroad, they should have 
money! Besides, we are talking about their parents, the people who raised and took 
care of them! What I have in mind is a luxury resort, where people would live in 
their own flats, but we would cater for them, take charge of cleaning and 
entertainment. If they want company, they should be able to enjoy it, but if they 
don’t, they should also be able to retreat in their own flat and not be disturbed. 
R: Who would be in charge of such place? 
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P: Me, of course. 
R: It sounds like a lot of work. How would you manage? 
P: Oh, I thought about that too! I will make myself a big flat in the asylum, so I can 
move my family there. In this way, I am close to the church and if anybody dies, or 
they need anything, I’m already there, right? Besides, we would live there free of 
charge and spend less on food and cleaning. I can rent my flat downtown and save 
the money for later.” 
(P, priest, entrepreneur) 
 
The priest explained in detail how charities can become very good businesses 
(Sundar 2000) by mixing spheres that relate to different registers. When explaining 
the purposes of the asylum or asking for funding, he positioned himself in a register 
of affection, but concomitantly assigned a value and a price to affection in an 
economic register. This is a typical practice among some priests who can exploit 
their role to enhance their financial status because of the traditional lack of financial 
regulation from the state apparatus and the nature of their work. The services 
performed by priests relate to a spiritual arena that is beyond the regulatory means 
of the state machine. 
 
A parish is seen as a business unit and the major rites of passage (e.g. baptism, 
marriage or death) as profitable work opportunities. The senior priests that I 
encountered during my fieldwork could easily approximate the real income from 
any parish in the county displaying extraordinary levels of social knowledge. It is 
not uncommon that good parishes are sold to the highest bidder by the local bishop 
who has the absolute regulatory power over his jurisdiction. Bishops can also 
become politically involved in the state affairs and associate themselves to one 
party, but as a general rule, they tend to formally maintain only their association 
with the church. In one case, the local bishop had been a former Securitate colonel 
during communism and later became a member of parliament. He eventually 
withdrew because his local businesses were keeping him far busier than any other 
political position. He had established a candle factory issuing an order that 
requested all the priests from his jurisdiction to buy only candles produced in the 
local factory. Another large scale business was a bread factory, but this was less 
successful because it would have been impossible to have the bread delivered every 
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Sunday to all parishes. On the side, he had also set up an import-export company 
that sold aluminium window frames which have become very popular in Romania 
over the past ten years. All these entrepreneurial affairs were public knowledge and 
the mix of economic and spiritual spheres was very much part of the local way of 
doing things that were acknowledged but not questioned. In fact, there were only 
two very young priests throughout my entire fieldwork who had considered 
applying for EU funding. Their more senior counterparts had politely declined the 
‘free money’ arguing that they already had ‘free-er money’ from the believers and 
needed no state intervention. 
 
For the rest of the actors, the road from the idea of the project to the final result is 
guided from the beginning by the EU requirements that force them into thinking 
through their endeavours for at least seven years (considering the usual time of 
implementation plus the five years monitoring afterwards). This anticipatory 
thinking coupled with the unstable conditions of the market forces caution and 
reflexivity upon entrepreneurs: 
“Yeah, we had an idea about what and how to do, but in order to fulfil the 
requirements you had to respect certain norms. For example, we had to be careful 
with the requests put forward by the Ministry of Tourism because they give you the 
classification for the B&Bs and hotels. Because we wanted to have a four stars 
hotel, we had to make sure that the rooms had a particular surface [e.g. for four 
daisies B&Bs/hotels94 the room has to be at least 15 square metres], which meant 
bigger rooms with more facilities, a restaurant…you know…everything […]. Also, 
we thought we might extend the hotel later on, so we had to be careful about the 
ceiling. It had to be more solid than usual to sustain another floor. The feasibility 
study was done for a period of about five years because for five years you are 
under...not necessarily control, but…the Agency monitors you for this period. They 
want to make sure you don’t change…I mean if you have done a B&B, then, for five 
years, you have to keep it as a B&B […]. After five years you can do what you 
want…sell it, make it your private home, whatever. But before that, you have to 
keep it as you said it would be, be active and have profit.” 
(D, entrepreneur) 
                                               
94
 The standardisation of hotels and B&Bs is measured differently in rural and urban areas. In rural 
areas the Ministry of Tourism awards daisies and in urban areas stars.  
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Careful investments are a necessity and as one of my respondents remarked “it is 
better to check our pockets before we start something, since we have the possibility 
to expand in time...” (V, applicant). The entrepreneurs are cautious because the 
context described below is characterised by high uncertainty. 
 
8.6.1. Volatile markets 
However, anticipatory thinking is not enough to ensure profit. No matter how 
optimistic or overpriced the budget approved by the Agency might be, the 
Romanian markets are so volatile that the applicant will always be forced to raise 
his/her contribution to the project. For example, the implementation phase starts 
with signing the contract of funding and making the first notebook of acquisitions 
(Chapter 5). Then the work can begin, using the private funds. This is the first 
moment when the plan handed in to the Agency is confronted with the reality of the 
market because the notebook of acquisitions is a document that details all the 
expenses incurred for completing the first part of the project. Such expenses might 
include materials necessary for building, costs of hiring a construction company to 
do the works, and personnel wages: 
 
“That’s when you find out if the prices have increased…which is usually the 
case…You see, it’s one thing to anticipate the costs on paper and another thing to 
start doing the project. When you do the project you realise that the costs are very 
different. So, you will never be able to finish the project and keep within the 
approved budget. It will always be more expensive for you, as an individual.” 
(R, entrepreneur) 
 
The instability of the Romanian economic situation makes the budget almost a 
useless tool due to inflation and the dynamics of the market (some companies might 
disappear by the time the project is approved, or others might appear and provide 
services at more competitive prices). Officially there is the possibility to amend the 
initial budget95 to reflect more realistically the economic situation and the field 
                                               
95
 An essential part of the initial budget is the exchange rate at which the prices are calculated. For 
example, an applicant can send the file to the Agency when the exchange rate is 3.6725 RON per 
euro. However, this rate can change in a few months and rise to 4.4 RON per euro. If the applicant is 
awarded the grant, the funding contract is signed at the initial value of 3.6725 RON per euro.  
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conditions, but it is very difficult to do so. Following this path means re-doing the 
funding file, including getting the approvals, elaborating the feasibility study, 
designing the marketing strategy, the technical plan and the budget. As already 
shown this documentation is very expensive and time consuming. These aspects 
coupled with the uncertainty of obtaining a positive answer deter the applicant from 
pursuing this path. At this point 
The success of everything depends on intuition, the capacity of 
seeing things in a way which afterwards proves to be true, even 
though it cannot be established at the moment, and of grasping the 
essential fact, discarding the unessential, even though one can give 
no account of the principles by which this is done. Thorough 
preparatory work, and special knowledge, breadth of intellectual 
understanding, talent for logical analysis, may under certain 
circumstances be sources of failure. (Schumpeter 1934:85) 
 
“One more thing: they [the Agency] ask you to prove that you have half of the 
money to do this project right? But you will never be able to finish with only 50%. 
Apart from the fact that the prices will increase there are other things. Let’s say you 
start the project and spend your half of the money. You do the construction and then 
send the reimbursement file to the Agency. There will be a time span between 
applying for a refund and actually getting it. This time span can be a month, two or 
God knows when. What are you going to do in the meantime? Stop the works? This 
is going to delay you entire project. So, you see, one always needs more than 50% 
in order to keep working to respect the final deadline.” 
(R, entrepreneur). 
 
Thus the costs of completing a project are higher even in very stable and predictable 
markets, and not only in a risky and unstable environment. 
 
8.6.2. Cash society 
Other hidden costs add to the project, thus making it less profitable. A particular 
aspect that creates problems is the fact that the Agency only takes into account bank 
payments. However, Romania is very much a cash society. Bank transfers are not 
commonly used by private individuals and are sometimes avoided also by SMEs 
because they are very expensive. In one of the villages where I conducted my 
research, most villagers received their pension through a bank transfer. However, 
 265
the village had no cash machine and in any case, they would not have known how 
to use it. Once a month, Veta’s son who shared the house with his parents and his 
wife, would collect the bank cards from his elderly relatives and go to the nearest 
town to withdraw the money. He carried the cards in a small brown leather bag 
around his waist like the old shepherds from the mountains. Each card had a post-it 
attached to it that carried the pin number. Most of the villagers had never used their 
cards – they would keep them safely in the wardrobe, under their best clothes. They 
chose to withdraw all the money at once for two reasons: they could not have 
accessed the money otherwise, and it was cheaper. For every card interrogation, the 
bank charged a fee which was more than most villagers spent in a typical day. 
Sometimes the pension was delayed for a day or two. In order to avoid paying bank 
fees, the locals would prefer to wait a week until Veta’s son next visited town. This 
form of superimposed technological modernisation dissatisfied everyone because it 
was diminishing their income through bank fees, paying for Veta’s son’s trip to 
town or informal borrowing to cover delays, which created further social 
obligations. At the firm level, for small and medium enterprises, the situation is 
similar and even some administrative units support the cash society indirectly. For 
example, some taxes can only be paid on the spot, which makes it impossible to use 
a bank transfer. These contextual traits are in stark contradiction to the EU funding 
regulations, which assume ab initio certain conditions that characterise modernity in 
the EU vision. 
 
The register of profitability is also related to aspects that do not have much in 
common with EU funding, but with the general commercial regulations of 
Romania. For example, it is far more profitable to obtain EU funding through a 
firm, than through a natural person. In both cases entrepreneurs have good chances 
of success, but there are other economic rationales behind this type of decision. For 
a natural person, it is easier to keep the accountancy for the EU project. However, a 
natural person cannot claim back the VAT: 
 
“It would have been better to be a firm to claim back the VAT. You see, for their 
share [the financial contribution to the project through EU funding] I was exempted 
from paying the VAT because of the EU contribution. For my share…I could not 
claim back the VAT. As a natural person you do not pay VAT in general. However, I 
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bought everything with VAT and paid all the works with VAT, but could not claim it 
back. Altogether it was about 700 million lei [approximately €17.000]. If only I 
knew from the beginning…I would have set up a firm in no time…” 
(R entrepreneur) 
 
The organisational setting of the firm is preferable from a financial point of view, 
but not from a practical point of view because it is typically accompanied by higher 
levels of control. 
 
8.6.3. Bank loans 
In order to prove the capacity to co-fund, the applicant needs to show a letter from 
the bank stating the amount of funds available. If needed, one can also obtain a 
bank loan to reach the required percentage. However, banks are more reluctant to 
fund start-up firms than the Agency and require far more documentation than the 
EU. 
 
“Most of the projects funded by the EU would never be endorsed by a bank. They 
are just not profitable enough or they might be profitable if you do not take in 
account repaying the loan and covering the bank fees. You need to be a serious 
investor, with a good entrepreneurial history or have a lot of valuable assets for a 
bank to give you comfort letters.” 
(A, bank employee) 
 
Entrepreneurs find such practices oppressive (De Meza and Southey 1996) and thus 
tend to rely on informal sources of capital or mortgage their properties. This is a 
risky strategy because the construction rarely works according to the plan and the 
rules of funding change very often (requiring new documentation or more time to 
assess compliance with the new regulations). Unsure of how the market would 
react, they choose to start small, avoid borrowing and rely on their own savings and 
personal assets (Aldrich 2005). 
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A loan complicates the budget, as various fees and bank commissions need to be 
taken into account and incorporated in the documents submitted to the Agency. This 
is one of the instances where expert knowledge is required: 
 
“About your financial contribution to the project…you either have the money or 
you make a loan; but when you make a loan it is more difficult to make the 
economic plan because you need to return the loan, take into account the bank fees 
for God knows how many years […] or, if you return the loan before the deadline, 
you need to pay something else [...]. You need to calculate some indices […] and 
these were more specialised. It was a bit too complicated for me also because it was 
a big project and you could not play with numbers. That’s why I used a consultancy 
firm – they do these things on regular basis.” 
(D, entrepreneur) 
 
The logic behind asking for these specific documents is not entirely an 
epistemological nonsense. Most entrepreneurs were familiar with such procedures, 
which would have had to be fulfilled at some point during the process of 
construction, even without accessing EU funding. However, the amount of details 
requested through the application file was considered exaggerated due to the 
unstable conditions on the market. “How should I put it? It was a bit too much – I 
mean the prices will change anyway by the time you start building. Besides, some of 
the suppliers might not even be on the market at the time” (R, entrepreneur). This 
aspect shows a fundamental difference in patterns of thinking between 
entrepreneurial and bureaucratic logic. The former is more fluid, adaptive and 
context-dependent in accordance with the fluctuating conditions of the market 
(maybe even more realistic from an economic point of view). The latter is more 
strict, based on assumptions of stability and continuity and thus, not necessarily 
suitable for this type of assessment. 
 
8.6.4. Regulations 
One last aspect that impacts negatively on the process of accessing EU funding is 
the fluidity of the regulatory framework. One year before joining the EU (2006) and 
a few years afterwards (2007–2009), all the regulations had been adjusted to reflect 
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the change from pre-accession to structural funding. New ministerial edicts and 
various drafts of the ‘Beneficiary’s Guide’ were passed on regular basis. The 
difficulty was not only the fact that the new information was simply hard to absorb 
due to its quantity, but also that the new regulations were more complicated and 
subjected to various interpretations. Thus respecting the letter of the law was more 
problematic for both beneficiaries and bureaucrats. The irregularities found by the 
authorities in some projects had less to do with mens rea and more to do with an 
honest lack of understanding sustained by the confusion created by the multitude of 
official interpretations. In one case DD, the mayor of a medium size commune, who 
has held this position for over two mandates (eight years) was investigated by DNA 
in 2010 and convicted to 12 years imprisonment by a local court. However, this has 
not deterred him and in 2011 he obtained 4.5 million euro in EU funding for works 
related to the development of the commune. The case in which DD was investigated 
had to do with leasing a terrain to one of the town council members, who later tried 
to access EU funding. In reality the terrain was common property of the residents 
who used it for graze. The councillor was convicted for giving false declarations to 
the EU Agency and the mayor was convicted for releasing false documentation. 
However, DD defended himself by saying that he had released such documents at 
the express recommendation of the Agency’s representatives and following the 
example of other mayors from neighbouring villages. Furthermore, the money 
received by the councillor from the Agency had immediately been transferred to the 
town hall account and used for the public’s benefit. 
 
8.7. Expensive money 
 
 
A close analysis of EU funding processes reveals that in the end the ‘free money’ is 
transformed into ‘expensive money’ due to the gaps between EU assumptions and 
local contexts. Most private entrepreneurs considered the process unprofitable 
arguing that the price of doing the project is divorced from the value of the product 
for small investments: 
 
“It’s not worth doing a project with EU funding if you have a small company or a 
small project. Let’s say, instead of a €200,000 project you have a €50,000 project 
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[…]. You have to do a lot of running around for the same papers. Expensive papers. 
For every approval you had to pay taxes and then, once you finished the 
construction you had to get the final authorisations and pay other taxes. So, for a 
small project, it’s not worth it because you have to get papers and papers…In the 
end, almost all the money you got from the EU office would be spent on taxes.” 
(D, entrepreneur) 
 
The length of the project, the amount of energy, attention or time as input variables 
are negatively correlated to the output. Consequently, to keep the business 
profitable, EU funded projects have to be a collateral activity: 
 
“This [the EU project] was never our main activity. It would have been impossible. 
Our business was very different. If this would have been our main activity, we 
would have all starved to death by now. This project only swallowed money for two 
and a half years. Seven hundred thousand euros [...]. If you are a natural person or 
have a small company with no activity – I mean you set up a company just to do the 
EU project – then, you either have another job or you have enough money to afford 
spending over the next two years.” 
(D, entrepreneur) 
 
The overinflated regulatory framework of EU funding is decoded by the above 
entrepreneurs in money, prices and profitability. In this context Schumpeter’s 
definition of entrepreneurship (1939) needs to be amended, because EU funding 
represents a particular form of economic activity. In the official (i.e. bureaucratic) 
understanding, this is a form of assistance offered by the state, based on a specific 
order of meaning that gives precedence to the beneficiary over the entrepreneur. A 
beneficiary is subject to the EU regulations and bound to reflect the changes in the 
patterns of governance. In this sense, this process is an exercise in disciplinary 
technologies conducted with the help of trained specialists who provide the 
requested output and make it work in predictable ways. The entire EU funding 
process is based on the fundamental idea that things can be strictly calculated, and 
in this way, the economic process and its results are predictable. Such vision leaves 
little room for Schumpeter’s romantic understanding of commercial adventures, in 
which entrepreneurs visualised their endeavours in a flash of inspiration. It also 
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makes the process far less profitable than expected, which explains the Romanian 
low absorption rates. 
 
8.8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that EU funding is an example of an intrusive European 
culture in the economic area in Romania, which has led to emerging syncretic 
cultures of entrepreneurship. In these newly created spaces, economic action that is 
embedded in a multiplex of social, economic, political and personal relations has to 
be presented as de-contextualised in order to fulfil the EU regulations. The 
“legitimate orders of power” (Weber 1968) that deny the opportunity-rich social 
environment also de-emphasise the informality of economic arrangements that turn 
local economies into moral economies. EU funding is essentially a process of 
learning to comply with European regulations. Actors learn to be beneficiaries, 
while always retaining their entrepreneurial ego. They perform “specific 
architectures of institutional compromise” (Jobert 1996:318) when in registers of 
eligibility and profitability (as shown in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
 
Through its regulations, EU funding reinforces the heavy players in the local arenas 
and thus fails to achieve its objectives (regarding the support offered to economic 
debutants). Furthermore, it is assimilated and integrated into the local panoply of 
business opportunities and benefits from the transfer of practices that ‘contaminate’ 
the purity (or Puritanism) of the European regulations. In practice, actors transgress 
the invisible boundaries between legal and illegal by making use of alternative 
concepts in their daily work routines. However, at the documentary level, such 
distinctions are preserved with great care in order to provide bureaucrats with great 
stories of success. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
In the conclusion of his PhD thesis, Stan Cohen remarked that “research of an 
exploratory nature cannot, in a sense, reach any conclusion” (1969:600). With his 
words in mind, in this final chapter I aim to summarise the arguments and reflect on 
the implications of this study. The first section revisits the aims of the thesis, the 
second section discusses the theoretical and policy implications and the last section 
looks at the limitations of this research while suggesting possible avenues of future 
endeavours. 
 
9.1 Revisiting the aims 
 
This thesis aimed to study the process of accessing EU funding in Romania. The 
results were based on 16 moths of ethnographic fieldwork that made use of various 
methods of data collection: secondary data analysis, media review, interviews and 
participant observation. As detailed in Chapter 2, the bulk of the data was gathered 
through participatory means within the framework of my own consultancy firm set 
up for the purposes of this research. This unusual research route was fraught with 
difficulties, raised numerous ethical dilemmas and confronted me with 
unanticipated risks, as discussed in the methodology chapter. Despite the fact that I 
was not always on ‘moral high ground’ (Birch and Miller 2003:92), as the ideal 
type promoted by the textbooks, I tried and firmly believe that I maintained a 
reasonable balance between academic recommendations and field imperatives. 
While I do not claim full immersion in the consultancy culture, my ethnographic 
endeavours provided the opportunity to experience directly the process of accessing 
EU funding, thus allowing me to speak more confidently about it. 
 
My research showed that the process of EU funding puts in relationship three 
generic actors as detailed in Figure 9.1: applicants/beneficiaries (people who want 
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and/or access the funding), consultants (people who assist the applicant in accessing 
the funding) and bureaucrats. 
 
 
Figure 9.1: The process of accessing EU funding in Romania: A stylised representation. 
 
During the project cycle, the interaction between these three generic actors spans 
three registers of behaviour: register of eligibility, register of profitability and 
register of compliance. The project begins with the preparation of the funding 
application. Due to the fact that EU funding is based on highly formalised idioms, 
applicants make use of consultants to construct eligibility. Consultants assist the 
applicants to prepare the necessary documentation by decoding the EU 
requirements. Once the funding application is approved the project enters the 
implementation stage, and the ‘applicant’ becomes the ‘beneficiary’. At this point, 
consultants usually exit the project, leaving the beneficiaries to interact directly with 
the bureaucrats. During implementation stage, beneficiaries and bureaucrats interact 
in the register of compliance, which is based on regular controls conducted by the 
bureaucrats in order to check work progress and authorise payments. Once the 
implementation is finalised, the project enters the ex-post monitoring phase in 
which bureaucrats can still conduct verifications, but the control is less intense than 
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in the previous stages. Regardless of the phase of the project, people who access EU 
funding are always in the register of profitability, as for them EU funding is first 
and foremost a business. 
 
So, how do the EU anti-corruption policies, practices and assumptions 
frame/shape the process of accessing EU funding in Romania? 
 
European anxieties about the possibility of defrauding EU citizens’ money have 
shaped the EU funding institutional establishment through systematic associations 
between corruption and EU funding fraud. The institutional transposition envisaged 
by the first aim of the thesis is discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. I have argued 
that the creation of anti-corruption and anti-fraud establishments was based on 
transfer of ‘good practices’ that involved a ‘one size fits all’ approach, which put in 
place impersonal institutions that failed to take into account the elements of time, 
space, biography and context. In order to underlie the symbolic commitment to 
tackle corruption and protect the financial interests of the EU, the newly designed 
organisations of policing and prosecution have become ‘elite squads’. Their 
superior status is sustained by high level of financial and symbolic capital: higher 
wages (between 40% and 75%) than other prosecutors/police officers, a particular 
profile of employees (very young, highly educated, preferably abroad, knowledge 
of foreign languages), access to international trainings and unmediated contact with 
EU officials. 
 
In order to counteract possible misuse of EU funds, the process was over-regulated 
as detailed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. At the micro level, these massive 
transformations impacted visibly on the process of accessing EU funding especially 
in shaping the registers of compliance and eligibility. The register of compliance is 
based on an overwhelming number of verifications, controls, inspections and 
monitoring. Chapter 7 shows that this type of surveillance has unanticipated 
consequences for the practices and discourses related to accessing EU funding 
(which corresponds with the second aim of the thesis). First, the systematic 
associations between corruption and EU funding have transformed this economic 
process into a semantic of governance. The discursive power of EU funding refers 
to practices that frame political action through development and anti-corruption, 
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with the effect of enhancing the user’s symbolic capital. Second, the overinflated 
regulatory framework on the one hand deters people from defrauding the EU budget 
as reflected in the statistical trends in conviction rates. On the other hand, it also 
discourages people from accessing EU funds altogether, thus reducing Romania’s 
absorption rates. Highly successful local entrepreneurs simply refuse to apply for 
EU funding arguing that the EU regulatory system is not adapted to the fluidity of 
the Romanian economic context. Third, the EU funding institutional framework 
creates its own informality through the proliferation of rules and controls that often 
expand or create the very conditions for carrying out simultaneously licit and illicit 
activities. 
 
The register of eligibility is in fact a collection of rules that aim to prevent 
corruption and fraud to EU budget. Chapters 5 and 6 have argued that this is a 
performative process in which the quality of the fit with the EU criteria is 
constructed with the help of consultants who decode and translate EU funding 
regulations. Potential applicants are taken aback by highly elaborate technical 
idioms employed by the rules that grant access to EU funding, and so they turn to 
consultants to understand how to become beneficiaries. Consultants exploit the 
technical, symbolic and economic space of EU funding as a terrain on which to 
construct market relations. In doing so, they essentially commodify EU funding by 
treating eligibility criteria as production factors. Consultants become market-makers 
by appropriating and ‘marketising’ a communication gap between bureaucrats and 
applicants. 
 
The regulatory framework of this economic process is based on a neoliberal 
conception of disembedded money, markets and management. In the process of 
accessing EU funding applicants and consultants ‘correct’ this view by making use 
of social relations that emphasise the importance of social protection and obligation. 
The success of a project depends not only on the ability to write a good funding 
application, but also on the ability to conduct negotiations and establish 
partnerships. Such skills, acquired through business interactions, become risk 
reduction strategies that counteract the highly uncertain, volatile markets through 
social embeddedness. ‘Papers are made to be credible’ one consultant remarked 
(M) and criminal law is used as business law in an attempt to obtain and preserve 
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EU funding. Actors live in multiple spaces (legal, economic, social) and act at the 
intersection of several markets, guiding their actions according to the principle of 
profitability. In their daily work routines involved in the process of EU funding, 
they employ a wide range of practices that make the theoretical distinction between 
legal and illegal superfluous. The interactions between applicants and bureaucrats 
are shaped by culturally embedded profit making routines. Gift giving, favour 
exchange, bribing, nepotism are part and parcel of an ‘archaeology’ of 
entrepreneurial work practices that might break criminal laws, but are based on 
generally accepted social values. 
 
The findings described above actually point to the fact that political and social 
orders are disjointed. This aspect becomes visible in discussing the third and last 
major aim of this thesis, which focused on the efficacy and efficiency of EU 
funding in Romania. The literature regarding EU funding generally asserts the 
positive impact of this European tool on local economies (Larsen, Munk and 
Thomas 1994). However, this research uncovered a few paradoxes relating to EU 
funding in Romania, which represent some challenges to the above mentioned view. 
- Firstly, the Romanian bureaucratic apparatus is fully functional and highly 
praised by the EU officials (Chapter 7). A high number of irregularities have 
been regularly reported to OLAF, the number of cases investigated for 
crimes in relationship to EU funding has increased and so has the number of 
convictions. However, Romania’s absorption rate is still very low (33% in 
December 2013)96, barely matching the national contribution to the EU 
budget. Under the circumstances, the low absorption rate coupled with large 
investments in the crime control apparatus make EU funding efficiency 
questionable. One might argue that the efforts will pay off in the long run, 
but such an assertion would also need to be proven. 
- Secondly, EU funding reinforces the heavy players and excludes the 
medium and small entrepreneurs, thus increasing (instead of decreasing) the 
economic differences. The strict regulations, the documentation price and 
the requirement to co-fund restrict the access to funding (Chapter 3 and 5). 
For example, in the agriculture sector less than 1% of the farms with over 
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100 hectares have received 50% of the EU subventions, while small farms 
(between 1 and 5 hectares) have received less than 25% (Ghinea 2009). In a 
sense, there are two agricultures in Romania (one small that produces of 
own consumption and one large, that produces on a massive scale) and EU 
funding programmes seem to support the large one. 
- Thirdly, EU funding has undoubtedly created a number of jobs through the 
individual projects. But an unintended consequence of the regulatory 
framework is the creation of a market and a profession. Consultancy 
appeared and developed out of the necessity to translate the bureaucratic 
requirements for entrepreneurs (Chapter 6). The number of regulations and 
technical idioms used for communication deter people from accessing funds, 
while making the epistemic status of EU funding the kingdom of 
consultants. 
After summarising the main findings, in the next section I discuss the literature and 
policy contributions of this thesis. 
 
9.2 Literature and policy implications 
9.2.1 Contribution to the literature 
 
This thesis contributes to the academic debates on EU funding (Larsen, Munk and 
Thomas 1994, Milio 2010, Torsello 2012), by offering grass roots knowledge about 
the process of accessing EU funding in Romania based on ethnographic material 
analysed from a distinctively sociological perspective. It explains EU funding using 
a mid-level instrument of analysis that sees markets, hierarchies and networks as 
mapping devices that explain the coordination of contemporary social, economic 
and political life (Powell 1990, Thompson et al. 1991). Despite the fact that the 
economic sociology literature typically presents them as alternative ways to achieve 
coordination, I argue that in my assessment, EU funding is a hybrid space that 
allows for a plurality of coordinative mechanisms rather than their mutual 
exclusivity. The thesis associates the three modes of coordination with the three 
registers of behaviour and the three actors, as shown in Figure 9.1. Each of them 
brings a distinctive contribution to the literature: the register of eligibility draws on 
sociology of markets scholarship that shows that consultants are market-makers 
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who commodify EU funding; the register of compliance is decoded through the 
literature on hierarchies and the role of regulatory framework for economic life; the 
register of profitability draws on literature about embeddedness of economic life 
through social networks. 
 
The thesis contributes to the economic sociology debates on markets and new 
industries (Stinchcombe 1965, Aldrich and Fiol 1994, Fligstein 2001) by showing 
that the EU funding regulatory framework promotes new entrepreneurial work 
routines based on flexible specialisation, technological competence and 
professionalisation through up-skilling (Sabel and Zeitlin 1997). These variables 
effectively change the work process while creating a wide gap between vernacular 
practices and the EU funding expectations. Consultants act as merchants of EU 
funding, assuming a role that could not have been fulfilled by diffuse networks 
through a market-making process. The new market for EU funding consultancy is 
an example of market creation as a result of excessive bureaucratisation. 
 
In discussing the role of hierarchies, the thesis argues that EU funding is not a 
‘normal’ economic process because it is highly regulated by transnational and 
national edicts, laws and orders. The classical debates about the role of law in 
regulating economic life (Weber [1922] 1968) are taken forward through the 
scholarly debates regarding the new technologies of governing promoted in 
relationship to development (de Sardan 2005, Escobar 1995, Scott 1998), 
Europeanisation and international aid (Sachs 2005, Easterley 2006). Building on 
these arguments, the thesis shows that in governing EU funding flows for Romania, 
the theme of development through foreign funding has metamorphosed into the 
theme of crime through corruption narratives (Chapter 4 and Chapter 7). Thus the 
dynamics of corruption rhetoric and anti-corruption practices are part of a wider 
political economic context the relevance of which is critical for understanding of 
EU funding. 
 
Indirectly, the thesis contributes to the debates about transparency and anti-
corruption (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996) drawing on recent scholarship (Rothstein 
2010, Ledeneva 2013) that criticises the conventional paradigm of corruption. I 
show that the inevitable association between corruption and EU funding led to a 
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transfer of anxieties and practices of control from corruption to the protection of the 
financial interests of the EU. Investigation and prosecutions are conducted by newly 
set up elite squads monitored directly from Brussels. This raises an interesting point 
about the concept of ‘transnational’ that is presently applied to crime. Some argue 
that due to globalisation, crime has become transnational (Van Duyne 2011), while 
others (Hobbs 1998) consider that inevitably crime happens in a particular place, so 
it is local in its nature. In the case of EU funding in Romania, the focus turns from 
crime to control: the nature of the crime becomes unimportant, as the control is by 
default transnational (as shown in Chapters 4 and 7). In this sense, this thesis should 
be read as a story of transnational enforcement and local subversions. 
 
The research adds to the economic sociology debates about the embeddedness of 
economic process in the social (Polanyi 1954, Granovetter 1973, Hart 2000, Thrift 
2001, Zelizer 2004). Markets and hierarchies are decoded and enacted through a 
dense web of political, religious and social interactions and affiliations. This gives 
rise to a relational economy which entails indefinite exchanges and transactions that 
encompass far more than bureaucratic norms and market prices. Networks are 
particularly adapted to counteracting contextual uncertainty by ensuring that 
communication about prices, norms or know-how is maintained through its 
informal mechanisms that spring from a particular cultural and social background at 
strategic moments. 
 
The concept of entrepreneurship runs like a thread throughout the entire thesis and 
establishes the link between economic sociology and sociology deviance (Hobbs 
1988, 2013; Rugierro 1996, 2012, 2013). In discussing entrepreneurship, 
Schumpeter (1939) argued that the key characteristic of entrepreneurs is their 
innovative capacity as this allows them to change the existing social order. In his 
strain theory, Merton (1938) showed that deviance is the result of a disjuncture 
between cultural goals and institutionalised means of achieving it. Innovation, in the 
economic initiative as well as in deviance, starts with accepting the cultural goals 
irrespective of the drastic or illegitimate means that it might require, as shown by 
research on the informal economy (Hart 1982, Sassen 1997), occupational deviance 
(Ditton 1977, Henry 1978, Klockars 1976) and white collar crime (Sutherland 1983, 
Cressey 1953, Levi 1981). Building on these links, the thesis contributes to the 
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sociological debates by analysing the blurred boundaries between legal, informal 
and illegal economic activities in the area of EU funding. It argues that legality is a 
fluid concept and that in everyday activities people make use of alternative 
conceptions of legitimacy. In the process of accessing EU funding, the State is 
important only to some degree because entrepreneurs know that “economics is a 
dance of the il/legal: a pas à deux” (Nordstrom 2007:206). 
 
9.2.2 Policy implications and looking at the future 
In the near future, the institutional establishment of EU funding is unlikely to 
shrink. Quite the contrary: control will probably increase and sanctions will become 
more severe. This prediction is based on the observation that the anti-fraud project 
tends to become more elaborate due to its association with corruption. For example, 
in September 2011 the European Commission set up a group of experts on 
corruption (2011/C 286/03) to advise the Commission on anti-corruption policies, 
and to evaluate and advance the present anti-corruption instruments at the EU level. 
The first Anti-Corruption report released on the 3rd of February 201497 analyses 
corruption in the 27 EU member states and signals major threats to EU funding, by 
showing for example that “weaknesses in the prevention and repression of 
corruption in public procurement adversely affect the management of national and 
EU funds” (EC 2014:21). This “can lead to interruption and/or suspension of 
payments until appropriate corrective measures have been taken by the Member 
State, including the strengthening of the management and control systems” (EC 
2014:26). Such an approach signals that EU supervision in the area of EU funding 
is likely to increase and policing/prosecuting EU funding might become even more 
powerful and more professionalised. 
 
These changes will also impact on the Romanian framework of EU funding 
distribution and implicitly on the potential beneficiaries. The integrity standards for 
beneficiaries are likely to be stronger and more explicit, the rules of public 
procurement will probably become more detailed and auditing will proliferate. 
Anechiarico and Jacobs’ observation about the future of anti-corruption in New 
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York can be applied to EU funding in Romania: it is likely to have “a corruption 
control problem as well as a corruption problem” (1996:193). The obvious solution 
to such a bleak future would be to assess the effectiveness of the present control 
tools before setting up new ones. This would generate some empirical analysis that 
might in turn lead to a more nuanced discourse about EU funding fraud and 
corruption. Furthermore, the control apparatus would benefit immensely from 
setting up a dialogue with Romanian business circles. Instead of preparing anti-
fraud policies based on the input of experts that have never accessed EU funding 
nor conducted business in Romania, the government could cooperate more with 
former and present beneficiaries. Such partnership would be a win-win situation, 
empowering local business circles while designing more effective regulations. 
 
8.3 Limitations and further research 
 
One of the limitations of this research that I intend to pursue in my postdoctoral 
work involves conducting ethnographic fieldwork in the EU funding bureaucratic 
apparatus. As detailed in the methodological chapter, guided by ethical concerns, I 
consciously saved this element for a time when I would have exited my other field 
roles. To my knowledge, there is no ethnographic research so far that investigates 
the process of policy making, policing and prosecutorial activity at the level of 
European transnational institutions in relationship to EU funding. 
 
This research offered a detailed account of the institutions and practices of 
accessing EU funding in Romania and its findings are context-specific. In order to 
introduce a comparative dimension to this research, I relied on the few other 
ethnographic accounts (e.g., Torsello 2012) and quantitative studies from other 
European countries (Gounev and Ruggiero 2012, Nowak forthcoming). The latter 
have been used with great reluctance because EU funding works on different 
accession rules in various EU member states and it is highly dependent on the 
economic growth and social stability. Simplistic quantitative assessments which 
define a country as successful on the basis of size of funds accessed are examples of 
‘irresponsible knowledge’. Based on this point, it would also be challenging to 
generalise the results of this research to other contexts (e.g., post-socialist 
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economies) because each country negotiates its own funding rules within the 
European framework of anxieties. For example, it is highly probable that countries 
that negotiate their EU accession at this point, such as Serbia, would face harsher 
criteria. 
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